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               The microfinance movement, pioneered by Dr Muhammad Yunus, who founded the Grameen 
Bank (GB), has earned fame as a model of poverty alleviation affording micro-entrepreneurs with 
credit. The GB model inspired many other countries to replicate it, including the UK and USA where at 
different periods numerous micro-lending initiatives surfaced adopting the model.  
The study considers the environment in which the Grameen model emerged in UK and USA, 
seeking to understand the nature of institutional challenges of adopting the model in these countries. 
For this purpose, it compares various operational aspects of microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
identifying at the backdrop the core features of the GB model and the environmental factors that have 
led to mitigation of institutional challenges in its country of origin.  
The findings indicate that that one or more core enabling elements were missing, either by 
design or imposed upon by the milieus leading to heightened institutional complexities in the UK 
experiences. As a result, for some MFIs, this has caused a change in organizational identity, framing 
and nature of alignment with partners. Such a situation has been worsened by an unfavourable 
environment for adoption of the model including the individualist nature of communities and 
regulatory distortions. Due to all such problems, organizations have generally struggled to secure 
legitimacy.   
In the US, most MFIs confronted similar complexities to the UK case studies in adopting the 
model in their respective contexts, resulting either in discarding of the peer group technique or 
ceasing operations. One organization, Grameen America (GA), stands out distinctive as it has revived 
the effective use of the Grameen model, widely perceived as archaic in the US industrialized contexts. 
Unlike most MFIs, GA has been particularly successful in doing so, as it has upheld the core elements 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
“Today, if you look at financial systems around the globe, more than half the population of 
the world — out of six billion people, more than three billion — do not qualify to take out a 
loan from a bank. This is a shame. What kind of institutions have we built that cannot afford 
to extend their services to the majority of the people” (Yunus, 2005) 
 
The diagnosis of the present-day socioeconomic malaise, as made by Muhammad Yunus of 
Bangladesh, implies the lack of access to loan that has ensued global divide amid poverty and 
social exclusion. It resonates well with what Adam Smith who lamented way back in 1776 
about the ‘great difficulty’ to access ‘a little’ to beat the challenges of poverty (Smith, 2007). 
‘Poverty’ is a complex phenomenon and carries no universal denotation. There have been 
various philosophical approaches to understanding poverty. One such methodology is the 
biological approach which classifies poverty as “total earnings insufficient to obtain the 
minimum necessities for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency as being in primary 
poverty” (Townsend 1974:16). This dates back to work done by Rowntree (1902) and 
Orshansky (1965) based on calculation of average dietary requirements of children and adults 
and conversion of such measures in terms of amounts of various foods or the cash values of 
such foods. The problem with this approach is incorporating the substantial disparities in terms 
of physical attributes of people, weather and working patterns and lifestyles. Sen (1982, 1999) 
also alluded to the difficulties in understanding nutritional requirements across different 
regions. The inequality approach is based on the notion that poverty is closely linked to the gap 
between the rich and the poor. There also appears to be weaknesses in this methodology. A 
significant decrease in prosperity may affect everyone in the society from the rich to the poor. 
However, unsurprisingly, it affects the poor to a much greater extent who start from the lowest 
strata of the society and may even lead to famine and destitution amongst this population. This 
should, under any view, be seen as an escalation of poverty. However, under the inequality 
approach, if regardless of the aforementioned factors, the social distributional framework 
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remains unchanged, then poverty remains the same (Sen, 1982). Under the basic needs 
approach, poverty is defined in terms of whether or not an individual has access to a set of 
needs which are essential for long lasting health and welfare which include food, housing, 
healthcare and education etc. The problem with this approach is that the notion of having access 
to a specific commodity and using that commodity to achieve a basic need may be significantly 
different (Streeten, 1984). Therefore, there may be a significant divergence between 
commodities and capabilities across different regions. For instance, the link between food 
consumption and nutritional achievements may differ significantly across regions depending 
on various factors such as gender and physical attributes (Tseng, 2011). An alternative 
methodology to understanding poverty may be the income method approach where the first 
step is to identify a poverty line income which helps an individual to meet all basic 
requirements in terms of food, clothing, housing and utilities (Pradhan and Ravallion 2000). 
The subsequent step would be to identify the number of people whose income has fallen the 
poverty line income. However, there also remains concerns with this approach. Laderchi et al. 
(2003) contend that such an approach does provide enough information about the distribution 
of income within the households. There may, for examples, be a gender bias in different 
cultures which is not incorporated within this method. There can be additional complexities in 
terms of the connection between income and capabilities. For example, an individual with 
mental and or physical disabilities is likely to find it much more likely to convert income into 
well-being than a person who does not suffer from such problems. Furthermore, the ability to 
convert income into well-being may depend on a range of factors which may include basic 
infrastructure, geography, social roles and political institutions, etc). The income-based 
approach risks emphasising income and ignoring all such factors which may be just a important 
(Sen, 1993; 2006; Tseng, 2011). 
12 
 
As has been pointed out in the above discussions of the limitations of various approaches, 
poverty should not be confined to simple notions of biology, inequality, basic needs or income 
as it may result in a narrow vision of the concept. An enhanced and wider vision of poverty is 
proposed by Sen (1993) though the capability approach. According to this approach, the well-
being of an individual depends on the range of choice available to them and the ease with which 
such options may be exercised. Sen (1993) argued that there are five broad types of freedom 
which reinforces capabilities, the lack of which may lead to an intensification of poverty. These 
include political freedom, economic opportunities such as (availability and access to credit), 
social facilities such as (healthcare, education etc), transparency of relations between 
individuals and between governments and people, protective welfare (including unemployment 
benefits and urgent famine relief) (Suraidi, 2014). 
A series of policies have been developed worldwide by governments and civil society 
organizations to respond to such problems of poverty in areas such as promoting agriculture, 
creating jobs, investing in health and education and countering social exclusion (Lipton and 
Ravalion, 1995). Thus, there has been an ongoing movement to surmount the challenges of 
poverty, often under the banner of microfinance, with a view to beat the curse of poverty and 
leave it behind forever.  The movement has been geared to access small credit to overcome 
poverty, with provisions of financial services to low-income clients. It has received ever-
increasing global prominence for its role in poverty alleviation. The United Nations (UN) 
designated 2005 as ‘International Year of Microcredit’. The Nobel Committee awarded the 
2006 Nobel Peace Prize to Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank (GB), declaring that 
microcredit is “an ever more important instrument in the fight against poverty” 
(Nobelprize.org, 2006).  In the 1970s, Yunus invoked a novel experiment of offering small 
loans to local villagers in Chittagong (Bangladesh). This was recognised as a pioneering effort 
to eradicate worldwide poverty and social exclusion. Very few people at the time could imagine 
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the enormous implications it would have for microfinance movement.  Since then as the 
experiment gained ground in Bangladesh and successfully expanded its operations, academic 
interest in the Grameen model progressively grew both within and beyond the country, making 
the model a creative focus of literary perspectives in the intellectual world. 
 
The Grameen model is commonly used in developing countries to combat poverty. However, 
it has also been used at various periods in the context of developed countries such as UK and 
the USA. The central research focus of this study is thus understanding the institutional 
challenges of adopting this model from the perspective of developing nations juxtaposed with 
that of developed countries.  The subject has engrossed my interest as research could potentially 
unveil the complexities of adopting a model in a radically different context to what it is known 
to be used for. As the work has progressed, it became apparent that the subject was inadequately 
explored. The multiplicity of logics involved in the operations of Grameen-based organizations 
also means that the conceptual themes are interdisciplinary in nature drawing from a range of 
theories from subjects as diverse as management, economics, development studies and 
sociology. This enhanced the appeal of the research topic. The subject is also of topical interest, 
as there have been recent initiatives across the Atlantic, in the UK and USA, which are bent on 
adopting the model to suit their respective contexts.  
Indeed, major mainstream organizations in both the countries have been involved in the process 
of adoption of microcredit in terms of providing substantial amounts of funding and support. 
For example, in the UK, Grameen in the UK (GU) has been supported by pertinent 
organizations such as Tesco Bank, Royal Bank of Scotland, Glasgow Caledonian University 
and Gloag Foundation; similarly, in the US Grameen America (GA) has received backing from 
organizations such as Citi Bank, Wells Fargo, Capital One and Wholeplanet Foundation. 
Despite the level of attention and importance attached to the adoption of the Grameen model 
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in both countries, research has been limited and disjointed particularly with regards to the 
challenges in adopting the model in the context of developed countries. This made it 
worthwhile to deeply scrutinize the subject and fill the gap in current literature. Thus, the 
objective of the current research has been to assimilate the experiences of several prominent 
case studies in the UK and the US and seek to understand the nature of institutional challenges 
in adopting the Grameen model in the context of these countries.  
Theoretical Framework 
The study utilizes Institutional theory for understanding the experiences of the case study 
organizations from two major conceptual elements: Institutional Complexity and 
Institutional entrepreneurship (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006; Tracey et al, 2011). 
Organizations experience institutional complexity “whenever they confront incompatible 
prescriptions from multiple institutional logics” (Greenwood et al, 2011: 375). Institutional 
entrepreneurs have been defined as ‘‘agents who initiate and actively participate in the 
implementation of, changes that diverge from existing institutions, independent of whether the 
initial intent was to change the institutional environment, and whether the changes were 
successfully implemented’’ (Battilana et al., 2009: 72). Such concepts are deemed relevant to 
the study as the microfinance institutions (MFIs) implementing the Grameen model have been 
active in the field of community finance in the context of industrialized economies and tackled 
the dual logics of community development and sustainability which may seem rather 
challenging to reconcile and hence confronted institutional complexities. The MFIs adopting 
the Grameen model were forerunners in the organizational field of communal finance and 
leading the community finance movement in their corresponding countries. The role of GB as 
an “Institutional Entrepreneur” is pervasive in literature which highlights its role as a social 
innovator and its practice of using a peer group lending model and providing financial access 
to the unbanked poor in Bangladesh. This lending methodology was unprecedented in 
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Bangladesh and the GB activities revolutionized the microfinance industry, paving the way for 
other organizations to provide microfinance services using the same model. The case study 
MFIs may be classified as institutional entrepreneurs as they adopted the GB model, which 
was predominantly being used in developing countries and rarely used in the context of 
developed countries. During the course of the research, it was evident that almost all case 
studies struggled to adopt the model in the UK and the US context which eventually led to their 
demise.  The sole exception to this trend was Grameen America (GA) which continued to 
expand significantly. In this theoretical backdrop, the main research question revolves around 
deducing the nature of institutional challenges of adopting the Grameen model in the UK and 
the USA and why GA has been able to overcome such challenges. 
 
Research Methodology 
The study has employed a qualitative case study approach. A case study is an empirical inquiry 
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 
2003). The case study method is used when a real-life phenomenon in depth needs to be 
understood but such understanding encompasses important contextual conditions, because they 
were highly pertinent to the phenomenon of study (Yin & Davis, 2007). The study adopts a 
critical realist paradigm and offers an interpretive theoretical perspective. There are several 
versions of the critical realist paradigm but this study subscribes to the view held by Bhaskar 
(1978, 1998). Critical realists contend for the usage of causal language in tandem with thinking. 
Critical realism advocates in-depth research with the goal of understanding why things are the 
way they are (Easton, 2010). It has been used in a number of notable studies in different 
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disciplines such as economics (Lawson, 1997), sociology (Sayer, 2000; Layder, 1990) and 
management (Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2000; Reed, 2005; Tsoukas, 1989). 
Primary data has been collected by conducting semi-structured interviews with the institutional 
entrepreneurs who endeavoured to adopt the model and key decision makers within case studies 
chosen for their knowledge of the strategic management processes, group dynamics, and 
interaction. 20 interviews were conducted with 17 interviewees, out of which 14 were 
microfinance executives and board members (current and former) of the US and the UK 
projects. The remaining 3 interviewees were microfinance experts from Grameen Trust (GT- 
the arm of Grameen responsible for replication of the model worldwide). Interviewees from 
Grameen Trust were chosen because of their deep knowledge and expertise on the global 
replication of the Grameen model. 
There was a total of ten organisation to which the interviewees belonged. Out of these ten 



















Table 1.1 Brief details of case study organizations1 
                                                             
1 A brief summary of the case studies in provided in Appendix (A.8-A.17) 
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Name of organisation Country of 
operation 
Periods in which Grameen 
model/variant of group lending 
model was used 
Periods of 
operation 
Street-UK UK 1998-2004 1998- present 
Street-Cred UK 1999-2005 
 
1999-2009 
Account 3 UK 1999-2004 1999-present 
East End Microcredit 
Consortium (EEMC)/ 
Fair finance 




Full Circle Fund (Weetu) UK 1998- 2013 1987-2013 
Grameen in the UK  
 
UK 2014-2018 2014-2018 
WEvolution UK 2011-present 2011-present 
Grameen America USA 2008-present 2008-present 





Contributions to literature 
The study seeks to address an ostensible dearth of microfinance studies from a management 
perspective, particularly in the context of developed countries providing meticulous impetus 
for organizational scholarship. The corollaries include informing 
academics/practitioners/donors and governments by uncovering the processes through which 
institutions are created and transformed by exemplary entrepreneurs in the community finance 
industry; incorporating the dynamic nature of institutional complexity arising from a 
multiplicity of logic and the extent of incompatibility between those logics (Greenwood et al., 
2011). The analysis explores link in the nature of the institutional complexities to the socio-
cultural contexts in which the case study microfinance institutions (MFIs) are operating. It 
reinterprets the operational challenges and the multiplicity of logics faced by the case study 
MFIs in terms of institutional complexity in order to understand how these logics are balanced 
and factors influencing this. In deducing management relevant factors and strategies crucial to 
encountering institutional complexity, this research, hopefully, will provide an insight to the 
managers for navigating their organizations through turbulent market environments, in addition 
to achieving their socioeconomic mission and sustainability goals. The case studies are also 
seen in the light of literature on institutional entrepreneurship using a core model proposed by 





Thematic Breaks              
The study consists of 8 Chapters, apart from the introductory and the concluding Chapters.  
A plausible conceptual framework is proposed in Chapter 2 in order to accomplish research 
objectives. It assesses how different theoretical perceptions have been utilized to understand 
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the application of the model in different countries. Concepts considered as pertinent are then 
located with a view to evaluate the progress of the case study organizations. Finally, it sets out 
the ways in which the current research is different to previous efforts and how it adds value to 
the enhancement of knowledge in the field.  
Chapter 3 scrutinizes the prevailing literature to provide an insight into socioeconomic and 
political context in which Grameen surfaced and developed in Bangladesh, USA and UK 
respectively and their ramifications. It outlines the origins of the Grameen model and examines 
its pioneering characteristics and socioeconomic consequences in Bangladesh; it also identifies 
the features which have led to its momentous global acknowledgment and caused its adaption 
in numerous countries. It segregates the events surrounding the emergence and development 
of the model into distinct periods for a better appraisal and for getting an integrated vision of 
the socioeconomic philosophy and contexts driving its trajectory in the UK and USA.   
Chapter 4 provides an in-depth explanation of the research methodology used in the current 
study. It elucidates the interpretive paradigm which has inspired the choice of research 
technique. The core theoretical concepts which form the basis of the study are identified next. 
Following, this the research strategies and methodological tools relevant to the study are set 
out along with arguments for selection of such approaches. The Chapter then delineates the 
research stages and provides a comprehensive explanation of each stage. Finally, the 
limitations of the research methodology along with procedures are suggested for alleviation of 
such problems.  
Chapter 5 analyses the operational experiences of seven case study organizations 
(retrospective as well as recent) which have endeavoured to adopt the Grameen model in the 
UK. It aims to deduce the nature of institutional complexities of adopting the Grameen model 
are aimed at applying the framework to understand various aspects of operations of the case 
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study organizations, such as loan recovery techniques, marketing approaches, regulatory 
framework and client training method. The Chapter assesses temporal and contextual changes 
in crucial factors such as strategy and socio-economic environment. 
Chapter 6 explores the institutional entrepreneurship process of adopting the Grameen model 
in the UK, using the same case studies as is done in the previous Chapter. The Chapter 
illustrates how the context has influenced the actions of these institutional entrepreneurs as they 
set about “disrupting” the current institutional environment by incorporating a novel and 
innovative methodology conventionally used in radically different socioeconomic contexts. 
Chapter 7 brings into analysis, two ongoing US organizations Grameen America (GA) and 
Project Enterprise (PE), which adapted the Grameen model in their differing milieus.  It sheds 
light on such complexities permeating across different areas of operation in US contexts. Thus, 
it considers whether the US institutional entrepreneurs are at variance or in harmony with the 
ideological values of the original model as they sought to pursue the dual logics of 
sustainability and development whilst adopting the Grameen model in their operational 
spheres. Links and/or similarities with previous operational experiences are identified so as to 
evaluate their resemblances and contradictions.  
Chapter 8 examines factors influencing the institutional entrepreneurship process of adopting 
the model for the two recent case study organizations in the US (Grameen America – GA and 
Project Enterprise- PE). It identifies the nature of the dynamics of entrepreneurship and social 
capital formation underpinning the major clientele base of two case study organizations. It 
considers the evolving characteristics of the US community finance field with a particular  
focus on the features of the case study organizations and how they applied diagnostic framing. 
Alliances with external actors and their role in encountering institutional complexities are 
subsequently scrutinized. Finally, how the combination of the above factors has been 
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incorporated within the organizational template and strategic vision of both US institutional 
entrepreneurs is assessed.  
Chapter 9 brings together the analysis in previous chapters and compares the current programs 
in the UK and USA to decipher the nature of differences in context and their implications for 
the institutional complexity and institutional entrepreneurship process in these countries. It 
further seeks to grasp whether there are any cross-cultural lessons to be learnt from the 
experiences of the case study organizations in these two countries.  
The concluding Chapter 10 assembles findings in all the Chapters by synthesizing a coherent 
argument about the nature of the differences in markets in Bangladesh, UK and the USA. It, 


















CHAPTER 2 ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
This Chapter attempts to underscore the pattern of analytical perspectives offered over the past 
decades once GB model of microfinance had drawn public interest and became fully 
operational as a success story in Bangladesh itself. The literary interest grew as the GB model 
has undergone various stages of experimentation elsewhere in various parts of the world and 
has also been widely replicated across the globe under the changing banners; varying 
nomenclatures have also been in use to project the adoption of the microfinance model 
innovated by Yunus. Concurrently an attempt has also been underway worldwide to render a 
more ordered conceptual orientation to the ongoing global endeavours to make the model 
operational across the continents. 
 
Keeping in perspective all that came about in the wake of successful operation and replication 
of the GB model, the current chapter of the study provides an alternative conceptual approach 
for analytical purposes. Section 2.1 identifies two major strands within the existing literature 
to specify the relevant concepts for analysing the case study organizations to identify the key 
research questions and proposes a theoretical model to answer the questions. The next section 
2.2 details the concepts that make up the model and their significance in literature. The final 
section 2.3 locates the gap in the prevailing and indicates the ways in which the study responds 






2.1 Institutional logics: Institutional complexity and 
Institutional entrepreneurship 
Institutional logics are overarching sets of principles that prescribe “how to interpret 
organizational reality, what constitutes appropriate behaviour, and how to succeed” (Thornton, 
2004: 70; Friedland & Alford, 1991). Such logics guide the behaviour of actors within a field 
and render their actions “comprehensible and predictable” (Lounsbury 2002: 255; Tracey et al, 
2011). They enable actors to deal with ambiguity by placing emphasis on certain issues, 
identifying which of these are significant and require managerial awareness and designing of 
potential solutions (Thornton, 2002).   The boundaries of organizational fields are demarcated 
and maintained by one or more shared institutional logics (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006; 
Tracey et al, 2011). Organizations experience institutional complexity “whenever they 
confront incompatible prescriptions from multiple institutional logics” (Greenwood et al, 2011: 
375). Generally, multiple logics are confronted by organizations some of which may be 
compatible while others may be incompatible.  (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Kraatz & Block, 
2008; Selznick, 1949). This causes great difficulties for the organizations exposed to them To 
the extent that the, the extent of which is determined by the incompatibility of different logics.  
Institutional entrepreneurs “mobilize resources to transform or create institutions that favor 
[their] interests” (Pacheco et al., 2010: 975; DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997; Rao, Morrill, & 
Zald, 2000; Maguire et al., 2004; Khavul et al, 2013). Institutional entrepreneurs not only create 
new institutional environments but also transform existing institutional environments (Phillips 
et al., 2004). They initiate change in motion (Greenwood et al., 2002). They may be individuals, 
organizations, or groups of organizations (Khavul et al, 2013). The case study organizations 
adopting the Grameen model have been operating in the community finance sphere in their 
respective countries and confronted the dual logics of community development and 
sustainability which may seem somewhat difficult to reconcile and hence confronted 
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institutional complexities. In accordance with the definition of institutional entrepreneurship, 
these were organizations which mobilized resources to create new institutions to serve their 
interest which was to address the problem of financial exclusion. They played a significant role 
in transforming an institutional environment where the less privileged were not considered as 
creditworthy.   Hence, institutional theory is a useful lens for analysing the case study 
organizations to analyse the interplay of such logics and the organizational response to the 
challenges in balancing them. 
 
Several influential studies have emphasized the importance of building multi-level theories in 
organizational research (House et al. 1995, Klein et al. 2000, Tracey et al., 2011). Institutional 
theory has been predominantly concerned with the macro processes related to 
institutionalization. Nevertheless, many authors have stressed on the importance of 
understanding the micro dynamics of institutional activity. Some of the earlier work 
highlighting this point was by Meyer and Rowan (1977), Zucker (1991) and DiMaggio and 
Powell (1991). However, there has been a renewed emphasis on such processes in recent 
studies indicating their significance (Barley and Tolbert, 1997, Powell and Colyvas, 2008, 
Tracey et al., 2011). Powell and Colyvas (2008), for example, contend that there is much to be 
gained from examining micro-processes. This micro-level analysis, according to the authors, 
leads to a richer and a more contextualised understanding of the manner in which 
“organizational participants maintain or transform the institutional forces that guide daily 
practice” (Powell and Colyvas, 2008: 2) The current research incorporates this factor by 
examining the micro-processes that have influenced the institutional activities. This has been 
achieved by an in-depth analysis of the institutional complexities, the first dimension of the 
theoretical framework. Furthermore, the theoretical framework integrates the macro-level 
25 
 
analysis of components underpinning the process of institutional entrepreneurship, the second 
dimension of the theoretical framework.  
 
In the backdrop of foregoing analyses, the paper offers some comparative perspectives in order 
to seek answers to the following central research question:  
‘What is the nature of the institutional challenges of implementing the Grameen in the UK and 
the USA?’  
As pointed out above, the paper analyses nine case study institutions and the institutional 
entrepreneurs, which have introduced such projects (the brief details of which are provided in 
Table 1.1.- Chapter 1).  
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The central research question that the study addresses is ‘What is the nature of the institutional 
challenges of implementing the Grameen model in the UK and the USA?’ 
As can be seen from Figure 2.1 above, the model for the theoretical framework in this study 
aims to understand the institutional complexities faced by institutional entrepreneurs (the case 
study organizations) in adopting the Grameen model in the context of developed countries. 
Battilana et al. (2009: 72) defines institutional entrepreneurs as ‘‘agents who initiate and 
actively participate in the implementation of, changes that diverge from existing institutions, 
independent of whether the initial intent was to change the institutional environment, and 
whether the changes were successfully implemented’’. The framework is thus inspired by the  
model proposed by Battilana (2009) to show the process of institutional entrepreneurship. The 
degree of success that institutional entrepreneurs are able to implement divergent change not 
only depends on how they create their vision of change but also enabling field level and 
contextual factors for implementation of the change. The framework thus uses some key 
conceptual factors (relevant to understanding the data) associated with the notion of these 
factors highlighted in yellow. According to the model, the institutional entrepreneurs also need 
to be able to deal effectively with institutional complexities in order to implement divergent 
change successfully. The concept of institutional complexity is linked to how multiple logics 
are balanced by institutional entrepreneurs in achieving core operational objectives highlighted 
in red. The central goal of the case study organizations revolves around the efficient provision 
of microfinance services. Greenwood et al., (2011) contend that research into institutional 
complexity must be unambiguous about the sources of incompatibility.  Thus, in order to 
identify such sources of complexities and to understand how the case study organizations deal 
with the demands of multiple logics, it is imperative to analyse and link the concept of 
institutional complexity discussed above to the core operational objectives of the institutional 
entrepreneurs. The sources of such institutional complexities are thus highlighted in red. The 
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sequencing of the chapters will begin with an examination of the institutional complexities as 
this is helpful in understanding how the process of institutional entrepreneurship has responded 
and adopted to such complexities (which will be explored in the following Chapters). The 
analytical framework proposed in Figure 2.1 is unique because it combines the concepts of 
Institutional complexity and Institutional entrepreneurship in a systematic manner to analyse 
the process of adoption of the Grameen model in the UK and the USA. This is unprecedented 
as this issue has not been approached from the perspective of institutional logics prior to this 
study. Thus, it makes an original theoretical contribution to the field of microfinance by 
utilizing this analytical framework to study the experiences of the chosen case studies. In 
addition, it also provides an interesting option for researchers who are interested in conducting 
similar studies into the progress of Grameen in the future in the UK and the USA of Grameen 
or the adoption of the model in other countries. The proposed framework can also be useful for 
analysing the adoption of other microfinance models other than that of Grameen. Given the 


































 Analyse the relationship between the core operational objectives of case study projects 
and the institutional complexities that they experience. 
 Explain the nature of differences in operational and strategic issues between institutions 
adopting the model in the UK and the USA. 
 Explain whether the differences in operations of case studies in the UK and USA reflect 
the variation of their regional socio-economic contexts. 
 Deduce the kind of variations which exist in the operations and the activities of case 
study institutions in terms of both intra-country and cross-country comparison vis-à-vis 
their immediate goals, program area of focus and strategic actions.  
 Investigate whether such variations are arbitrary, or do they indicate some set of 
fundamental dynamics. Consider to what extent do existing theories account for an 
underlying pattern of variation, should there be any. 
 Explore the strengths and limitations of the various strategies adopted by management 
of the case study institutions in UK, USA and Bangladesh. 
 Clarify the relevant policy implications emanating from the extant study. 
 
 
2.1.1 Institutional complexity 
The current section addresses the broad microfinance literature on operational issues and the 
confronting functional challenges. The analysis is divided into some major areas of strategic 
themes which are of research interest to the current study. In each area, the key theories and 
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the underpinning debates encompassing these areas are identified, which are then used to guide 
the study to answer to the aforementioned research questions with respect to the selected case 
study institutions. 
The central goal of the case study organizations revolves around the efficient provision of 
microfinance services. Greenwood et al., (2011) contend that research into institutional 
complexity must be unambiguous about the sources of incompatibility.  Thus, in order to 
identify such sources of complexities and to understand how the case study organizations deal 
with the demands of multiple logics, it is imperative to analyse and link the concept of 
institutional complexity discussed above to the core operational objectives of the institutional 
entrepreneurs. As has been pointed out above, microfinance institutions in the UK are termed 
as “Community development Financial Institutions”. The term “community development” 
alludes to the community logic these organizations have to reach out and provide their services 
to the financially excluded in a fair and responsible way. This is in turn is expected by all 
relevant stakeholders to lead to strong regeneration impact within the area they are serving in. 
On the other hand, the term “Financial Institutions” reflects the market logic of providing such 
services in a sustainable manner. The concepts perceived to contribute to such institutional 
complexities in MFI institutions in the extant literature are now discussed below with respect 
to the core functions identified: 
 
The tensions created by the aforementioned dual logics in an MFI is reflected in the concept of 
“Microfinance Schism” in literature which highlights two opposing strands of thought on the 
significance of sustainability for the efficiency of MFIs from the point of view of MFI 
researchers and practitioner (Woller et al., 1999, Morduch, 2000). The Institutionists 
emphasize the importance of a financial systems approach whereby revenue from the program 
should be able to cover at least the operating costs and financing cost with the revenues 
30 
 
generated from the program (Murdoch, 2000; Woller et al, 1999; Brau and Woller, 2004). This 
paradigm originates from a study by Gonzalez-Vega (1994) that concludes that institutional 
sustainability is key to effectively provide financial services to the poor and financial self-
sufficiency is essential for achieving institutional sustainability (Brau and Woller, 2004). This 
view is reinforced by Hollis and Sweetman (1998) who compared six microcredit organizations 
of 19th-century Europe to identify the institutional designs required for success and 
sustainability. The authors found that organizations reliant on donor funding were more fragile 
and lost focus more rapidly in comparison to those organization getting funds from commercial 
sources.  
 
The other group, the Welfarists, postulate that financial self-sufficiency is not necessary for 
attaining sustainability (Morduch, 2000, Woller et al., 1999). They stress on the depth of 
outreach and their primary concern is to enhance welfare of MFI clients. As such, Welfarists 
are more reluctant than the Institutionist in compromising these goals in favour of achieving 
other goals such as financial self-sufficiency (Hollis and Sweetman, 1998; Woller et al., 1999; 
Morduch, 2000; Robinson, 2001; Hermes, 2007; Sheremenko, 2011).  The MFI donors are 
viewed as social investors by the welfarists. According to the Welfarist approach, these 
investors are willing to accept zero financial returns in favour of higher intrinsic/social returns 
(Sheremenko, 2011). The debates about the Institutionist approach and the Welfarist approach 
has become increasingly relevant as donor finance has begun to dry up.  
 
One of the key factors closely associated with sustainability is loan recovery. Yunus clearly 
places significant emphasis on high recovery rates for replication of the Grameen model. As 
he states, “In replicating Grameen, one must remember from the beginning that, if recovery 
rate is not near 100%, no matter how good it looks, it is not Grameen. All the strength of 
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Grameen comes from its near perfect recovery performance” (Yunus, 1998: 126). The GB 
approach operates on two central innovations: Peer Group Lending and Weekly meeting. These 
features (listed below) enable GB to overcome adverse selection and moral hazard experienced 
in the mainstream banking sector. 
 
Peer Group Lending is a centrepiece of the GB model, which involves division of a large 
group of villagers into 5-member groups. It has significant advantages in terms of lower cost 
of monitoring and screening loans and debt repayments enforcement. To systematically 
establish, Grameen firstly Grameen I, a system where in which two members of a group firstly 
obtain their loan (Rogaly et al, 1999). Once all instalments are paid on time as per the original 
agreement, the initial disbursements are then followed 4 to 6 weeks later by loans to two other 
members within the group and subsequently an additional 4 to 6 weeks later, by a loan 
disbursed to the chairperson of the group. This system is known as the 2:2:1 staggering (Aghion 
and Morduch, 2005), and served as an incentive to enhance loan repayment.   
 
Weekly Meetings is the second core feature of the GB model. These meetings entail a great 
degree of discipline and formality (Rogaly et al, 1999). These are held in the presence of the 
all members of a ‘centre’— usually comprising of 6 to 8 groups consisting of five borrowers 
(Jain, 1996). The objectives and process of the meetings are entwined. Borrowers repay 
instalments at such meetings and discussions and engagement amongst borrowers are 
encouraged and fostered which leads to substantial learning within and across groups. The 
meetings are considered to be of pivotal importance in ensuring high recovery rates, improving 
transparency and function as a mechanism for effective monitoring of clients. Grameen II has 
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retained this system of weekly meetings from Grameen I thus showing the emphasis GB places 
on the building of social capital2 (Vulkan et al., 2013).  
The banking sector traditionally suffers from problems of asymmetric information that leads 
to moral hazard3 and adverse selection4 concerns.  The banks, being the provider of loans, act 
as a principal and the borrower (micro-entrepreneur/potential client of micro-lenders) as an 
agent in loan transactions (Lean and Tucker, 2001). Under a market characterized by “perfect” 
conditions, such transactions do not incur any costs to either parties as market failure is 
avoided. Nevertheless, in reality, market conditions are imperfect. From the lender’s viewpoint, 
when it has imperfect information regarding the underlying attributes of the project and the 
organization skills of the borrower, it may lead to the issues of adverse selection (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981). The borrower may also fail to perform effectively, consequently leading to 
problems of moral hazard. This, in turn, may accelerate cost for banks as they struggle to 
efficiently screen borrowers’ ventures, eventually leading to a situation where it is too costly 
for banks to efficiently monitor borrower projects which, in turn, may lead to a gap in the 
provision of debts (Bester, 1987; Bester and Hellwig, 1989; Binks and Ennew, 1996; Lean and 
Tucker, 2001). 
The information asymmetry dilemma thus may result in good lending prospects being denied 
by providers; it may also cause lenders to provide loans to poor prospects (Altman, 1968). The 
first problem is regarded as a Type II Error whereas the second is viewed as a Type I Error in 
                                                             
2 a term which refers to the social networks, informal structures and norms that facilitate individual and 
collective action (Halpern, 2005) 
 
3 the tendency of a person who is imperfectly monitored to engage in dishonest or otherwise undesirable 
behaviour (Mankiw, 2008a). This is applied here in the context of the lender not being able to fully monitor the 
borrower. 
4 The tendency for the mix of unobserved attributes to become undesirable from the standpoint of an uninformed 
party (Mankiw, 2008b). This is applied here in the context of the lender not being able to distinguish between 




Altman’s risk categories (may be seen as correspondingly relevant in the instance of potential 
borrowers of MFIs, as is illustrated in Figure 2.2) 
Figure 2.2- Altman’s risk classifications 
 
 
However, the GB’s group-lending methodology characterized by self-selecting groups has 
aided it to deal with such problems in Bangladesh. Potential borrowers can utilize local 
knowledge to select best partners who are typically close neighbours. The group responsibility 
enshrined in the peer group lending technique thus allows safer borrowers to be grouped 
together while riskier borrowers have no alternatives but to form their own groups. This process 
is known as “Assortative matching” (Aghion et al, 2005). Problems of moral hazard may be 
addressed by the feature of self-selection of groups as monitoring of borrower activities is made 
easier for the groups following the take up of loans. Physical collateral is therefore substituted 
by social collateral, as non-repayment of loans results not in the appropriation of physical assets 
by the lender, but rather in the social penalization of the defaulter by others working in the 
group and the wider community. (Goldberg et al, 2003). The schematic model in Figure 2.3 





Figure 2.3 The Grameen model and mitigation of problems of asymmetric information  
 
 
A number of factors have been identified in literature as influencing loan recovery. Some 
studies such as Besley and Coate (1995), Wydick (2001) have specially focused on the 
importance of social ties in their respective studies. This was further confirmed by Al-Azaam 
(2012) who found that peer monitoring, group pressure and social ties as major factors which 
have influenced recovery rates. Fernando et al. (2020) investigated data from a Mexican MFI 
and found that social ties as a major factor driving repayment rates up. Along similar lines , 
Stiglitz (1990) and Varian (1990), Banerjee et al. (1994),  Aghion (1999) and Chowdury (2005) 
have discussed theoretical models which highlight the joint liability feature of group lending 
models which enables them to encounter moral hazard problems. Ghatak (1999; 2000) and 
Gangopadhyay et al. (2005), discussed how such features help to overcome adverse selection 
problems. Other important factors which have been identified in literature are the frequency of 
payments Field and Pande (2008), flexibility of repayment, Shankar (2007) and the extent of 
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maturity and cohesion in groups (Hauge, 2010) and lending design (Kodongo and Kendi, 
2013). 
A closely associated factor to recovery rates in microfinance strategy is selection of clients. As 
discussed above, Grameen’s model clearly dictates that clients must self-select each other to 
form groups Furthermore, the emphasis on women is highlighted by the fact that currently 
nearly 97% of Grameen Bangladesh clients are women (Grameen.com, 2020). The importance 
of gender has been highlighted in several studies. Brana (2013) studied a portfolio of 3640 MFI 
clients in France and concluded that gender is a key factor in comparison with other factors 
with respect to the amount of credit provided. This is supported by D’Espallier et al (2013) 
found that a focus on women is interlinked with peer group lending, global orientation, smaller 
size of loans, and legal status of MFIs. A number of studies focus on the issue of gender 
targeting with respect to the default rates experienced by MFIs taking into account institutional 
conditions (Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Brau and Woller, 2004; Engler, 2009; D’Espallier et al., 
2011; Chakravarty & Pylipiv, 2013; Boehe and Cruz, 2013). The study will explore the 
selection strategies of the case study institutions, the reasons behind adopting such strategies 
and also the implications of different strategies for the sustainability of the projects.  
Along with sustainability and loan recovery, outreach is the most pertinent operational 
objectives pointed out in MFI literature. It is centred on getting an appropriate number of clients 
who genuinely lack access to entrepreneurial finance. It can incorporate a number of factors 
including the degree of lending in deprived communities, extent of lending to women and group 
lending activities and average loan size (Mersland and Ström, 2009). There is strong demand 
for microcredit in most developing economies (Sheremenko, 2011). In Bangladesh, this is 
highlighted by the mushrooming number of MFIS alongside the prominent microfinance 
institutions such as Grameen, BRAC and ASA. This trend of high demand is also common in 
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the rest of the subcontinent, Russia, Central and South America and increasingly Africa. 
However, the extent of demand for such services in developed countries is unknown and the 
belief that there is a potentially substantial market led to the emergence of the projects in the 
UK and the US. However, the presence of good institutions in such countries may be a 
hindrance to the outreach efforts according to a study by Churchill (2019). Hence, it is 
important to understand the factors which influence this demand. This study will consider 
analysis of the foregoing factors attaching pertinence to the views of the management of these 
organizations.   
A major dimension of outreach objectives is training. Karnani (2007) asserts that majority of 
the global poor lack expertise, inventiveness and hence an understanding of how to grow their 
business. He further argues that borrowers would be in an inferior position after taking loans 
as the aforementioned factors will cause the return on the investment from loans to be less than 
the amount which needs to be paid back to the MFI by the borrower. In an effort to build up 
the skills and expertise repertoire of the borrowers, many of the MFI projects in the UK and 
USA have offered some form of training and advice as an important part of their services. 
Several studies have attempted to assess the impact of business training on MFI clients in 
various contexts. Karlan and Validivia (2011), for example, showed using the example of a 
Peruvian group lending program that training had no discernible effect on key factors such as 
business, revenue, profits or employment. Interestingly, the study found that the training did 
have positive impacts on business knowledge improvement and client retention rates. Drexler 
et al. (2014) found that simplifying training may increase effectiveness for less sophisticated 
individuals. However, overall, very few studies have found business training programs to have 
significant impact on sales or profitability (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2014). Business training 
is thus a contentious issue in microfinance as academics and practitioners argue about its 
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viability in different contexts. This research will analyse the client training aspect of the case 
study projects and resulting implications for institutional complexity. 
An important factor in achieving outreach objectives is the regulatory environment surrounding 
the MFI project. Hubka and Zaidi (2005) argue that regulation can be used to attain important 
objectives such as the elimination of unfair competition from public institutions and enhancing 
the business environment. There tends to be less regulation in developing countries compared 
to industrialized nations. Some authors even feel that the regulatory framework for monitoring 
MFI activities is inadequate in such countries (Campion, 2002). A comparative study of the 
regulatory framework for Asian MFIs recommended implementation of prudential regulatory 
environment for MFIs similar to the banking sector which it pointed out was much needed 
particularly for NGO-MFIs which showed inadequate internal controls, ownership and 
governance structures (Haq et al., 2008). Several authors reason that high regulation imposes 
costs and prevents growth of microenterprises in industrialized countries compared to 
developing nations (Meehan, 2004; Bredberg and Ek, 2011). This research will analyse the 
regulatory dimensions of the case study projects and resulting implications for institutional 
complexity. 
 
2.2.2 Institutional entrepreneurship  
Organizational fields are “structured systems of social positions within which struggles take 
place over resources, stakes, and access” (Maguire et al. 2004: 658; Bourdieu, 1990). The 
concept of institutional entrepreneurship highlights such tussles and the ways in which relevant 
actors shape and influence their institutional contexts (Beckert, 1999; DiMaggio, 1991; 




Battilana et al. (2009: 72) defines institutional entrepreneurs as ‘‘agents who initiate and 
actively participate in the implementation of, changes that diverge from existing institutions, 
independent of whether the initial intent was to change the institutional environment, and 
whether the changes were successfully implemented’’.  The case study projects adopting the 
Grameen model were in the organizational field of social finance and at the forefront of the 
CDFI movement in their respective countries. As such, they adhered to logics borrowed from 
both the social and financial sector and confronted institutional complexities as a result of it. 
The role of GB as an “Institutional Entrepreneur” is well documented as its practice of using a 
peer group lending model and providing financial access to the unbanked poor in Bangladesh. 
This practice was unprecedented in Bangladesh and the GB activities transformed the 
microfinance industry, paving the way for other organizations to provide microfinance services 
using the same model. The other case study organizations in the study may also be classified 
as institutional entrepreneurs as they adopted the GB model which was predominantly being 
used in developing countries and rarely used in the context of developed countries. 
 
In this section, the study will use, to an extent, the analytical framework suggested by 
Greenwood et al (2011) to systematically analyse institutional complexities faced by the case 
study organizations identified in the first part of the project and their responses. It will take the 
following factors into account into the analysis of the case study institutions: 
Tracey et al. (2011) highlighted the significance of the concept of legitimacy supported by an 
alignment of interest with external actors in analysing strategic response of institutional 
entrepreneurs. Suchman (1995: 574) defines this concept as “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper and appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions”.  Organizations adhere 
to certain logics to obtain approval and legitimacy from pertinent external actors in their 
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institutional environments which in turn guide their course of action and strategies (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Khavul et al, 2013). Maguire et al. (2004) argued 
along similar lines when they view that one of the key aspects of success for institutional 
entrepreneurs is the manner in which they link their innovative projects to behaviour and 
interests of other relevant actors in a field designing the projects to fit in with the field 
circumstances.  
Some authors stress on the conscious advancement of such strategies for legitimizing 
institutions (Zilber 2002; Maguire and Hardy 2006, Tracey et al, 2011). Power and influence 
are one of the other key factors to this process. The selection and prioritization of certain logics 
will be achieved by those with greater authority and influence.  Greenwood et al. (2011) 
suggested a number of approaches to analyse the link between power and institutional 
complexity. The first approach emphasizes the role of ownership. Lounsbury (2001), for 
instance, showed how variation arises in the staffing of recycling programs at colleges and 
universities. A relevant finding was that publicly funded universities aligned their strategies 
with requirements of the government on which it relied heavily for finances. In general, a 
number of studies reflect upon an organizations response to institutional complexity being 
influenced and shaped by the need to align interest with relevant external actors (Dobbin et al., 
1993; Edelman, 1992). The second approach focuses on the concept of “specificity” of logics 
(Goodrick and Salancik, 1996). This implies that the degree of discretion that can be exercised 
to balance competing logics by organizations is closely linked to the specificity of logics 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). For instance, Quinn et al., (2009) found that academic 
institutions had limited scope in choosing how to comply with established rules and criteria. 
This suggests that strategic behaviour by organizations is inhibited by high specificity of logics. 
On the contrary, organizations may have more leeway in dealing with institutional complexity 
when logics are vague and lack specificity. This significantly enhances the organizations ability 
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to reframe problems, develop innovative solutions and amalgamate structures and practices in 
response to the institutional complexity (Greenwood et al, 2011). In the context of MFI 
research, Helmig and Pinz (2014) report that there have been very few studies addressing the 
importance of partnerships and networks, pointing out the study by Caudill et al. (2009) as an 
exception. This study will address this gap looking into the significance of such alliances.  
An important construct of institutional analysis is the field level structure, as is viewed by 
Wooten and Hoffman (2008).  Fligstein (1997) reasoned that the use of certain expertise and 
strategies by an institutional entrepreneur is linked to the formative stage of the organizational 
field.  The nature of the institutional complexity encountered by organizations is thus primarily 
given shape by the evolving processes within an organizational field (Scott, 2008). Comparison 
and contrasting of “emergent” and “matured” fields received prominence in current literature 
(Anand & Peterson, 2000; Garud et al., 2002; Greenwood et al., 2002; Child, Lu, & Tsai, 2007; 
DiMaggio, 1991; Lawrence, 1999; Lounsbury, 2002; Lawrence et al., 2002; Maguire et al., 
2004; Phillips et al., 2000; Purdy & Gray, 2009; Wooten & Hoffman, 2008; Greenwood et al, 
2011).  Emergent fields are often exemplified by unpredictability of conflicting logics, as 
relevant actors tend to favour certain logic suitable to their material interests or normative 
beliefs which results in the fluctuating significance of particular logic (Greenwood et al, 2011). 
Such fields are likely to be characterized by “narrowly diffused” and only “weakly entrenched” 
institutional practices (Lawrence et al., 2002; Maguire et al, 2004). On the other hand, matured 
fields tend to develop stable priorities between different logic (Hoffman, 1999), in a constant 
struggle for supremacy (Abbott, 1988; Dunn & Jones, 2010; Reay & Hinings, 2009; van Gestel 
& Hillebrand, 2011; Greenwood et al, 2011). Institutional practices in such fields are 
extensively diffused and widely accepted (Lawrence et al., 2002; Maguire et al, 2004: 659).  
The foregoing argument originates from an assumption that tensions between competing logics 
have been resolved at the field level. This, in turn, leads to a solitary central logic prevailing 
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over others thus increasing the predictability of institutional complexity at the organizational 
level (De´jean et al., 2004; Garud et al., 2002; Lawrence & Phillips, 2004). A change in the 
social context may enable institutional entrepreneurs to effectively activate a new logic or 
reprioritize existing ones (Lok, 2010; Greenwood et al, 2011). New situations to which the 
organizations must react to are created as the institutional complexity unravels. Thus, the type 
and degree of institutional complexity depends upon the field level structure within which they 
are positioned. The field level structure thus leads to all-embracing principles being 
programmed in dominant institutional logics which are enshrined in formal procedures and 
actions of an institution (Dacin, Munir & Tracey, 2010).  
 
There has been recent research input on identity as an important factor in organizational 
response to institutional complexity (Glynn, 2008; Dobbin & Kelly, 2007; Kalev et al., 2006; 
Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998; Gioia & 
Thomas, 1996; Lok, 2010; Meyer & Hollerer, 2010; Creed, DeJordy, & Lok, 2010; Kodeih, 
2010; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Rao et al., 2003). Identity may be conceptualized as a set of 
claims to “institutionally standardized social categories” (Greenwood et al. 2011: 346, Glynn, 
2008; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pratt & Kraatz, 2009; Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, in press; 
Whetten & Mackey, 2002: 397). It is about membership in a distinct identity at the 
organizational field level (Glynn, 2008; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pratt & Kraatz, 2009; Mackey, 
2002: 397). For instance, the term “Accounting firm” or “Bank” results from a category which 
is socially set and comprising of certain field level processes (Kennedy, 2008). Organizations 
may want to project themselves in certain ways to appear to fulfil such a criterion. This plays 
an important role in aligning themselves with national institutions and in the process gaining 
increased legitimacy.  
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The link between interests, agency, and institutions is a focal point of institutional 
entrepreneurship. DiMaggio (1988: 14) stated ““New institutions arise when organized actors 
with sufficient resources (institutional entrepreneurs) see in them an opportunity to realize 
interests that they value highly”. Institutional entrepreneurs guide processes in order to discover 
opportunities, frame concerns and problems, develop counterfactual thinking and reacting 
swiftly to any change in the institutional environment. They are at the forefront of institutional 
change and lead efforts to inculcate novel and innovative processes into social structures (Rao 
et al, 2000; Tracey et al. 2011). Rao’s (1998) study of the formation of a consumer watchdog 
organization revealed how successful framing strategies may lead to ascendant frames which 
appeal to a wide-ranging audience including governments, professions and other organizations. 
The study also showed how losing frames either exit, migrate or convert to the ascendant frame. 
Comparable trends could be noticed in the US chemical industry when formation of self-
regulatory institutions was aligned with the notion of enhanced efficiency and environmental 
protection (King & Lenox, 2000; Lenox, 2006). Such framing strategies cleverly associate 
legitimacy for new forms and practices by carefully amalgamating new designs and 
philosophies with narratives which are generally accepted (Pacheco et al., 2010).  
2.3 Conclusion 
Several studies have revealed the importance of the helpful socioeconomic impacts (in terms 
of factors such as gender empowerment and poverty reduction) that programmes adopting the 
Grameen model have had in Bangladesh (Khandaker, 1998; Zaman, 2004; Naved, 1996; 
Hashemi et al, 1996; Newaz, 2000). The experiment has been adapted across five continents 
(Aghion et al, 2005).  The Grameen model, usually applicable to developing countries, is 
increasingly being used in developed countries like the US and UK, despite their differing 
socioeconomic contexts. In the U.K and U.S, the microfinance sector has been  termed as 
community development finance to reflect their common purpose to fill gaps in access to 
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finance for businesses who find it difficult to access the fail to access it from mainstream 
financial institutions (McGeehan, 2006).In the US several generic studies found the 
Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) as successful in business growth 
development, job creation , enhancing participants’ incomes, generating self-confidence and 
improving community participation (Anthony, 1997; Balkin, 1989; Clark et al., 1999; 
Edgcomb et al., 1996; Himes & Servon, 1998; Light & Pham, 1998; Servon, 1999; Kolodinsky, 
2006).  
 
Copisarow (2000) promoted the necessity for application of microcredit technology in the U.K 
as she pointed out that numerous households lack access to financial products and services in 
areas suffering from high deprivation. Research suggested that self-employed individuals 
appeared to face great difficulties in obtaining finance from banks (Whyley et al, 2001). In 
response to such projected needs, microcredit schemes based on Grameen model emerged in 
the late 1990s. The initiatives included the Street-UK, which operated in Birmingham, the Full 
Circle fund, in Norwich and the East End Microcredit Consortium (EEMC) project in East 
London. In 1998, Women’s Enterprise Employment and Training Unit (WEETU) started 
running the Full Circle Fund, modelled on the Grameen peer lending programme in response 
to the growing marginalization of women in the economy of Norwich and surrounding areas. 
The EEMC was set up as an experiment to enable greater understanding of the effectiveness of 
the Grameen model in the context of UK.  In terms of objective it sought to identify the need 
for accessible finance for women who wished to develop their income-generating ideas into 
reality. It was initiated by an institutional entrepreneur, Faisel Rehman, a former intern at the 
GB. He wanted to use his experiences with the organization to address the issue of financial 
exclusion in the UK. It was based on a ‘hub and spoke’ model wherein the EEMC was the hub 
offering lending and administering loans, whereas the role of the spokes was taken up by three 
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local community organizations Streetcred, Homeless family unit and Account3 involved in 
direct and support, outreach work and operating the peer group model (Ramsden, 2008). The 
following year Street-UK was founded, inspired by the success of a Polish scheme known as 
Fundusz Mikro. It sought to adopt the Grameen Style group-lending in order to provide access 
to finance for low-income, self-employed people and very small businesses, not viewed 
creditworthy by banks.  
 
All of the foregoing UK initiatives have faced significant challenges since their inception and 
have responded in different ways. Some of them have ceased operations while others continue 
to thrive after undergoing major transformations. EEMC for example, metamorphosed into a 
new organization known as Fairfinance (Ramsden, 2008; Account3 website, 2015). However, 
despite all such challenges being faced by the preceding microfinance organizations Grameen 
in the UK was launched in Scotland early in 2014 in the UK. The scheme enjoyed micro-
lending support from Grameen Bank and Tesco; was also backed by funding from the Scottish 
government and local entrepreneurs. Grameen Scotland operated in Glasgow, North Ayrshire, 
West Dunbartonshire and Inverclyde. However, despite the initial enthusiasm, the organisation 
closed down in 2019.  
There is an element of similarity in the story of microfinance in the US. Most initiatives 
adopting the GB model have faced numerous challenges due to inefficiencies and high default 
rates (Richardson, 2009). Majority of American micro lenders have adjusted to this reality by 
ceasing to offer group lending programs (Freemark, 2005). Research on failures of the 
attempted initiatives to copy the Grameen model in the UK and US has been scanty. One such 
a study conducted by Taub (2005) was on a project know as Good Faith fund initiated in Pine 
Bluff, Arkansas in 1988, an attempted cloning of the Grameen model. He noted that transfer 
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of Grameen model to the project failed due to substantially high default rates, causing the 
project to shift to individual lending.  
However, Grameen America (GA), as founded by Yunus himself in 2008, has been 
exceptional. Since its inception, GA has become one of the prolific lenders in the US 
(Leiberman et al, 2012). It has steadily expanded each year, growing from 500 borrowers at 
the end of 2008 to 124000 by December, 2019. It has created 131000 jobs and managed to 
achieve a repayment rate of around 99%. It has also expanded rapidly, operating currently in 
fifteen US cities (GA Website a, 2019). The steady progress of GA has not gone unnoticed in 
the prominent mainstream media with several outlets reporting on its expansion, exceptional 
repayment rates and prospects for growth in the USA (Economist, 2011; Chau and Dayan, 
2014; MSNBC, 2014). A report by Dewan (2013), for instance noted, how microfinance had 
boomed in the post-2008 period, leading to an increase in more than triple the number of 
borrowers. Indeed, GA had developed rapidly into a microfinance leader since its inception. 
Several reports have also reflected on the individual accounts of positive experiences of the 
GA’s clients (Dewan, 2013; Blanchard, 2014; O'Brien, 2014; Fremson, 2014). 
There appears to be avoid in current literature in respect to the applicability of the Grameen 
model in different contexts with respect to the experiences in the origin country. Only few 
papers have used comparative studies to reflect on the challenges encountered in achieving 
target objectives for initiatives adopting models originating in developing countries (Taub, 
1998; Schreiner et al, 2001, Schreiner and Woller, 2003; Giusti and Estevez, 2011). Examples 
of such studies by Bernstein (2014) and Saeed (2014) are generic and have no focus on a 
particular context or use specific case studies, thus lacking in detail.  
Several studies indicate the need for future research in this area (Khavul, 2010; Khavul et al. 
2013; Bernstein, 2014). Khavul (2010) asserts that there has been limited research on MFIs 
from a management perspective in order to investigate operational issues. She goes on to point 
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out examples of several research themes and questions that can be explored by management 
researchers. First is the diffusion and institutionalization of practices and second is 
sustainability and survival. The first element involves investigating the institutions and forces 
driving the adoption of new lending practices and the abandonment of old lending practices. 
The second element is concerned with analysing how microfinance organizations assess threats 
to sustainability and factors influencing their survival over time (Khavul 2010:67:68). Sonfield 
(2012) also points out the limited prior scholarly research with this focus and suggests an 
agenda for needed future research. He asserts the need for more factual information to be 
developed through scholarly work pointing out that, “Very few scholarly or other analyses of 
American microfinance programs have been conducted and reported” (Sonfield, 2012: 7). 
This work seeks to fill in that gap by analysing the challenges faced by case study organizations 
in implementing the Grameen model in achieving their objectives in Bangladesh, the U.S. and 
UK and the organizational response to such challenges. The analysis of such initiatives is 
relevant given the renewed focus on Grameen’s efforts in both the UK and USA. The thrust is 
to synthesize a consistent and coherent argument about the nature of the differences in markets 
in Bangladesh, the U.K. and the US. Utilizing several case studies, it analyses various aspects 
of their operational features and performance criteria in respect to the original goals. It 
identifies the contexts in which this model can be successful in achieving its objectives. 
Keeping all this in perspective it offers comparative nature of the institutional complexities 
faced by the parent program in Bangladesh (where the model originated and remains 
functional) as against those of more recent efforts in the US and UK, which this study addresses 
itself to examine. It identifies how institutional entrepreneurs adopting the Grameen model in 
the developed countries, balanced different and sometimes conflicting logics over the periods 
of their operation.   
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CHAPTER 3 GRAMEEN MODEL: 
EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION 
Introduction 
The current chapter analyses the socio-economic and political context in which Grameen 
emerged and evolved in Bangladesh, USA and UK respectively and their implications. This is 
deemed necessary to obtain a holistic view of events and circumstances leading to the 
emergence and surrounding the development of case studies before going into more detailed 
analysis in the following chapters. Section 3.1 traces the origins of the Grameen model, 
analysing its socioeconomic impacts in Bangladesh, which have enabled it to earn significant 
international recognition leading to its replication in many other countries. Section 3.2 seeks to 
analyse the economic and ideological paradigm along with the socio-economic circumstances 
which influenced the rise of Grameen in the USA.  It divides the events surrounding the birth 
and evolution of the US case studies into three periods; the mid-80s to late 90s during which 
the organizations adopting the Grameen model emerged and evolved; the late 90s to mid-2000s 
during which microfinance underwent significant transformations and finally the contextual 
and policy events which has affected US microfinance post-recession. Section 3.3 examines 
the socio-economic and political context which led to the emergence and evolution of Grameen 
style initiatives in the UK. In doing so, it distinguishes between two key periods: the late 90s- 
2005 during which most of the UK case studies emerged and post-2005 during which such 
microfinance organizations either ceased or underwent major alterations and new initiatives 
rose to prominence.  
Figure 3.1 below provides a summarized timeline of the emergence of the case study 





Figure 3.1 Timeline of emergence of case study organizations in UK, USA and Bangladesh 
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Figure 3 shows that GB emerged in Bangladesh with the Jobra experiment and rose quickly to 
prominence in 1983 as it received formal recognition as a bank. The early success of model did 
not go unnoticed in the US as it resonated well with the Neoliberal ideologies of successive 
governments from the 1980s. The concept of microfinance of self-employment (as an 
alternative to the growing poverty and unemployment and an answer to rising welfare bills) 
was thus considered to be intuitively appealing and led to considerable support from the 
government.  This gave rise to a number of microfinance initiatives some of which sought to 
adopt the Grameen model. The industry was furthered strengthened and formalized by Clinton 
who not only played an important role in the piloting of one of the earliest Grameen style 
initiative (GFF) but also implemented a number of legislations in favour of community finance. 
However, most of the US initiatives adopting the Grameen model changed their model to 
emphasize individual lending and business training or terminate operations in light of their 
experiences in the late 90s.  In the UK, Clinton’s “Third way” also played an influential role in 
inspiring New Labour’s policy as the concept and identity of CDFIs (originally conceived in 
the UK) was imported to the UK in 1999 to address the growing unemployment, social and 
financial exclusion. The New Labour policies also resonated well with EU microfinance 
agenda of assisting vulnerable groups such as women and immigrants. Thus, Grameen style 
projects emerged during the late 1990s in the UK. However, support for community 
development finance in the UK waned as a result of number of factors, the principle amongst 
them being a lack of long-term sustainability (including the Grameen inspired projects) during 
2004/05. Thus, a major source of funding, the Phoenix Fund was devolved to RDAs, which 
were decentralised and hence free to pursue their own agendas. As a result, there was overall 
sharp decline in support for CDFIs during this period (GHK consulting, 2010). This resulted 
in the UK case studies either ceasing operation or changing their models in a quest for survival 
and sustainability. Interestingly, this mirrored the situation of most Grameen style US projects 
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in earlier periods which encountered similar fates (one of the US case studies PE was an 
exception to this trend and continues till date). However, a financial crisis affecting both the 
UK and US in 2008 reversed the fortunes of CDFI industry in both countries as demand for 
their products and services increased as a result. There was ensuing political support from both 
the Obama and Cameron Administration which promoted microenterprise as a key factor for 
economic revival in both countries. The post 2008 period also saw the emergence of GA in the 
US which has a rapidly rising profile in the industry with a steadily increasing clientele base. 
In UK, the most recent initiatives which have emerged are WEvolution (formerly known as 
Passage to India) set up in 2011 and Grameen in the UK (GU) which started operating in early 
2014. The following sections will now explain these events in greater details. 
3.1 Grameen in Bangladesh  
3.1.1 Context of emergence  
The microfinance movement had its origins to the Grameen Bank’s pioneering activities in 
Bangladesh. The contextual impetus driving the rise of the Grameen model was a drought and 
famine affected country which killed 1.5 million people (Macfarlane, 2002).  It all started when 
Yunus came across the 21-year-old Sufia Begum who resided in Jobra village near Chittagong 
University where he taught. Yunus had learnt that Sufia was being exploited by local 
moneylenders who provided her a loan of 25 cents and charging approximately 10% every day 
which was in turn being used by her for making bamboo stools. These stools were sold by her 
for a price which was substantially under their projected market value. This resulted in the 
initiation of an action-research project by Yunus in 1976 in a remote village, now named the 
‘Jobra’ experiment. The experiment revolved around group-based credit delivery with peer 
monitoring to deal with the relief and rehabilitation needs of post-independence Bangladesh. 
Yunus had thus mobilized 42 individuals suffering from similar problems of poverty and 
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exploitation and lent them amount equivalent to $27. Yunus had realized that the model could 
be replicated across the country when all of the borrowers had paid back. Yunus had 
subsequently attempted to convince banks into providing uncollateralised loans to the poorest 
of the society. Yunus efforts failed owing to the reluctance of the banks which raised issues of 
viability of lending smaller amounts. Early cynics had also raised concerns about such 
provisions increasing level of indebtedness amongst the poor (Yunus and Jollis,1998; Zhang 
et al. 2004; CDF, 2006). Yunus responded to such challenges by establishing Grameen Bank 
(GB) which was based on the same principle as his earlier experiment and founded on the 
vision of providing micro-loans without collaterals to micro-entrepreneurs.  The Bank received 
formal recognition in 1983 when the government passed legislation permitting it to accept 
deposits.  
The lending objectives include extension of banking services to poor women and men, 
elimination of abuses by means of money-lending, overturning of vicious circle of "low 
income, low savings, low investment, low income" and rotate the above into an expanding 
system of "low income, credit, investment, more income, more credit, more investment, more 
income" (Sherraden, 2014: 109). The process would embody enhancement of self-employment 
prospects for proper utilisation of manpower to make them more resourceful, induction of the 
disadvantaged populace within some organizational format that they can understand/operate, 
and harnessing the socioeconomic and political strengths through mutual support (Barua, 
2006). 
The GB’s core service is to offer loans. The borrowing GB clients are also its shareholders. GB 
forwarded a cumulative disbursement of US $18,079.49 million in loans, as of November, 
2015. It has 8.79 million members. It operates in 81392 villages, with a coverage of over 97% 
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of villages in Bangladesh. People with less than half an acre of land get access to GB loans; 
97% of its borrowers are women (Grameen-info.org, 2016)  
3.1.2 Socioeconomic Impact 
Several studies have pointed towards the role played by institutions adopting the GB model in 
poverty alleviation in Bangladesh. Household level data was utlized by Khandaker (1989) to 
examine gender implications and the cost-effectiveness of BRAC5, Grameen and the Rural 
Development-12 project and other microcredit programmes in Bangladesh, in comparison to 
other poverty alleviation programs. The study revealed that for whereas household 
consumption increases by 18 takas for every 100 taka of loans forwarded to a woman; the 
figure reduces to 11 takas if the same amount was lent to the opposite sex. The study also 
estimated that moderate poverty reduces by approximately 15 percent, and ultra-poverty by 25 
percent, for members who have been with BRAC up to three years. The results are similar for 
both the Grameen and BRDB6 members.   
Consequent studies by Murdoch (1998, 2004), Zaman (2004), Copestake et al. (2005) and 
Develtre and Huybrechts (2002, 2005), Chowdhury (2007) and Kuhinur and Rokonuzzaman 
(2009) and Momen et al. (2011), have reinforced the findings in terms of positive effects of 
GB style microcredit program on poverty alleviation. 
Furthermore, many studies on the MFIs have reflected on the effect they have on addressing 
issues of female vulnerability through empowerment. Naved (1994) used participatory rural 
appraisal methodology to evaluate the impact of participation in a MFI program in Manikganj, 
Bangladesh, and concluded that access to credit enhanced the status of a woman as result of 
                                                             
5 Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) is one of the world’s largest non-governmental 
developmental organisations based in Bangladesh. 




her perception as the bread winner of the family. These findings were supported by other 
studies such as Hashemi et al. (1996), Newaz (2000) and Zaman (2004).  Recent studies seem 
to concur with the positive results of the earlier studies. Basher (2007) and Khan and Rahman 
(2007), for example, reveals that GB develops its members from being inert recipients of credit 
to dynamic agent in social and commercial facets of life. 
The arguments of the studies bring forward the positive effects of microcredit on empowerment 
in Bangladesh; these appear to overshadow those who have reservation about its impacts. This 
is based on the following considerations: (i) The central theme around which the studies 
showing the positive impact are based appear to revolve around the notion of enhanced status 
as a result of improved access to credit (a crucial household resource). This is both instinctively 
appealing and resound well with the extant academic research on households’ bargaining 
models. (ii) The emphasis on female control over loans, a key element of the sceptics’ 
argument, does not take account of the fact that credit goes into the entire income pool of the 
household, all the members of which mutually participate in the loan investment decision 
(Zaman, 2004).  
The preceding analysis indicates that the GB’s group lending model has several attributes 
which has enabled it to respond effectively to the asymmetric information problems 
experienced by conventional financial institutions in advancing loans to Bangladeshi micro-
entrepreneurs. This along with the considerable social and economic impacts on its clientele of 
Grameen style programs has led to the adoption of the GB model in many countries, including 






3.1.3 Limitations of the Grameen Model 
Despite the enthusiasm about Grameen, several authors have questioned studies (such as those 
mentioned in the previous section) that have shown the positive impact of Grameen on poverty 
alleviation mainly on the basis of the existence of some of form of selection bias (Karlan 2001, 
Armendáriz & Morduch 2005; Alexander-Tedeschi and Karlan 2006; Banerjee, Duflo, 
Glennerster and Kinnan 2009; Karlan & Zinman 2010; Roodman & Morduch 2014). 
Armendáriz and Morduch (2005) noted, for instance, that microfinance programs do not 
randomly pick borrowers they want to work with but rather carefully select borrowers on basis 
of incalculable factors such as greater entrepreneurial attitude and enhanced business networks. 
Therefore, concluding that microfinance programs are having a positive impact on poverty 
alleviation on the basis of comparison of borrowers with non-borrowers without incorporating 
such factors into the analysis may simple be wrong. Furthermore, there have been other 
questions related to the extent of Grameen’s outreach. Amin at. al (2003), for example, used 
GB data from 229 borrowers’ households and concluded that even though GB is successful at 
reaching the poor, it fails to a great extent in reaching the extreme and vulnerable poor, the 
group which is most susceptible to destitution. Furthermore, analysing GB data, Chowdhury 
(2005) found that the effectiveness of the loans diminished in the long term. There have also 
been questions raised about the group lending approach adopted by Grameen. Using a case 
study in Bolivia, Ladman and Afcha (1990) showed that there can be difficulties in getting 
borrowers to perform specific roles such as that of the group leader who have to devote a lot 
of time towards duties such as the arrangement of meetings and monitoring of group members. 
Costs associated with monitoring and enforcement of contracts can be prohibitive even if 
borrowers live near each other. Secondly, unforeseen environmental disasters such as the flood 
of 1998 in Bangladesh can mean that the lending process can collapse as borrowers struggle to 
pay back loans. Thirdly, according to some studies, individual lending seems to be more 
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profitable and appealing to organisations with the objective of achieving financial sustainability 
compared to group lending. This is not only attributable to higher amounts of loans issued but 
also to significantly reduced costs of administration (Armendáriz and Morduch 2000, 2004; 
Cull and Morduch 2007). Fourthly, the individual lending approach appears to be more 
effective in serving mature clients who seek larger amounts of loan enabling institutions using 
such approaches to be more profitable (Tseng, 2011). Finally, when viewed from the lens of 
Sen’s capability approach, by ensuring access to credit and networks, the Grameen model may 
possibly lead to a higher degree of individual freedom in terms of capabilities and 
opportunities. Such advantages are often shown in terms of concepts such as enhanced female 
empowerment in various aforementioned studies. However, these benefits may be offset by 
potentially significant disadvantages. Poverty stricken borrowers enter into strict contracts 
which obligates them to pay loans back in regular intervals. The ability to adhere to such 
contracts vary depending on a range of factors ranging from personal characteristics to 
environmental and economic factors. Often, it is the poorest who suffer not only because they 
have less money but also lower ability to transform investments into successful businesses 
(Hulme & Mosley 1996; Hulme and Moore, 2007). Failure to repay loans has serious 
implications for the borrowers and implications for freedom as repossessions take place 
(Hulme and Moore, 2007). Karim (2011), who studied, microfinance in the context of 
Bangladesh reports that it is common for defaulting borrowers’ possessions such as houses, 
chicken or food items to be seized and sold by fellow members of a borrowing group. 
Therefore, there is a risk that microfinance may further suppress Bangladeshi women by an 
endorsement of an exploitation of traditional cultural values (Goetz and Gupta, 1996, 2001; 
Montgomery et al., 1996; Rahman, 1999; Levin, 2012). Along similar lines, Morduch (1999:6) 
questions claims of empowerment by contending that women “are mediators between male 
household members and the bank.” and points out that  “the lending mechanism can operate 
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under the prevailing patriarchal norms of the village society and the positional vulnerability of 
women.”  
 
3.2 Grameen in USA 
3.2.1 The influence of neoliberalism  
Microfinance began to bloom in the 1980s in the US as the socio-economic and political 
contexts unfolded in the US. The established banks began to fold up branches in deprived 
neighbourhoods which compelled the local population to use the services of pawn shops or 
other informal lenders for financial services (Light and Pham, 1998). There was an 
intensification of unemployment problems as a result of rising globalization and the resulting 
outsourcing of jobs (Blau, 1999; Rosen, 2002; Jurik, 2005). This was worsened by an 
ineffective health care system care system which did not provide adequate protection to the 
poor and government policies such as cutbacks of farm subsidies and import quotas which lead 
to reduced viability of farming. This made life particularly difficult for rural families for whom 
it was challenging to find alternatives (Jurik, 2005). Welfare expenditures has always been a 
contentious subject in US politics. There was a cutback in welfare expenditures during both 
Reagan and Bush tenure in the 1980s as a result of their high cost and perception as being 
contrary to capitalist philosophy of encouraging innovation and competition.  Microfinance 
(including the Grameen style Microfinance Programs) thus began to surface as a method for 
combatting the situation of rising unemployment and the consequent reliance on welfare 
provision (Srivastava, 2010). These initiatives were viewed as an effective tool for stimulating 
enterprise and alleviate poverty in the process.  
One of the earliest organizations to adopt the Grameen model was the Women/s Self-
Employment Project (WSEP) in Chicago in 1985. The adaptation of the Grameen model by 
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WSEP was known as the Full-Circle fund. Its organizational mission was to enhance income 
and self-sufficiency levels of women by encouraging self-employment as a means of poverty 
alleviation. Further, it aimed to achieve this by means of microfinance and entrepreneurial 
training and business development services (Schreiner and Sheraden, 2007).  WSEP’s effort to 
provide microfinance for low income welfare dependent women did not go unnoticed as its 
achievements were recognised as it consequently received the Chicago Spirit Awards. It also 
paved the way for other similar projects aimed to enhance financial access to deprived regions 
(Liou, 1998). Thus, the Good Faith fund was established in Arkansas by the then Governor Bill 
Clinton as a result of the high numbers of poor in that region. The objective of the fund was to 
encourage self-employment by providing them with microfinance on “good faith” with no 
collateral requirement (Auwal, 1996: 39).  
By 1990s, microenterprise promotion along with such microcredit initiatives were considered 
to be among the premier strategies to enhance economic development and tackle 
unemployment and social exclusion (Anthony, 1997; Balkin, 1989; Clark et al., 1999; 
Edgcomb et al., 1996; Himes & Servon, 1998; Light & Pham, 1998; Servon, 1999; Kolodinsky, 
2006).  In 1993, an analysis by SBA revealed that small businesses (those with less than 20 
employees) produced a high proportion of new jobs (4.1 million) compared to a loss of jobs in 
medium (850000) and large (500,000) firms (Burrus, 2005). Furthermore, significant 
demographic transitions had also led to greater attractiveness and viability of self-employment 
as an alternative. These included: (a) higher proportion of women in work, many of whom 
considered self-employment as an effective way to balance work and family priorities; (b) 
rapidly growing number of immigrants who faced culture barriers less likely to be in 
employment thus considering self-employment as an alternative; (c) an aging population 
increasingly turning to self-employment as a way of earning additional income and (d) finally 
rural families affected by rising unemployment and unwilling to migrate turning to self-
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employment as a means to continue living in their neighbourhoods (Burrus, 2005). These trends 
thus paved the way for more microfinance organizations to emerge in the US in the 90s.  
Microfinance had gained even more relevance as a result of reduction of welfare expenditure 
during the Clinton era when several social programs such as the Job Opportunities and Basic 
Skills (JOBS) Training program Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and the 
Emergency Assistance (EA) program were replaced by with Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) and greater restrictions imposed on criteria for eligibility of recipients 
(Srivastava, 2010). Furthermore, the enthusiasm that Clinton had for the Grameen model as 
shown by his earlier support for the GFF in Arkansas was evident in his Governments policy 
during both his presidential terms (Schreiner and Morduch, 2002). Major drives to the industry 
thus followed in 1992 after the enactment of the first legislation for the development of 
microenterprise under the SBA demonstration program which consequently went on to be 
permanent (Carr and Tong, 2002). Further, a milestone in the history of community finance 
was the ‘the Reigle Community Development and Regulatory Act’ which was passed in 1994 
that led to the formation of the official organizational identity “Community Development 
Financial Institution” or CDFI attributed to certified organizations which operated in the sphere 
of US community finance. The CRA act of 1977 was reinforced by the enactment of this 
legislation as it encouraged commercial banks to gain CRA credits by lending to CDFIs 
operating in deprived neighbourhoods which under normal circumstances would be less viable 
for it to operate in (Jurik, 2005). It was thus mutually beneficial for both banks and CDFIs as 
banks were able to comply with their obligatory CRA requirements and CDFIs could obtain 
funds to operate smoothly (Hawke, 2002).  Such policies led to the development of a number 
of MFI initiatives some of which endeavoured to use the Grameen model. Project Enterprise 
(PE) was one such example. Inspired by the achievements of WSEP, it opened its doors in New 
59 
 
York in 1996 and was the first institution to offer microloans without collaterals in the city 
(Counts, 2008; PE website, 2016).  
3.2.2 Paradigm Shift 
Despite the initial enthusiasm, most initiatives adopting the peer group lending model either 
ceased operation or shifted to individual lending by the end of the decade. For example, WSEP 
had experienced a number of operational issues in adopting the model to an urban American 
context. These challenges included: (i) Serving a population which was much less dense and 
more dispersed compared to developing countries resulting in the escalation of costs (ii) 
Difficulties of establishing Grameen like centres as a result of clients being reluctant to attend 
group meetings who are unwilling to step beyond limited community boundaries to establish a 
large network of borrowers. (iii) A welfare system which created disincentives for borrowers 
to earn income and build assets (factored into the eligibility criteria for receiving welfare) and 
increased client risk of losing out on benefits. (iv) A combination of the above factor made 
marketing Grameen style loans extremely challenging (Cohen, 1989). WSEP shifted to 
individual lending before eventually terminating operations due to a lack of funding (Westal et 
al. 2000; Counts, 2008).  An evaluation study by Taub (1998) revealed that GFF had 
experienced similar difficulties to WSEP. Such difficulties led to low repayment rates (48%) 
and volumes of clients both of which were key factors in GFF not being able to achieve any 
semblance of self-sufficiency (Taub, 1998). Consequently, the GFF also had changed its model 
to emphasize individual lending and training for employment before being phased out 
eventually (Schreiner, 1999; Harms, 2005). Working Capital were able to recruit substantial 
number of clients in its initial periods of operation due to the prevailing economic environment 
characterized by high unemployment and financial exclusion. During the late 90s it 
experienced a steep decline in demand as a result of greater prosperity and availability of credit. 
Consequently, many of its hubs and affiliates began to collapse as it was unable to recover even 
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half of its operational costs. Working Capital responded to such problems by restructuring its 
products to emphasize individual lending and increasing the size of loans (Ashe, 2000). 
Another notable example of a change in lending strategy was Accion International, which 
attempt to adopt the peer group lending model early on in its operations in 1991 but later shifted 
to an individual lending model (Fairbanks, 2008; Accioneast.org, 2016).   
Several studies have reflected on numerous reasons for the difficulties of operating the group 
lending model in an American context (Edgcomb et al., 1996; Taub,1998 and Ashe, 2000). 
Schreiner and Woller (2003) pointed out four key reasons which lead to great challenges for 
the adoption of the group lending model in a US context. Firstly, a lack of social capital in 
industrialised country such as US means that markets are characterized by impersonal nature 
of transactions unlike the markets of developing countries often frequented by the same 
clientele who are involved in day to day bargaining. Furthermore, people often do not find it 
necessary to extend their relationship network beyond families as they rely on employment and 
welfare programs for sustaining their livelihoods. Woolcock (1999) postulates that individuals 
need to be constantly in touch with another to form effective levels of social capital.  Thus, the 
high mobility of the American population compared to developing countries may also 
contribute towards problems of adopting peer group lending. The second challenge is 
associated with the diversity of the US population. GB’s groups are usually composed of 
members coming from similar ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds who speak the same 
language (Bengali). This is in turn makes it easier to operate and manage such groups compared 
to the US where clients often come from diverse backgrounds which may reduce the social 
capital. Thirdly, US programs are frequently reluctant to enforce the system of joint liability 
(i.e. making members liable for default of other members in the group) (Bhatt, 2000; Hung, 
2001). This is an interesting area of contention because GB has also phased out joint liability 
in 2001 with the introduction of Grameen 2 which has replaced the earlier version Grameen 1.  
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Finally, the credit market is more established and pervasive in the US and hence provides 
alternatives to potential clients to obtain individual loans through other sources (such as credit 
cards). This means that many borrowers may be reluctant to take the risk of forming groups 
with borrowers and be liable for the potential default by any group member. A domino effect 
may ensue as potentially safe borrowers may be inclined to default to evade paying for others 
(Besley & Coate, 1995; Paxton, Graham, & Thraen, 2000).  
As explained above, most of the programs responded to the challenges of adopting the group 
lending model by shifting their emphasis to individual lending model and client training 
(Schreiner and Murdoch, 2001). By the end of 2002, out of the 554 MFIs operating in the field, 
356 organization provided only training services while out of the remaining 198, 182 provided 
individual lending whereas only 36 had some peer group element in their products (Burrus, 
2005).  
3.2.3 Developments post-recession 
In spite of the efficiency and sustainability problems plaguing the US microfinance institutions 
outlined in the previous section, microfinance has continued to thrive as a result of socio-
economic and political circumstances unfolding in the US. Poverty remains a pertinent problem 
in the US society with the official poverty rate being almost 15% in 2014 (approximately 46.7 
million live in poverty in 2014 according to official sources) (US Census Bureau, 2016). To 
compound the problem, 34% of poverty affected households are female headed households 
while 1 out of 5 children live in poverty (GA website, 2016). The poverty figures have been 
static since a number of years and have been markedly higher for African Americans and 
Hispanic population (Pimpare, 2014). Pimpare (2014) argues that the census figures can be 
misleading and if poverty was to be considered as a more dynamic measure incorporating 
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people moving in and out of poverty over sustained periods, the problem is much more chronic 
with figures around 32%.  
Microfinance is conventionally viewed as targeting the poorest of the poor suffering from low 
levels of education. The recession meant that many MFIs could expand their clientele base to 
meet the requirements of an emerging middle-class clientele base (without access to adequate 
assets and resources), many of whom were well educated. However, it may have also resulted 
in a mission drift of such MFIs (Keng, 2009). Finally, there has been growing recognition and 
awareness of rising financial exclusion, particularly the significant numbers of “unbanked” 
Americans with substantially low-income levels lacking access to financial resources. A study 
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 2009, for example revealed that 
around 8% (approximately 8 million households are “unbanked”. Another 19% (approximately 
21million) are “underbanked” with limited access to products and services of mainstream 
financial institutions (Knowledge@Wharton, 2011).  
Thus, in congruence with such emerging socio-economic issues and growing demand and 
awareness of microfinance as an alternative, there has been significant political support from 
the Obama administration. This was evident in the earliest period of Obamas tenure with the 
passing of American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) of 2009. The predominant 
objective of the ARRA was to preserve and create employment opportunities in the aftermath 
of the financial recession (MacDonald et al., 2012).  The legislation enabled $730 million to 
be awarded to SBA to be used for the objective of supporting microenterprise. This was a 
significant amount given that the SBA had issued approximately $3.2 billion in 2007 (Maltby, 
2009). $50 million out of this $730 million fund was specially designated for utilization for 
SBA’s Microloan program (Keng, 2009). Further, there was approval of $24 million in 
additional grants for micro-lenders which offered the provision of financial training and 
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assistance to their clients. In addition, ARRA led to the creation of a larger sum of potential 
funding for CDFI certified micro-lenders worth $100 million from US Treasury Department’s 
CDFI fund. Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program was allocated $1 billion 
worth of funding which meant that local governments were endowed with additional funds 
which could potentially be invested in microfinance projects (Accioneast, 2009). The following 
year saw the enactment of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
designed to support micro lending through forming alliance with larger institutions (Lawrence 
and Truglio, 2013). This was the contextual backdrop in which Grameen America emerged in 
2008. Despite the challenges faced by its predecessors and their eventual termination or shift 
to different lending models, Grameen America (GA), as founded by Yunus himself in 2008, 
has been exceptional. Since its inception, GA has become one of the prolific lenders in the US 
(Leiberman et al, 2012). It has steadily expanded each year, growing from 500 borrowers at 
the end of 2008 to 42780 by Jan, 2015. It has created 51335 jobs and managed to achieve a 
repayment rate of around 98 to 99%. It has also expanded rapidly, operating currently in eleven 
US cities (GA Website a, 2015). The steady progress of GA has not gone unnoticed in the 
prominent mainstream media with several outlets reporting on its expansion, exceptional 
repayment rates and prospects for growth in the USA (Economist, 2011; Chau and Dayan, 
2014; MSNBC, 2014). A report by Dewan (2013), for instance noted, how microfinance had 
boomed in the post-2008 period, leading to an increase in more than triple the number of 
borrowers. Indeed, GA had developed rapidly into a microfinance leader since its inception. 
Several reports have also reflected on the individual accounts of positive experiences of the 
GA’s clients (Dewan, 2013; Blanchard, 2014; O'Brien, 2014; Fremson, 2014). 
GA has been steadily expanding since its inception and has been recognised as one of the 
prolific lenders in US microfinance (Lieberman et al., 2012). GA operates in eleven cities and 
has grown from serving 500 borrowers at the end of 2008 to currently serving 64295 clients.  
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3.3 Grameen in UK 
3.3.1 Rising social and financial exclusion and the New Labour era 
The socioeconomic contexts and political environment in which initiatives replicating the 
Grameen model have emerged in the U.K are now analysed. The integral roots of the UK 
community finance sector dates back to 1960s with the establishment of community credit 
unions (Brown et al. 2003; Collin et al. 2001). However, the real impetus for the CDFI 
movement was in the late 1990s with a change in political environment in the UK, preceded 
by certain changes in the socioeconomic contexts that required policy initiatives in the socio-
financial sector. 
Over the years, inequality has steadily risen in Britain; some geographical regions have been 
more prone to poverty than others.  Britain has experienced since the late 1970s a marked rise 
in the geographical concentration of poverty; disparity between rich and poor people has also 
been consistently rising (Green, 1994; Rogaly et al, 1999). Factors such as a lack of safe shelter, 
inferior diets, ineffectual social relations or incapability to exercise influence over events in the 
local community had a noticeable impact on many households. Research has revealed that 
relative poverty can accelerate the frequency of incidence of illness and early death (Wilkinson, 
1996). Socioeconomic analysis of data on absolute poverty pattern amid 1979-1995 revealed 
an 8% increase in poverty in terms of real income for the most deprived 10 (Hills, 1998). As 
can be seen from Figure A.1 shows that the numbers of low-income households (i.e. those with 
income below 60% 0f the median) has constantly risen from 7.6 million in year 1979 to 13.4 
million in 2000. 
Unemployment is typically viewed as a central attribute of exclusion and the likeliest cause of 
poverty in Western Europe (Rogaly et al, 1999). An in-depth analysis by Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation (JRF, 1997) in Britain, Germany and Sweden found that unemployment became 
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more unbearable with prolonged duration. Loneliness, seclusion and a loss of dignity was 
reported by various respondents in these three countries. They depended on family and friends 
for company and support, feeling a lack of empathy and discriminatory attitude from their 
wider communities. Moreover, British individuals who suffered long term unemployment were 
more likely to be unable to pay for basic needs and hence in greater danger of incurring severe 
financial liabilities. In both Sweden and Germany some indication of 'social exclusion' were 
observed, but the evidence is more discernible and prevalent in Britain (Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, JRF, 1997).  
Amartya Sen (1997) contends that unemployment is at least a pertinent cause of poverty as 
poor income, as it has a profound influence on various aspects of poverty. These include loss 
of confidence, sadness and increased family conflicts. Unemployment in UK seems seem more 
marked in some areas than others.  For example, a report revealed that unemployment in 
Birmingham exceeded the national rate by more than two times in 2000. This problem has also 
been pervasive in other areas such as Tower Hamlets. Such problems are further accentuated 
with regard to the high percentage of ethnic minorities groups such as Black, Bangladeshi and 
Pakistanis who live in such regions. Department of Work and Pension (DWP) figures have 
consistently indicated that unemployment rates for ethnic minority groups are significantly 
higher than that of their white counterparts (Inman, 2014). Furthermore, the fact that female 
entrepreneurs have always been the central focus of the Grameen model and the persistently 
high unemployment rates amongst this population rendered the initiatives adopting the model 
as an attractive proposition for regeneration funders keen to address such issues.  The 
provision of microfinance and promotion of self-employment was an obvious choice for 
moderating such problems; naturally it gained increasing momentum and received substantial 
consideration from both the government and funders.  
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A detailed survey was carried out in three areas of London; the report examined the access to 
banking services and also the usage of substitute (costlier) services. This study suggested that 
`financial exclusion` is associated with inadequate income of households, costly sources of 
credit, substantial amounts borrowed to pay for everyday living expenses, lack of savings, lack 
of access to the inexpensive fuel tariffs. Furthermore, it is also linked to apprehension about 
debt, reliance on means-tested state benefits, caring obligations that limit the ability to work 
and employment uncertainty and low-income professions (Dayson, 2004). Empirical research 
also upholds such findings on access to credit and debt among low income families in the UK 
households (Bridges and Disney, 2002). Further, one research study suggested that micro-
enterprises in underprivileged communities are most likely to be affected by financial exclusion 
(Collard at al, 2001). The Annual Review of the Bank of England (2002) confirms that fewer 
self-employed people in low income communities had personal accounts compared to the 
relatively more affluent regions. The numbers dwindle even more for the number of individuals 
with business accounts. The lower incomes earned by enterprises in disadvantaged areas 
predictably made it more problematic to borrow money; for setting up new ventures with lower 
individual savings, it was even more difficult still to obtain start-up capital (BoE 2002; Collard 
et al 2001; Dayson, 2004).  
The return in 1997 of Labour Party to government dawned a new era in the British desire to 
combat poverty and social exclusion. The CDFI movement gained impetus after Labour’s re-
emergence to power. The NGOs and civil society groups consistently pressurized the new 
administration to meet its commitments under the 1995 UN Copenhagen summit. Microfinance 
was then increasingly viewed by the Labour government as a powerful means of tackling 
poverty and social exclusion. It integrated the growth of CDFIs into its regeneration policies 
by assisting the institutions through grants and incorporating tax incentives to encourage 
investment into the sector. The government soon established the Social Exclusion Unit to 
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address some of society’s most complex issues. The Policy Action Team (PAT) reports from 
1998 onwards were initiated with the purpose of providing crucial foundational elements for 
the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal.  
The government’s delineation of socioeconomic problems as social exclusion in accordance 
with its prominence given to financial exclusion (Giddens, 1998; Levitas, 1998; Byrne, 1999, 
Affleck and Mellor, 2006); as well as weight attached to economic exclusion (Cameron and 
Davoudi, 1998; Hills et al., 2002). An integral factor of the government’s social inclusion 
agenda was to boost employment through the means of paid work. Nevertheless, it also 
understood the significance of encouraging self-employment7, small businesses and social 
enterprises within deprived communities. It also realized further that there was a serious lack 
of entrepreneurial culture amongst the disadvantaged communities which depended too much 
on traditional economic institutions for creation of jobs (Giddens, 1998).  
Core problems affecting such disadvantaged neighbourhoods were viewed as such as lack of 
employment, enterprises and community services. The reasoning was social impact would be 
maximized for such localities by boosting entrepreneurship. Along similar lines, a study by the 
Small Business Service (SBS), revealed that start up rates in deprived neighbourhoods are 
approximately ten times less than those in the high-performance regions (SBS, 2002).  The 
significant weight attached to community development by the government originated from a 
firm belief that there was great potential for enterprise growth with adequate financial and 
technical support (Social Exclusion Unit, 2000)  
This identification of the multiple facets of financial and social exclusion and a tremendous 
commitment to encourage entrepreneurship in underprivileged regions led to a favourable 
                                                             
7 Self-employment is projected to offer clear advantages over waged employment including flexibility, 
universality (even illiterate and poor people can exploit inherited skills), overcoming rigidity of waged 
employment and offering a way out of welfare dependency among others (Yunus, 1998). 
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environment of increased impetus of government support for community finance projects in 
the late 1990s amongst which was organizations that wished to adapt the Grameen model in 
delivering microfinance to disadvantaged groups. Thus, the UK adoption of microfinance as a 
tool for fighting social and financial exclusion was inspired by the US Clinton Administration’s 
“Third Way” which viewed financial inclusion as way of developing enterprise and boosting 
competition to revive the economy and reform the welfare system (Giddens, 1998; Marshall, 
2004). The idea of the organizational identity of CDFI conceptualised in the US in 1994 was 
adopted officially by the UK government in 1999 (NSFNR, 1999). In addition, a critical issue 
enabling the growth of the case study UK CDFIs was the launch of the Phoenix Fund in 1999, 
the objective of which was to deal effectively with social and financial exclusion particularly 
in disadvantaged areas (GHK, 2004). The fund was administered by the Small Business Service 
(SBS). It was utilised to sponsor CDFI loan funds and processes by grants.  The main purpose 
of such schemes has been to address the mounting problems of poverty8, social9 and financial 
exclusion10 in neighbourhoods where they operate.   
Copisarow (2000) advocated the need for application of microcredit technology in the U.K as 
many households lack access to financial products and services in heavily concentrated areas 
of high deprivation. Research has reinforced a belief that self-employed people are very critical 
of banks and many found it difficult to raise finance they became considerably interested in 
                                                             
8 Poverty is defined in relative terms as the experience of living in a household with a level of income or wealth 
below than that is necessary to purchase the range of goods and services considered insufficient for living by the 
standards of a majority in a particular reference group (Rogaly et al, 1999). 
 
9 Social exclusion is defined as the processes which bring about a lack of range of citizenships. Economic 
citizenship includes access to good quality employment and to financial services. Political citizenship refers to 
the capacity to influence processes of decision-making that affect one’s own life: being able to change the rules. 
Social citizenship includes a sense of belonging as well as an ability to accumulate and maintain supportive 
social networks (Rogaly et al, 1999). 
 
10 Financial exclusion is defined as exclusion from particular sources of credit and other financial services 





micro-lending schemes (Whyley et al, 2001). In response to such projected needs, microcredit 
schemes based on Grameen model emerged in the late 1990s. The initiatives included the 
Street-UK, which operated in Birmingham, the Full Circle fund, in Norwich and the East End 
Microcredit Consortium (EEMC) project in East London. In 1998, Women’s Enterprise 
Employment and Training Unit (WEETU) started running the Full Circle Fund, modelled on 
the Grameen peer lending programme in response to the growing marginalization of women in 
the economy of Norwich and surrounding areas. The EEMC was set up as an experiment to 
enable greater understanding of the effectiveness of the Grameen model in the context of UK.  
In terms of objective it sought to identify the need for accessible finance for women who wished 
to develop their income-generating ideas into reality. It was initiated by an institutional 
entrepreneur, Faisel Rehman, a former intern at the GB. He wanted to use his experiences with 
the organization to address the issue of financial exclusion in the UK. It was based on a ‘hub 
and spoke’ model wherein the EEMC was the hub offering lending and administering loans, 
whereas the role of the spokes was taken up by three local community organizations Streetcred, 
Homeless family unit and Account3 involved in direct and support, outreach work and operating 
the peer group model (Ramsden, 2008). The following year Street-UK was founded, inspired 
by the success of a Polish scheme known as Fundusz Mikro. It sought to adopt the Grameen 
Style group-lending in order to provide access to finance for low-income, self-employed people 
and very small businesses, not viewed creditworthy by banks.  
In Scotland, an important phase of the emergence of community finance began with a formation 
of Developing Strathclyde Limited (DSL) in 1993 in order to counter social and financial 
exclusion in deprived neighbourhoods in Glasgow. Soon after in the same year Glasgow 
Regeneration Fund (GRF) was established with the objective of providing microfinance to 
boost entrepreneurship in underinvested regions of Glasgow (Gorbals, Govan, Greater 
Easterhouse, Castlemilk, Drumchapel, Glasgow North, the East End and Greater Pollok). The 
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Glasgow Women’s Microcredit Project (based on the Grameen model), was set up in 1997 as 
a sub-fund of the GRF and was operated by the DSL in co-operation with the Wellpark 
Enterprise. This pilot project ended in 2001 and was viewed as having achieved target 
objectives. Consequently, DSL in conjunction with the Scottish Enterprise launched the 
National Microfinance Program in 2002 (Wellpark was no longer involved in this initiative) 
(DSL Business Website, 2016).  
The preceding analyses has revealed how the socio-economic circumstances surrounding 
poverty, social and financial exclusion in Britain had unfolded in the 1990s. The new 
administration in 1997 recognised the pervasive poverty and social exclusion plaguing 
societies across the UK and hence provided a conducive environment for various socio-
economic initiatives to initiate operations. A number of CDFIs surfaced as a result in UK, some 
of which were inspired by the Grameen model. 
3.3.2 Developments post 2005 
A significant shift in government policy towards community finance transpired in 2005. A core 
factor of government funding and support was the potential sustainability of such projects. For 
example, actual or potential viability was a key factor assessed for application of CDFIs for the 
Phoenix fund. In addition, this was also an important objective of another government initiative 
Community Investment Tax Relief (CITR) introduced in 2002 which enabled CDFIs to access 
loans at reasonably lower levels of interest.  In order to achieve accreditation, a CDFI had to 
demonstrate that “‘the promotion of enterprise, economic development and social inclusion in 
disadvantaged communities [is] its main goal’, had an established record of performance and 
‘viable plans for long-term sustainability’ (HMT, 2001:14; Appleyard, 2008). The CDFI sector 
was greatly dependent on the Phoenix fund for support, as 60 CDFIs received approximately 
£42 million (SBS, 2005). Moreover, 30 CDFIs would be non-existent without the fund and 
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approximately 40% of all operational cost of almost 40 CDFIs was covered by the fund (GHK, 
2004; Ramsden, 2005).  
There were two important policy changes that affected the trajectory of UK microfinance in 
2005/2006. Firstly, the Phoenix fund was terminated and responsibilities for CDFI funding was 
devolved from the SBS to Regional Development Agencies (RDAs).  This could be attributed 
to the fact that most of the CDFIs were not able to demonstrate their long-term viability as per 
the original conditions of much of the funding and support they had received. All of the 
foregoing Grameen inspired UK initiatives have faced significant challenges since their 
inception and have responded in different ways. Some of them have ceased operations while 
others continue to thrive after undergoing major transformations. EEMC for example, 
metamorphosed into a new organization known as Fairfinance (Ramsden, 2008; Account3 
website, 2015). Studies reveal that RDAs were much less supportive of CDFIs than the SBS 
and more stringent with regards to issue of long term sustainability (Appleyard, 2008; Aase, 
2014). An analysis by GHK (2010) revealed that the funding during the RDA period was much 
less than that of that earlier Phoenix funding. Thus, there may have been a policy contradiction 
between what the government expected from the CDFIs (i.e. long-term sustainability) requiring 
scale and sustainability on a national context whereas the decentralisation of CDFI support 
implied that policy emphasis was confined to a local level (Aase, 2014). Secondly, there was 
microfinance policy shift with a greater emphasis on personal lending (Appleyard, 2008). This 
was evident in the 2005 budget.  The Pre-Budget report had identified access to affordable 
credit as one of the three major areas including access to banking and money advice for 
effective tackling of financial exclusion. The Budget report acknowledged that many 
households depend on the alternative credit market where products usually had Annual 
percentage rates greater than 100% and CDFIs had an important role in redressing the balance 
(HMT, 2005). However, much of the government funding and support for community finance 
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waned in this period. As a result of the aforementioned policy changes, many CDFIs including 
the aforementioned UK case studies struggled to obtain funds as a result of low levels of self-
sustainability which consequently led to their closure or had undergone major transformations 
adopting different business models to survive. In Scotland, despite the Scottish National 
Microfinance program being termed “a success” by an evaluation report in 2005 (Policy 
Research Network: 50), it was terminated in 2007 owing to funding constraints (DSL Business 
Website, 2016).   
Nevertheless, the financial crisis in 2008 had reversed the situation to a significant extent as 
financial institutions tightened their lending policies which in turn led to a substantial rise in 
demand for CDFI loans from individuals and businesses. This also led to the introduction of 
the Enterprise Finance Guarantee with the objective of encouraging banks to lend to small 
businesses who were unable to provide the required bank collateral. The election of the 
Conservative government marked the beginning of some important changes which had relevant 
implications for the CDFI industry.  The government reorganized forces in relation to the 
development of the CDFI industry. Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) took over from RDAs 
in 2011/ 2012 and Social Exclusion Task Force was replaced by Office for the Civil Society in 
2010 (Helm & Asthana, 2010). The Enterprise Finance Guarantee was restructured to specially 
assist CDFIs. There was a discernible change in rhetoric in the Conservative manifesto with a 
focus on reduction of deficits and taxes and significant weight attached to supporting small 
businesses. Microbusiness and self-employment seem to be in vogue and political limelight. 
Microbusinesses was labelled as “the lifeblood” of the economy by David Cameron who 
assured early on during his tenure to remove obstacles for their development (Dellot, 2014: 
14). This Conservative rhetoric has resonated well with a number of initiatives that have been 
launched since its election in 2010. The Regional Growth fund (RGF) totalling £3.2 billion was 
introduced with the purpose of allocating grants to boost private sectors projects and jobs 
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particularly in areas that are reliant on the public sector for job creation (Gov.uk, 2015). The 
New Enterprise Allowance scheme (NEA) and the Start-up Loan Scheme (SUL) were set up 
to assist and encourage the unemployed who desired to start their own business. Big Society 
Capital, the world’s premier financial institution dedicated to providing financial support to 
social sector organizations was launched in 2011.  It is evident that such initiatives had an 
important effect as the CDFI sector experiences major growth since 2011 with enhanced levels 
of professionalism and sustainability (Aase, 2014). 
In Scotland, microfinance has developed sporadically post 2005 with Scotcash, a prominent 
CDFI which provides personal lending at affordable rates being launched in 2007. 
Subsequently, Passage from India, an initiative based on a variant of a group lending model 
(the Self-reliant/ SRG from India) was launched in 2011. This has been rebranded and launched 
as WEvolution in 2014 after having received Government funding in 2013. The most recent 
initiative based on the Grameen model is Grameen in the UK (GU) which began its operations 
in 2014 targeting clients based in Glasgow, North Ayrshire, West Dunbartonshire and 
Inverclyde. 
Thus, it may be deduced from the above that the microfinance policy environment surrounding 
the UK case study initiatives may be divided into two distinct periods. The first period 1998/99 
to 2004-2005 saw the emergence of several CDFIs including the case study organizations 
owing to the Labour government support the most significant of which was the Phoenix 
Development fund. The second period (post 2005) saw increased recognition and importance 
attached to the debt problems plaguing the UK society exacerbated by predatory lending and 
CDFIs providing personal lending products were viewed as a part of the solution. However, 
there was a gradual waning of political funding and support of CDFIs as many were perceived 
to have performed below expectations with respect to outreach and sustainability. This situation 
was reversed by the financial crisis in 2008 which caused the demand for CDFI finance to 
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surge. It is perhaps important to note that the Conservative government supported microfinance 
but promoted it as a tool for boosting small business. This was unlike the 1997 Labour era 
which had projected a more socially oriented brand of microfinance as a means of addressing 
the social and financial exclusion with a much greater emphasis on issues of gender and 
ethnicity. The common factor during both government’s tenure, however, has been a perception 
of microfinance as an alternative to the welfare state.  
3.4 The role of credit unions 
A notable common factor in both the UK and the USA is the backdrop of the credit union 
movement in the emergence of microfinance in the UK and USA as both GU and GA have 
been inspired by the movements. GA aspires to become a credit union in the US while GU 
authorities believed that the strong credit union culture in Glasgow would contribute to strong 
demand for their services. A credit union may be defined as financial cooperative which is 
owned and controlled by its members and operated on a not-for-profit basis (O’Sullivan and 
Sheffrin, 2003). The membership usually ranges from 30 to 100 individuals.  Members’ savings 
may be used to secure a loan or some form of small household assets such as cow or goat or a 
bicycle may also be used as collaterals to guarantee loans. Local financial resources can be 
mobilised effectively by credit unions due to flexibility of savings and competitive interest 
rates compared to banks. The small size of a credit union enables members to effectively 
manage it as they willingly devote all or part of their time to run the union and can easily access 
information about reliability of individuals (Tseng, 2011). However, the credit unions have 
some disadvantages as well. These may include, often having inadequate funds to meet 
shortfalls in liquidity, problems with risk diversification, prone to inflation and damage caused 
by the economic reverses of members (Adams, 1999). Despite such problems, there has been 
a strong history of communal banking in the UKA and the USA.  In the USA, the movement 
dates back to the 2008 when St. Mary's Bank of Manchester  and St. Mary's Cooperative Credit 
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Association was established] by French-speaking immigrants. Membership was limited to 
"groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined 
neighbourhood, community or rural district" by the Federal Credit Union Act 1934. Credit 
unions have continued to grow steadily since their inception in the US (Wilcox and Dopico, 
2011; Hayes and Duren, 2019). In the UK, co-operatives or mutual organisations such as 
building societies date back to the 18th century. Mutual societies were formalised under the 
Friendly Societies Act 1819 prior to the welfare state and were established to meet the 
requirements of a burgeoning urban working class. This involved pooling of small regular 
individual payments for shared communal benefits. Building societies were set up with the 
objective of building local houses by pooling resources from members. The first credit union 
(Derry) was formed in the UK in 1960 by six members who pooled their savings. The number 
of credit unions have had increased steadily over the years as  the credit union membership in 
the UK almost doubled from 562,000 in 2004 to nearly 1.04 million in 2012 (Jones, 2013).It is 
perhaps important to note given the emergence of GU in Glasgow, that credit union 
membership and coverage has remained strong as one in six Glaswegians is a credit union 
member. There also exists 100 credit unions in Scotland with 33 operating in Glasgow 
(ScottishCU, 2021; Cucity, 2021). At Grameen in the UK, it was felt that a strong credit union 
culture and a history of communal banking in Scotland would contribute towards the demand 
for its services prior to launch. This stemmed from a belief that most credit unions were 
becoming increasingly formal like banks in their approach as they check credit histories and 
required bank statements from prospective clients. Further, credit unions often do not provide 
extensive services for business loans and usually have strict requirements of clients to save for 
a certain period of time before any credit could be provided to them. It was reasoned that many 
potential clients of GU did not meet such requirements11.    
                                                             




The analysis above indicates the key differences between the emergence of the GB and UK 
and US case studies. GB was much more aimed at classical poverty alleviation as it surfaced 
in the contextual background of Bangladeshi poverty and famine in a war-ravaged economy. 
This is naturally different to the context for the emergence of most US microfinance initiatives, 
the primary objective of which was to utilize microcredit to promote microenterprise 
development rather than classical poverty alleviation. The Grameen Philosophy of motivating 
the poor to become self-employed and self-reliant was resonant with the Neoliberal US 
Capitalist ideology of free market and competition. In the UK, although poverty and social 
exclusion was a key theme along with microenterprise development in the earlier Labour era’s 
support for microfinance, this changed over the years with the current Conservative 
government promoting microcredit as a means to boost small businesses rather than the more 
socially oriented brand of microfinance endorsed by earlier regimes. This orientation in both 
UK and US in both countries is also evident in the fact that the policy emphasis is on 
microcredit to develop microenterprise rather than on extensive microfinance services (i.e. 
savings and insurance), important tools to address the vulnerability of the poor in developing 
countries (Srivastava, 2010). A common continual theme prevalent amongst the UK and US 
policies has been the perception of microfinance as a tool to address rising welfare 
expenditures. This contrasts with Bangladesh where microfinance was viewed as a tool for 
improving the economic livelihoods of the poor (in the absence of a welfare state) and 







CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND 
METHODLOGY  
Introduction 
A systematic and well-ordered analysis of the data in any investigative work prerequisites 
clearly defined research design and premeditated methodologies. Precisely for this purpose the 
study in the current chapter intends to lay down the basic framework of research and set of 
methodologies that may well be relevant or useful for taking the objectives of the study 
forward.  With such ends in mind the sections below (4.2—4.7) place in view the interpretative 
paradigm, perspectives of theory, research strategies and the methodological tools, stages of 
research and the rigour needed in the process of research and analysis. A key focus has been to 
ensemble the research objectives in sequential order with a view to explain the process of 
research. An inherent idea has been to delineate conceptual frontiers of the themes relevant, 
enabling the analyst to offer insights and schematize crucial aspects of the decisions taken in 
the process of research. The limitations of the research design and methodology introduced in 
the chapter have also been identified towards the end, with added notes on mitigation steps 
taken (section 4.8). 
The gendered multi-culturally situated researcher approaches the world with a set of ideas, a 
framework (theory, ontology) that specifies a set of question (epistemology) that he or she then 
examines in specific ways (methodology, analysis) (Denzin et al., 2003). That is, the researcher 
collects empirical material bearing on the question and then analyses and writes about them. 
Every researcher speaks from within a distinctive interpretive community that configures, in 
its special way, the multicultural, gendered components of the research act (Denzin et al, 2003). 
In this regard, Crotty (2003) identifies the following four key questions: 
1. What methods do we propose to use? 
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2. What methodology governs our choice and use of methods? 
3. What theoretical perspective lies behind the methodology in action? 
4. What epistemology informs this theoretical perspective? 
The four key elements of the foregoing questions (relevant to the current research) are 
interlinked, as is shown in Figure 4.1 below:  
Figure 4.1 Elements of the research process 
EPISTEMOLOGY-----CRITICAL REALISM 
  
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE- INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
 
METHODOLOGY----QUALTITATIVE RESEARCH COMBINATION OF HISTORICAL     
 AND INTERPRETIVE 
 
METHOD---CASE STUDY APPROACH 
Each of the above elements requires exposition and is addressed in the following sections: 
interpretive paradigm, theoretical perspective, research strategies and methodological tools. 
4.1 Interpretive paradigm 
A critical realist paradigm is more suitable to the research process given the nature of the 
research question. Critical realism is typified by a stratified ontology consisting of the 
empirical, the actual and the real (Bhaskar, 1978). The empirical domain is where observations 
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take place experienced. Nevertheless, events which transpire in the actual domain may not be 
observable or interpreted in a theory laden and subjective manner which may lead to different 
connotations on the part of observers. Events take place as a consequence of mechanisms which 
exist in the real domain (Easton, 2010). In accordance with such a view, social phenomena may 
be explained as being "both causal (as does the positivist) and interpretive (as does the 
hermeneuticist)" (Collier, 1994: 167). This provides an opportunity to reconcile understanding 
and explanation (Welch et al, 2011). This approach discards the notion of sensory observation 
as being the solitary source of explanation. It assumes transcendental realist ontology and an 
interpretivist epistemology contending that causality can be understood by unobservable 
mechanisms (Easton, 2011; 119; Welch et al, 2011).  The actuation of a mechanism depends 
on the conditions it operates in. Hence research needs to incorporate the spatio-temporal 
context effectively (Welch et al, 2011). A high degree of importance is attached to causality in 
terms of the analysis. A positivist approach assumes causality to be dependent on existence of 
regularities or law-like generalizations for interpretation and prediction. The most significant 
problem with this approach is a continual conjunction of variables is not a causal explanation 
rather “simply an atheoretical statement about the world” (Easton, 2010: 118). Interpretivism, 
on the other hand, may not also be a suitable approach as it rejects the possibility of detecting 
causality. Thus, in the context of the current research, critical realism is deemed to be a better 
alternative compared to other paradigms such as positivism and interpretivism. Positivism is 
focused on regularities, models of regression based on various types of variable and a quest for 
law-like generalisations whereas interpretivist studies emphasize interpretation and vivid 
descriptions over the notion of causality. The core tenet of critical realism is that causal 
language may be used to explain concepts and used in tandem with thinking (Easton, 2010). 
Causality is defined by (Sayer, 1992: 104) as “To ask for the cause of something is to ask ‘what 
makes it happen’, what ‘produces’, ‘generates’, ‘creates’ or ‘determines’ it, or, more weakly, 
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what ‘enables’ or ‘leads to’ it”. Under this view, objects or entities form the theoretical 
foundational units for an explanation under critical realism. In a microfinance context, these 
objects would include things such as the case study organizations, borrowers, the relationships 
(for example- amongst borrowers or between borrowers and the organizations), attitude/ 
changing ideas of the management etc and have casual powers and liabilities causing events to 
occur under certain conditions which the researcher attempts to investigate. Critical realism 
originates from epistemic fallacy, the separation of ontological statements (what we say exists- 
the real) and epistemological statements (what we can understand about what exists or the real). 
There must also be a differentiation between transitive and intransitive knowledge.  Thus, the 
transitive component includes theories of structures and events which we attempt to explain 
the intransitive aspect. Critical realists postulate a difference between the real world (which is 
not possible to observe and occurs independent from our perceptions, theories and 
constructions) and the observable world (which we are able to interpret and construct through 
our viewpoints and experiences). Observable events are caused by unobservable structures 
which necessitates that these structures be understood for research questions to be answered. 
The main research question addressed by this thesis is the nature of the institutional challenges 
of adopting the Grameen model in the UK and the USA.  In the context of this research, it is 
observable is that the Grameen model is difficult to adopt in the context of developed countries 
such as the UK and the USA. However, Grameen America stands out as an exception out of 
nine case studies across the UK and USA which has seemingly been able to deal with 
institutional complexities well and be a successful institutional entrepreneur.  
4.2 Theoretical perspective 
Institutional logics are overarching sets of principles that prescribe “how to interpret 
organizational reality, what constitutes appropriate behaviour, and how to succeed” (Thornton, 
2004: 70; Friedland & Alford, 1991). Such logics guide the behaviour of actors within a field 
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and render their actions “comprehensible and predictable” (Lounsbury 2002: 255; Tracey et al, 
2011). They enable actors to deal with ambiguity by placing emphasis on certain issues, 
identifying which of these are significant and require managerial awareness and designing of 
potential solutions (Thornton, 2002). The boundaries of organizational fields are demarcated 
and maintained by one or more shared institutional logics (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006; 
Tracey et al, 2011). Organizations experience institutional complexity “whenever they confront 
incompatible prescriptions from multiple institutional logics” (Greenwood et al, 2011: 375). 
Institutional entrepreneurs “mobilize resources to transform or create institutions that favor 
[their] interests” (Pacheco et al., 2010: 975; DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997; Rao, Morrill, & 
Zald, 2000; Maguire et al., 2004; Khavul et al, 2013). Institutional entrepreneurs not only create 
new institutional environments but also transform existing institutional environments (Phillips 
et al., 2004). They initiate change in motion (Greenwood et al., 2002). They may be individuals, 
organizations, or groups of organizations (Khavul et al, 2013).  
The current study adheres to the interpretation of institutional entrepreneurship whereby it is 
viewed as ‘‘agents who initiate and actively participate in the implementation of changes that 
diverge from existing institutions, independent of whether the initial intent was to change the 
institutional environment, and whether the changes were successfully implemented’’ (Battilana 
et al., 2009; Sharma, 2010: 168). Research in the study focuses on case study organizations 
which used the Grameen Bank (GB) model. The model is unique and is considered pivotal in 
the worldwide emergence of microfinance as an effective tool for addressing financial 
exclusion. 
The GB model is typically used in developing countries; but currently it is also being replicated 
in high income economies of the developed world such as the UK and US with varying degrees 
of success. The award of Noble Peace Prize in 2006 and numerous other international awards 
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to the pioneer of the model Professor Yunus and GB provide sufficient evidence of a worldwide 
acclamation and recognition of the model. The focus on this model is necessary because of the 
community development and market logics associated with it which may seem difficult to 
reconcile, particularly in the context of a developed country. It is also interesting to compare 
and contrast the experiences of the institutional entrepreneurs adopting the model in the context 
of high-income countries such as the UK and USA to the country in which the model originated 
and still thrives (Bangladesh).  The case study projects adopting the Grameen model have been 
operating in the community finance sphere in their respective countries and confronted the dual 
logic of community development and sustainability which may seem somewhat difficult to 
reconcile and hence confronted institutional complexities.  
In accordance with the definition of institutional entrepreneurship, these were organizations 
which mobilized resources to create new institutions to serve their interest in dealing with the 
problem of financial exclusion. They played a significant role in transforming an institutional 
environment where the less privileged was not considered as creditworthy. The fundamental 
question in the study deals with institutional complexities faced by such institutional 
entrepreneurs in adopting the Grameen model and their strategic response to such complexities.  
4.3 Research Strategies 
The study will employ a qualitative case study approach. A case study is an empirical inquiry 
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 
2003). The case research methodology is viewed as both appropriate and essential where either 
theory does not yet exist, or where theory exists but the environmental context is dissimilar, or 
where cause and effect are in doubt or involve time lags (Stuart et, al, 2002). How institutional 
entrepreneurship and the resulting complexities of adopting the Grameen model is 
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conceptualized, understood and interpreted is greatly influenced by socioeconomic context and 
cultural attitudes in the regions in which the case study organizations operate in. This 
contextual significance is even more relevant for the current study as it analyses the adoption 
of the model which has originated in the backdrop of a developing country and is being applied 
in the contrasting context of developed countries. A critical realist case study approach is 
congruous with the institutional theory perspective adopted in the study, which is concerned 
with “clearly bounded but complex phenomena such as organizations, inter-organizational 
relationships or nets of connected organizations” (Easton, 2010: 123).  
There has been a recent call in literature for more qualitative research into organizational 
phenomena (Bluhm et al, 2011), a view that is coupled with a strong plea for adoption of a 
qualitative approach in the study of strategy and organizations such as this (Graebner et al. 
(2012). The rationales for adoption of such a line of thinking are:  
(i) A key purpose in qualitative approach such as this is to capture the subjective life 
experiences and interpretations of the informants. The institutional entrepreneurs in the UK 
and the USA have been engaged in significant efforts to address financial exclusion in their 
respective societies adopting an innovative model. This study attempts to understand how they 
perceive the reality and experience of using the model to perform this noble task.  
(ii) In cases where there is a lack of clear theory and a limited scope for current theory to be 
developed, it warrants a qualitative approach. This is relevant for the current study because it 
has been pointed out in the literature review that there have been very few studies with this 
focus and the current study fills a literature gap and addresses the void in the theoretical 
contributions. Thus, a qualitative case study methodology is appropriate for this case study 
because the central phenomenon, institutional entrepreneurship in the context of an emerging 
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field, microfinance in UK and USA, is not well understood or documented (Marshall and 
Rossman, 1995).  
(iii) The qualitative approach used in the current study is well-suited to investigating the 
processual factors in such organizations as the research may deal with multi-layered situations 
(often entrenched in subtle social relationships) and the temporal dynamics and the causal 
mechanisms associated with them in an effective and comprehensive manner (Gephart, 2004; 
Bluhm etl, 2011). The extent that social existence involves uncertainty, accounts of that 
existence ought to be able to tolerate those ambiguities and contradictions. This method 
incorporates these factors better than quantitative methods (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994).   
(iv) Along similar lines, qualitative research is seen as particularly important for management 
research (Gephart, 2004), which is trans-disciplinary in nature. This line of reasoning is 
particularly relevant as the current research on Grameen model that incorporates a number of 
concepts borrowing from diverse fields such as economics, finance, organization and 
sociology.  
(v) Finally, analysing and connecting all such factors mean that the resulting theory is likely to 
incorporate several abstract concepts which a qualitative approach may be able to better 
elucidate as the main advantages of qualitative data lies in their “vividness, concreteness, and 
richness” (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Graebner et al, 2012: 279). A qualitative case study 
method is suitable because it is appropriate for producing managerially relevant pertinent 
insight, as research is undertaken in close communication field professionals who navigate 





4.4 Methodological Tools 
The study uses a combination of interpretive and historical methods. These tools are employed 
to understand institutional changes. From such a perspective, each method may be better suited 
to analyse certain dimensions of change. Institutional change regarded as a major swing in 
conventional views is best analysed with interpretive methods, while change conceived as a 
complex process is best explained by historical methods (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2009). 
However, analysts opine that most exemplary papers use a combination of approaches to 
achieve a more rounded and all-encompassing understanding of the process of change.  The 
study follows this approach to deduce the impact of complex change processes involving 
economic, social and political factors on the different aspects of organizations (both observable 
and unobservable). Such an approach incorporates a combination of historical and interpretive 
methods to address the research questions raised. According to Welch et al (2011) a historical 
methodological insight resonates well with the philosophy of critical realism as it is linked to 
the contextualised explanations which look to elucidate why and how events take place.  
4.5 Research Stages 
The study holds on to a process of case study research. Stuart, et al. (2002) suggested such a 
work plan and process involving five critical stages, as is illustrated below in Figure 4.2 and 
Figure 4.3. 





Figure 4.3 Work Plan 
 
                            YEAR 1                               YEAR 2                                       YEAR 3-6      
 
Stage1 involves defining the research question and then the case-based investigator needs to 
develop measurement instruments to capture data for future analysis.  
Stage2 steps in conducting case research and develop a research instrument and select 
appropriate field sites.  
Stage3 engages in data gathering via selected quantitative and/or qualitative methods.  
Stage4, fundamental to research task, requires analysis and evaluation of the data and finding 
the best way of presentation.  
Stage5 involves final writing up of the dissertation, with preferred course may be, as advised 
by Yin, R. (2003), multiple-case designs over single-case designs, enabling greater 
generalisability of the research findings.  
This study also takes its lead from Eisenhardt (1989) who breaks down the case study research 







Table 4.1 Case study research Steps 
 
Steps  
1 Getting started 
 
2 Selecting Cases 
 
3 Crafting Instruments and 
Protocols 
 
4 Entering the field 
 
5 Analysing data 
 
6 Shaping Hypothesis 
 
7 Enfolding literature 
 
8 Reaching closure 
Whilst following the above steps the current research has adapted itself to the following lines 





4.5.1 Getting Started- Importance of well-defined focus 
 
Mintzberg (1979: 585)   writes: "No matter how small our sample or what our interest, we have 
always tried to go into organizations with well-defined focus to collect specific kinds of data 
systematically" Gephart (2004) supports this assertion as he points out that a lack of focus in 
qualitative research may lead the research into wrong directions. In line with the above 
reasoning, the current study has conducted an extensive literature review and identified the 
central focus on understanding institutional complexities of adopting the Grameen model in 
the context of developed countries and the response of the institutional entrepreneurs in 
tackling such challenges. The research questions, goals and objectives have been stated 
explicitly which in turn has guided the data analysis and research outcomes. Gephart (2004) 
also points out that where research questions are provided, the essential concepts associate with 
the questions are often poorly defined that results in ambiguity. The current study attends to 
this by clearly deconstructing and defining all concepts relevant to the questions.  
4.5.2 Selecting Cases 
 
Sampling of selected cases is a key step forward.  However, the rationale for selection of case 
studies should be clearly stated so as to enable the reader to comprehend the underlying 
reasoning for the selection of cases (Gibbert and Ruigrok, 2010; Cook & Campbell, 1979). 
Moreover, sampling must have theoretical focus, which conveys the sense that the selection of 
cases must be appropriate and relevant for elucidating and elaborating interactions and logical 
reasoning between notional constructs (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Single case studies 
may be useful for elaborating the prevalence and evolution of a phenomenon (Siggelkow, 
2007). However, a multiple case design is more preferable as it provides a more solid 
foundation for building theories as a result of groundedness, accuracy and generalizability 
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(Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Such designs facilitate comparisons which help 
to identify whether research outcomes are distinctive to a particular case or reliably applicable 
to several cases (Eisenhardt, 1991).  
In the current study, purposive sampling has been used to select nine case studies, which have 
tried to adopt the model (or a variant of the model) in the context of the UK and the USA (All 
case studies have been listed previously in Table 1.1 and brief details of each organisation have 
been provided in the Appendix). All of these cases studies are community development 
financial institutions as no bank has recently looked to adopt the model in the context of the 
UK and the USA.  
4.5.3 Crafting Instruments and Protocols  
Research in a study such as this entailed artful crafting of available mechanisms and protocols.  
Eisenhardt (1989) noted that the triangulation made possible by multiple data collection 
methods leads to stronger corroboration of constructs and hypotheses, particularly pointing to 
the combining of qualitative and quantitative evidence. Triangulation enables the researcher to 
investigate the same phenomenon from various angles (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Jick, 1979; 
Pettigrew, 1990; Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994; Gibbert and Ruigrok, 2010). 
Case study research can involve qualitative and/or quantitative data, i.e. each disjointedly or in 
combination of both (Yin, 1984). For the current research, quantitative data from various 
sources such as annual reports, research reports or any relevant documents archiving relevant 
information has been used to compare with qualitative data obtained from interviews. This 
helped in enlightening relationships which did not seem apparent initially. This also proved 
helpful in avoiding misleading patterns in the qualitative data. Furthermore, findings are 
strengthened when qualitative evidence is substantiated by quantitative data.  
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4.5.4 Entering the field 
Research in a microfinance field as is proposed in the current study may involve overlapping 
and adjustments. An overlapping in data collection is important as it provides the researcher 
with flexibility in assorting and cumulating of data and then enabling adjustments that can be 
made during the data collection process (Eisenhardt (1989). Field notes are suggested as 
equally important means of achieving the process of overlap and adjustment (Eisenhardt, 
1989). In accordance with such a process, an initial impression of the broad themes after each 
interview was written down and then compared with the actual transcripts.  
There is also further recommendation requiring additional adjustments that can be made to data 
collection instruments, such as the addition of questions to an interview protocol or questions 
to a questionnaire, which may well be helpful to probe developing themes (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
This was practiced during the current research. An example of this is that the questions placed 
to the management of the UK case studies were framed according to the response of the 
Grameen Trust authorities whom I had interviewed until then. Similarly, the following 
interviews that had been conducted with management staff of US organizations had 
incorporated the views of the interviews conducted earlier and the issues raised by 
interviewees. 
 
4.5.5 Data Collection and Analysis 
A critical realist case study approach necessitates data collection related to current and past 
events to identify the causal mechanisms behind the key phenomena being studied while still 
paying the attention to any concerns with construing the data connected to the real entities and 
their features (Welch et al., 2011). A critical realist can utilize both deductive and inductive 
cycles of data collection (Easton, 2010). This strategy is followed in the current study. Prior 
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constructs and potential causal mechanisms have been identified from extant literature and 
inductive data has been used to contrast and compare such concepts. Data collection and 
analysis procedures are similar to an important previous critical realist study of institutional 
entrepreneurship (Leca and Nacacche, 2006).  
However, further refinements are in order which are in accord with the needs of the current 
study. Key informants are viewed as the most insightful professionals of an organization with 
respect to the phenomena under study, as is suggested by Bluhm et al. (2011). The importance 
of loan officers who interact directly with clients as an important source of insights and 
information are emphasized in this context, as these personnel may be the most important link 
for certain research designs as they manage the relationship that MFIs projects have with the 
clients (Khavul, 2010). The key research question and theme around which the study revolves 
are the concepts of institutional entrepreneurship and institutional complexities of adopting the 
Grameen model in the context of developed countries. How such themes are perceived vary 
according to the personal interpretations of the institutional entrepreneurs concerned which in 
turn is influenced by the socio-economic and cultural context in which these projects operate.  
There is then the contextual nature of studies such as this, which is best analysed by using 
interviews (Myers, 2008). Such a view is echoed by analysts who point out that interviews are 
an effective method of data collection, particularly if the phenomenon being studied is highly 
periodic in nature (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).   As such, primary data has been collected 
by conducting semi-structured interviews (details provided below in Table 4.1) with the 
institutional entrepreneurs who endeavoured to adopt the model and key decision makers 
within case studies chosen for their knowledge of the strategic management processes, group 
dynamics, and interactions. It is also viewed that informant bias caused by retrospective 
sensemaking or image management can be addressed by selecting interviewees from different 
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hierarchal levels or from other relevant organizations to get a different insight into the same 
phenomena (Eisenhardt and Grabener, 2007). Thus, in order to incorporate this strategy, some 
interviews were conducted with experts from the Grameen Trust (the arm of Grameen 
responsible for replication of the model worldwide).  
In order to alleviate analytical bias another key strategy suggested is to synthesize retrospective 
and real-time cases (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Leonard- Barton, 1990).  The importance 
of such strategies for complex macro level studies in analytical processes also found emphasis 
for strategy formulation and innovation (Langley, 1999). The current research followed this 
strategy. Retrospective cases include former MFI projects (such as Street-Cred and Full-Circle, 
none of which no longer exist), but both of which tried to adopt the Grameen model. The 
inclusion of both MFIs has enabled the researcher to get a deeper insight as a result of additional 
informants, with an added advantage of greater number of cases. Such retrospective 
perceptions enabled the researcher to comprehend the manner in which institutions surfaced, 
sustained and faded away (Welch et al, 2011).  On the other hand, real-time cases such as Fair 
Finance and Street-UK have proved very useful as they seemingly shifted to a different model; 
yet the data may very well be used to analyse the longitudinal nature of institutional changes 
and the strategies revolving around such changes. The study was defined in terms of national 
boundaries and restricted to data collection in 3 countries (UK, USA and Bangladesh) (Ruef 
and Scott, 1998; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Khavul et al., 2013).  
All interviews have been conducted face to face. The interviews have been recorded for ease 
of storage and transcribing (with the exception of one interview where notes were taken 
instead). This method seems particularly effective at producing data which deal with topics in 
depth and in detail, based on informants’ priorities and are flexible (Yin 1994; Fontana and 
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Frey 2003; Bryman, 2004; Denscombe 2007, Siwale et al., 2007, Maykut and Morehouse, 
1994, LIewellyn, 2001).  
In contrast to other methods, face to face semi-structured interviews puts the interviewer and 
the interviewee as coequals reducing ethical concerns, making the interviewee more of an 
“informant” than a respondent (Yin, 1994). Such a method is also recommended for its ability 
to capture “raw data” as compared to structured interviews that are based on past theory (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967). There is the ability in this method to gain access to the “unsolicited data”, 
(general chat) after the actual interview of which most researchers have found at times to be 
very resourceful and truthful than the recorded data as one would not achieve this through most 
methods (Bryman, 2004).  
Interviews varied between 40 minutes to 2 hours and averaged 1.5 hours. The research adopted 
the strategy, as is suggested by Miles and Huberman (1984: 233), to address informant bias 
caused by reconstructive rationality. The researcher was cautious not to impose preconceived 
concepts or notions to influence the response of the informant (Gibbert and Ruigrok, 2010). 
The questions were designed in accordance with suggestion of Blaxter et al (2006) to keep 
them clearly structured and relevant for research objectives. The questions were also relevant 
to the research purpose in order to promote validity (Gray, 2009). About 15 to 20 questions 
were asked in each interview. Some questions were standard and were asked to all the 
management personnel associated with the case studies. Some additional questions were asked 
which varied according to the response of the interviewee.  An illustrative list of questions is 
included in the Appendix (Table A.6).  20 interviews were conducted with 17 interviewees, out 
of which 14 were microfinance executives and board members of the US and the UK projects. 
The remaining 3 interviewees were microfinance experts from GT. They were chosen because 
of their deep knowledge and expertise on the global replication of the Grameen model. It was 
not possible to interview clients of the organisations as access was not granted due to concerns 
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about confidentiality. Table 4.1 below shows the profile of the interviewees and the 
organizations they belong to: 
Table 4.1 List of Interviewees 
Interviewees Position Organization 
Microfinance 
Executives 
(ME # in the 
text) 
  
ME # 1 Founder and Director, Board member, 
Former Co-ordinator (EEMC) 
Fair finance/ EEMC 
ME # 2  Founder and former Co-ordinator Street Cred 
ME # 3 Founder and Former Director Street-UK 
ME # 4 Manager Account 3 
ME # 5 Chief Executive Officer (former) Grameen in the UK 
ME # 6 Chief Operating Officer (former) Grameen in the UK 
ME # 7 Founder and Co-ordinator Passage from India/WEvolution 
ME # 8 Former Director of Loan Fund Full Circle Fund 
ME # 9 Chief Advisor Grameen America 
ME # 10 National Director Grameen America 
ME # 11 Senior Manager (Operations Support) Grameen America 
ME # 12 Branch Manager (Long Island City- 
New York) 
Grameen America 
ME # 13 Former Executive Director Project Enterprise 
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ME # 14 Former Director of Programs Project Enterprise 
 
Experts (EX 
# in the text) 
  
EX # 1 Managing Director and Board Member Grameen Trust, Grameen 
America 
EX # 2 General Manager Grameen Trust 
EX # 3 Head of Training Grameen Trust 
 
The data analysis comprised of four phases explained below:  
Phase 1- A narrative account was developed (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988, Maguire et al., 
2004), which established the chronology of the crucial events surrounding the projects adopting 
the Grameen model in the context of UK and the US tracing their emergence, progress and 
evolution since inception.   
There are several purposes for using a narrative strategy. Firstly, it serves as a device for 
organizing data (Eisenhardt, 1989). It is useful for integrating an analytical perspective in order 
to identify initial analytical themes and deduce causal linkages (Pettigrew: 1990:280). Some 
analysts postulate that organization theorists often have to decide on theorizing processes 
within a narrative framework or a generalizing analytical model (Whipp & Clark, 1986:17-18). 
However, others contend that the research may be structured in ways to integrate both analytic 
and narrative schemas, even suggesting that such an approach may be appropriate for 
theoretical papers based on institutional logics which is a key theoretical perspective in the 
current study (Hassard and Decker, 2014). This approach, known as analytically structured 
history, forms an integral strategy in this paper. It is a method which is used to construct 
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narrative from organizational archives. It maintains narrative as a key source of analysis, 
emphasizing concepts, events and causal linkages (Hassard and Decker, 2014). This strategy 
thus drew upon all relevant existing research, internal documents, reports and media coverage. 
It assisted the researcher in getting a broad understanding of the important events which had 
transpired shaping the activities of the institutional entrepreneurs since the projects began. A 
temporal bracketing strategy was used to identify key transition phases for the case studies 
to compare and contrast the changes in strategy and context (Van de Ven and Poole, 2007).  
Phases are described as “relatively distinctive and coherent clusters of activity, temporally 
bracketed, and organized around common themes (Abbott, 1984 and 2001; Langley and Truax, 
1994; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2009: 184). Institutional theorists are increasingly cognisant 
of the reality that institutions are an outcome of intricate layers of historical challenges, crises 
and attritions (Cooper et al., 1996; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2009). The paper acknowledges 
these factors and in accordance with suggestions by Alford (1998), it pays significant attention 
to the historical context and the actual social processes and interactions that are associated with 
the data (Alford, 1998: 122). The temporal decomposition strategy provides stimulating 
insights for the analysis of such processes. This decomposition facilitates the study of how 
strategic actions in one period is linked to the other and the role of the evolving contexts 
(Langley, 1999). In doing so, the paper responds to calls from authors such as Barnett and 
Burgelman (1996) who suggest that strategic research should emphasize how strategy has 
evolved rather than being prescriptive about implementation of strategy (Langley et al, 2007).  
Phase 2- The study identified key themes based on the existing literature in order to construct 
relevant questions. This helped me to locate key actors within the field who were institutional 
entrepreneurs leading the process of introducing the model in the UK and USA. I then 
corroborated my understanding of the major events established in our narrative account in 
Stage 1 with the interviewees. As mentioned above, the study followed a purposive sampling 
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process in accordance with qualitative case study research principles. The data was being 
analysed simultaneously as it emerged and additional interviews was being conducted on the 
basis of this concurrent research. 
Phase 3- At this stage, the study grouped the interviews according to the organizations they 
are linked with. For example, Interviews with ME#1, ME#2 and ME#4 were grouped together 
as they were all associated with EEMC. Similarly, all interviews from the Grameen Trust 
authorities were grouped together.   
Coding is the process of condensing data sets into analysable units by creating categories from 
the data is known as coding (Atkinson and Coffey, 1996).  Coding has been used to examine 
the data and group them according to major themes. This was principally an inductive process 
of open coding of focusing on interviews which reflected on the process of introduction of the 
Grameen model by the case study projects, the operational challenges they had faced and their 
responses to such challenges.  This helped to compare and identify patterns (Kvale, 1996), 
locate any inconsistencies in the data and interrogate data in a more systematic manner (Yin, 
2003; Maguire et al., 2004). Further, this process was important to avoid “data asphyxiation” 
(Pettigrew, 1990). N-Vivo software has been used in this research project to ease and facilitate 
data storage and analysis.  
Operational features were often compared across the cases in my study for in depth analysis. 
In doing so, the goal was to avoid information processing bias. Some of the common pitfalls 
have been mentioned as jumping to conclusions despite having limited data (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1973), being swayed by the vividness in the data (Nisbett & Ross, 1980) or by more 
influential respondents (Miles & Huberman, 1984) or overlooking fundamental statistical 
properties (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).  The key to avoid such problems, according to 
Eisenhardt (1989), is to look at data in many ways. In accordance with the principle suggested 
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by Eisenhardt (1989), two strategies were adopted in this regard. Firstly, a category was chosen 
and then similarities and differences were identified within and across groups. Examples of 
this are categories such as loan recovery and sustainability in Chapter 2. Secondly, various data 
sources were considered as well when comparing data. So, an example is when a manager 
mentioned about a certain aspect of their operation during an interview, this would be compared 
to published qualitative and quantitative data in a research report. This enabled finding to be 
more robust if a trend from one data source was supported by patterns from the other. However, 
divergent patterns can cause the researcher to synthesize findings through an in-depth analysis 
of the interpretation of the differences (Eisenhardt, 1989). Informant bias is another potential 
problem of the qualitative approach being adopted in this study (Gardener et al., 2012). A 
number of strategies was adopted to address this issue in accordance with suggestions by 
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007). Real-time and retrospective data has been collected by 
utilizing interviews of both current and past management of case study projects. In addition, 
data has been triangulated by comparing interviews of independent evaluative experts and 
miscellaneous archival sources such as research reports.  
Phase 4- The study, at this stage, clustered the data according to responses to the primary 
questions (Lofland, 1976; Battilana and Dorado, 2010). This helped to ascertain broad 
emergent themes without introducing premature analytical bias. 
Phase 5- Retroduction is a core epistemological process in critical realism. It involves 
incessantly moving back and forth in the research process until epistemological closure can be 
achieved (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). The outcome of this process was to identify causal 





4.5.6 Shaping Hypothesis 
Shaping of hypothesis in research and the use of related theoretical constructs are major 
challenges facing analysis. Efforts have been underway in tracking down emergent trends, 
patterns and relationships amongst variables both within and across cases. The goal is set to 
build a theory which fits the data closely. Precisely that is suggested by analysts for use of 
tables and visual devices to encapsulate case evidence for demonstrating depth and detail 
(Eisenhardt and Grabener, 2007). Tables can be used to condense a significant amount of 
qualitative data and present in an effective and lucid way. Such tables may be important for 
creating a strong connection from qualitative evidence to theoretical testing of research finding. 
Such tables have also been used effectively in previous research studies (Graebner, 2004; 
Gilbert, 2005; and Zott and Huy, 2007). Thus, tables have been used to summarize and 
elucidate findings in the current study based on the constructs used (Miles & Huberman, 1984; 
Sutton & Callahan, 1987; Eisenhardt, 1989)  
A verification process is often suggested to deduce whether the emergent relationships fit with 
the evidence in each case (Eisenhardt, 1989).  There is also a reasoning that different cases 
should be considered as experiments which confirm or disconfirms the relationships (Yin, 
1984). Cases which confirmed the relationships is used to augment the validity of the findings 
and the cases which disconfirmed anticipated relationships is considered as an opportunity to 
refine and extend the theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). An example of this is Street-cred, which 
experienced low recovery rates even though it served only female clients unlike other case 
studies in the study such as GB and Full Circle. Looking at the data more closely revealed that 
the selection procedures at Street Cred were different to other organizations which may be an 
important cause of the differences in recovery rates. This was validated by the microfinance 
officials at EEMC who identified selection strategies as a crucial factor resulting in low 
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recovery rates at Street Cred12. Piekkari et al. (2011) distinguish between four types of methods 
of theorizing from case studies: inductive theory-building, interpretive sensemaking, natural 
experiment and contextualized explanation. They go on to place the different methods on a 
spectrum (ranging from weak to strong) based on emphasis on contextualization and 
explanation. This is illustrated in the Figure 4.4 below. 
Figure 4.4 Four Methods of theorising from case studies  
 
(Source: Piekkari et al., 2011). 
As can be seen from Fig 4.4, contextualised explanation can be an effective way of theorizing 
from case studies, as it balances trade-off problems between contextualisation and causal 
explanation with a strong emphasis on both unlike the other methods. This method is based on 
the contention that contextual richness is retained rather than eliminated by causal explanations 
produced by case studies. The positivist interpretations of causation with its emphasis on 
regularity and abstraction from time and place is ignored in favour of a more nuanced 
understanding that appreciates the evolving nature of the cause and effect relationship (Piekkari 
et al., 2011). In adopting this approach to theorising, the study balances the trade off between 
                                                             
12 (ME#1, 2014) 
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the emphasis on internal validity in positivist studies and the focus on thick descriptions in 
interpretive paradigms.  
4.5.7 Enfolding literature 
As research enters into a mature stage, it is pertinent to enfold the emergent trends and 
relationships. The study takes care to constantly compare and identify similarities and 
contradictions with the existing literature. Any similarity was seen as promoting internal 
validity, generalizability and a deeper conceptual level in the theory. Eisenhardt (1989: 11) 
writes, “The juxtaposition of conflicting results forces researchers into a more creative, frame 
breaking mode of thinking than they might otherwise be able to achieve. The result can be 
deeper insight into the emergent theory and the conflicting literature, as well as sharpening of 
the limits to generalizability of the focal research.” This is the approach which was followed 
in the current research as any contradiction of the findings with the extant literature was taken 
an opportunity to sharpen theory. 
4.5.8 Reaching closure 
The case study research process is particularly useful for generating original theory. Fresh 
insights often emerge as a result of collocation of conflicting or inconsistent evidence 
(Cameron & Quinn, 1988). The continuous process of this alignment of contradictory or 
paradoxical evidence has greater potential in producing insightful theories than armchair 
axiomatic reasoning (Bartunek, 1988). The construction of theory from case study research is 
significantly iterative in nature (Eisenhardt, 1989). Throughout the process, the research went 
back and forth between different stages as new data emerged. For example, the research 
questions were continuously refined as more cases were analysed and cross compared. 
Theoretical saturation was achieved when there was insignificant additional learning from 
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either adding more cases or further iteration between theory and data (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967).  
4.6 Limitations 
Research in fields like MFIs originating from a developing society moving through continents 
across shores and being replicated in totally differing setting of developed societies cannot but 
have some limitations. In research such as this there are obvious constraining issue areas akin 
to cultural variations, differences in social milieu, and more importantly disparities in economic 
contexts. There may also be incompatible practices in operational spheres.  For instance, 
research using data collected from loan officers may be subject to bias as such officers’ face 
increasing pressure to highlight the positive aspects of their organization, a point specifically 
made in a relevant study (Khavul, 2010).  
However, in the context of the current research, such pressures did not subsist for the four UK 
case studies, as the projects are no longer in existence. For other case study organizations, the 
questionnaire has been carefully designed and structured to avoid any kind of bias. The use of 
retrospective interviews presents an additional challenge, as data may be affected by poor 
memory or self-serving interests of participants (Barley, 1990; Golden, 1992; Laurila, 1997; 
Suddaby and Greenwood, 2009). These were addressed in a number of ways. Firstly, there was 
a focus on verifiable details and actions, rather than principles or meanings (Golden, 1992). 
Secondly, data was triangulated using multiple sources wherever possible (Jick, 1979). There 
were some issues which could have been better explored if clients were interviewed. However, 
this was simply not possible for case study institutions which no longer exist and access was 
denied for clients for others citing confidentiality and sensitivity as factors. The study is also 
very contextual in nature which limits its generalizability to a certain extent.  
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Nevertheless, the complex and interconnected nature of processes unfolding over time 
necessitated an approach which focused on a specific number of case studies. Another 
limitation revolves around the specificity as the study focuses on projects adopting the 
Grameen model. The distinctive nature of the model along with its unique adoption and 
application in the context of high-income economies such as the UK and USA may have 
significant implications for the process of institutional entrepreneurship.   
As the research uses semi-structured interviews as a key source of data, it faces the issue of the 
double hermeneutics (as is suggested in Woodside et al., 2005). This refers to the additional 
dimension of intricacy as a result of the researcher having to interpret the interpretations of the 
interviewee. This in turn may be influenced by the entirety of a researcher’s background, 
education, experience, social status (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983; Maxwell, 1992, Bluhm 
et al. 2011). Indeed, a qualitative research of this nature may be fraught with issues of 
reflexivity. Reflexivity may be defined as the scrutinization of personal opinions, attitudes and 
beliefs over the entirety of the research process and how research may have impacted by these 
factors. This involves questioning one’s own assumptions embedded into the researcher’s mind 
which may cause bias in understanding or interpreting findings. Finlay (1998) stresses that this 
demands honesty from the researcher who should have the ability to accept that he/she is a part 
of the process and has the ability to influence it.  For this research, this involved constantly 
weighing up all dimensions of a finding whether positive or negative.   
 In addition to these issues, there are number of weaknesses/ limitations associated with using 
critical realism as an interpretive paradigm. It could be criticised on the ground of being too 
realist by interpretivists and not being sufficiently realist by positivists. It can be often difficult 
to understand for a non-specialist audience. Critical realism is a meta theory which does not 
offer a comprehensive procedure for doing social research. It may be considered as more of a 
philosophical position consisting of three layers: empirical data, the theories that we use to 
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explicate this data and metatheoretical stance behind our theories. Being pretty mindful of the 
foregoing limitations, a scrupulous effort has been made in the succeeding chapters to hold on 

















CHAPTER 5 INSTITUTIONAL 
COMPLEXTIES- UK CASE STUDIES 
Introduction 
The study herein analyses the institutional complexities faced by the MFI initiatives in UK in 
implementing the Grameen model towards achieving their objectives at a micro-level. In the 
backdrop of diagnosis offered and analytical gaps identified in the literature review, the 
following key research question is addressed in the current chapter:  
‘What is the nature of the institutional complexities of implementing the Grameen model in 
UK?’ 
In addressing the above key question, this chapter draws on the experiences of seven 
organisations, six of which operated the Grameen model in the past and two of which adopted 
the model recently (However, it should be noted that one case study adopted a variant of the 
model) and evaluates the adaptability of the Grameen model in UK13. The case studies are 













Table 5.1 Brief details of the UK case study organizations 
Name of organisation Periods in which Grameen 
model/variant of group 
lending model was used 
Periods of operation 




Account 3 1999-2004 1999-present 
East End Microcredit 
Consortium (EEMC)/ Fair 
finance 
1999-2005 EEMC- 1999-2004 
Fair finance- 2004- present 
Full Circle Fund (Weetu) 1998- 2013 1987-2013 
Grameen in the UK  
 
2014-2018 2014-2018 
WEvolution 2011-present 2011-present 
 
It is worth noting that EEMC has metamorphosed into a new CDFI known as Fair Finance and 
WEvolution offers a variant of the peer group lending model. Furthermore, the outreach 
organizations responsible for providing the loans on behalf of East End Microcredit 
Consortium (EEMC) were Street-Cred and Account3. 
Chapter 5 is structured as follows: 
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Section 5.1 explains the institutional complexities of the loan recovery process at the UK 
initiatives. Section 5.2 explores the regulatory constraints faced by the case study organizations 
and their implications. The client training methods at the case study organizations are analysed 
in Section 5.3.   The challenges and issues surrounding the outreach efforts of the MFIs are 
scrutinized in section 5.4. In each section, the study follows a chronological approach in firstly 
analysing the retrospective case studies (i.e. the case studies which operated the model in the 
past) followed by looking at the more recent case studies. The conclusion sums up the findings 
and reflects on further research.  
5.1 Loan Recovery 
This is the first element of the theoretical framework (provided in Figure 2.1- Chapter 2). For 
replication of the Grameen model, Yunus clearly emphasized recovery rates (Yunus, 1998). 
“In replicating Grameen,” as he states, “one must remember from the beginning that, if 
recovery rate is not near 100%, no matter how good it looks, it is not Grameen. All the strength 
of Grameen comes from its near perfect recovery performance.” (Yunus, 1998: 181). A key 
strength of Grameen peer group lending is its ability to overcome adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems that conventional mainstream financial institutions face. This is exemplified 
by Grameen’s recovery rate which has consistently been very high since inception. The 
recovery rates for year 2002 to 2020 have been consistently high and currently stands at 
99.85%14 (Grameen Bank, 2020). The annual recovery rates for the past UK case studies along 








                                                             
14 See Table A.1 (Appendix). 
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Table 5.2 Potential reasons for high/low loan recovery   
Case studies Recovery Rate Self-Selection Focus on Women Potential reasons for high/low 
recovery rate 
Street-UK 63%   Lack of risk diversification, Low 
group cohesion, Diverse 
background of clients, Improper 
usage of loan funds, High 
percentage of male clients 
Street-Cred 60%   Client selection by development 
workers, Ineffective debt collection 
practices, Cultural Issues 
Account 3 96%   Features of the lending program 
similar to Grameen model with 
respect of self-selection and focus 
on women 
Full Circle 96%   Features of the lending program 
similar to Grameen model with 
respect of self-selection and focus 
on women 
 
Table 5.2 is now explained in greater details. Some of the core reasons attributed to the high 
recovery rates achieved by Grameen Bangladesh is the focus on self-selection and women. 
Member know each other for a long period of time in close knit neighbourhoods which enables 
them to be a good judge of other borrowers. There is also a focus on women as Grameen piloted 
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the program with mixed gender membership and found male members to be non-compliant 
with the usage of loans and repayment. Unlike Grameen, recovery rates were consistently low 
for several UK programs. One of these was Street-UK, for which the recovery rates were about 
63% (shown in Table 5.2 above).  The experiences of Street-UK are thus contrary to the 
Grameen model. The Street-UK management felt that clients were coming together for the sake 
of getting the loan rather than genuinely knowing and trusting each other15. The selection 
process was thus weakened by the disjointed nature of groups at Street-UK. Members were 
often detached and knew each other for a brief period; the strength of the bond amongst the 
borrowers hence suffered as a result in comparison to the nature of the relationships formed 
amongst GB members whose relationships were long lasting due to being familiar with each 
other for long periods and living next to each other. Thus, social collateral did not replace 
physical collateral as is expected under circumstances where GB model is implemented.  
ME#316 points to an absence of social cohesion as a key factor behind the low recovery rates 
at Street-UK. Copisarow (2004) also underlined the corrosion of customary communal bonds 
in an earlier study. This has surfaced as a major worry owing to weakening family attachments; 
which in turn has adverse implications for insulation against risk for individual family 
members. Studies in the US have shown similar patterns (Schreiner and Woller, 2003; 
Schreiner, 2001). It is particularly relevant in the UK, as it shows that social capital is habitually 
fragile in the western world. People in the west, most often than not, make their livelihoods 
from wage-earning or official/public support, without the necessity of forming an endured 
socioeconomic bonding.  
It is impossible to compare the UK with Bangladesh (where high recovery rates have been 
achieved) without considering the difference in the contextual scenarios.  In a country like 
                                                             
15 (ME#3, 2014) 
16 (ME#3, 2014). A.13 (Appendix) provides background on Street-UK.  
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Bangladesh where social linkages exist within the marketplace, people trade/haggle over prices 
every day, whereas in comparison clients in UK often are diverse, making it difficult to form 
homogeneous groups. Hofstede identified an important dimension for analysing national 
culture: the level of individualism or collectivism prevailing in a society (Hofstede, 1980; 
Hofstede, 2011; Hui & Triandis, 1986; Kagitcibasi, 1997; Sinha & Verma, 1987; Triandis, 
1995).   The one company approach on the basis of which Hofstede derives his findings on an 
entire culture has also been challenged by several authors (Graves, 1986; Olie, 1995).The 
theory has also been criticised by authors such as McSweeney (2002) as being overly reliant 
on questionable assumptions such as generalisation about national factors based on a limited 
number of questionnaires. Along similar lines, Schwartz (1999) also questioned the legitimacy 
of surveys to estimate cultural differences across regions. Dorfman and Howell (1988) 
questioned the practice of using individual assessments to make overall conclusions about an 
entire community. Furthermore, variables such as Uncertainty avoidance (the  extent to which 
a society feels susceptible to uncertain circumstances and act accordingly to avoid such 
situations) may be highly transitory and heavily influenced by the time in which the 
questionnaires were completed (Sondergaard, 1994; Newman, 1996). Despite the criticisms 
mentioned above, Hofstede’s research has been highly popular amongst academics and 
practitioners compared to other models (Furrer et al., 2000; Ross 1999; Sondergaard 1994). 
Hofstede’s methods were backed by a rigorous design, systematic data collection and clear 
rationales (Jones and Alony, 2007). A bibliographical analysis conducted by Sondergaard 
(1994) comprised of 61 replications. Majority of the studies were in line with Hofstede’s 
predictions. Other studies have been developed with the purpose of testing relevancy have also 
confirmed the accuracy of Hofstede’s four dimensions (Jones and Alony, 2007). 
It is thus useful to understand the differences in socio-cultural milieu which seemingly 
influence the adoption of this model in UK and Bangladesh using Hofstede’s framework.  
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Collective communities are exemplified by a strong socio-kinship bonding between members 
who prioritise collective objectives over individual goals which in turn guides the actions and 
behaviour of the members (Hui & Triandis, 1986; Triandis, 2001).  Contrastingly, 
individualism is characterized by autonomous members where individual goals dominate 
collective objectives (Hofstede,1980; Hofstede, 2011; Schvaneveldt & Behnke, 2012). UK was 
found to be the most individualist country in the world by one study (Alleyne, 2009). This is 
confirmed by an analysis by the Hofstede Centre which scored countries according to their 
level of individualism on a scale of 0-100. The study rates UK as one of the most individualist 
societies with a very high score of 89, and points out how individualist thinking is prescribed 
and reinforced in British children from an early age. It also reflects on the pervasive nature of 
the ‘ME’ culture in the UK society fuelled by enhanced prosperity and a proliferating 
consumerist culture (The Hofstede Insights, 2020). On the other hand, Bangladesh is 
considered to be a collective society with a very low level of individualism as shown by its low 
score of 20.  
 




Figure 5.1 Individualism in UK and Bangladesh  
(Source: The Hofstede insights, 2020) 
This can be attributed to the loyal nature of relationships in the Bengali society based on 
strength of association between extended families or networks. In such societies, there is a 
strong sense of responsibility towards other members and transgression at the cost of collective 
goals is considered to be a disgrace (The Hofstede Insights, 2020). It follows that the ‘moral 
responsibility’ that Grameen model requires individual members to undertake on behalf of all 
group members resonates very well with the collectivist nature of the Bangladeshi society. 
Further, the threat of censure by the society if one does not act in accordance with the 
collectivist objectives of the group and the community seems to be more credible in the case 
of a collectivist country such as Bangladesh and hence may lead to enhanced repayment rates 
for GB. The counterargument to this line of thinking may be that some of the initiatives (for 
example, Street-Cred and Street-UK) worked with many clients originating from collectivist 
societies such as Bangladesh and Pakistan (which according to the Hofstede Centre has an even 
lower score for individualism at 14) but still failed to thrive. The immigration assimilation 
hypothesis may be relevant to understanding this phenomenon. According to this theory, 
migrants’ length of stay is proportional to growing approval for the host country’s culture and 
a corresponding reduction in the traditional culture of the origin county (Gupta, 1975; Al-
Mubarak & Adamchak, 1994; Ayçiçegi-Dinn, & Caldwell-Harris, , 2011) Most of the migrant 
client served by the UK MFIs were second or third generation UK citizens who had lived in 
the host country for a reasonably long period which meant that they possibly identified more 
with the individualism ascribed by the UK society rather than the collectivism of their 
respective host countries, hence rendering the use of the Grameen model ineffective.  
In the case of Street-UK, there was also a high concentration of risk, meaning that people in 
the same borrowing circle often develop relationships, being involved in similar kind of 
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business both prior to and after joining the group and are exposed to the same risks. 
Diversification of risk by group members being engaged in different types of businesses may 
make sense from a financial perspective. However, the essence of Grameen model is to 
naturally allow the groups to self-select and form without dictation vis-a-vis any aspect of 
group formation. The emphasis is on ensuring the formation of social collateral within the 
groups. Thus, Grameen model has no restriction concerning the types of businesses the 
entrepreneurs may start; members of the same group can also get involved in similar kinds of 
businesses if there be substantial demand within that particular area for a specific type of 
product or services17. Innovative solutions are also required to resolve demand-supply issues 
sometimes. One interviewee, cited the example of production of milk in certain regions of 
Bangladesh as a common business taken up by group members. In such areas, supply of milk 
may exceed demand and drive prices down and make it unprofitable for borrowers who supply 
milk and hence unsustainable for Grameen to lend to such borrowers. In such cases, Grameen 
motivates the borrowers to take loan for purchasing milk and supplying it to towns which need 
the product thus improving the overall supply-chain for milk in the entire region. Nevertheless, 
Grameen does encourage diversification to clients enabling them to engage in ranges of 
business18 . As listed in Table A.2 (Appendix A) shows that Grameen members in a group 
diversify risk by participating in trading of various products and services which range from 
paddy husking to rickshaw purchase.  
The recovery rates for the Full-Circle Fund has been approximately 96% throughout the course 
of its operation19. The high recovery rates of the Full-Circle Fund (which was operated by 
WEETU) should be treated with caution, given the low number of clients that subscribed to the 
                                                             
17 (EX#3, 2013) 
18 (EX#1, 2013) (EX#3, 2013) 
19 Collected by Author 
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service. Unlike Street-UK, diversification was not an issue for Full-Circle as clients would 
form groups because of personal connections rather being in a similar kind of business20.  
Annual recovery rates21 for Street-Cred and Account3 were 60% and 96%. The former 
management of EEMC attribute a number of reasons for this low recovery rate that Street-Cred 
experienced. These include clients not valuing the groups and feeling responsible for making 
payments towards the group, lenient collection practices in terms of lack of enforcement by 
Street-Cred and the quality of businesses started by the clients. Furthermore, Street-Cred 
adopted a practice of cash collection during the group meetings. It was felt that this was a 
laborious process of collecting repayments and the higher collections were from automatic 
collection methods22. The selection method practiced by Street-Cred may have been another 
major reason for the poor recovery rates. The practice was for the development workers to 
select the members of a group, as Street-Cred found it difficult to get clients to self-select each 
other and form groups23. This represents a marked deviation from the self-selection process of 
the Grameen model, a core feature creating awareness and responsibility among group 
members that helped it to overcome asymmetric information problems leading to high recovery 
rates in Bangladesh.24. The willingness to form groups is also an indication of the necessity and 
urgency on the part of borrowers to be involved in the process. If an individual is needy, there 
will be greater effort from the borrower into forming an effective group25. Not unsurprisingly 
most of the Street-Cred clients did not attach any importance to the group nor felt an obligation 
to repay the loans as group members were selected by development workers of Street-Cred.  
The cultural issues at Street-cred were also problematic. Women from particular ethnic 
minority groups were very difficult to work with because traditionally they carry a more 
                                                             
20 (ME#8, 2014) 
21 Collected by Author 
22 (ME#1, 2014) 
23 (ME#2, 2014) 
24 (EX#1, 2013) (EX#2, 2013) 
25 (EX#1, 2013) (EX#2, 2013) 
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passive approach to work, not actually encouraged to go outside their home. The local 
indigenous population was also a group particularly hard to work with because many came 
from families unemployed for 2/3 generations, were entirely reliant on the benefit system, and 
suffered from lost hope and confidence26.  
Account3 was the other outreach organization used by EEMC. In contrast to Street-cred, 
Account3 had managed to achieve a high recovery rate. Interestingly, the features of the 
program that Account3 ran was more similar to Grameen in comparison to Street-Cred as they 
were getting clients to self-select to form groups and their service was entirely focused on 
women.  However, it is important to note that the management of Account3 feel that the high 
recovery rates is more attributable to the fact that the clients looked up to Account3 as the peer 
and relied on the organization rather than the social collateral effect produced by the lending 
model27. 
 An interesting similarity between most of the UK projects achieving high recovery rates was 
that all of them adopted a model more akin to Grameen’s where members of a group self-select 
each other.  Street-UK was an exception to this because its annual recovery rate was low (63%) 
even though it practiced self-selection. However, a fundamental difference between the three 
schemes (Street-Cred, Account 3 and Full-Circle) and Street-UK is that the other schemes offer 
their credit to women-only groups, while Street-UK offered its loans to both sexes28 
(approximately 65% men). A focus on female membership is an important factor which is 
attributed to the high recovery rates achieved by Grameen, given the fact that membership of 
women has increased exponentially for GB, currently stands at a staggering 97% (Grameen 
                                                             
26 (ME#2, 2014) 
27 (ME#4, 2014) 
28 (ME#3, 2014) 
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Bank, 2020). This is recognized as one of the main reasons that Grameen has been able to 
maintain high recovery rates during its operations29.  
Yunus himself rested his faith in gender empowerment and perceives women as better 
borrowers in general than men. His experiences in Grameen substantiate his belief that women 
were much more judicious in usage of loans than men who were often foolish and bent on 
wasting the money immediately on financially impractical activities, including entertainment 
of friends or other forms of amusements. He also came to recognize the noticeable 
improvements in the socio-economic conditions of the children if women, rather than men, 
received the loans. Such a phenomenon Yunus attributed to the basic expertise women gained 
over many years being deprived in a poor family30. Even at Street-UK, over the course of its 
operations, women have been better at repayment than men lending further credence to this 
argument31. Thus, although Street-UK practiced self-selection methods for clients it deviated 
from the Grameen practice of forming groups with predominantly female clients. This may be 
one of the causes for its poor recovery rates during the group lending phase.  
It is interesting to compare GU’s recent experiences of using the model to the retrospective 
case studies. The lending process at GU started with the self-selection of 5 individuals. Their 
training requirements were then assessed by GU which tailored and provided it according to 
their needs. During the training, members committed to building savings. After completion of 
the training, each member was provided with a business loan worth £1000 which may be used 
either to initiate a business or invest towards an existing business. The members were then 
required to meet with a lending officer at meetings which were held weekly and pay weekly 
                                                             
29 Studies undertaken by Grameen confirm that women perform better in repaying their loan compared to the 
opposite sex (Yunus, 1998). 
30 Dr. Muhammad Yunus, Founder and Managing Director of Grameen Bank in his writings advises any 
replications of the Grameen model to focus services on the poorest women (Yunus, 1998).  This clearly was not 
followed by Street-UK who had a larger proportion of men in their groups. 
31 (ME#3, 2014) 
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agreed instalments. If all agreed instalments were paid back on time, the group members 
became eligible to progress on to larger loans worth £2500 in Year 2 and £5000 in Year 3. 
Group members could open bank accounts with Tesco Bank or Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) 
if they did not already have existing bank accounts. Each group was represented by a Chair and 
Vice Chair. The business proposals along with their probability of success were mutually 
discussed amongst group members following which a joint decision was made on the approval 
for the loan application by the Chair along with the GU loan officer. The interest rate in year 
1, 2 and 3 were 23.95%, 20.95% and 17.95% respectively. Importantly, the group members 
only undertook moral responsibility for each other’s action, and were not thus financially 
accountable for the default of any group members32.  
The process at WEvolution is based on the self-help group (SHG) model of India. The groups 
are called self-reliant groups (SRG), which is thought to be a more relevant label in the local 
context. There are two types of SRG formed at WEvolution. The first is a version where the 
SRG works towards a collective business jointly owned by all the group members with the 
profits to be collected by a person nominated by the group and any employee of the business 
would also get a wage for their services. The second version is where all members have their 
own separate businesses but belong to the same group. In both cases, a system of joint liability 
is followed for loans whereby members are financially responsible for the default of any 
members within the group. WEvolution also expects members to contribute regularly towards 
a common savings pot. However, it does not dictate any specific amount for this purpose.   
The annual recovery rate at Grameen was 82%33. The figures seem somewhat underwhelming 
compared to GB especially given the low number of clients which were being served at GU 
and appeared to indicate major problems with loan recovery. This is even more apparent GU 
                                                             
32 (ME#5, 2014)  
33 (ME#6, 2016) 
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continued to experience dwindling loan recovery which caused it to close down in 2018. There 
could be a number of reasons for this.  The most important factor leading to difficulties in 
recovering loans may be the difficult context that GU was operating in. This includes regulatory 
factors which undermine the nature of operations and cause distortions from the original model. 
Regulations prevented weekly meetings from being held at houses of the client as per the 
original model so they were held at small shops or spaces which are often confined and not 
convenient for attendees. This often led to reluctance on the part of clients to participate 
effectively and reduced the learning effect from attending the meetings. The regulatory 
restrictions also led to other issues. One such difficulties in loan recovery may also be 
associated with the fact that unlike GB, GU was often unable to form groups around closely-
knit communities as outreach work is based on shops or other commercial locations. This is 
because of the non-marketing license that GU has which restricted it from approaching clients 
directly in their homes or other gatherings.  Although members know each other, they are often 
dispersed across locations which reduces the strength of the association of the groups. A senior 
manager contrasted this to a Bangladeshi community where outreach is often based around the 
clients’ homes enabling the Grameen model to derives its strength from the close association 
between local neighbours. This, in turn, leads to cohesive groups and enhanced accountability. 
It was also noted that centre meetings at GB are often held at different homes to minimize the 
side effects of indiscipline such as poor attendance spreading across groups. At GU, in contrast, 
centre meetings were often held at the same location consecutively as a result of a lack of 
availability of space which led to problems of indiscipline permeating across groups.  A 
positive aspect of meetings at GU was that loan instalments are collected electronically as it 
enhances security and provides a safe method of conducting transactions. However, an 
interviewee points out that this may also result in indiscipline if clients make payments using 
such methods and become reluctant to attend meetings. All such problems may have 
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contributed towards a subsiding of the peer pressure effect perceived to be generated by the 
model34.   
Furthermore, GU stood out as a sole exception in the Grameen’s global replication efforts of 
the model as it serves a high proportion of men. This aspect of GU also runs contrary to non-
Grameen microfinance initiatives worldwide which implement the group lending model. This 
was thus, a significant point of contention with the authorities of the parent organization as it 
clearly contradicted Professor Yunus’ philosophy. Thus, GU was perhaps repeating the same 
mistake of offering loan to both genders, a strategy used by past case studies such as Street-
UK. It is also worth pointing out that GU did not operate mixed groups unlike Street-UK (which 
segregated the members into groups consisting of purely male and female clients). This may 
have caused further problems increasing the chances of male members dominating the group. 
It is worth pointing out here that an earlier adoption of the Grameen model in the UK such as 
the Full Circle Fund which focused entirely on women had near perfect recovery rates. Another 
key difference between the Full Circle fund and GU is that whereas the former served a mostly 
homogeneous clientele base comprised of English white females, the latter served a much more 
diverse background which consisted of clients from Asian, African and European origin. the 
latter This may have made the model more difficult to operate for GU given that GB, in 
Bangladesh, has utilised the model to serve clients who come from a homogeneous ethnic and 
cultural background.  
WEvolution has only forwarded 4 loans since it began its operation in 2011, all of which has 
been paid back on time. As the number of loans forwarded is negligible, the current study does 
not incorporate WEvolution’s loan recovery performance into the analysis.  
 
                                                             




Most projects in UK such as Street-UK, Full-Circle and Street Cred had used conventional 
marketing methods to promote their services and recruit clients. Methods such as leafleting, 
newspaper advertisements or networking with existing community organizations were used by 
these projects35. Networking with existing community organizations was seen as advantageous 
as it would ensure access to an existing set of clients. However, in some cases, such 
organizations did not cooperate. The behaviour of such organizations was perceived by some 
respondents as a fear of losing their clients to the microfinance projects36. The methods used 
were significantly different from the parent program in Bangladesh where a series of projection 
meetings are held with potential clients usually in the presence of a community leader and door 
to door marketing by Grameen outreach workers37. Such projection meetings involved a depth 
of conversation not possible in the context of UK for some projects such as Street-UK as a 
result of funding constraints38. In addition, some projects viewed door-to-door marketing as 
intrusive and inappropriate in the context in UK39. However, it is interesting to note that, the 
marketing strategy of Account3 was viewed as effective by ME#1, the former coordinator of 
its parent organization EEMC. Account3 had managed to hit its target in terms of recruiting 
client even though the targets were quite modest. The marketing strategy adopted by Account3 
revolved around outreach work done by an experienced multilingual outreach team who had 
previously worked with a large number of potential clients in related projects. They had links 
and access to schools, nurses and health centres where they went and held promotions. Most 
importantly, according to the Account3 management, door to door marketing was a central 
strategy of their promotions and most of their clients were successfully recruited through this 
                                                             
35 (ME#3, 2014) (ME#2, 2014) (ME#8, 2014) 
36 (ME#2,2014) 
37 (EX#1, 2013) (EX#1, 2013) 
38 (ME#3, 2014) 
39 (ME#2, 2014) 
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method. The factor which was crucial in the success of this method was that the outreach 
workers lived in and belonged to the same community and was trusted by the community they 
were approaching. Clients had often referred to outreach workers as a ‘friend’ in feedback 
forms enquiring about marketing. This allayed the fears of other project managers that such an 
approach may be intrusive. Another advantage that Account3 had was that it was already 
providing training services such as driving instruction courses which meant that group lending 
clients would prospectively bond around such services40 .  
However, the most significant outreach challenge for the case study MFIs has been that the 
extent of demand for such services in the UK has been low as evidenced by the experiences of 
the case studies41. The demand for microcredit in most developing economies is strong 
(Sheremenko et al., 2012). This is highlighted by the mushrooming number of MFIS in 
Bangladesh alongside the prominent microfinance institutions such as Grameen, BRAC and 
ASA. This trend of high demand is also common in the rest of the subcontinent, Russia, Central 
and South America and, increasingly, Africa. Thus, the UK experience stands in contrast to 
such regions. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 below show the number of loans disbursed for Street-UK and 
Full-Circle Fund.  
Table 5.4 Street-UK 2002 to 2008 - Cumulative Loans  
 
Year of operation 2002 2003 2004 2008  
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41 (ME#1, 2014)  
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EEMC     N/A 4000 250 
  
EEMC had suffered a similar fate only being able to forward a maximum of 250 loans across 
the consortium42. This also contrasts with the GB experience in Bangladesh, as there is vast 
demand of loans43 by Grameen’s massive expansion of branch and its widespread coverage.  
There can be various factors leading to such low demand for group loans in UK, as opposed to 
the high demand prevalent in Bangladesh. One such factor may be the risk attitude of women 
who remain more averse to debt, as opposed to their male counterpart in Western countries44. 
Projects such as Street-UK and Full-Circle had used joint several liability systems which was 
used in the older version of the GB model, Grameen I (no longer being used under its current 
version Grameen II) which meant if one clients did not make their loan repayment it expected 
the rest of the group to make that payment good (Pearson and Watson, 1997). This may have 
deterred potentially risk-averse clients from taking the loans. According to one interviewee, 
                                                             
42 See Table 5.6 
43 See Table A.13  
44 (ME#2, 2014) (ME#4, 2014) 
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many clients were not culturally prepared to take on the loans, which meant that they had to 
accept the responsibility of a loan default by another group member45. 
However, projects suffered low demand even if they did not have joint liability system. Street-
Cred and Account3 are such examples. Both projects had a system whereby clients were only 
“morally” responsible for each other46 and clients would be individually financially 
accountable for the loans47. Furthermore, both projects had a progressive lending system 
whereby existing clients would have access to higher amounts of loans in the next period if 
they fulfilled all their obligations48. About 80% of the client bases were not interested in taking 
on further loans. This was attributed in case of EEMC to the original loans not being used for 
the purpose they were being taken for49.  A similar trend was observed at Full-Circle.  
The Account3 management felt that clients who were doing well enough to repay the money 
easily did not feel the need to incur additional cost by borrowing more signifying an extent of 
debt aversion and a certain level of discomfort about the group lending system amongst the 
existing clients50. It was also believed that demand was inhibited because clients were not really 
interested in the circles as a result of a fear of their ideas being stolen by someone else within 
the group. There was also disinclination towards sharing information with others particularly 
if their businesses were not performing very well. This had resulted in the circle meetings being 
ineffective. According to ME#1, there must be benefits to clients if groups are to be convened 
and in EEMC’s case, most clients did not view forming groups as beneficial to their objectives. 
In addition, formation of groups also led to higher costs in terms of time and effort invested in 
                                                             
45 (ME#3, 2014) 
46 (ME#2, 2014) 
47 (ME#1, 2014) 
48 The initial amount lent was £500 and then if loan was repaid this would be increased to £1000 and eventually 
£2000 in the following periods. 
49 (ME#1, 2014) 
50 (ME#4, 2014) (ME#1, 2014) 
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monitoring (as the groups were not strong) and thus became a laborious process51. The demand 
problem was further exacerbated by the interest rates charged at Account3 which was 
approximately 25%. This was labelled as an “administration fee” and was fixed regardless of 
the period the loan was taken for. The problem with this fee was that, firstly, it was perceived 
as quite high by most of the clients and secondly, there was no incentive of paying the loan 
back quicker. This meant that the cost was prohibitive for clients who wanted the loan for a 
shorter period and hence caused discontent. It is interesting to note that the core principle of 
interest rate policy for GB replication efforts has been to keep the rates at a tolerable level for 
borrowers to ensure profitability of their projects. It is believed that this strategy would assure 
viability of both Grameen and the borrower projects52. This may be in contrary to prominent 
MFIs such as Compartamos where interest rates have been levied at a rate which is higher than 
what is required for cost coverage and reinvestment for the development of the organisation 
(Santos, 2012; Sacchetti and Borzaga, 2020) 
The contrasting cultural context between UK and Bangladesh may also have important 
implications for demand for Grameen loans. One of the core attributes of the Grameen model 
is the weekly meetings which are used to build social networks and solidarity amongst group 
members. The high level of individualism prevailing in UK society, as explained earlier, means 
that the such features may be less appealing to British clients in comparison to their 
counterparts in the developing countries. Further, almost all respondents in the study pointed 
out the booming demand for either predatory lending services or other forms of inappropriate 
financing with high interest rates compared to the low demand for Grameen style loans which 
was being offered. In addition to the aforementioned theory of individualism, two other 
concepts known as uncertainty avoidance and indulgence developed by Hofstede (2011) is 
                                                             
51 (ME#1, 2014) 
52 (EX#1, 2013) 
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important to understand the differences in nature of demand.  Uncertainty avoidance shows the 
extent to which a society feels susceptible to uncertain circumstances and act accordingly to 
avoid such situations (Hofstede, 2011). The level of uncertainty avoidance in the UK and 
Bangladesh is shown in Figure 5.2 below.  
Figure 5.2 Uncertainty Avoidance 
(Source: The Hofstede insights, 2020). 
 
The contrasting levels of uncertainty avoidance between UK and Bangladesh means that the 
British society is more comfortable with the unpredictability of future events while 
Bangladeshi communities may feel a greater need for microfinance and the associated savings 
services offered by GB which can be used as a cushion in the event of any unforeseen 
calamities.  The other concept of relevance to the current research is that of Indulgence. This 
is defined as the extent to which people attempt to resist inherent cravings and inclinations 
based on their upbringing. Comparatively weaker control is termed as “Indulgence” while 
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reasonably strong control is labelled as “Restraint”. The levels of indulgence in UK and 
Bangladesh as revealed in a study by the Hofstede Centre are shown in Figure 5.3 below.  
Figure 5.3 Indulgence  
(Source: The Hofstede insights, 2020).  
 
As figure 5.3 above suggests, UK can be considered as an indulgent society as result of its high 
score of 69. This may be an important explanation for the booming growth in the UK for 
inappropriate finance such as payday loans53, despite high charges associated with such 
services in comparison to the entrepreneurial microfinance offered by the case study MFIs. The 
ease and availability of such services means that they are likely to be used in the UK to gratify 
immediate needs regardless of how important they may be. On the other hand, Bangladesh is 
classified as a restrained society (as underlined by its low score of 20) with a low penchant for 
indulgence. In such societies, future prospects are likely to be valued much more than the 
                                                             
53 Many respondents noted the spiralling growth of payday lenders in the study (ME#4, 2014), (ME#2, 2014) 
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gratification of immediate desires.  As a result, there exists a great demand for entrepreneurial 
microfinance in order to invest and save for a better future.   
The low demand for Grameen style loans may also be attributed to the scale and nature of 
entrepreneurial activity in the UK. One interviewee attributed the low demand to the low scale 
of entrepreneurial activity in the UK54. This seems to be backed up by evidence. The Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) is an international study providing estimates of 
entrepreneurial attitudes, activity and aspiration in the UK with France, Germany and the US. 
Figure 5.4 below published by GEM shows that the UK entrepreneurial population has been 
around 15-20% since 2002. (GEM UK Report, 2018). The study estimates the total early-stage 
entrepreneurial activity or TEA as “the sum of the nascent entrepreneurship rate and the new 
business owner-manager rate – without double counting” (GEM UK Report, 2018:29). This 
estimate is relevant to understanding the nature of demand for Grameen-style loans as it is early 
stage entrepreneurs who are most likely to be interested in this kind of product.  The GEM 
report reveals that the UK TEA rates has historically hovered between 5 to 8% reaching a peak 
of 10% in 2012 declining since then (in the period 2002-18). This has been significantly less 
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Figure 5.4   Participation in Entrepreneurship in the UK by most established stage of 
entrepreneurial activity, 2002 to 2018  




Account3 management also attributes the low demand to the general entrepreneurial 
environment in the areas they operate characterized by a lack of role of models arising from a 
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perception that men may be better placed to run businesses than women. The clients would 
often keep businesses under their spouse’s names and in general lacked drive to put themselves 
forward55.  The lack of entrepreneurial drive in females compared to their male counterpart was 
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Table 5.7   Entrepreneurial Attitudes in the UK among households in 2016, 2017 and 2018 
(Source: GEM UK, 2018)
 
Table 5.7 above illustrates that men are more positive in comparison to women in all the 
attributes studied. The difference is particularly pronounced for self- confidence in possessing 
skills and expertise required to start a business and fear of failure. The GEM study interpreted 
the results as an indication that women may be more risk conscious than men. The study also 
noted that opportunity perception amongst both men and women have continued to be low in 
the period between 2002 and 2018 hitting record lows in 2009. Across the same period, fear of 
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failure has been constantly higher for females in comparison to males across the same period 
whereas opportunity perception has been lower (GEM UK report, 2018). The trends are 
illustrated in the Figure 5.5 below. These findings are consistent with the low demand for 
Grameen style loans offered at the UK projects. Many such projects also tended to focus their 
services on women and it is unsurprising that they experienced low demand given the subdued 
nature of entrepreneurial attitude amongst the female population in the UK shown by the data 
above.  
Figure 5.5 Male and female attitudes towards Good Opportunities and Fear of failure 
(2002-2018) 





Prohibitive childcare costs were also suggested as an important factor causing low demand by 
two interviewees, both of whom were involved in management of Street-Cred and Account356. 
Indeed, the Full-Circle fund incorporated this factor into their strategy by hugely incentivizing 
the loans by making childcare contingent on having a loan. However, this failed to generate 
higher demand for the loans57.  
Grameen’s vast expansion in Bangladesh may be due to the fact that Bangladeshi women have 
little option given the paucity of employment opportunities and prohibitive social contexts, but 
to gamble on a business venture with the start-up loans provided by Grameen in in search of a 
better life.  Such conditions are linked to the notion of necessity-entrepreneurship (i.e. 
launching a business as a result of lack of availability of employment opportunities) which is 
associated with the country-level income (GEM, 2004). The country level income level is 
linked inversely with the degree of necessity-entrepreneurship. This implies that countries such 
as Bangladesh are likely to experience a much higher level of necessity entrepreneurship 
compared to developed countries such as UK. One respondent involved with the management 
at Street-Cred, explained importance of necessity driven entrepreneurship, citing the example 
of African refugees (as these clients did not have access to welfare support) who she found to 
be the most committed and successful 58.   
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A perceived absence of incentives to graduate from welfare to work intensifies the demand 
problems further as it compels people to function in the ‘grey’ economy as they are concerned 
that access to benefits payments will be lost59. Indeed, a lack of interim support for clients who 
wish to set up their businesses formally and escape poverty was pointed out by ME#2, Street-
Cred’s former senior manager. This is echoed by ME#4, Account3 manager, who pointed out 
the need for a mechanism to provide transitional support assuring potential clients continued 
access to welfare support until their business reach a certain level of profitability60.  The 
aforementioned argument was further reinforced by the experience at WEETU with Full-Circle 
Fund. Around a third of the clients were women with children who are likely to have access to 
housing, medical and several other benefit payments which would prevent them from 
considering the option of accessing the loans with a view to start-up a business due to the fear 
of losing such payments61. Interestingly, an interviewee at GT drew an analogy between a lack 
of welfare to work incentives in UK to a Grameen program designed especially for street 
beggars in Bangladesh known as the Struggling [Beggars] Members program which was 
introduced in 2002. Under the program, beggars are motivated to become borrowers at 
Grameen and gradually become self-reliant.  One of the important features of the program is 
that members are not forced to give up begging. However, they are motivated to borrow and 
become involved in additional income generating activity like door to door selling of goods or 
even at the location of begging (Alam and Getubig, 2010). This feature has not prevented it 
from becoming a successful program62. 
                                                             
59 In Illinois, USA, a micro-finance institution avoided this situation by getting a special exemption from the 
governor of state which allowed welfare recipients who took out micro-loans to be covered by welfare in the 
interim period until they could get their small personal business off the ground (Yunus, 1998). 
60 (ME#5, 2014) 
61 Many quickly calculate the amount of welfare cheques and insurance coverage they would lose by becoming 
self-employed and conclude there is nothing to be gained by it (Yunus, 1998). (ME#8, 2014). 
62 (Hussain, 2013) 
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However, there are those who disagree that welfare benefits are a significant factor inhibiting 
demand. ME#1, for example, contends that only a small percentage of the UK unemployed 
population is entrepreneurial and for those who are entrepreneurial the welfare system is not a 
stumbling block63. Street-UK operated a Department of Work and Pensions program called 
new enterprise allowance, encouraging people on benefits to set up businesses on their own 
account and provide loans and a very short income bridge so that they can continue to receive 
benefits for 13 weeks while they are setting up their business. The Street-UK management 
acknowledges that a sizable proportion of clients of such programs are genuine entrepreneurs. 
There is, however, a fear or perception that such programs may create a false incentive for 
people to gamble on entrepreneurship even when they lack the necessary motivation and 
expertise to be successful in doing so. This may be attributable to the ease of obtaining such 
loans which may lead to opportunistic behaviour by potential borrowers without a significant 
commitment to their business. This issue may have led to inflated demand for business loans. 
Other demand side factors include low savings, inadequate financial literacy or insufficient 
insurance protection due to its non-availability or its high charges. Further to this there is also 
an advanced private sector characterised by intense rivalry, which reduces the probability of 
small business survival specially compared to developing countries (Copisarow, 2004).  A 
research report, for example, shows a large proportion (55%) of small and medium sized 
business enterprises (SMEs) do not survive the first five years (RSA, 2014).  
The recent case studies have also faced similar issues with low demand. During the inception 
of the project, Grameen Trust (GT) (the advisory body for global replications of Grameen) had 
initially estimated the projected demand to be substantial for GU’s microfinance products. The 
estimated figures are provided below in Table 5.8. 
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Table 5.8 GU’s outreach targets  
 
 Pilot estimates Revised targets 
Year 1  400 100 
Year 2 800 400 
Year 3 1500  500 
 
The original targets were later on revised during the initial period of operations (also provided 
in Table 5.9). This shows the problems that GU were encountering in achieving outreach 
objectives. GU, at the time of writing, were behind the revised targets. As can be seen from 
Table 5.9, the targets were quite modest and the fact that GU were struggling to meet such 
targets indicated the operational challenges of reaching out effectively to the target audience. 
The main method of outreach adopted by GU is referral through community organizations and 
councils.  There were differences in ideologies of the GU management with respect to this 
method of outreach. This seemed to be attributable in part to the different professional 
backgrounds of the management staff. Those with a professional background in development 
associated with replication of Grameen in various countries favoured a more direct approach 
compared to those with a background predominantly in commercial banking. One such staff 
member noted that it is much easier to implement the model in countries such as Turkey and 
Mexico where he had previously worked. In those countries, it was possible to implement the 
original Grameen style of marketing which is to hold mini meetings at shops, cafes or various 
public spaces. The direct method was perceived to produce better results as potential clients 
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could be motivated by Grameen staff to take on the loans. It was felt that this was a more 
effective method than referrals from council or community organizations where management 
often had their own agendas and were less interested to co-operate with GU. Further, managers 
of such organizations may have been less effective in convincing potential clients of taking on 
Grameen loans and about the nature of benefits associated with being GU clients. Such 
problems that GU has confronted in dealing with external organizations is not unlike the 
experiences of previous UK organizations such as Street-Cred described above.  
A key challenge was to motivate people to form groups. It was often time consuming as 
approaching the clients and getting them to form groups may take from 3 to 6 months. There 
was often a lack of awareness or understanding of the Grameen model on the part of many 
clients who are approached. There were issues of trust as clients often view Grameen as 
commercial moneylenders who want to sell their loans and potentially impose charges that may 
be hidden. Language and culture may also be barriers as GU staff have been meeting with 
potential clients from varied national backgrounds. However, a significant stumbling block is 
fear of losing out on welfare payments. A pilot study conducted by GT revealed that potential 
clients were particularly wary of losing housing benefits as a result of participation in the 
program. The data indicated this problem as well. GU comprised of 95% ethnic minority clients 
most of whom are migrants (without recourse to public funds) and 5% Scottish nationals who 
have such access. GU used an online software program which calculated how much clients are 
likely to lose out on by becoming self-employed for various hours of work and often many 
clients did not feel incentivised enough to take on the risk of becoming self-employed. The 
management staff noted the difference in attitude amongst different ethnicities with respect to 
this issue and pointed out that this problem is particularly relevant to the Scottish population 
that they were targeting. Clients from an African background were much more inclined to be 
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involved in self-employment even if they were only relatively better off in doing so64. The fact 
that Grameen found it difficult to attract potential clients on unemployment benefits may also 
be evidenced by the fact that majority of their clients were already self-employed and not on 
such benefits. In addition, the ethnic minorities were more well versed about the Grameen 
model and microcredit as a result of such models being pervasive in their respective countries 
in general which helped in reaching out to such communities.   
Word of mouth referrals from existing clients was the most productive source for new recruits. 
A pastor who introduced Grameen to the congregation members in church based in Bridgeton 
was cited as one such example. However, a challenge was the unavailability of spaces for group 
activities (which cannot take place at homes due to regulations). This meant that unlike GB, 
groups had to be based around shops or commercial places rather than around houses which 
may compromise cohesion.  It is interesting to note that GU had a high number of male clients 
in contrast to the parent organization and all global replications of Grameen. The inclusion of 
male members appears to be a contentious issue about which GT has expressed reservations. 
However, the legal team of GU has advised against an all women focus as it may be deemed 
as discriminatory under current UK regulations65. There was a proposal from some of the GU 
management to implement mixed groups which was rejected by Grameen. An additional reason 
noted for accepting male clients at GU has been the numerous difficulties in meeting even the 
revised outreach targets in light of all the aforementioned issues. Gradually, the number of 
males began to rise at GU and at one point was higher than women which caused tensions with 
the parent organization.  GU wanted to address this problem and thus adopted a proactive 
approach to recruiting females and a reactive approach to recruiting male clients66. At the time 
of writing, females formed 53% of the GU clientele base.  
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WEvolution also has a similar strategy to GU in terms of reaching out to their clients as it relies 
on referrals from partner organizations. However, there are differences in the way which it 
actualizes this strategy. It requests partner organizations to refer at least two women. Two 
specific criteria are sought when selecting women which are (i) They must have leadership 
qualities (ii) They must be eager to transform their lives. WEvolution wants the women to work 
in pairs as the benefits are that they can support each other or if one client wants to give up the 
other can continue with the process. Subsequently, a cohort is formed combining such women 
from various organizations who are then trained for a three-day period spread over three weeks. 
After this these clients are expected to venture out and form the groups themselves. There are 
also differences in nature of clients with GU owing to as the organization ascribes higher 
priority to empowerment and social inclusion rather than the financial exclusion aspect. There 
are 25 groups at WEvolution comprising of 125 members out of which 116 are female and the 
remainder are male. Interestingly, unlike GU, WEvolution clients are predominantly 
indigenous Scottish White population (95%) while the rest comprise of immigrants.  
Initially, there were no official targets due to the small size and informal nature of the project. 
However, WEvolution received funding from the Scottish government which has enabled it to 
set a target of 20-25 groups. Some groups formed initially disintegrated due to inappropriate 
training from external organization while others were perceived to have achieved successful 
outcomes as they were in employment or used the training as a pathway to further education. 
Unlike GU, WEvolution management does not discount the notion of more direct modes of 
marketing but adoption of such strategies will depend on other factors such as staff capacity. 
For example, approaching potential clients at supermarkets is being considered as a potential 
future strategy. The target and nature of clientele base at WEvolution also appears to be 
different to GU. Social inclusion and empowerment as goals are prioritized over addressing 
financial exclusion. This results in the recruitment of many clients who may not be considered 
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as conventional entrepreneurs. Such clients may suffer from a lack of confidence or health 
issues but still have a great appetite for transformation in their lives and are thus likely to benefit 
from the group process.  
The aforementioned low number of clients and difficulties in reaching modest targets indicates 
that there are operational challenges in recruiting clients. The key difficulties noted by the 
management are (i) The Welfare system in the UK which provides some safety net and 
sanctions incremental earnings by micro-entrepreneurs. The WEvolution management were 
keen to ascribe the blame on the system rather than people citing that current arrangements do 
not provide adequate incentives to potential micro-entrepreneurs to let loose their aspirations 
but rather holds them captive. (ii) The second challenge involves the lack of availability of 
spaces which constrains the ability of the groups to engage in activities. WEvolution has 
addressed the problem of isolation and constrained spaces by introducing hubs. These hubs are 
spaces hired by the organization which are used by clients to meet up on a weekly basis and 
use it as their workspace. This strategy was firstly successfully trialled at Inverclyde as it led 
to an acceleration in the formation of groups at WEvolution. Subsequently, additional hubs 
were opened in Inverclyde and Dundee. (iii) WEvolution tried to work with other organization 
to obtain client referrals as such organizations were perceived to hold the trust of local people 
as they have worked with them over a sustained period of time. Similar to GU and the past case 
studies, WEvolution has also found it difficult to obtain referrals through external organizations 
as the management of such organizations often act as “gatekeepers” and are insecure about 
losing their own clients to WEvolution which may have potential implications for their funding. 
The organizational field environment is thus often not that of co-operation but competition. 
(iv) The management pointed out the individualistic nature of the Scottish society as a major 
impediment to the development of the SRG movement. People were perceived to lack social 
networks and connections to form groups. Potential clients would often be interested in forming 
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groups but unable to do so as they did not know anyone within the community thus making 
self-selection into genuine groups to be very difficult. Formation of self-selected groups is 
taken for granted in India or Bangladesh, however in the UK context appears to be extremely 
difficult. (v) Finally, the bureaucracy and paperwork (such as permissions) required to start 
even a basic small business was noted as a major barrier67. According to the WEvolution 
management, there is an acute lack of opportunity and conducive business environment for 
micro-entrepreneurs to trial their ideas as a result of burden of regulations. Food cart business 
was noted as on such example where a number of different permissions are required before one 
can operate a business.  
The modest targets and the difficulties in achieving them indicate the importance of welfare to 
work incentives as a major impediment to recruiting native clients on such programs. It is worth 
noting the differences in demographics of the clientele base of GU and WEvolution. GU had a 
clientele base comprising of immigrants (95%), most of whom are African. In contrast, 
WEvolution’s clientele base consists mainly of Scottish White female (95%) and very few 
immigrants. The nature of programs at GU and WEvolution are very different with a much less 
emphasis on loan on the part of WEvolution and a much greater focus on other factors such as 
training and empowerment. While there is a loan component in the WEvolution the take up for 
this had been very low with only four loans being forwarded. The loans are a central attribute 
of the GU program on other hand and has very few take ups from the indigenous Scottish 
population. The implications might be that Scottish clients think that group engagement may 
be beneficial to them where they may learn from each other and are empowered by such 
processes. However, they are less inclined to taking up loans a result of fear of losing out access 
to welfare and also lack the social networks to be involved in income generating activities 
characterized by the individualistic nature of the Scottish society. The high take-up of GU 
                                                             
67 (ME#7, 2014;2016) 
142 
 
services by immigrants (many of whom without access to welfare support) may indicate the 
nature of aspirations that they have when come to the UK which is often economic and the 
collective characteristic of such communities where social networks of friends or families may 
be utilized for entrepreneurial purposes.  
A key common impediment to outreach efforts mentioned by both the management of GU and 
WEvolution is the individualistic nature of the Scottish society. It is suggested that the 
indigenous clients are often reluctant to become members as they lack social networks and 
friendships within fragmented local communities to form effective groups. While the number 
of clients is generally low for both GU and WEvolution, GU in particular, has struggled to get 
the indigenous population to sign up for its program. As has been mentioned before, GU’s 
clients are predominantly made up of African immigrants with the most common country of 
origin being Nigeria. It is thus worth understanding the differences in culture between UK and 
Nigeria with respect to the extent of individualism or collectivism in both countries. The extent 














Figure 5.6 Individualism in UK and Nigeria 
 (Source: HOFSTEDE INSIGHTS, 2020) 
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 5.6 above, Nigeria has a much lower score indicating that it is a 
highly collective society.  There are a number of studies which highlight collectivist nature of 
African economies. Plateau (2000), for instance, revealed that successful individuals within 
such societies are often distrusted and cajoled into sharing their revenues.  The wealthy are 
often collectively penalized in the form of social banishment, loss of prestige or even brutality.  
Witchcraft is commonly used by some communities to penalize materialism. This in turn stems 
from a fear that cohesiveness of the community will be compromised by the achievement of an 
individual who may desire to leave the community or be reluctant to share his/her profits 
(Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2012). Baland et al. (2007), Comola and Fafchamps (2010) and 
Jakiela and Ozier (2011) documented how individuals in African communities are inclined to 
conceal information about their savings in fear of the aforementioned censure from the 




Conversely, according to the above study, UK is considered one of the most individualist 
nations in the world. The demand from Nigerians for GU’s services compared to the originally 
perceived target of the indigenous clients may thus imply that the collectivist nature of the 
Grameen model built on existing social collateral in communities may appeal to them and be 
more relevant to that community. The fact that WEvolution have a much higher proportion of 
indigenous clients may be attributable to the fact that such clients are aware of the 
individualistic nature of the society they reside in but still feel that they can benefit from 
WEvolution’s process which (unlike GU) does not make it mandatory for them to obtain loans 
but trains them on how to build cohesive relationships in the community. Such a feature may 
be less relevant for Afro- Asian communities such as the Nigerian society that GU serves where 
such strong relations are already present (as evidenced from the low scores of individualism in 
the above study) and it is more a financial rather than a social need due to the economic nature 
of their aspirations.  
5.3 Regulatory Environment  
Sustainability is difficult to achieve based solely on lending to micro-entrepreneurs. GB 
recognized the importance of savings by incorporating savings within its processes. Grameen 
I regulations, for example, stipulated a certain percentage of savings for each member to be 
credited at group meetings held every week. Additionally, a proportion of the loan amount is 
charged for the “group fund”, whilst a certain amount is deducted on the basis of the loan size 
for the “emergency fund”. The group operates the fund which provides a supplementary source 
of ‘loanable funds’ for the poor when an agreement is mutually made. GB overlooks the 
emergency fund which may be utilised as an insurance should there be any default in the event 
of death or illness or calamities (Khandaker et al, 1994). The group account system is no longer 
functional under Grameen II and has been replaced by a special savings into which borrower 
must credit money and also a voluntary savings account which provides interest income 
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(Vulkan et al., 2013). Thus, an important feature of this strategic shift at Grameen was its 
immense focus on savings mobilization as an integral part of its lending, which provides a vital 
internal source of fund for on-lending. An insightful study pointed to three perceived needs of 
the underprivileged in terms of financial management (Collins et al., 2009). Dealing with the 
basics is the management of cash flow to reorganize fluctuating income streams into a reliable 
consistent flow in order to meet daily requirements. Risk Management is coping with 
emergencies may require significant sums of money and have an adverse effect on the financial 
situation of a household. Accumulating significant sums for personal expenses such as 
weddings. Another study (Wright, 2010:1) posited that the following financial services are 
required in order to satisfy such needs. A current savings account which enables clients to credit 
and draw out expediently, an emergency or a general loan fund which can be obtained and paid 
back swiftly. The list also includes recurring, commitment or contractual savings products or 
multi-purpose loans. Studies have acknowledged the enormous success of Grameen II in 
designing and developing its products to meet such requirements (Wright, 2010).  
Grameen used its experience to redesign its system to incorporate a number of new       savings 
products. Amongst these were: (i) Public deposit services which were utlised to mobilize funds 
not only from its poor members but the relatively well off in the villages. (ii) Another popular 
service is the “Grameen Pension Savings” which lets members to save up for the long-term for 
significant expenses, such as education or weddings of family members (Rutherford, 2006). 
(iii) Last is the provision of individual passbook savings accounts and contractual savings 
products that enables clients to save “up” or “down”. The broad range of products on offer at 
GB thus met a set of diverse needs from both existing and potential clients. It assisted GB in 
its outreach efforts by attracting new clients as a result of the benefits of these products. It also 
helped to retain GB’s existing set of clients amd motivated the return of drop-outs or defaulters 
to repay and reparticipate  in the program.  
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Thus GB’s savings mobilisation has played a crucial role in enhancing  its organizational 
growth and liquidity. However, for UK MFIs a significant stumbling block is the inability to 
open such savings accounts as CDFIs are not permitted to do so by the government68. Unlike, 
GB which is a bank in Bangladesh, the MFIs in UK are CDFIs, usually registered as charities, 
which do not have the permission to operate savings accounts of their clients under current UK 
regulations. It may be crucial to integrate savings mobilization into MFIs programs for the 
following reasons: (i) It may be a comparatively economical source of capital for onward 
lending (Robinson, 1995; Murdoch, 2000). (ii) Some studies indicate that insufficient savings 
may be a more important factor impeding business development than a lack of access to finance 
(Berger and Udell, 1998; Bates and Bates, 1997). (iii) Savings facilities enable poor households 
to smooth consumption over time and they may also use such savings for investing rather 
relying on other lenders. (iv) Savings accumulation cultivates self-restraint and discipline into 
borrowers leading to substantial entrepreneurial learning. Thus, it may be argued that a savings 
program should be an essential component of both subsidized and viable MFIs in UK.  
 
In terms of recent experiences, GU has also faced the above problem as it is not allowed under 
UK regulations to mobilize savings. As it is unable to mobilize savings, GU uses its banking 
partner Tesco to offer clients savings facilities. This is an important factor as GU currently 
borrows on the money market for forwarding loans. If GU were allowed to mobilise savings, 
it could have used the fund for onward lending. This is a problem which has been previously 
outlined by Christen & Rosenberg (2000) and Arun (2005) in different contexts which has 
prevented firms from accessing a steady stream of funds at lower costs. Moreover, appropriate 
regulations that permit institutions such as GU to attract deposits from their clients may enable 
to achieve sustainable growth and develop alliances with the banking sector, enhancing their 
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operational network and improving their control and reporting standards in the process (Arun, 
2005). There are other advantages in addition to this. It is likely to enhance outreach efforts as 
clients may be attracted towards savings facilities and also acts as an insurance against urgent 
needs such as illness and the loan is not diverted for such purposes. It advises clients to save 
regularly however, unlike GB, it is not a mandatory part of the program.  
 
The key regulatory body that GU and WEvolution must deal with is the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA). FCA had introduced a regulatory system which discriminates between low 
and high-risk applicants. The purpose was to invest higher levels of resource to protect 
vulnerable consumers from the activities of high-risk firms (subjecting them to more stringent 
regulatory standards and requirements in terms of supervision, reporting and factors such as 
capital requirements). At the same time, the objective was to ensure appropriate levels of 
intervention for low risk firms.  The system incorporated a provision for a ‘limited permission’ 
regime for low risk applicants which provides benefits in terms of lower threshold 
requirements, supervision, reporting and assessment fees. GU had applied initially for this 
interim license as a consumer credit provider for approximately two years following which it 
had applied for a full license. Crucially, GU had applied for a non-marketing license which 
restricted its ability to approach clients directly. It was classified as a low risk lender as a result 
of the low interest rates it charges, not offering individual loans and not having the ability to 
mobilize savings. Applying for a direct marketing license risked GU being classed in the same 
high-risk category as a provident or doorstep lenders which charge extortionate rates. Under 
current legislations, it would be categorized as a “Domestic premises supplier”. “Domestic 
premises supplier” is defined as “a supplier who: a) sells, offers to sell or agrees to sell goods, 
or; b) offers to supply services or contracts to supply services, to customers who are individuals 
148 
 
while the supplier, or the supplier’s representative, is physically present at the dwelling of the 
individual.” (FCA, 2016: 18)  
 
Some of the GU management thus contended that, given the regulatory circumstances, liaising 
with community organizations for referral as the main outreach strategy was appropriate in the 
context of a developed Western nation where direct marketing methods may be seen as 
intrusive and a breach of a right to privacy69. Others felt that a more direct approach where 
potential clients may be met and explained the features of the model is far more effective. 
Moreover, such an approach is thought to be more resonant with Grameen principles of 
emphasis on going to the clients rather than clients coming to the organization. It may be 
mentioned, however, that GU staff did offer presentations at community organization affording 
them the opportunity to speak to the public directly. But obtaining invites for such presentations 
was often difficult as some organization were suspicious of its intentions as a moneylender 
while others were simply apathetic to GU’s cause. As a result of its non-marketing license, GU 
relied on referrals from external community organizations for expanding its clientele base. A 
senior manager pointed out that this is a time-consuming process which often produced poor 
results70. This is similar to the experience of most previous case studies.  
GU was unable to focus its services on women as it had been advised by Clifford and Chance 
(a partner legal firm) that it may be discriminatory under current UK regulation. Some 
interviewees disagree with this as they feel it is a misinterpretation of the sex discrimination 
legislation. It is argued that there are exemptions within the legislation for voluntary or third 
sector groups to offer gender focused services71. There seems to be substance in this argument 
as several former UK case studies such as Street-Cred, Account 3 and Full-Circle have offered 
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an exclusive service to women previously without encountering any legal problems. A key 
factor in outreach targets being revised downwards during the initial periods of GU’s operation 
was the time-consuming process of ensuring compliance with relevant UK legislation. Legal 
recourse had to be incorporated into the loan agreement in contrast to Grameen methodology. 
Anti-money laundering laws require GU to verify applicant’s address and the permission to 
work in the UK. This is also a point of contention as GT officials feel that the process is too 
time consuming and complicated.  
However, not all regulations have a negative impact on operational processes. A significant 
issue cited by the GU management is compliance with the customer complaints process 
outlined by FCA. An interview cited the example of a client not being able to pay several initial 
instalments as a result of sudden illness. Under conventional Grameen methodology, she would 
be allowed to reduce instalments and let the payments continue for a longer period of time 
which would lead to a costly accrual of interest charges. However, a core operational 
requirement under the current FCA regulations is the fair treatment of consumers. The FCA 
guide sets out six principles that firms should adhere to. Two particular principles listed as 
Outcome 1 and 4 are relevant to the aforementioned situation. Outcome 1 is defined as 
“Consumers can be confident that they are dealing with firms where the fair treatment of 
customers is central to the corporate culture” whereas Outcome 4 is explained as “Where 
consumers receive advice, the advice is suitable and takes account of their circumstances” 
(FCA 2016: 12). GU, as a responsible lender, has thus restructured the loan to avoid complaints 
and the ensuing discontent from the FCA, It issued a new loan for the client to pay off her dues 
and rescheduled the new loan over another 52 weeks to reduce weekly instalments to eliminate 




An important feature of the Grameen model is a visit to the home of the borrower which takes 
place before the loan is disbursed. This is an essential element of the model as it enables the 
organization to (a) confirm that clients are residing permanently in the address provided (b) 
check whether clients in the same group is living in the same vicinity (c) assess the social status 
of the borrower. However, home visits were not possible under the license that GU had. 
According to the regulations, GU had to write to the clients to ask for permission and give 28 
days’ notice if it wanted to visit the house. This rendered the process cumbersome and lengthy 
and also exposed it to difficult situations where clients may refuse this permission citing 
various reasons including privacy. This means that it has to rely on paperwork for all of the 
above listed purposes which may make the process prone to error. The borrower’s house is 
often used as a venue for weekly meetings with borrowers at GB and other global Grameen 
replications. This option was eliminated for GU as a result of the aforementioned regulations. 
GU thus often held such meeting in the borrower shops where space is constrained and often 
has limited sitting facility. This results in the borrowers rushing to complete the meeting 
affecting group discipline. The process of formation of social collateral is thus hindered and 
may lead to less cohesive and geographically dispersed groups.  
WEvolution has also applied successfully for a consumer credit license from the FCA for the 
microfinance component in its program. However, much of the aforementioned regulatory 
issues are less relevant for it as much less emphasis is placed on the financial element of the 
program with the predominant aim being to enhance social collateral in the community with 
finance being one of various tool of achieving this aim. This is unlike GU programs which 
revolved around the loan as a central factor. The crucial difference, thus, is that at GU program 
participation hinged on members taking a loan while at WEvolution obtaining a loan is not a 
prerequisite to membership.  Rather, WEvolution avails microfinance as an option for 
supporting any self-reliant group (SRG) members who thinks it may be beneficial for them. 
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This means that WEvolution is not under any pressure to forward a specific number of loans. 
Hence unlike GU, WEvolution does not have clear targets and the ensuing pressure for 
forwarding loans.  
The regulatory regime had detrimental effects on the operational processes of GU, in particular, 
owing to the lack of flexibility. The findings seem to resonate with a number of other studies 
which have revealed regulations to not having the desired impact. Jansson and Wenner (1997), 
for instance find that in Latin American and Caribbean countries, regulations are often 
incongruous with the delivery methods adopted by MFIs which causes differential biases in 
terms of requirements such as capital adequacy, documentation and provisioning which in turn 
leads to high cost for the MFIs. Similarly, Singhe and Luche (2020) find that regulations have 
created obstacles for MFIs to fulfil their mission of financial inclusion.  Such costs would be 
justified if regulations are found to have the desired impact on the financial performance and 
outreach of the MFIs. Some studies have found regulations to have no such effect on these 
factors. Hartarska,  & Nadolnyak, (2007) and Mersland, & Strøm, . (2009) have analysed global 
datasets of MFIs to conclude that regulation has no beneficial effect on performance and 
outreach of MFIs. Other studies have, in fact, concluded that regulations may have an undesired 
impact on outreach. A study by Cull et al. (2011), for example, revealed that profit-oriented 
MFIs reacted to greater regulation by reducing outreach to women and clients that are 
expensive to reach.    
It is nevertheless important to note that a lack of regulation may leave clients vulnerable to 
unscrupulous conduct of MFIs. Numerous people have suffered in Bangladesh due to dishonest 
behaviour or ineptitude of unsupervised and obscure institutions (Wright, 2000). Perhaps, the 
best solution in the UK, lies in designing a regulation regime that permits MFIs to mobilise 
savings but at the same time have safeguards in place to protect clients from opportunistic 
behaviour. The system needs to incorporate the differences in nature, processes and ambitions 
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of organizations operating in UK microfinance industry which consists of a wide array of 
organizations from predatory lenders which are purely profit oriented to organizations such as 
WEvolution which place a great emphasis on the welfare of clients. A one size fits all approach 
to regulations will clearly put unfair burdens on organizations with a strong lean on Welfarist 
objectives. A tiered approach which recognizes the difference between bank and non-bank 
providers and also differentiates between different types of MFIs may thus be beneficial. The 
advantages are that such a system may allow MFIs to progress between tiers and provides a 
convenient regulatory environment distinguishing between different types of institutions 
(Berenbach & Churchill, 1997; Meagher, 2002; Arun, 2005; Pedrini et al., 2016).  
 
 5.4 Client Training 
 A major difference between the UK case studies and GB lies in the area of business    training. 
GB does not provide any specific business training or any kind of specialized advice72.  The 
management of Grameen Trust (GT), point out there are cost implications of providing such 
training and deem it superfluous as there is a lack of credible evidence proving the value of 
such training. Some projects provide such training regardless of whether clients require it or 
are interested in it73. In such a situation, clients may feel patronized as a result of such provision 
which may have an undesired effect. Grameen thus assumes that the borrowers know best. 
“Continuous training program” is the only form of training that Grameen provides—a training 
that is quite different to the programs provided in UK. It’s a brief training for the borrowers 
provided prior to the approval of loans. It educates and creates awareness amongst the 
borrowers about the methodology, responsibilities, credit delivery and recovery systems of 
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Grameen74. This training is distinguishable from those of the replication efforts in UK 
comprising provisions on business and financial topics. Most of the schemes provided financial 
literacy training free of charge. The client training scheme of Full Circle Fund may be cited as 
a case in point. Full Circle clients had to undergo two stages of business training “Enterprise 
for me” and “Skills for me” before making up their mind up about whether to take a loan. The 
Street-Cred clients also were required to train on subjects related to financial literacy. A 40-
module business training manual was provided to clients consisting of topics, which were 
deemed essential for business start-ups. In addition, business training was provided by 
development workers. It was believed that this would reduce development workers’ 
preparation time for meetings.  
One major learning lesson from the EEMC experiment was to realize that it is quite complex 
to set up a business for micro-entrepreneurs in the UK as it requires massive growth and scale 
extremely quickly relative to one’s income. This is in contrast to the situation in Bangladesh 
where most of the microfinance go to existing entrepreneurs who have a trade-able activity that 
they just scale75. This means that UK projects such as Street-Cred had to provide additional 
training support other than finance with respect to setting up a business, navigation of the 
welfare system and HMRC and various regulatory requirements—all of which added to the 
cost of providing the service and created pressure on sustainability. When Street-UK was 
initiated such training was not deemed essential (Copisarow, 2000), but within a few years of 
operation it introduced an advice service free of charge, adding pressure on sustainability, as 
the service proved not to be cost-effective76.  
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However, some interviewees pointed out the intricate nature of the UK business environment 
where micro-entrepreneurs have to be mindful of licensing and tax regulations. This is in sharp 
contrast to Bangladesh where business environment is much more relaxed for borrowers to 
establish their businesses. As a result of the divergence in business conditions, some 
organizations in UK felt a need to persist training clients irrespective of the cost. Interestingly, 
the main incentive driving membership at the Full Circle fund was not for the loan but the 
training and support provided. This is evidenced by the fact that a substantial number of 
participants in the training never borrowed once the training had been completed.77 Similar is 
Street-Cred experience where just 23% (162 out of 685) of the total Street-Cred clients 
graduated to be granted loans after completion of their training. Nevertheless, there appears to 
be discord about the extent of training required. Some believe that micro-entrepreneurs operate 
at a basic level of the economy and need elementary knowledge while others are in favour of 
more detailed training78.  
Contrary to the practices of GB, there were training services provided free of charge to the GU 
clients during the pilot phase. This training was deemed to be necessary as a result of the 
complexity of regulatory and the business environment in the UK. The training was provided 
for 2 hours a day for five days and consisted of topics such as operating bank accounts, 
budgeting and operating a business, planning income and expenditure and different aspects of 
the business regulatory environment. An interviewee pointed out that in contrast to GB, GU 
did not deal in cash which the management felt, necessitated that the micro-entrepreneurs be 
provided training on managing bank accounts in order to ensure that adequate funds are 
available in the account to clear weekly instalments to GU79. This clearly contradicted the 
Yunus philosophy of entrepreneurs not needing training and emphasis on “doing by learning”.  
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Unsurprisingly, the training program at GU was redesigned following the pilot phase. The 
management felt that a lot of the training was surplus to requirements. They realized that a 
large part of the clientele base (approximately 90%) were existing businesses and it would be 
patronizing to teach them about running businesses and operating accounts as they were already 
much experienced at doing it. Hence, GU changed the system to that of a “needs based 
assessment”80, where appropriate training is then tailored according to the needs of the 
individual. The stance of the management of WEvolution is quite similar to the pre-pilot phase 
of GU with the business regulations in the UK being thought of as burdensome compared to 
developing countries. Training is perceived to be advantageous for the group members in terms 
of overcoming such barriers.  
The rationale of providing entrepreneurial training has been questioned by numerous authors 
such as MkNelly et al. (1996). Yunus (1999), in particular, regards entrepreneurial skills as 
innate and stresses that such abilities cannot be taught. Along similar lines, Banerjee and 
Newman (1993) and Paulson and Townsend (2004) also place the greater emphasis on financial 
exclusion encountered by potential entrepreneurs.  Training requirements will differ depending 
on the stage of the business owned by the entrepreneur such as awareness, pre-start up, start 
up, growth and maturity (McMullan and Long, 1987, Monroy, 1995; Gorman and Cunningham 
,1997; Bridge et al. 1998; Henry et al. 2005). Gorman and Cunningham (1997), in particular, 
urged careful consideration of the perception of entrepreneurial characteristics and the 
processes to enhance them. It is thus necessary for an MFI to clarify its purpose of training 
clients before investing in entrepreneurial education. Balkin (1992: 141) postulates that the 
objective of entrepreneurial training “is to provide the practical knowledge to do the myriad of 
little things it takes to start and sustain an enterprise.” Hence it is relevant to distinguish 
between whether the purpose is to “start” or “sustain” the business of the trainees. A large 
                                                             
80 (ME#5, 2016) 
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segment of the training at the pilot stage at GU covered topics aimed at clients starting a 
business.  
Thus, GU’s refinement of its training methodologies was in line with the above reasoning as it 
realised that most of its client were existing businesses which have a degree of knowledge and 
experience making this segment of its training mostly irrelevant to its audience. It thus changed 
its methodologies to focus on into its internal principles and procedures which in turn made its 
training methodology more congruent with the parent organization. There may be a case for 
GU clients to be provided with entrepreneurial training to sustain their businesses. Some 
studies reflect on such training needs for women particularly in the area of financial literacy 
(Goodwin and Voola, 2013). Landvogt (2008), for instance, argued that the distress, despair 
and discomfort that women correlate with money requires extensive provision of financial 
literacy training. However, to make training pertinent, provision would require specialist 
support tailored to the nature of the different businesses of the clients. Given the diversity of 
the nature of clientele businesses and the demographics of the clients that GU serves, this was 
difficult and costly to provide. It can also be difficult to justify given that several studies show 
that such initiatives are often ineffective in attaining their objectives (Scrheiner and Murdoch, 
2001; Oosterbeek et al., 2010, Karlan and Valdivia, 2011) 
Conclusion 
Despite the difficulties in adapting the Grameen model, it is difficult to conclude that the GB 
model cannot be used effectively in the UK context, because some crucial elements that played 
an integral role in Grameen’s success in Bangladesh are conspicuous by their absence in most 
of the UK case studies. These missing elements must be viewed from a strategic and 
environmental perspective.  Peer group lending and the savings mobilization (vital for 
organizational growth and sustainability) are the key links in the Grameen strategies.   An 
effective implementation of Grameen model has some fundamental operational preconditions 
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for the peer group lending including primarily female borrowers, self-selection, substantial 
demand for loans, savings mobilisation and good loan recovery performance.  
          For MFI initiatives in UK, some of these seem absent such as self-selection for Street-
Cred and group cohesion and mainly female borrowers for GU and Street-UK resulting in low 
loan recovery for both projects. The inability to mobilize savings (due to the prevailing 
regulatory environment) and the consequent constraints of generating internal funds for 
additional lending is a factor which has affected all MFI initiatives in UK. In addition, either 
one or more of the following factors suppressed demand for all the projects causing significant 
problems. These intertwined factors, comprises a comprehensive welfare system with 
insufficient interim assistance, intricate business environment in which the micro-entrepreneur 
functions (compelling MFIs to provide expensive training regimes irrespective of cost), 
borrowers who are reluctant to undertake risk and individualistic nature of the UK scoiety. In 
addition, regulatory impediments cause distortions from the original model making operations 
even more challenging. This is particularly relevant for GU as it was unable to adopt the 
marketing approach consistent with the original model as management were wary of being 
classed as a high-risk applicant under existing regulations or being perceived as an abusive 
lender to prospective clients. Regulations also caused additional distortions in other important 
areas such as loan recovery by preventing home visits an essential part of the original model 
and affecting the cohesiveness of groups. Moreover, meetings had to held at confined spaces 
reducing their effectiveness and worsening problems of indiscipline. Regulations also have 
adverse impact on the nature impact on outreach as interpretations of the sex discrimination 
legislations lead to a loss of female focus. The overall impact may have worsened as GU 
grappled with combined effects of all the regulatory problems and responded to it be taking on 
more male clients to meet outreach targets. Such developments were clearly in contradiction 
to the essence of the Grameen model. The discussion above pointed out the need for a bespoke 
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regulatory approach that is tailored to different types of MFIs and their organizational 
ambitions. Moreover, given the heavy emphasis on Welfarist objectives, regulations may also 
allow such organizations to mobilize savings with appropriate safeguards in place to protect 
consumers. Many organizations including GU and WEvolution adopted the method of 
obtaining referrals from external organizations which was difficult due to the conservative 
attitude of such organizations. The differences in the demographics of the clientele base 
between GU and WEvolution indicates that it was difficult for GU to enrol indigenous clients 
onto its program as a result of the loan being a mandatory and core component. The regulatory 
issues also made it harder for GU to operate effectively as a result of this emphasis on loans. 
All of the aforementioned factors posed significant institutional complexities for GU which led 
to its untimely demise.  WEvolution may been able to survive thus far as a result of its non-
emphasis on loans and lesser pressure and complexities. These factors appear contrary to 
Grameen experiences in Bangladesh, thus contributing a substantial degree of institutional 
complexity in GB model’s replication in UK.  
            Yet, it cannot be construed that the GB model has proved ineffective in the context of 
high-income economies. Contrarily, Grameen’s experiences in USA (as will be analysed later) 
support the view that the model may enable combating financial exclusion in the context of a 
developed country GA has expanded steadily in the USA since its inception in 2008. Some 
interviewees in the current study believe, the Grameen model may offer effective means of 
combating financial exclusion as the socioeconomic contexts unveils in the UK81. Future 
researchers may explore a comparative perspective of the GA’s replication efforts in the USA, 
which may suggest further avenues for research.   
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CHAPTER 6 INSTITUTIONAL 




Institutional entrepreneurs are perceived to instil “changes that diverge from existing 
institutions, independent of whether the initial intent was to change the institutional 
environment, and whether the changes were successfully implemented’’ (Battilana et al., 2009: 
72).  This Chapter considers the same case studies as the previous chapter, most of which MFIs 
have undergone major transformations since their inception, the most significant of which are 
a change of lending models and target clientele.    
The study in the present chapter analyses the contextual factors which have triggered such 
changes. It explains how the field characteristics and circumstances influenced the framing of 
problem by the institutional entrepreneurs. It outlines the process in which the institutional 
entrepreneurs mobilized allies in order to accomplish their missions. It delineates the respective 
organizational identities, templates and strategic visions and the corresponding implications 
for the institutional entrepreneurship process. More specifically, it offers a macro-level 
perspective how the MFIs in UK responded to the institutional complexities at the micro-level 
as identified in the previous chapter in the light of the emerging context in which they were 
operating.      
As per diagnostic perspectives outlined and analytical gaps indicated in the literature review in 
the Chapter 2, the current chapter addresses the following principal research question:  
‘What is the nature of the process of institutional entrepreneurship of implementing the 





Content-wise, the Chapter is divided into five sections. Section 6.1 identifies the key contextual 
factor affecting the operations of the MFIs and their links to the evolving organizational 
strategies. Section 6.2 analyses the comparative nature of problem framing between the 
respective MFIs and how this evolved with the emerging field level characteristics and 
circumstances. Section 6.3 contrasts the organizational templates and strategic visions with 
respect to Institutionist and Welfarist goals adopted by the MFIs and their ramifications. 
Section 6.4 examines the dynamics of alliances formed by the MFIs with external actors in 
overcoming institutional complexity. Section 6.5 shows the role of identity and how this 
influences the institutional entrepreneurship process of adopting the Grameen model in UK. 
The conclusion sums up the findings and envisages future developments in the field.  
6.1 The Emerging Context: Rise of Predatory Lending and 
Welfare to work incentives 
There has been a low demand for Grameen-style loans in UK, which some micro-lending 
authorities such as ME#4, ME#2 and ME#5 attribute to the activities of predatory lenders, as 
their presence increased substantially during the periods of their operation. The potential micro-
lending clients are often attracted to predatory lending due to the ease and speed of the process.  
Many abusive lenders make the lending process very easy with little paperwork such as 
application forms etc. This is appealing for prospective clients as they are reluctant to fill out 
detailed forms because of the complexity and time required to do so. In addition, clients are 
also hesitant about revealing sensitive personal/financial information, even though using the 
services of abusive lenders comes at a high price as clients are charged extortionate 
fees/interest. Many clients are vulnerable and simply fail to realize the extent of exploitation 
they will have to suffer as a result of having to pay such rates and become swayed by the 
immediate ease of obtaining such loans. One respondent compared the ease of obtaining 
payday loans with the difficulties of getting Grameen-style loans which require hard-work in 
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terms of coming together in groups, attending meetings and taking moral, sometimes financial 
responsibilities for default of the loan (ME#2).  When comparing the process with predatory 
lenders the potential clients perceive the Grameen loans as risky (ME#2).  A Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism (BOIJ) study revealed that payday lending had experienced swift 
growth even through recession. Although Wonga is the most prominent amongst such firms, it 
is not the only firm to benefit from the rapid boom in the industry. The study revealed that the 
top ten companies which offered short-term payday loans (some of which charged up to 7000% 
APR) had a collective revenue of £800m which was an increase of approximately 41% from 
the last three years (Warren, 2013). Furthermore, the study traced 1427 short-term lending 
stores in UK, Scotland and Wales, meaning that there was approximately one such store for 
every seven bank or building society.  
The study, however, analysed only the dominant national chains, leaving aside many smaller 
and independent operations (Warren, 2013). Concern is on rise how these payday lenders often 
cluster around the most deprived locations causing further exploitation in such areas. A BOIJ 
study, for example, showed that the payday lending stores are often disproportionately situated 
in areas of poverty82. In addition to the high interest and fees charged by the payday lending 
firms there remains a great concern about debt collection practices of the payday lenders. 
Payday lenders often exploit clients by abusing procedures such as Continuous Payment 
Authority (CPA), a method by which firms can take out a succession of payments from a 
client’s bank account without obtaining prior approval for each transaction; even firms can 
repeatedly take various amounts of money from their account without any notice. These 
practices have caused the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) to implement new rules requiring 
that lenders engage with borrowers to find out what is wrong after two failed attempts at using 
                                                             
82 London Borough of Lewisham is one such example. The Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) identified it as one of the most deprived borough. It approximately has 7.6 stores per 
100000 residents (Warren, 2014). Other boroughs with high store concentrations found in the study included 
Barking and Dagenham which also suffers from a high level of deprivation. 
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the CPA to obtain payments (Osborne, 2013). The phenomenal growth of high cost lending 
industry is attributed to the speed and ease of the borrowing process and to the sophisticated 
marketing techniques used by such lenders to attract clients. It is difficult for UK CDFIs to 
compete with such marketing both in terms of scale and scope as they simply lack the money 
to do it (ME#2). The situation gets worse still by illegal, unregulated loan sharks who tend to 
abuse their clients.  
Another key contextual factor which has been highlighted by the management of all the case 
study organizations as a major impediment is the issue of welfare to work incentives. The 
previous Chapter revealed how all the case study organizations have struggled to target the 
indigenous population who have been reluctant to participate in such programs owing to fear 
of losing out on benefits such as Job Seekers Allowance, Income Support and in particular, 
Housing Benefit. Universal Credit (UC) is a policy introduced by the UK government in 2013 
with the intention of restructuring the benefits system. Under this system, six means tested 
benefits including the aforementioned benefits has been streamlined by amalgamating into a 
single payment (Institute for fiscal studies, 2014). This has been gradually rolled out across the 
country with the intent of completion by 2021. 
A principle objective of all microfinance initiatives is to stimulate self-employment by 
providing finance to potential micro-entrepreneurs. It is thus imperative to assess the nature of 
impact that such policies have on self-employment. The purpose of the Universal Credit policy 
has been to smoothen the transition in and out of benefits and make work pay. However, since 
its introduction, the policy has been criticised by many as having an adverse effect on poverty 
particularly affecting employed parents or second income earners (Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, 2012; Resolution Foundation, 2013; Savage and Jayanetti, 2018). However, the 
most significant impact may be on the self-employed who may be discouraged by the new 
system. The previous system enabled self-employed individuals on low incomes to claim 
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Working Tax Credits to enhance their earnings like employed.   Under the universal credit 
system, the benefits being claimed by self-employed individuals will be attached to a 
“minimum second income floor” (an expected level of earnings”) (David, 2011; Dellot, 2014, 
Caraher and Reuter, 2019). Evidence indicates that a substantial number of people are claiming 
this (O’Connor, 2013). The implications are that if they earn below this level, they will not 
receive additional UC to offset the gap while if they earn above this threshold level, their UC 
payments will reduce immediately. An analysis by Dellot (2014) revealed that the earnings of 
a large proportion of self-employed (approximately 37%) is below the threshold making it 
potentially extremely difficult to claim under the current system.  
The reason being attributed to such policy is the inclination of the government to motivate 
people to grow their businesses rather than just surviving by relying on state support. This focus 
on high growth business comes at a cost of ignoring entrepreneurs who may enjoy the 
flexibility of working for themselves or doing business as a pleasure activity which in turn may 
have other beneficial effects such as improvement of mental health. This in turn thus has 
important negative implication for those organizations which may be targeting or serving such 
clients. WEvolution, for example, targets individuals who are not considered as traditional 
entrepreneurs driven for growing their business but may involve themselves in such activities 
to bring about positive changes in their lives.  In addition, it may take time for self-employed 
to grow their businesses to a level when state support is no longer required. The government 
recognizes this to an extent by putting into place a ‘Start-Up Period’ within the current system 
which prevents the self-employed from being liable from reaching the minimum income floor 
for a year. However, this may simply be not long enough as many businesses take longer to be 
established (Dellot, 2014). By penalizing those have put in the effort to grow their businesses 
to the extent of minimum income floor immediately after such a period lapses and discouraging 
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those on low income the policies seem contrary to the perceived “fairness” they are projected 
to bring. 
In addition, the universal credit system makes it much more complex and harder to navigate 
for the self-employed. The UC system requires claimants to be interviewed by the Job Centre 
during which they have to provide invoices, business plans and several statements evidencing 
their intention to grow their business and become “gainfully self-employed”. If unable to prove 
this, the individual will be compelled to seek alternative routes of employment by the adviser. 
This has been criticised as it leaves the process vulnerable to the subjective evaluation of the 
adviser who may lack genuine understanding of the specific business that clients want to be 
involved with. Another problem is that the UC system does not incorporate fluctuation of 
earnings as it uses monthly assessments of one’s earnings. This means that a claimant who has 
a consistent income is likely to be better off than the more common case of a self-employed 
individual whose income oscillates between periods. This has resulted in Social Security 
Advisory Committee (SSAC, an independent statutory body) to urge the Department for Work 
and Pensions (DWP) to reassess how fluctuating income from self-employment is dealt with 
(SSAC report, 2014).  
Furthermore, self-employed individuals will have to submit monthly information detailing 
their income under the UC system as opposed to filling out an annual tax return thus leading to 
increased bureaucratic hassle (Alaekson et al., 2015; Caraher and Reuter, 2019). Such problems 
with the UC policy provision may thus cause existing businesses to increasingly cease trading, 
discourage potential micro-entrepreneurs to starting their own business and make self-
employment an exclusive domain for the elite for whom access to finance is not an issue 
anyway (Dellot, 2014; Rampen, 2015). Research confirms the reluctance on the part of many 
to become self-employed although there is a clear desire to do so. A research report (Going 
Solo) by the charity Citizen’s Advice, for example, revealed that 40% of the UK workforce 
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would prefer to be self-employed but only 15% were self-employed in 2015 (Citizens advice, 
2015). In addition, the average income of the self-employed has experienced a decline in the 
last two decades (Patterson, 2014; TUC, 2018). All these factors may thus made it extremely 
difficult to target the indigenous clients looking to be in self-employment for both the past case 
studies as well as the recent case studies such as GU.  
 
6.2 Field Characteristics and Problem Framing 
 
Three distinctive ways are identified in which institutional entrepreneurs can frame their vision 
for change (Battilana et al., 2009). First is ‘diagnostic framing’, which revolves around 
ascribing blame by detecting inadequacies of current organizations or the wider field and 
existing institutional designs (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Second is ‘prognostic framing’, 
which is about projecting an institutional practice as an improvement to an earlier design. It 
causes the institutional entrepreneur to be involved in de-legitimating existing institutional 
designs supported by rivals (Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), 
and legitimating to relevant external actors or possible associates. Finally, there is 
‘motivational framing’, which requires presenting convincing logics of supporting the newly 
promoted idea (Misangyi et al., 2008).  
Some of the UK case studies used diagnostic framing to present the problem of financial 
exclusion in the context of the locations in which they were operating. EEMC and its 
component organizations, for example, based in the East End of London, widely viewed as a 
particularly deprived region presented the problem as a lack of access to entrepreneurial finance 
for women and suggested the problem was even more chronic for the predominantly ethnic 
minority population they were aspiring to reach out to. WEETU, in a similar vein, used 
diagnostic framing to highlight the feminisation of poverty in UK in terms of lack of 
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employment and networking opportunities, lower wages, skills and training and projected how 
Full Circle was developed in response to growing marginalisation of women in Norwich and 
surrounding regions in Eastern UK (Pearson and Watson, 1997). Street-UK, however, 
originally framed the problem in a slightly different manner to the aforementioned 
organizations. The founder institutional entrepreneur Rosalind Copisarow postulated that 
microfinance in industrialized countries is not about classic poverty alleviation rather about 
supporting the development and sustainability of small businesses and to support clients 
operating in the informal “grey” economy to transition to the mainstream (Copisarow, 2000).  
Copisarow (2000) also used prognostic framing to identify ten key areas in which the existing 
financial institutions were failing to meet the potential demand from micro entrepreneurs 
insisting that there was a market gap for a specialized institution such as Street-UK to provide 
such services. She also used elements of motivational framing to provide compelling reasons 
in terms of desirable outcomes such as enhanced levels of business survival, self-esteem and 
confidence, skills, income and social networks for borrowers. She further pointed out the 
success of a Polish counterpart organization (Fundusz Mikro) that she had founded with similar 
visions.  
However, the rapid growth of the high cost lending industry outlined in the previous section 
coupled with the institutional complexities of adopting the Grameen model (as explained in the 
previous chapter) led to a significant change in strategic vision of some micro-lending projects. 
The suggested concept of “specificity” of logics (Goodrick and Salancik, 1996) may have 
relevance in this context. It may be inferred that the extent of discretion that can be used to 
balance competing logics by organizations is closely related to the specificity of logics 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Strategic behaviour of organizations may be inhibited by high 
specificity of logics; when logics are vague and lack specificity, they may have more leeway 
in overcoming institutional complexity. This significantly enhances the organizations’ ability 
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to reframe problems, develop innovative solutions and amalgamate structures/practices in 
response to the institutional complexity (Greenwood et al, 2011). When the UK CDFIs adopted 
the Grameen model, the problem of financial exclusion was interpreted by the microcredit 
projects mainly as a lack of access to entrepreneurial finance; the model was then adopted as a 
way to address the problem. In the wake of numerous challenges and experiences with the 
application of the model (as discussed in the previous Chapter) and burgeoning activities of 
abusive lenders, the financial exclusion problem was reframed by ME#1 and Street-UK as that 
of combating abusive lending. It is reasoned that the use of certain expertise and strategies by 
an institutional entrepreneur is linked to the formative stage of the organizational field 
(Fligstein, 1997).  The field of community finance was at an embryonic stage when the UK 
case studies adopting the Grameen model began in the late 1990s. In fact, the industry body 
Community Development Financial Association (CDFA) was established in 2002 a few years 
after the case studies started operations. Hence the organizational field was very much at a 
formative stage and the processes, strategies or organizational templates were yet to be 
established. This is in contrast to countries such as Bangladesh where initiatives which 
replicated the Grameen model had an idea of processes to be implemented and possible 
challenges to be encountered as cues could be taken from the Grameen experiences.   
Thus, the emergent field of community finance field in UK was characterised by “narrowly 
diffused” and “weakly entrenched” institutional practices (Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002; 
Maguire et al, 2004). As mentioned in the previous chapter, some of the projects such as Street-
Cred did not adhere to the core features of Grameen model. In this case the source of the 
complexity may have been the lack of implementation of self-selection strategy which was 
contradictory to the essence of the model Street-Cred desired to adopt. The community logic 
was prevalent as Street-Cred aspired to help the micro entrepreneurs in the region it was 
operating in, however, the market logic of delivering finance in a sustainable manner was 
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compromised as loan recovery was poor due to deviation from the original model. By the time 
the EEMC ceased and Fair Finance emerged, relevant lessons were incorporated into its 
practices by the former administrator of EEMC, ME#1, who was its managing director. The 
learning outcome from the pilot at EEMC was that the demand for entrepreneurial loans was 
not as high as was expected and also the fact that such loans have to be of significant size and 
require ancillary services such as technical advice and training to make the clients’ businesses 
grow quickly and be sustainable, which in turn substantially increases the cost for the CDFI.  
The microfinance solution in UK, according to ME#1, was thus about tackling predatory 
lending rather than providing entrepreneurial loans83. The Grameen model, piloted at EEMC, 
was thus discarded. The predominant objective at Fair Finance was to address financial 
exclusion and exploitation amongst the deprived communities in the UK providing personal 
and business loans at reasonable interest rates.   
Interestingly, as ME#1 views, if the clients were offered a personal loan rather than business 
loans at EEMC, it would have been inundated with demand. The level of demand for personal 
loans is much higher compared to business loans at Fair Finance supporting this assertion84. 
Fair Finance has expanded quickly and 2 branches have achieved sustainability, with 3 others 
moving towards sustainability (at the time of writing). On an average, it takes about 3-years 
for each branch to become sustainable. This success is attributed by the management to 
appropriate designing of products, accurate pricing and targeting of clients and collaboration 
with apposite organizations85. The organizational field had thus matured to an extent that 
group-lending practices were deemed to be redundant for the UK context and the priority of 
the market logic dictated that more conventional methods are used. Hence at Fair Finance, a 
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84 (ME#1, 2014)  
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more conventional risk assessment methodology is used whereby credit search is conducted on 
clients.  
However, unlike mainstream financial institutions, it has a more sympathetic approach as loan 
applications are not rejected as a result of bad credit history. Rather, the search provides an 
overview of client’s financial situation and indicates the ability to repay or manage existing 
debts. At the core of the Fair Finance’s success in terms of improved default rates, client 
retention rates, its simultaneous growth and expansion has been the fact that it has emphasized 
on building strong relationships with its clients with the help of dedicated loan officers. In 
trying to achieve scale and sustainability, this focus was not compromised as the face-to-face 
element of its operation has always been prioritised. The loan officers are given a limit of 
maximum number of clients to work within a year by the managing director. An inverse bonus 
policy is adopted whereby if this limit is exceeded, then the salary is reduced by a proportional 
amount. This runs contrary to the conventional banking logic of encouraging higher number of 
clients per staff to increase profitability. Fair Finance’s strategy was thus divergent from 
orthodox tactics focusing on transactional lending to a greater emphasis on relationship-based 
lending. The market logic was therefore compromised to a degree by Fair Finance but not to 
an extent which would impact on its sustainability and a greater significance has been attached 
to the community logic with the continued emphasis on building one-to-one relationships 
focused on understanding client needs.  
Along similar lines, Street-UK changed its model to provide personal loans for protecting 
clients from abusive lenders, which together with improved delinquency management and 
underwriting criteria, have led to a much improved loan recovery rates. This also led to positive 
changes in the demand for loans, delinquency levels and operational sustainability for the 
project. The money is now being lent against a known cash-flow rather than a speculative cash-
flow proposed by an entrepreneur unlike the previous system resulting in lower risk. Street-
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UK has made significant progress since then doubling the number of loans in 2008 since this 
strategic shift reaching operational sustainability and generating surpluses in 2008/09 86. It has 
continued to increase number of outlets serving clients and has inaugurated its fifth outlet. The 
management attributes this success to a change in the market that Street-UK serves and the 
loan products it provides. The new lending model is geared towards smoothing an individual’s 
cash flow requirements87. In addition to change in the lending model, Street-UK developed the 
Street-serve service which was a back office financial software management-service supplied 
to other CDFIs. This was successful and had generated a surplus subsidizing the lending 
operations over the years. Thus, the new lending model was predominantly focused on 
displacing predatory lenders, rather than providing entrepreneurial loans. According to the 
management, approximately £15m had been lent to clients since the changes saving clients 
almost £4.5m in fees and interest relative to loans that they would have taken otherwise88.  
Both the recent case study organizations’ strategic aspirations seem to be in accordance with 
the concept of mimetic ‘Isomorphism’ proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (2002). 
Isomorphism refers to a situation in which organizational designs and practices in different 
organizations are similar. Mimetic isomorphism refers to situations when the senior 
management of an organization willingly aspire to follow another exemplary institution 
(Biesenthal et al, 2018). It follows that GU desired consciously to follow the unique peer group 
lending technique adopted by Grameen in order to utilize it effectively in an UK context. 
WEvolution, on the other hand, was inspired by the Myrada model in India and aspired to adopt 
the collective aspects of the Indian SHG system.  
It is worth investigating what framing strategies the recent case studies adopted. The 
WEvolution management note the fragmented nature of the Scottish society in areas of high 
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deprivation characterized by high levels of isolation. They contrast the nature of this 
deprivation typically construed as mental images of unemployed, criminal or lazy individuals 
reliant on generous welfare regime with that of India where underprivileged areas are often 
associated with a lack of hygiene. It is suggested that people in such communities in the UK 
often perceive themselves as “bad” which in turn adversely affects their self-worth and 
confidence. It is believed that the collective process of SRG model will help such people break 
such generalizations and consider themselves as producers or individuals who add value to the 
ecosystem rather than simply being mere consumers or recipients. The WEvolution authority 
stress that the sense of aspiration and mutual support generated by the collectivist nature of the 
model is a core factor with loans playing a supplementary role. It may thus be inferred from 
the above that WEvolution uses elements of diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing 
to project financial and social exclusion problems. It uses diagnostic framing to highlight 
inadequacies of current institutional designs which the management insist are 
compartmentalized specialized services for addressing problems of financial exclusion or 
issues of mental health or social isolation. Prognostic framing is then used as WEvolution is 
proposed as an alternative arrangement to existing institutional arrangements, a unique one 
stop service which provides an integrated solution to financial and social exclusion 
amalgamating all elements of such services under a single umbrella. Motivational framing is 
also used as WEvolution brings to the fore the SHG model through which it looks to empower 
the self-reliant group and envisages individuals acting as independent entities within the group 
and promotes this as an unprecedented way for individuals to work together in an UK context89.  
The way in which WEvolution uses framing is thus consistent with the Myrada model which 
it is inspired from. The core mission statement of Myrada is “Building appropriate local 
people’s institutions” which emerges from a conviction that the underprivileged should be 
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afforded the opportunity to build their own institutions which should be valued. The integrated 
nature of the WEvolutions’s organization aim and operations also resonates well with the 
versatility of Myrada’s ambitions. Some of its core objectives are: (i) to enhance the 
sustainability of livelihoods of poor through developing institutions, strategies and skills, (ii) 
improve the quality of life and environment by achieving the appropriate balance between 
natural resources and genuine needs of people, (iii) help guide and shape public policy in favour 
of the deprived and finally (iv) to build and foster community network and linkages 
(Myrada.org, 2020).  Although WEvolution is open to both male and female members, there is 
a specific focus on women in its framing approach. This is evident from the high proportion of 
women on its board and staff team. It is also apparent from its marketing materials such as 
video and photos and testimonials of clients on its website. WEvolution authorities attribute 
this focus to the fact that about 80% of single parent households are led by women and a priority 
on this particular gender is required to address issues of family breakdown, health and 
economic inequality. It is also interesting to look at GU’s framing approach. The mission 
statement of GU on its official website, stated:  
“Grameen in the UK offers financial support by providing micro-credit business loans to thousands of people 
who are currently not served by any mainstream financial services. The goal is to improve the economic situation 
of the most financially disadvantaged in the UK, initially in the West of Scotland, on a sustainable basis. We 
provide a real opportunity for change, enabling individuals to begin to help themselves, their families, their 
communities and to challenge the cycle of poverty and welfare dependency in the UK.”  (Grameen in the UK, 
2017) 
GU thus used diagnostic framing to point out the inadequacies of the mainstream financial 
services in meeting current demand for loans from micro-entrepreneurs. The statement further 
pointed out the intention of GU to challenge poverty and unemployment by inspiring Scottish 
people reliant on welfare to be involved in self-employment. However, GU’s operational 
experiences and the aforementioned difficulties of outreach initiatives amongst the native 
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residents has significant implications for the nature of this framing. Magnusson et al. (2008) 
proposed the concept of Contradiction which make apparent the deviation of reality from 
rhetoric (Goodwin and Voola, 2013). This is evident in the fact that GU’s clientele base was 
predominantly formed of immigrants whereas the program’s mission was clearly aimed at the 
indigenous population reliant on welfare provision to a great extent. It may mean that the 
problem of financial exclusion needed to be subtly reframed by GU more in terms of meeting 
the needs of sole traders (which comprise over 90% of GU’s current clientele base) locked out 
of the existing financial system unable to obtain loans rather than native audiences looking to 
start their own small business and give up on welfare in the process.  
Interestingly, GU adopted a generic non-gender biased frame in contrast to the parent 
organization. This is attributable to legal advice provided to GU which prevents it from 
marketing products specifically for women. Microfinance has been promoted as a way of 
galvanizing women. MFI initiatives focusing exclusively on women have been traditional been 
seen as cornerstones of poverty alleviation and gender egalitarianism (Kabeer 2009; 
Armendariz & Morduch 2010; Rai & Ravi 2011). Some global MFIs have even been formed 
with the distinct goal of “empowering women” (Copestake et al. 2005: 4). Global institutional 
entrepreneurs in the field such as Bancosol and Grameen have remained committed to their 
focus on women (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). Professor Yunus, in a speech in 2012, 
highlighted the female focus of the Grameen model where he pointed out the main difference 
of Grameen with conventional banks. One of the key differences he noted in that speech was 
that conventional banks served a predominantly wealthy male audience whereas Grameen 
focuses its services on poor women (Tedx Talks, 2012). GU’s orientation was thus 
contradictory to the essence and philosophy of the original model. One may argue that it has 
been forced to an extent into this position by the interpretation of existing legislation and the 
corresponding legal advice it has received. There are some reflections in the extant literature 
174 
 
which seems to resound well with this issue. Okin (1989:10-13), for example, postulated that 
‘false gender neutrality’ in theories and public polices often risked concealing or 
unintentionally reinforcing gender disparities (Bubeck 1995; Folbre 2001; Robeyns 2003; 
Hobson & Fahlén 2009). Goodwin and Voola (2013), along similar lines, criticised the gender-
neutral orientation of Australian microfinance policy for not incorporating within it the 
perceived effects of gender on an entity through gendered institutions, philosophies or 
prospects.  
WEvolution is not as reliant as GU on existing social collateral between individuals to form 
successful groups. Rather it acknowledges the disjointed nature of the UK society and seeks to 
build cohesion amongst clients with an appetite for change in their lives. The subsequent 
process may or may not produce successful entrepreneurs but the ultimate goal is to empower 
them and build their skills and confidence. Microfinance is just one of the tools to achieve this 
goal. At WEvolution, ambitious micro-entrepreneurs with specific needs for microfinance are 
more likely to referred to organizations such as GU or commercial banks.  On the contrary, GU 
starts with aspiring entrepreneurs and builds on existing relationships by requiring clients to 
self-select into groups.   
There is a distinction made between “central” and “peripheral” organizations in the extant 
literature. The former is usually considered to have greater size and status. A higher status may 
lead to an amplification of institutional pressures arising from higher prominence as a result of 
media coverage (Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007; Greening & Gray, 1994; King, 2008; King & 
Soule, 2007; Rehbein, Waddock & Graves,2004; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). Conversely, 
Peripheral organizations, may not be subject to the same levels of institutional demands and -
the nature of their reactions to such complexities may thus be considerably dissimilar to central 
organizations.  (Davis, 1991; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989; Greve, 1998; Kraatz, 1998; 
175 
 
Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997; Westphal & Zajac, 2001; Zuckerman, 1999; Greenwood 
et al., 2011). Although Grameen is a central organization in a global context as a result of the 
great media coverage of Professor Yunus and his numerous awards and accolades, all the case 
study organizations including GU were peripheral in a local context. This may be attributed to 
the relatively modest targets which the organizations struggled to attain.  
6.3 Alignment of Interest with External Actors 
 
Battilana et al. (2009) postulates that the ability to mobilize allies and garner support in 
implementing divergent change is central to the process of institutional entrepreneurship. The 
institutional entrepreneur behind EEMC and Fair Finance, Faisel Rehman initially negotiated 
with Environment Trust (at the time an established development Trust in East London) for 
support believing that the Grameen model would work in the context of UK. The trust provided 
him with a limited time to prove that the concept would work. Finding it difficult to convince 
potential funders, he used £4000 from his own credit card to lend to clients and in the process 
formed four groups. Once he established a track record, he was able to form a consortium 
comprised of Welfarist development organizations. The consortium appealed to component 
organizations as the objectives were consistent with the needs of their clients. Account 3, for 
example, was a well-established women’s enterprise agency which were interested because of 
a perceived need of small loans for some of its clients. This enabled him to secure funding 
worth £50000 from a local regeneration project (Cityside SRB5). With a 25-loan record and 
formalisation of the consortium enabled Faisel to convince Natwest to lend £20000 of its 
community fund bond. It was mutually beneficial as the consortium received finance and 
NatWest was able to fulfil community development commitments as part of it corporate social 
responsibilities. A major source of the funds then came through the Phoenix fund which was 
initiated by the then Labour Government to tackle social exclusion in disadvantaged areas such 
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as East London. By 2004/05, numerous challenges surfaced and the resulting underwhelming 
performance of the pilot projects adopting the Grameen model meant that funding support had 
dried up including the Phoenix Fund which ended in 2006 (Brown and Nissan, 2007). Faisel 
adjusted by aligning his strategies accordingly and going on to establish Fair finance. For the 
first four years of Fair Finance’s operations, funding was difficult to obtain. Faisel had used 
personal finances, small loans from friends and family and few grants with a view to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the model without scaling up the operations. From 2008/09 
period, it started to grow rapidly when two different types of funding were sought: first was 
funding from banks on commercial terms to scale its loan book and second was to pursue 
funding from investors who would assist in scaling up operations in terms of working capital 
and expansion. It may be noted here that it was perhaps quite difficult for Faisel to coalesce 
with commercial banks. This is due to the fact that by agreeing to collaborate the bank would 
ideologically accept its failure in serving a certain population and also cooperate with a 
relatively new organization with a limited track record. In addition, the profit maximization 
and purely Institutionist philosophy of the bank would be in contradiction with the social 
business model of Fair Finance. It is notable that two of Britain’s largest commercial banks, 
Barclays and RBS had refused to support Fair Finance in 2011 (Wilson, 2011). However, Fair 
Finance was soon able to secure a funding package worth £3m inclusive £1m of debt finance 
underwritten by Santander of half a million from BNP Paribas and Société Générale, two of 
France's leading lenders. The deal was considered an unprecedented landmark as it was the 
first commercial microfinance deal in Western Europe which could be utilised to tackle 
financial exclusion (BNP Paribas, 2011). Significantly, the strong orientation of Fair Finance 
towards the market logic proved to be appealing to the investors. This is evident in the 
following statement by Ian Fisher, Chief Country Officer for Societe Generale in the UK: 
“We understood very quickly Fair Finance would always be constrained if relying solely on grants and 
donations. We therefore wanted to make a genuine commitment to support a sustainable business model that 
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would enable them to support many more entrepreneurs in the future, and we felt this was the best means to 
doing so”. (Societe Generale, 2011) 
The structure of the deal was considered as a “game changer” in the area of social impact 
investment as the crucial component was the £750,000 patient capital underwritten by social 
investors to cover costs including potential defaults which made it attractive for banks to be 
involved in the funding process. In addition to the social impact, another incentive for these 
socially minded investors was that they would recover their investments within 7 years and 
gaining 5% interest per annum as long as a surplus is generated by Fair Finance.  According to 
the financial strategist behind the deal, it was once again Fair Finance’s emphasis on the market 
logic that was the key factor enabling the deal to be successful (Cheng, 2011). This is apparent 
from the following statement:  
“They saw it as an end to the begging bowl for the charity – no more charitable donations. As businesspeople it 
really appealed to them. The philanthropists we presented to got the concept right away. They were very taken 
with the idea that an investment strategy could be used and their money could be recycled.” (Cheng, 2011) 
Thus, Fair Finance was able to successfully obtain both types of funding as social investors 
have bought into the ethos and ideology of Fair Finance along with its impressive track record 
of efficient provision of services.  The returns for investors have been capped at 5% per annum 
for a ten-year period. Such a strategy resonates well with the community logic as a higher level 
of return for investors would imply charging higher interest rates to clients. Fair Finance has 
resisted the temptation to charge an interest rate which is slightly below the market and 
undercut rivals. Rather its interest rates, in congruence with its community logic, has been 
substantially below its competitors (Hawkins, 2014). Fair Finance addressed the problem of 
financial exclusion by offering personal loans at reasonable rates. It took a leading role in 
promoting financial transparency and accountability in the CDFI industry by publishing its first 
disclosure report of all its lending activities. Furthermore, it pioneered online disclosure of all 
its lending activities (Fair Finance B, 2020). This level of accountability and transparency was 
unprecedented in the CDFI industry. Such unique features of Fair Finance made it more 
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credible and consequently attracted higher investments over the periods of its operations. 
Important links were established with key organizations such as environment trust which in 
turn helped to build relations with housing associations and attract funding support from the 
banking sector. Another aspect of the alignment strategies was in terms of building productive 
referral systems. Business Lending at Fair Finance picked up since late 2007 as a result of Fair 
finance’s collaborations with local business advice agencies (Nissan and Thiel, 2008). Other 
noteworthy alliance was with housing associations such as EastendHomes for a project known 
as ‘Money Matters’. The project focused on helping clients with a range of issues such as rent 
arrears, debt counselling and arranging repayments. It is pertinent to note that the nature of the 
service offered was different than typical government sponsored schemes providing a generic 
service as it was more personalized and customised to client needs.  This was effective in 
combining the community logics of addressing financial exclusion by means of debt advice 
and assisting housing associations in lowering rent arrears and the market logics of generating 
a consistent source of income (as funding support was provided by these associations). In 
addition, the market logic was enhanced by the fact this partnership opened up another source 
of possible avenue of income as debt ridden clients of the association could be served by Fair 
Finance. 
The Street-UK also noted that effective provision of MFI services in the context of 
industrialized countries requires a collaborative approach from MFIs, the government and the 
voluntary sector. In 1999, Rosalind Copisarow placed a proposal to serve the needs of small 
businesses which lacked access to mainstream finance to Esmee Fairbairn Foundation, a major 
independent grant-making foundation in the UK. The foundation approved the proposal and 
made a grant worth £1.329 one of the largest in its history. The strong focus on sustainability 
shown by Street-UK’s ambition of achieving a self-sustaining institution using an innovative 
model such as Grameen and the projected outreach appealed to Esmee as it resonated well with 
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its stated objective of “investing in organizations that aim to deliver both a financial return and 
a social benefit” (New Economics Foundation, 2004; Esmee Fairbairn Website, 2020). Street-
UK also benefitted from funding from the Phoenix Development fund. Street-UK established 
the project “StreetLab” in 2002 for policy and advocacy activities which included projects with 
Community Links and Inland Revenue to decipher impediments for self-employed people to 
transition from informal to mainstream economy, the results from which influenced policies of 
both the Social Exclusion Unit and Inland Revenue.  
  
An evaluation carried out NEF concluded that there was evidence of value added to policy area 
generated by this component of Street-UK’s service. However, this value added was not found 
to validate its high cost funded by an internal subsidy (NEF, 2004). This caused it to be 
discarded eventually. A notable partnership Street-UK developed in 2003 in response to its 
outreach problems was with Pertemps Employment Alliance, a subsidiary of a national 
employment agency which had referred a substantial number of clients to Street-UK. However, 
the aforementioned problems of using the Grameen model soon led to frictions between Esmee 
and Street-UK as the core targets of sustainability and outreach set out in the proposal were far 
from being achieved. Alliance with external organizations was difficult as a result of its 
Institutionist goals of becoming a nationwide organization in a short span of time which was 
viewed as arrogant by other CDFIs (New Economic Foundation, 2004).  Apart from developing 
personal loans products, Street-UK also developed a new way of aligning with other CDFIs. It 
used the comparative advantage it had from its pioneering experience of providing MFI 
services by developing a wholesale service known as “StreetServe” for selling to other CDFIs. 
The comprehensive service was particularly appealing for new entrants into the CDFI industry 
as it incorporated functional support in terms of dealing with enquiries, performing credit 
checks, management of loan disbursements, repayments, monitoring and processing 
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comprehensive credit control functions. This enabled Street-UK to deal with institutional 
complexity as the sustainability logic was helped by the fact that the service had a high number 
of subscribers as sales made a significant portion of its trading income90. In addition, the 
development logic has been attained as the service is helping other CDFIs to provide efficient 
services hence leading to more comprehensive tackling of financial exclusion.  
At WEETU, the institutional entrepreneurs faced similar struggles to the above organizations 
in initiating the Full Circle project. Erika Watson, one of the founders found it particularly 
difficult to obtain funding as forwarding loans without collaterals seemed to be a radical 
concept which was unacceptable to many social investors. She eventually managed to raise 
£80000 from sources such as the community fund, Natwest and the European Social Fund. A 
major source of the funds like the other case study organizations, came through Phoenix 
Development Fund. One of the early collaborative initiatives was with Women's Self 
Employment Project (WSEP), a CDFI based in Chicago which had adopted the model 
effectively in the context of an industrialized countries such as USA.  The mission and identity 
of WEETU resonated well with the WSEP’S goals of empowering women through cooperative 
action and WEETU learnt a great deal from this partnership (Pearson, 1998). It subcontracted 
the management of loan to a specialist organization Charities Aid foundation (CAF) for 
effective monitoring and management (Pearson, 1998).  Partnerships were developed with 
other projects such as Enterprising Women’s network, a business advice and mentoring service, 
which was also a source of business contacts for Full Circle clients (Pearson and Watson, 
1998).  
This was followed by an innovative partnership with Childminding matters an organization 
which offers advice and support services for childminders and parents across Norfolk. Clients 
of the organization were offered mini-loans of £60 to assist new childminders in meeting 
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registration costs which was connected to the core loan product offered at Full-Circle to enable 
to start or develop their businesses91. Long term sustainability was viewed by WEETU as 
networking and partnerships with relevant organizations in terms of developing concurrent 
services in other regions and also engaging with organizations such as credit unions and LETS 
(Local Exchange Trading Schemes) to offer enhanced savings and barter services (Sweetman, 
1997). In order to implement this strategy and align itself with relevant external actors, 
WEETU had later on developed a full credit toolkit providing for £15000 to any organisation 
wanting to replicate or develop the programme. This innovation had important implications for 
sustainability of the project as well as establishing a network of peer lending providers that can 
target isolated communities; yet it failed to take off as subscription was low in general92. In 
2011, it was successful in a bid for obtaining funds from Barclays Community fund. WEETU’s 
mission was aligned with the fund’s objective of providing accessible and affordable credit in 
deprived regions. The joint project sought to enhance the lending program and one of the core 
components of this change was a removal of peer group lending and a shift to individual lending 
for entrepreneurial loans. However, the changes had limited impact with debt aversion being 
noted as a major issue in achieving outreach objectives (Transact.org, 2013). The Full-Circle 
project faced similar problems to the above organizations as it experienced a funding constraint 
owing to the cessation of important sources of funding streams such as the Phoenix 
Development Fund and it continued to lobby for additional funding (Flemons, 2008). However, 
it struggled in an environment where larger more corporate providers were increasingly 
favoured at the expense of smaller localized providers. Moreover, the change in the funding 
environment was also characterized by an increased emphasis on payments by results. Frictions 
arose between funders and such projects due to discord about what constitutes as results; the 
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funders were often viewed as rigid and lacking contextualized understanding of the situation. 
Unlike organizations such as Street-UK and EEMC/Fair Finance above did not make the 
strategic shift towards providing personal loans and ceased operation.     
As for the recent case studies, the strategy for WEvolution to interact with potential allies is to 
“infect” the institutional environment and inspire other organizations to start their own SRGs. 
As has been mentioned before, it has been difficult for WEvolution to mobilize allies in its 
field due to the conservative and protective attitude of management of some of these 
organizations who act as “gatekeepers”. This also makes it difficult for it to recruit clients 
through such organizations. This is one of the reasons which has led to the WEvolution 
management considering alternative avenues for recruiting clients in the future.  WEvolution 
recognizes the importance of savings as enhancing the collective element of its model. It has 
addressed the regulatory challenge of savings mobilisation by partnering with Airdrie Savings 
Bank which is UK’s only independent savings bank. All SRGs across Scotland could operate 
savings accounts at this bank since 2015. The alliance with the bank was possible due to 
networks of one of the senior board members who is a retired banker and has been responsible 
for starting four banks in the UK. The approach from WEvolution was to get authorities from 
the bank to come to the organization and spend time talking to the clients and understanding 
what they do. Subsequently, the organization received approval from the bank as they wanted 
to support such activities in the community. The option of savings account has been popular 
with the clients as evident from the high subscription.  
In addition, WEvolution has an academic collaboration with Glasgow Caledonian University 
(GCU) to assess the nature of impact it is having on clients. Interestingly, the management have 
not struggled to obtain funding for the project despite the fact that WEvolution is a peripheral 
organization and has an ambiguous organizational identity. This may be attributable to the fact 
that its institutional identity seems to have hold substantial appeal for funders as it is seen as a 
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novel way of working with people which may lead to notable social impact for beneficiaries. 
The major sources of funding are the Scottish Government and Church of Scotland. The 
Scottish Government has provided significant funding for the project as the mission of the 
project to enhance self-reliance and build the confidence of the Scottish population to make 
them more resilient fits well with their vision of a Fairer Scotland. Church of Scotland has 
supported the project as its parent organization with an ambition of promoting SRGs in poorest 
regions suffering from multiple deprivations which have very few churches in operation. Other 
Churches have also been supportive with St Meddens Church of Scotland in Troon and St 
Quivox Church in Ayr having raised funds to support the SRG movement. Churches have also 
provided spaces for the hubs that SRG clients use to meet up.  
WEvolution is also working with the Scottish government in a policy and advocacy capacity. 
It has, for example, communicated to the government the nature of difficulties it is facing with 
regards to issue of welfare to work incentive. However, currently most decision-making powers 
on this issue is assigned to the Westminster administration. More powers are expected to be 
devolved to the Scottish government in the future which may be helpful for the organization. 
A notable strategy by the management has been the development of a social franchise model 
to mobilise potential allies. This is a replication toolkit (inclusive of organizational training) 
which is being developed at WEvolution which is to be sold to organization who are interested 
to start SRGs in their specific regions. This has yet to be fully officially launched, however 
there has been substantial initial interest. Ten organization from all over the UK have already 
attended Do it yourself (DIY) sessions (projected to be a part of the social franchise model 
being developed) at WEvolution following which additional sessions have been requested. 
More organizations are scheduled to attend such sessions at the time of writing. Further, this 
strategy seems to harmonise well with the WEvolution’s organizational ambition of 
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influencing the institutional environment as organizations in Glasgow, Manchester and Wales 
have gone on to start their own SRGs after they received training from WEvolution93. 
The distinguishable feature of GU’s identity is its direct affiliation with parent organization 
which has resulted it in acquiring the original brand name “Grameen” which is well known 
globally. This along with the involvement of Professor Yunus had given it initial recognition 
affording it a comparative advantage over any other new entrant in the field. This had meant 
that GU had on board some high-profile partners even before it started operating formally. 
However, despite prestige of the Grameen label it was difficult for GU directors to obtain 
support from commercial banks convincing them provide funding for lending to poor at a time 
when the banks were tightening their lending criteria at a time of recession. The process of 
communicating and networking with the banks was a lengthy process as a result of this 
reluctance.  
Eventually, Tesco Bank agreed to provide loan capital finance and valuable support in terms 
of website development, general banking, compliance and legal services. Importantly, it had 
provided savings accounts facilities (which also paid out interest) to the clients without 
background checks as they found Grameen’s vision to be in line with their Corporate Social 
responsibility agenda of supporting the local community. It was mutually beneficial for GU 
and Tesco as Tesco’s CSR drive could receive a boost through their association with the 
prestigious Grameen brand while Grameen received support for their clients and financing 
capital for organizational development. Furthermore, Tesco’s involvement along with the 
prestige of Professor Yunus and the Grameen brand lured other high-profile partners such as 
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), GCU and Clifford Chance. RBS offered GU clients a 
foundation business account without any background checks for which there was no charge 
imposed for an initial period of 2 years. 
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GU had an academic collaboration with GCU to evaluable impact of its activities on the 
Scottish society. Crucially, GCU had provided space for GU’s office activities free of charge 
saving it a substantial amount in operating costs. Clifford Chance acted as a pro-bono legal 
adviser to GU. The management attribute the Grameen label to the copious amount of initial 
funding support it had received from various organizations. They acknowledged that it would 
have been extremely difficult for a new organization without the label to get such funding and 
support. Wholeplanet foundation, for example, which supports microcredit replications 
globally had provided GU with generous grant funding worth £50000 in year 1 followed by 
£100000 in the next two years94.   
In addition, the various aspects of GU’s mission and activities had resonated with other 
charitable organizations. GU had thus received funding support from Gloag Foundation which 
supports anti-poverty projects in the UK. They have also received grant funding for a loan 
officer’s salary from Moffat foundation which had similar objectives for people living in 
Ayrshire. GU also worked with charities for obtaining client referrals. One such example, Heart 
for the City, is a charitable ministry of social revival, a core aim for which is to support asylum 
seekers and refugees to integrate into the society. The fact that GU comprised of 95% 
immigrant population showed that the program may have been beneficial for those new into 
the country and hence provided a source of referrals for charities such as this to achieve their 
objectives.   
Institutional entrepreneurs have to deal with various actors in order to implement divergent 
transformations in the field. Thus, they need to identify proponents, adversaries and other 
actors relevant to their initiative (Scully & Creed, 2005). They may come across opposition 
from “Institutional defenders” who are likely to gain from the current state of affairs and hence 
oppose change (DiMaggio, 1988; Levy & Scully, 2007). Battilana et al. (2009) postulate that 
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such trends are even more noticeable if the suggested divergent transformations implemented 
by the institutional entrepreneur have consequences for the organizational advantages and 
status of the opposing actors in the field.  As has been mentioned above, GU and WEvolution 
have encountered difficulties dealing with external organizations for referral and working in 
co-operation to benefit the community. It may be difficult to label such organizations as 
classical “Institutional defenders” per se as they do not directly oppose the activities of the case 
study organizations. However, by declining to work with GU and WEvolution, they benefit 
from the status quo in terms of retaining exclusive access to their clients. This, however, may 
not be in the interest of their clients as they are not made aware of the extensive products and 
services at their disposal from the case study organizations.  
Furthermore, institutional entrepreneurs often project and promote narratives and relate 
historical events to develop a storyline to delineate villains and heroes placing such characters 
as central to the development of a field (Morrill & Owen-Smith, 2002; Zilber, 2007). 
Exemplary stories are thus utilised to illustrate the organizational landscape and relating 
exceptional local anecdotes or narrative to generic issues (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This is 
evident in the strategy of both case study organizations. For, GU, the story of Professor Yunus 
and the successful replication of the Grameen in the local context of first Bangladeshi village 
Jobra has been reemployed numerous times to drive home the need for such a model in various 
contexts including the UK. In addition, institutional entrepreneurs commonly suggest a 
theorization of such narratives (Morrill & Owen-Smith, 2002), which in turn has the potential 
effect of making their argument seem coherent and hence more appealing to a wide range of 
audience (Greenwood et al., 2002). In GU’s case, the theorization of the Grameen story boils 
down to the proposition that the poor are creditworthy and adequately skilled to be successful 
entrepreneurs. It is not hard to imagine why this story is intuitively attractive for organizations 
which have poverty alleviation as their core objective. Similarly, WEvolution also uses the 
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symbolic stories of the successes of the SHG model to achieve its objectives. One such example 
is a blog linked to its official website which incorporates the symbolic and inspiring story of 
Lijjat Papad (an Indian organisation established in 1959 by seven females to make and sell 
poppadum which has currently expanded to approximately 42000 employees. The blog goes 
on to the point that the distinctiveness of the business which lies in the fact that all the 42000 
women own a share of the business consistent with the model advocated by WEvolution 
(Passage to India group, 2011). The theoretical implication of such narratives may be that 
success, self-reliance and well-being is possible if community feelings are harnessed and 
members are empowered through the formation of SRGs.  
An important related concept relevant to understanding alignment strategies is that of 
legitimacy. The definition of legitimacy is a hotly contested topic in literature (Parsons, 1960; 
Maurer, 1971; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Pfeffer, 1981; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) with some 
emphasizing the evaluative aspect while others focusing on the cognitive dimension (Meyer et 
al., 1983; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). The current research adopts the interpretation of 
legitimacy by Suchman (1995: 574) who defines it as a “generalised perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions”. Suchman (1995) distinguishes 
between legitimacy is sought by organizations for credibility and continuity. Both WEvolution 
and GU as new organizations may have encountered “liability of newness” (Freeman et al. 
1983: 692; Stinchcombe, 1965:148). This is associated with implementing unprecedented 
systems and the challenge of gaining approval for the appropriateness of the method and or 
their own acceptability as an establishment.  It follows that the case study organizations have 
till date been seeking legitimacy for credibility given their newness and have been successful 
in doing so as they have negotiated support from various quarters particularly in their initial 
stages.  Moral legitimacy is centred on whether a given action is socially acceptable rather than 
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beneficial to the evaluator (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Parson, 1960; Suchman’ 1995). The case 
study organizations have been successful in gaining moral legitimacy given the ideologically 
appealing nature of organizational ambitions. Scott (1977) and Scott and Meyer (1991) propose 
that moral legitimacy may also be gained in the form of evaluation of techniques and 
procedures. The novelty and uniqueness of the methodologies adopted by GU and WEvolution 
may also have been important in gaining moral legitimacy. In GU’s case, it has clearly 
benefited from personal legitimacy gained through the involvement of Professor Yunus. It is a 
form of moral legitimacy earned through the enchanting personality of individual leaders.  
Weber (1978: 245) cites the example of “moral entrepreneurs” who play an influential role in 
unsettling the status quo. Thus, personal legitimacy may have afforded Yunus the credibility 
to reinforce the theory that poor are creditworthy despite an economic context characterized by 
recession in which contrasting beliefs are held by mainstream financial institutions.  However, 
Suchman (1995) contends that moral legitimacy also incorporates important elements such as 
evaluation techniques, procedures, outputs and consequences. The initial euphoria for GU 
along with the moral and personal legitimacy gained through the Yunus and Grameen branded 
may have receded over the years through a closer examination of the inherent contradictions, 
techniques and procedures along with the negative consequences for outcome and 
consequences. This may have resulted in its eventual closure in 2018.  
6.4 Identity 
Identity features as an important factor in organizational response to institutional complexity95. 
Definition and redefinition of identity is pivotal to building sustainable alliances (Rao et al., 
2000). It may be conceptualized as a set of claims to “institutionally standardized social 
                                                             
95 (Glynn, 2008; Dobbin & Kelly, 2007; Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, 2006; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach & 
Kramer, 1996; Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998; Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Lok, 2010; Meyer & Hollerer, 2010 Creed, 
DeJordy, & Lok, 2010; Kodeih, 2010; Kraatz & Block, 2008;Rao et al., 2003). 
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categories”96. It is about membership in a distinct identity at the organizational field level97. 
Recent studies distinguish between “collective” or “institutional” identity and organizational 
identity (Glynn, 2008; Kodeih and Greenwood, 2014). The former is considered as being an 
affiliate of a social category while the latter includes central and unique claims of how the 
organization views itself to others in that social class. It follows the case study organizations 
had an institutional identity of being a “Community Development Financial institution” in the 
UK. This term is used to encompass a broad category of organizations that provide responsible 
community finance by the industry body (formerly known as Community Development 
Financial Association or CDFA).  
 
This institutional identity and membership to the industrial body enables them to access various 
forms of public and private funding earmarked for social enterprises operating in the 
community finance sphere in the UK.  CDFA membership also facilitates policy and advocacy 
initiatives aimed at influencing the government and other relevant stakeholders in addition to 
enhanced networking and marketing opportunities (Responsible Finance A, 2019). This is 
unlike Grameen Bangladesh, for example, which has an organizational identity of being a 
Microfinance institution, a more refined term used to denote organizations that provide finance 
to microenterprises. It is pertinent to note that the field of community finance in the UK is 
under constant redefinition struggle owing to the diverse and fragmented nature of the products 
that CDFIs provide. The industry body, for example, the erstwhile “Community Development 
Finance Association” has most recently renamed itself “Responsible Finance”. The 
organization attributes this to the fact that the original name did not clearly convey the nature 
of the services provided by its members and was not comprehended well (Sharman, 2015). The 
                                                             
96 (Greenwood et al. 2011: 346 Glynn, 2008; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pratt & Kraatz, 2009; Thornton, Ocasio & 
Lounsbury, in press; Whetten & Mackey, 2002: 397) 
97 (Glynn, 2008; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pratt & Kraatz, 2009; Mackey, 2002: 397) 
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confusion over the institutional identity is also perhaps revealed by the changing definition of 
the term CDFI. CDFIs were previously defined by Responsible Finance (former CDFA) as 
“sustainable, independent organisations which provide financial services with two aims: to 
generate social and financial returns. They supply capital and business support to individuals 
and organisations whose purpose is to create wealth in disadvantaged communities or 
underserved markets” (Nissan and Thiel, 2008: 8). CDFIs have now been relabelled as 
“Responsible Finance Providers” and the current definition is that Responsible finance 
providers have the following attributes: “1) Increasing access to finance- Serving customers 
not supported by mainstream lenders, 2) Mission-driven- Social enterprises re-investing 
profits to deliver economic and social benefits 3) Treating customers fairly- Clear and 
transparent about the costs of borrowing, lending only to those who can afford to repay and 
ensuring customers get the best deal and the best outcome 4) A personal service- A supportive 
approach, with decisions made by people for people 5) Quality-assured and professional- 
Meeting all Financial Conduct Authority requirements and complying with the Responsible 
Finance Code of Practise” (Responsible Finance B, 2020). It can be noted from the above that 
the former definition was much narrower acknowledging only those organizations that provide 
entrepreneurial finance. The current definition resonates very well with the experience of the 
case study organizations and encompasses organizations providing broad range of services 
including entrepreneurial and personal loans. The exclusion of the term “sustainable” from the 
current definition is also congruent with all the institutional complexities that many UK CDFIs 
including the case study organizations have experienced in their quest for sustainability. The 
case study organizations had an organizational identity at their inception which distinguished 
them from others within the same social category as “CDFIs using the innovative Grameen 
model to provide entrepreneurial loans”. WEETU Full-circle’s organizational identity was 
even more refined as it was heavily gender biased with its services focused entirely on women. 
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Thus, microcredit initiatives adopting the Grameen model projected an organizational identity 
which resonated well with the regeneration agenda of the then Labour government, supportive 
of community development finance as an aspect of community regeneration. The aim was to 
provide credit to poor communities for stimulating local enterprise, thereby reducing 
dependency on state support (Affleck and Mellor, 2006).  
 
CDFIs were seen as part of a new, more socially receptive economics, which through the 
development of social, community and local enterprise will sustain local economies, and 
support local communities98. The multiple dimensions of socioeconomic exclusion and a desire 
to promote entrepreneurship in deprived areas led to a conducive environment of increased 
momentum of government support for community finance projects in the late 1990s amongst 
which were initiatives replicating the Grameen model in delivering microfinance to deprived 
communities. This is evidenced by the fact that all the case study organizations were recipients 
of the Phoenix Development fund specially earmarked for achieving regeneration objectives 
of the then Labour government. Addressing financial exclusion through the provision of 
microfinance and promotion of self-employment thus gained increasing prominence and 
resonated well with the policies of the government and funders alike. Regeneration was thus at 
the core of the identity of the case study organizations when they adopted the Grameen model. 
However, in the wake of the aforesaid numerous challenges faced by these initiatives meant 
that such regeneration efforts were largely unsuccessful leading to declining funding support. 
CDFIs such as EEMC/Fair Finance and Street-UK reacted to the difficult funding environment 
by changing their core organizational identity to that of “Responsible Finance Providers 
promoting social justice and transparent lending (i.e. combating the malice of abusive lending)” 
                                                             




as their distinctive selling proposition rather than the regeneration identity that the predecessor 
organizations were trying to project99. This change of identity also led to modifications in their 
stated missions. Street-UK’s original mission, for example, was to “to help poor, financially 
excluded micro entrepreneurs who wish to help themselves” (Copisarow, 2004). This has 
currently been changed to “providing support to financially excluded individuals with tailored 
financial services on a sustainable basis” (Street-UK website, 2020). This change has enabled 
the case study organizations to serve a broader client portfolio for services for which clearly 
there was a great demand as evidenced by the booming predatory lending industry along with 
the emergence of a handful of successful community finance initiatives aimed at tackling such 
lenders. This helped them towards their welfare logic in terms of achieving much greater 
outreach and addressing wider needs. Furthermore, the change in identity also enabled these 
organizations to traverse beyond the realm of entrepreneurial finance aligning themselves in 
the process with important external players and providing diverse products tailored to the needs 
of the local community, thus enhancing the welfare logic. One example of this is the 
collaboration of Street-UK with Local Authorities, Housing Organisations and Regional 
Consortiums in providing affordable home finance for financially excluded individuals.  
 
Organizational names are an important distinguishing indicator of organizational identity. 
Names which resonate well with the current institutional philosophy and practices are likely to 
be selected by organizations (Czarniawska &Wolff, 1998; King et al., 2010; Gioia et al., 2010). 
The Full-Circle project was heavily associated with its parent organization WEETU (Women’s 
Employment, Training and Enterprise Unit) characterized by strong focus on the services to 
the female entrepreneurial population. The fact that female entrepreneurs have always been the 
central focus of the Grameen model and the persistently high unemployment rates amongst this 
                                                             
99 (ME#1, 2014) (ME#3, 2014) 
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population rendered initiatives such as WEETU adopting the model as an attractive proposition 
for regeneration funders keen to address such issues. It is notable that the Full-Circle project 
had attempted to redefine its organizational identity by discarding the group lending 
requirements and operating as a “CDFI to use individual lending model to provide 
entrepreneurial loans” in a late effort to boost outreach. However, the impact of this change 
was limited (Transact.org, 2013).  The change of identity and associated mission to providing 
personal loans like Fair Finance and Street-UK was perhaps difficult and a step too far for the 
Full-Circle project given its strong affiliation with its well-established parent organization 
WEETU (founded in 1987), heavily rooted in its gender-based identity and mission. One may 
argue that even EEMC and its component organizations were heavily gender biased. However, 
in contrast to WEETU, EEMC could be treated as a relatively young and loose consortium of 
disparate organizations for piloting an innovative model, the lessons of which was incorporated 
into the off-shoot organization, Fair Finance.  
 
In terms of the recent case studies, WEvolution’s organizational identity is based on the Indian 
microfinance model which revolves around the concept of forming self-help groups (SHGs). It 
is inspired by the work of Myrada, an Indian NGO which aims to contribute towards poverty 
alleviation, gender empowerment and social inclusion. The model WEvolution uses is based 
on collectivism as the loan is provided to the group rather than the individuals. The business is 
owned by the group which makes crucial decisions on how to invest the loan and other 
enterprise activities. Unlike the Grameen model, the group members take collective moral and 
financial responsibility for the loan in the event of a default. This is the collectivist element of 
the process within the group which is perceived to be unique and unprecedented in the UK 
institutional environment and an effective way of dealing with the individualistic nature of the 
UK society. It is difficult to assign WEvolution an organizational identity of purely a 
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community development financial institution or a charity or an anti-poverty organization as 
result of the integrated nature of services it provides. Rather it is viewed by the management 
as a counter cultural and disruptive movement, the core function of which is to generate wealth 
and opportunities for its clients. It is thus unlike the aforementioned organizations (i.e. CDFI 
or charity) as it attempts to provide an umbrella of sometimes disparate services such as 
financial inclusion or issues of social connectedness, mental health and confidence rather than 
providing a specialized service for a particular element.  
 
Interestingly, the institutional identity of WEvolution has been refined as it has progressed to 
suit the environment that it is operating in. WEvolution was initially termed as “Passage to 
India” when a group of Scottish women from the organization first visited India to observe 
SHGs in operation. This was changed to “Passage from India” after the group came back. This 
label emerged from origin and sentimental value of the women experiencing the Indian SHGs 
first-hand. The groups were called SHGs in congruence with the original model and to highlight 
the collective nature of the model. However, the name of the project was then changed to 
WEvolution as it was realized that potential clients were often not able to identify with the 
name, many of whom had not travelled or had no experience of India. These clients were 
informed about the origin and the history of the model but what was relevant to them was the 
current context in which the model was being applied.  When selecting a new name, the 
management consciously avoided the attaching the term “woman”. This is because although it 
wants to focus its services on women, it is still open to working with men. An agency was 
appointed to come up with a name which reflected the nature of the organizational ambitions 
and clientele it wished to serve, following which the organization was labelled WEvolution. 
The name self-help group or SHG was changed to self- reliant group (SRG) after a certain 
operation period at WEvolution. This is attributed to the fact that the term “self-help” was often 
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associated by potential clients with issues of mental health or alcoholism in an UK context. 
While clients with such issues were more than welcome at WEvolution, it was at a risk of being 
ignored by a large group of potential clients which did not have such problems but could still 
benefit greatly from its services. Thus, the word “help” was dispelled and replaced by the word 
“reliant” to better express the nature of services and organizational aspiration that WEvolution 
has. The term “self” was preserved, however, to underline the collective element of the group 
process100. The changing of terminology appears to indicate the peripheral nature of 
WEvolution and the emergent feature of the its field as it is loosely connected to the original 
organization by the virtue of being inspired by it. This means that they are unlikely to be under 
the same pressure as central organizations to reassert current practices from the source 
organization (Davis, 1991; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989; Greve, 1998; Kraatz, 1998; 
Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997; Westphal & Zajac, 2001; Zuckerman, 1999; Greenwood 
et al., 2011). WEvolution is registered as Scottish Charitable organization (SCIO). It is a 
Community interest company (CIC) which has a credit consumer license obtained from the 
FCA. The management are considering applying for membership of Responsible Finance (the 
industry body for Community Development Finance Institutions, previously CDFA) as 
membership would enable WEvolution to receive a significantly discounted fee for its credit 
consumer license. Membership may also enable it to network with similar minded 
organizations and hence influence the institutional environment in the UK.   
 
GU management perceived its institutional identity as being more aligned with that of a CDFIs. 
However, the GU board had been considering applying for Responsible Finance membership 
which was thought of as beneficial bringing in further funding. GU also had future plans to 
apply as a bank in the long term which depended on it proving operational sustainability over 
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a sustained period. The organizational identity of GU centred around it being one of the only 
two organizations in the UK which sought to use the peer group lending model to address 
financial exclusion. In addition, it belonged to a very small number of community finance 
organizations which was willing to forward loans without conventional assessments of 
backgrounds or credit scores of its clients. Thus, the model relied on social collateral or the 
bonds between group members. Unlike WEvolution, GU provided loans to individuals who 
decide how to invest it their own separate business and hopes that individuals may benefit from 
the group processes such as weekly meetings where it can lead to inter-group learnings as a 
result of sharing of experiences.  
 
GU was more central compared to WEvolution as a result of its direct link to the parent 
organization so it had more institutional pressure to reassert its practices. This meant that GU 
had to adhere to essence of the original model which is the peer group lending and requires 
members to form groups to be eligible for loans. This had proved to be the most difficult 
challenge.  Some of the management felt that numbers would grow rapidly if GU were to offer 
individual loans.  However, as a result of its strong links to the parent organization, it may be 
extremely difficult for GU to respond to its institutional complexities by simply shifting to 
lending models based on individual loans or offering personal loans. This is unlike previous 
UK organizations which did not have any such attachment to the parent organization and thus 
were relatively much more peripheral. Those organizations thus had less pressure and more 
leeway to respond to institutional complexities by changing their lending models and redesign 
the institutional entrepreneurship process.  
 
Both GU and WEvolution’s institutional identity is slightly ambiguous as they cannot be 
classed as CDFIs (although both had been considering application for membership to 
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Responsible Lending) nor as banks. It is important to note the difference in prestige and status 
between the models the organizations are based on. Grameen (on which GU is based) is 
globally more recognised than the Myrada/SHG model (on which WEvolution is based on) as 
a result of replication around the world and its founder who has won the Nobel prize and 
numerous other accolades including the US congressional gold medal. The achievements of 
Myrada on the other hand is more recognised in a local and national context in India with its 
founder Aloysius Fernandez being awarded Padmashri (a prestigious National Award) by the 
Government of India in 2000 for his contribution to social development. The GU organizational 
identity incorporates the name of the original model indicating its direct connection to Grameen 
and thus benefits from the global prestige and status of the parent organization. WEvolution, 
on the other hand is loosely inspired form the Myrada/SRG model which itself is relatively 
well known compared to Grameen. This means that it is less likely to enjoy the similar 
privileges compared to GU in terms of its status which in turn made it more challenging to 
obtain funding and mobilize allies. Former studies have noted status as an influential factor in 
the formation of institutional strategies. Durand and Szostak (2010), for example, reflected on 
how an actor’s stature enables him/her to combat status quo in a field and bring about desirable 
change. Professor Yunus emphasizes the message that poor are creditworthy and that Grameen 
model is an effective way of addressing poverty at a UK speech during GU’s inception 
(WatchGCU, 2012). Yunus’s global standing may have enabled him to credibly deliver this 
message to social investors and allies despite the experiences of previous UK organizations 
which failed to utilise the model effectively and   the existing economic and institutional 
environment in which banks were increasingly tightening their lending criteria. However, this 
message was not eventually backed by GU’s performance in terms of repayment rates, outreach 




Another potential problem for GU may have been the dilution of its identity by offering the 
loans to both sexes. All its website materials including mission statements, for example, 
indicated the generic nature of this marketing. It thus consequently served a large proportion 
of male clients (almost 50%). This stood in contrast to the original model and all global 
replications of Grameen rendering GU’s identity incongruous (with that of the parent 
organization) and hence potentially less credible to potential clients and relevant stakeholders.  
6.5 Organizational Template and Strategic Vision 
 
As has been pointed out in Chapter 2, Institutionists attach greater importance to the market 
logic whereas Welfarists emphasize community development over sustainability.  The EEMC 
and its component organizations followed a Welfarist approach towards service provision 
relying heavily on external funds for continuity101. By the time EEMC devolved and led to the 
formation of Fair Finance, the cessation of policy support by the government and termination 
of important sources of funding such as the Phoenix Development fund required a change of 
strategy for operational survival and sustainability. Fair Finance achieved this by redressing 
the balance between the Institutionist and Welfarist approach. It adopted a sharper focus on 
sustainability along with its Welfarist goals of addressing financial exclusion. In its website, 
for example, Fair Finance identifies itself as a Social Business (Fair Finance A, 2020). Social 
Business is defined by Yunus as a non-loss, non-dividend company structured to address a 
social problem. It is financially sustainable with any profits generated going into the expansion 
and development of the business rather than paid out in dividends to owners. Unlike profit 
maximizing firms, the principle objective is not to maximize profits (although there is a 
significant weight attached to generating profits). On the contrary, unlike non-profits, it is not 
                                                             
101 A key institutional entrepreneur involved in establishing Street-Cred for example perceives sustainability as a 
buzzword created to persuade funders to contribute more towards the MFIs (ME#2, 2014). 
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heavily reliant on charitable donations with a strong emphasis on being self-sustainable 
(Yunus, 2009; Yunus et al., 2010; Yunus, 2011). Fair Finance identifies sustainability as a core 
operational objective but retains welfarist objectives of being a responsible and transparent 
lender. It is also noted that all profits are reinvested for the development of the company rather 
than being retained by shareholders unlike a conventional business (Fair Finance A, 2020). The 
major shift was the offering of personal loans as a core product as opposed to group loans 
which the consortium was piloting earlier. This was in line with its sustainability goals as 
evidenced by the great demand from clients which in turn may be attributed to the ease of 
access, affordability of the loans and flexibility of terms and conditions.  
 
The Street-UK has consistently maintained an Institutionist financial systems approach towards 
service provision, attaching great importance to financial sustainability. This was evidenced by 
its lofty ambitions of building a fully self-supporting national institution with 20,000 clients 
borrowing £40 million within 7 years. These figures turned out to be unrealistic due to the 
institutional complexities explained in the previous chapter.  The focus on sustainability is also 
evident from the opening loan amount, set by the organization to £2000 (Copisarow, 2004). 
This was in contrast to the much smaller initial loans of £500 being offered by EEMC (Please 
see Table 6.1 below for comparison). This follows from the fact that it is much costlier to 
administer smaller loans compared to larger amounts.  
 
Table 6.1 Starting Loan amount for Case study MFIs  
[Based on data from Copisarow (2004), fair finance website (2014), QSA (2005), ME#1 and ME#5, 2014] 
Projects     Strategic Perspective    Starting Business Loan 
Street-UK        Institutionist £2,000 
Street-Cred         Welfarist £500 
Account 3         Welfarist £500 
Full Circle         Welfarist £500 





The Street-UK’s objective was to combine elements of revenue maximization models and cost 
minimization models adopted by MFIs globally to achieve maximum impact in terms of 
outreach (Copisarow, 2000). Street-UK’s modest loan volumes for its group lending program 
resulted in low interest/fees from lending which were inadequate to recover costs. This caused 
subsidy requirements to exceed beyond tenable levels and compelled a strategic focus on 
capitalizing on economies of scale (Copisarow, 2004).  Street-UK thus shifted to offering 
personal finance in order to combat abusive lending for organizational survival and 
sustainability. This was in accordance with the basic philosophy of the organizational business 
model as such loans were cost effective to provide as a result of the much lower time and effort 
required to disburse compared to group loans (lot of time and effort needed for monitoring and 
supervision). Revenue was also higher as a result of enhanced demands and increased interest 
income.  
 
Isomorphism refers to a situation in which organizational designs and practices in different 
organizations are similar (DiMaggio and Powell, 2002). It follows that there was an element 
of isomorphism in the change in strategy by these organizations as they realized the great boom 
in demand for personal loan products that payday lenders were offering and the success of 
award winning CDFIs such as Moneyline which offers personal loans in North West UK, 
Midlands, Yorkshire and Humber & Wales since 2001. The institutional entrepreneurs decided 
to offer similar products themselves making it easily accessible for clients. The isomorphism 
seems to be evident from not only the type of the products which are offered but also the 
business models and marketing approach which is used. The social business model at Fair 
Finance seems to have been inspired by Moneyline’s model which is not set up for making 
profits for shareholders but ensures costs are covered by income from lending. Moneyline’s 
success has not gone unnoticed as it has been hailed by politicians in the Welsh assembly for 
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its role in tackling financial exclusion. It has also received consecutive awards for responsible 
lending in 2011 and 2012 (Moneyline-UK, 2020). Along similar lines, an evaluation report by 
Street-UK noted Moneyline’s (and a few other community reinvestment trust) suc6cess in 
developing personal loan products as a way of achieving sustainability and recommended a 
similar path to achieving viability for Street-UK. This was clearly incorporated into following 
business strategies.  The report also stated that there were important lessons to be learnt from 
existing money lenders in terms of product marketing and packaging (Copisarow, 2004). 
Consequently, Street-UK also adopted a more corporate look and design to its branches similar 
to professional lending organizations. The website of Fair finance markets the personal loans 
in a remarkably similar way to lenders such as Moneyline showing the weekly instalments and 
interest rates and fees that the potential clients is likely to incur. However, it also refines the 
marketing by outlining how it is much cheaper compared to abusive lenders by providing a 
comparison table. Thus, both organizations have been conscious not to compromise the 
Welfarist objectives by setting interest rates at reasonable levels and offering flexible terms 
and conditions. The aforementioned report by Street-UK, for example, cautioned against 
predatory lending practices which include setting high interest rates and “constant capitalising 
of interest and unlimited escalation of the principal amount owed.” (Copisarow, 2004: 26). Fair 
Finance, on the other hand, lists being transparent (being open and honest about its activities) 
and responsible (offering accessible and affordable credit) as core operational objectives on its 
website.  
The WEETU Full-circle project seemed to subscribe to a Welfarist approach. Although 
founders recognised the importance of institutional sustainability from a financial systems 
perspective, sustainability was perceived by them as long-term benefits of the female 
participants of the program (Pearson and Watson, 1997). Sustainability, in this case was thus 
not conceptualized in a narrower sense of covering operational costs but a broader perspective 
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of getting the clients out of welfare dependency hence leading to long run benefits such as 
saving taxpayers’ money (Pearson, 1998). In a report published much later by WEETU, it 
conceded that operational sustainability was unattainable and sustainability was viewed by it 
in terms of social collateral.  The concept of “mission driven sustainability” was thus prioritized 
over operational sustainability in the report which according to the author should be measured 
by the extent to which the project can demonstrate social impact and good outreach (Flemons, 
2008: 22). Institutional complexity may complicate the ability to adhere to institutional 
prescriptions because “the adoption of a policy or practice that sends a favourable message to 
one audience may simultaneously send an offensive message to another” (Heimer, 1999: 18; 
Kodeih and Greenwood, 2014: 7). In this case, such a perception of sustainability may have 
been appealing to organizations whose missions and goals are aligned with such views however 
some social investors who require tangible evidence of progress may have found it difficult to 
accept. The project thus eventually ceased to exist as the parent organization WEETU, 
providing the transactional training and development support for the borrowers, discontinued 
owing to funding concerns, including emerging issues between WEETU and funders such as 
funding environment that resulted in the funding infrastructure for the type of training that 
WEETU provides to change to payment on results. The debate between WEETU and funders 
revolved around what should constitute as effective results. This new funding environment 
prioritized large corporate training providers and left little space for small localized 
organizations like WEETU102 .  
The foregoing analyses suggest that the MFIs can be divided into two distinct types based on 
their strategic actions, as is depicted in Figure 6.1 below.  Projects like Street-UK and Fair 
finance follow a financial systems approach with a significant focus on achieving long-term 
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sustainability. These projects piloted the Grameen model for several years and implemented a 
strategic shift focusing on personal loans. This shift can be attributed to the meteoric rise in 
abusive lending during the period of operation for both projects, which in turn led to a 
realisation of the senior management that microfinance can be used as a tool for displacing 
such lenders and offer clients increased protection from being charged extortionate rates. 
Contrarily, projects such as Street-cred and Full-Circle fund adopted a developmental model, 
relying entirely on external funding for sustaining operations. These projects did not adopt the 
strategic shift to providing personal loans implemented by Street-UK and Fair Finance. As a 
result, such projects struggled owing to an increasingly competitive funding environment 
where larger more corporate providers were increasingly favoured at the expense of smaller 
localized providers. Moreover, the change in the funding environment was also characterized 
by an increased emphasis on payments by results. Frictions arose between funders and such 
projects due to discord about what constitutes as results; the funders were often viewed as rigid 
and lacking contextualized understanding of the situation. These projects did not make the 































In terms of the recent case studies, the key differences between GU and WEvolution in terms 
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Strategic Vision: Poverty 
alleviation, women empowerment, 
self-sustainability  
Strong emphasis on both Institutionist 
and Welfarist objectives Clear focus 
on sustainability, i.e. covering 
operational expenses; branch 
sustainability to be achieved within 4-
5 years, serving 1500-2000 clients 
which is confirmed by the senior 
management during the interviews. 
 
Predominant Focus on Welfarist 
objectives as sustainability perceived 
by the management mainly as the 
long-term welfare of clients. 
However, Institutionist goals are also 
considered important as WEvolution 
is trying to reduce its heavy reliance 
on grants by developing branding 
panel for SRGs, marketing the SRG 
products and a social franchise model.  
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Characterized by power, size and 
status of the parent organization 
(Grameen)as a global beacon for peer 
group lending. However, identity 
diluted by non-gender based generic 
framing unlike parent organization 
Based on Myrada which is not 
involved in the UK effort. The 
original name Passage to India 
rebranded as WEvolution to suit local 
context. This along with the leads to a 
fact that it is a peripheral organization 
less distinctive identity.  
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N/A (negligible number of loans) 
 
 
Outreach 281 clients (even behind modest 
revised target of 400 clients by April 
2016) 
125 clients (recently set annual targets 
of 20-25 groups which has not been 





Table 6.2 will now be explained in detail. Organizational sustainability is perceived by the 
WEvolution management in several different ways. A heavy lean towards the Welfarist 
perspective is apparent as greatest significance is attached to the notion of sustainability in 
terms of long terms benefits of the clients. The most notable achievement is thus regarded as 
clients feeling empowered enough to be able to manage their groups and lives for sustained 
periods without the intervention of the WEvolution authorities. The emphasis on Welfarist 
objectives is also ostensible from the very reasonable interest rates which are charged on the 
loans. There is three parts to the process in which the interest rate is set at WEvolution. The 
first £200 borrowed is kept interest free for 10 months, the second phase is up to £2000 interest 
free for the first 12 months and 3% interest on the remainder for a next 6 months. Finally, 
another phase of £5000 which is loaned at 7% over the base rate of interest set by Bank of 
England (which has been quite low recently) The authorities prefer the loan to be interest free 
with the view that its often the high interest rates that push people into poverty. The reasonable 
charges are attributable to zero borrowing costs for WEvolution as the source of loans are 
unconditional grants. However, nominal rates are charged with the intention of reducing 
reliance on grants103.  
Despite the significant attachment to the Welfarist view at WEvolution, there is growing 
importance on the Institutionist perspective as well as the management realize that the 
organization is heavily dependent on grants. Thus, the management are developing strategies 
with the objective of enhancing operational sustainability. Revenue generating systems are thus 
being put into place with retail merchandising of SRG made products assuming a central role. 
A branding panel has been established with the purpose of assessing the quality and brands of 
the SRG products. Whilst SRG members are allowed freedom to sell to whomsoever they wish, 
WEvolution is contracting these products out and selling them online and at weekend markets. 
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The management realise that this aspect of their operations will be crucial and hence there is 
significant emphasis on factors such as pricing, volume and identifying right market for SRG 
products within the current organizational training.  WEvolution obtains a commission on the 
products sold and expects this section of their operation to grow and expand over the following 
years generating healthy revenues for it in the process.  
 
WEvolution is also in the process of developing a social franchise model which entails the 
provision of training and related materials to external community organizations which may be 
interested to start their own SRGs across the UK. There will be a fee for this service which will 
contribute towards generating revenues for WEvolution. Initial interest has been high with 
several organizations already attending DIY SRG training sessions (for which there is a fee) 
and going on to start their SRGs. The management hopes to include these DIY sessions as part 
of the social franchise model in the future104.   
 
GU had clear Institutionist goals with precise targets for outreach and an ambition of achieving 
operational self-sufficiency. While the initial target for achieving this was 3 years by getting 
1500 clients within that period. This had been revised in light of GU’s experiences of the 
difficult regulatory and environmental context it operates in. Under the revised target, GU 
hoped to recruit 1350 clients by the end of Year 4 who will be on a mixture of Tier 1, 2 and 3 
loans giving them a projected income of about £20000 which would have covered their 
operational costs of approximately £150000.   
 
GU had a strong focus on Welfarist perspective as is evident in the tiered interest rate that it 
charges. The interest rates are 23.95%, 20.95% and 17.95% for Year 1. Year 2 and Year 3 
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respectively. Initially it was 17.95% across the loans, however it was realized that this was not 
enough to cover the cost of forwarding the loan including training and administrative costs. 
The strong emphasis on Welfarist objectives was reflected by the fact that GU’s interest rates 
were substantially less than other subprime lenders operating in the same field which charge 
much higher interest rates in the range of 100-160%. The small size of loans means that such 
organizations often charge a higher interest rate in their efforts to become self-sustainable and 
administrative fees as interest revenue is low. However, it is difficult for GU to adopt similar 
strategies due to its Welfarist objectives and their desire to be like Grameen which does not 
impose any such charges or unreasonably high interest rates. Instead GU hoped that clients will 
progress on to the higher Tier 2 and Tier 3 loans leading to higher interest revenues which may 
be then be used to subsidize losses in the earlier years. Under the revision, GU had modest 
targets of 9 Tier 2 loans a month105.  
 
Although it had future ambitions of becoming a bank, GU was during the period of its 
existence, neither a bank nor a CDFI.  This ambiguous institutional identity that GU has may 
have significant implications for the regulatory impediments it was experiencing. As a licensed 
credit consumer, it was dealing with FCA regulations which are likely to be stringent as they 
are designed primarily to protect consumers from abusive lenders. Unlike those lenders 
however, GU held a strong Welfarist view evidenced in its relatively low interest rates, flexible 
terms and conditions, empathetic approach towards members who are struggling to repay. 
Although such an approach is laudable, it made it extremely difficult for GU to achieve its 
Institutionist ambitions of achieving operational self-sufficiency. An example of this regulatory 
dichotomy that GU faced is the restriction to visit homes which risked it being classed as a 
high-risk lender. Clearly such regulations are designed as a precautionary measure against the 
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malice of predatory lending but not suited to the objectives of an institution such as GU which 
wanted to use home visits as a means of fostering social collateral in a community rather than 
purely selling loans. From the clients’ perspective it may also be costly and inconvenient to 
attend meetings at distant venues rather than in their own communities. Another evidence of 
distortions caused by regulatory problems may be the issue of gender focus. As has been 
discussed before, sex discrimination legislation in the UK has resulted in GU being legally 
advised not to offer its services purely to women in contrast to the original model. It seems 
ironic that GB’s purpose of offering its services to women was to protect them from being 
discriminated against and empower them to make decisions. Being able to offer women 
focused services in a Scottish context is relevant as a result of high proportion of single parent 
families headed by women. Surely, provisions should be in place for organizations such as GU 
to be able to offer gender focused services without any significant legal implications. Thus, 
regulatory barriers make it even more difficult for GU to operate the model smoothly in an 
already challenging environmental context. The inability to mobilize savings placed further 
restrictions as this would have enabled it to use the funds for onward lending and save 
substantially on borrowing costs. The advantage that GU had is the substantial and sustained 
initial support it was receiving from several organizations in terms of funding. It had no 
overhead costs except wages for example as it had been provided with free office space by 
GCU. This support was crucial as it gave GU time and patient capital to learn from its 
experiences and adjust and tweak operations according to the context in which it operated in. 
However, unfortunately, GU could not take advantage of this initial breathing space as it 
suffered the outcome of the aforementioned deviations from the parent model in terms of poor 
loan recovery, thus causing it to perish in 2018. In terms of outreach efforts, GU’s problems 
may have been compounded by the fact that the Scottish population which was the original 
target clientele had not formed the mainly clientele base. This is attributed to the fact that they 
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are mainly disincentivised by the current welfare system and the nature of the society 
characterized by a high level of individualism. GU’s clientele base predominantly consisted of 
African migrants and some other ethnic minorities. This indicates that aforementioned 
contextual and regulatory difficulties may have limited selection to ethnic minorities which is 
a much smaller proportion of the Scottish population (about 3% Asians and 1% Africans 
according to the 2011 Scottish census) compared to the originally perceived target of 
indigenous Scots.  Although Grameen is a central player in the field of microfinance in a global 
context, GU was peripheral in an UK context and very much in its infancy trying to learn from 
its experiences and adapt to its context accordingly. A significant challenge for GU was always 
to move to a more mainstream and hence central position in the UK community finance field. 
This, in turn, needed GU to deliver credible and robust performance in terms of key 
performance factors such as recovery and outreach. However, as discussed earlier, it was 
unable to even meet the relatively modest targets it had set itself and ceased operations.  
Conclusion 
 
As a way of summing up it may be re-stated that the MFIs in UK faced numerous institutional 
complexities in adhering to the Grameen model. When it comes to the past case studies, along 
with the difficulties of providing group-based loans, the emerging context of booming 
predatory lending led to a strategic shift to the provision of personal loans from providing 
Grameen style entrepreneurial loans. This shift was implemented by organizations adopting a 
financial systems approach with a strong emphasis on the market logic (Street-UK and Fair 
Finance). The analysis also shows that these organizations either used diagnostic framing to 
structure the problem of financial exclusion originally as either feminisation of poverty and a 
lack of female entrepreneurial access to finance or prognostic framing to identify areas in which 
existing financial institutions were generally failing to meet the market gap for entrepreneurial 
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finance.   These MFIs (Street-UK and Fair Finance) shifted to providing personal loans used 
prognostic framing to reframe the problem of financial exclusion as that of combating abusive 
lending. 
 
The organizations that managed to survive and expand had a strong alignment towards market 
logic characterised by their respective business models. This strong orientation towards the 
market logic and the resulting emphasis on the sustainability was appealing to potential allies 
including social investors and hence enabled the organizations to form effective alliances to 
achieve their objectives. The institutional identity in the field of community development 
finance has undergone significant transformations due to the emergent nature of the field, the 
unravelling of the field context and the resulting institutional complexities surrounding the case 
study organizations. Street-UK and Fair Finance were able to redefine their organizational 
identities to align themselves with their new framing and strategic visions but retain their 
organizational identity at the same time. 
On the other hand, WEETU did not implement a shift to providing personal loans, despite a 
late move to individual lending and eventually perished along with its parent organization in a 
constrained funding environment. It attempted to refine its organizational identity during the 
latter years of operations. However, it was unable to bring about similar changes to identity as 
the other case studies given its affiliation to the well-established parent organizations 
entrenched in its strong identity based on gender and mission of addressing female poverty.  Its 
organizational template was characterized by a development model where sustainability was 
perceived as “mission-driven” and viewed not purely as covering operational costs but 
achieving long term benefits such as motivating clients out of welfare dependency and saving 
taxpayer’s money. This line of thinking, although laudable, failed to strike a chord with funders 
particularly during the latter periods of its operation when the novelty of its organizational 
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identity wore off and institutional complexities began to be exposed and led to its eventual 
demise.  
The extent of predatory lending and the consequent exploitation of millions of borrowers in the 
UK meant that the service provided by CDFIs such as Fair Finance and Street-UK are 
commendable, as they have continued to offer borrowers reasonable rates of interest and 
protection from being exploited by predatory lenders. The numerous awards and recognition 
achieved by Fair Finance, in particular, supports this view. The abusive designs and practices 
of predatory lenders have led to immense criticism amongst the mainstream media and 
campaigners which has steadily risen over the years.  
The UK government finally took belated notice of the criticisms of the system pf predatory 
lending and introduced regulatory measures to bring about scope meant for competition, 
accountability and transparency in the payday lending industry. Payday loans costs are capped 
at 100 per cent of the amount of the loan. Furthermore, new creditworthiness standards were 
introduced, which required all types of lenders to make more efforts to ensure customers could 
make repayments without profound changes in their wider financial situation. This has caused 
the number of payday lenders to fall from 106 to 88 from 2016 to 2019 and significant changes 
in business models within the industry (Noonan, 2019; FCA, 2019).  The most noticeable of 
these was the previously high-flying Wonga, which collapsed in 2018 struggling to adapt to 
significant regulatory changes, and being forced to pay out significant amounts in 
compensation.  
However, despite these changes, demand for such loans is likely to be unaffected by the 
reduced availability and continue to surge. There are fears that such changes in the payday 
lending industry and a lack of viable alternatives along with an unchanged high level of demand 
from potential clients may leave them exposed to illegal loan sharks. Lenders may also be 
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compelled to use the services of illegal money lenders including online firms operating from 
beyond the boundaries of UK. This would obviously put them at a greater risk of exploitation.   
In the backdrop of these changes, the role of CDFIs such as Fair Finance and Street-UK is 
likely to become even more important in providing suitable access to finance. However, they 
are predominantly branch based and require a lot of funding and support to cope with the 
challenge of deterring potential clients from using the services of dominant payday lenders 
CDFIs such as Fair Finance and Street-UK provide a reasonable and low-cost alternative to 
consumers and represent means of filling the market gap as regulatory environment unfolds in 
the UK and drives out some of these high cost payday lending firms out. Thus, the government 
should not only think about imposing regulations on existing payday lending firms but also 
provide policy and funding support to such CDFIs to help plug the gap created as a result of 
the newly introduced regulations.  
Unlike some of the past UK case study organizations, GU was unable respond to the 
institutional complexities by altering its framing or organizational identity as a result of its 
strong links to the parent organization. WEvolution, conversely, may have enjoyed this 
privilege as it does not have such links. It has already demonstrated this by changing the label 
and hence the identity of the organization to suit local tastes.  As the above research has pointed 
out, future development in the welfare regime incorporating the full roll-out of the Universal 
credit is likely to make it even more difficult for such organizations to target indigenous clients.  
 
Both organizations had successfully aligned themselves with relevant actors as a result of 
different factors, particularly in the initial phases. WEvolution, for example, seemed to have 
aligned itself with the Government by the virtue of the intuitively appealing way in which it 
has theorized the problem of socio-economic exclusion that it aims to address whereas a large 
part of GU’s effective alignment with important local and international actors may be attributed 
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to the globally imminent status of the parent organization and personal legitimacy of Professor 
Yunus. As the case study organizations matured and progressed on to a more advanced stage 
of operations, the concept of consequential legitimacy became more relevant. It has been 
defined by Meyer and Rowan (1991) as being gained on the basis of organizational 
accomplishments. It thus follows that having gained moral legitimacy and support for the initial 
period of their operations the case study organizations moved on to a critical stage where 
consequential legitimacy may have been sought from relevant stakeholders such as funders or 
government. This in turn depended on achieving the appropriate outcomes in terms of factors 
such as repayments and outreach. However, there are potential difficulties as some socially 
oriented outputs are difficult to measure. Meyer and Rowan (1991: 55) for example, note that 
“the technical properties of outputs are socially defined and do not exist in some concrete sense 
that allows them to be empirically discovered”. The ambition of WEvolution, for example, is 
not about forwarding loans but rather to build community cohesion and empower individuals. 
The methods which should be adopted to measure such outcomes is contentious and open to 
interpretations. In such situations, the concept of procedural legitimacy may become more 
pertinent (Scott, 1992). Sound systems and processes are, in such cases, used as a basis of 
evaluating whether the organizations are making substantial progress in achieving their 
objectives. Appropriate implementation of peer group techniques in line with the parent model 
may have been one form of gaining such procedural legitimacy for GU. The non-gender biased 
framing of the problem by GU may have been a problem for some stakeholders as it is 
inconsistent with the original model. Such inherent contradictions in the framing and identity 
of the organisation along with difficult social and regulatory context (some of which may have 
been responsible for such contradictions) led to numerous institutional complexities in 
recovering loans and achieving outreach objective. This, in turn, may have caused GU to 
compromise procedural and consequential legitimacy and eventually perish in 2018.  
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CHAPTER 7 INSTIUTIONAL 
COMPLEXITY: US CASE STUDIES 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses the operational challenges confronted by the US microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) in applying the Grameen model. However, it limits it’s focus on two case 
study organizations, viz. Grameen America (GA) and Project Enterprise (PE).  Whilst choice 
of such analytical focus may sound somewhat arbitrary, yet there is ample rationale for such 
selection of US MFIs.  
The operation of the Grameen Bank (GB), as visualized and productively run by Yunus in 
Bangladesh made an impact worldwide. USA, the leading developed western nation, was 
among the first to discern the appealing features of the GB model. The striking rich-poor 
socioeconomic divide in the US, the incapability of the deprived—especially the blacks and 
ethnic minorities—to access fund/credit were among the noticeable facets that trapped many 
Americans in poverty. In contrast, the GB model placed an emphasis on combating poverty 
mixing a balance of communitarian principles built on social collateral and on the importance 
of innovative entrepreneurship, the cornerstone of the capitalist economy (Taub, 2003). 
Consequently, Yunus, along with the Grameen model, has enjoyed broad positive media 
attention, earned substantial honours across US socio-political spectrum and extensive awards 
and laurels in the US.  
This provided setting for the emergence of a number of MFI initiatives in the US which sought 
to adopt the GB model, even though not many could sustain their efforts and previous studies 
attest to this. One of the earliest attempts to replicate the model within the urban American 
context was by the Full-Circle fund, a peer lending program started by ‘Women’s self-
employment project’ (WSEP) in 1985, an off-shoot of the South Shore Bank (Liou, 1998). 
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Another attempt to adopt the model in a rural context surfaced in 1988 when the Good Faith 
fund in Arkansas was started by its former Governor Bill Clinton (elected later as US President) 
with the goal of poverty alleviation and promoting entrepreneurship (Zephyr and Yunus, 2004). 
In 1994, the number of MFIs adopting the model rose to over two dozen (Counts, 1996). 
However, most earlier studies point to numerous challenges of adopting the model, including 
low client demand, poor recovery rates, regulatory issues and high costs (Counts, 1996, Zephyr 
and Yunus, 2004; Bhatt and tang, 2002; Painter, Bhatt and Tang, 2001; Schreiner and Woller, 
2001; Lieberman et al, 2012). Owing to such problems, most organizations have either 
terminated operations or moved to commercialised models based on individual lending 
(Freemark, 2005). One of the earlier notable US MFI initiative has been Accion International, 
which distinguished itself as it endeavoured to adopt the Grameen model since the inception 
of its operations in 1991; yet soon it shifted to an individual lending model (Fairbanks, 2008). 
On its website, Accion states explicitly that it has found individual lending to be more 
appropriate in the US context (Accioneast.org, 2013).  
The PE, in contrast, which began in 1996, made a sustained journey; it designed its operations 
on the Grameen model. It was the brainchild of a philanthropic social investor couple (Nicholas 
and Debra Schatzki) who were inspired by Grameen and its successes. On inauguration, PE 
was the sole MFI in New York which provided loan with no requirements from clients in terms 
of collaterals or credit histories (PE website, 2015). Its operations were continual, though it 
was a relatively small organization in terms of the number of clients (200), operating from its 
single branch office in South Bronx. The operations at PE was terminated in 2016. 
However, the GA, founded by Yunus himself in 2008, has proved even more exceptional. Since 
its inception, it has become one of the prolific lenders in the US (Lieberman et al, 2012). It has 
steadily expanded each year, growing from 500 borrowers at the end of 2008 to 132000 by 
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2020. It has created 139000 jobs and managed to achieve a repayment rate of around 99%. It 
has also expanded rapidly, operating currently in fifteen US cities (Grameen America A, 2020). 
Keeping in sight the sustained nature of their functioning both the US MFIs—GA and PE (both 
of which operated in the same city, were active for a part of time of this study and survived for 
around 12 years and 20 years respectively)  —an effort is made in the current chapter to 
examine the operational features, actions and the strategies of the two US case study 
organizations. As per diagnostic perspectives outlined and analytic gaps indicated in the 
literature review in the earlier chapter, the current chapter addresses the following principal 
research question:  
‘What is the nature of institutional challenges of implementing the Grameen model              
in USA?’ 
 
The study seeks to provide insights into how effective the US MFI managers proved to be in 
adopting the Grameen model in their particular contexts to balance conflicting dual logics of 
sustainability and development. The insights gained will hopefully assist future projects 
adopting the Grameen model in the developed countries to traverse through uncertain 
contextual circumstances and attain their organizational objectives. 
Content-wise, the chapter in six sections examines the effectiveness of methods the US 
institutional entrepreneurs adopted. Section 1 analyses their loan recovery process and how 
their differing approaches have led to varying degrees of success. Section 2 elucidates the 
factors affecting their outreach efforts and how their marketing methods have evolved over the 
periods of the operation. Section 3 considers how staff recruitment and training methods were 
developed and refined over the years. Section 4 identifies the regulatory impediments that both 
organizations have faced and their implications. Section 5 compares and contrasts the client 
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training methods adopted by the US MFIs. The conclusion (Section 6) sums up the findings 
and suggests areas for more research and policy reflection.  
7.1 Loan recovery 
The current section addresses the comparative nature of loan disbursement and recovery 
process of both GA and PE. The diagrams below outline the loan process both the GA and PE 
adopted: 
Figure 7.1 The GA lending process   































Figure 7.2 The PE lending process 








As is shown in Figure 7.1, at GA self-selected groups applying for loans have to attend 
continuous group training, lasting for five days. Following this training, the GA forwards them 
for loans. The borrowers then have to attend a weekly meeting with the centre manager where 
they pay back an agreed part of their loans. Upon full repayment, the borrowers can apply to 
receive incremental loans. Figure 7.2 summarizes PE’s lending process. Clients applying for 
loans at PE have to attend a six-week training followed by an examination which they need to 
pass in order to be eligible for the loan. Once the loan is provided, they have to attend bi-weekly 
meetings in which business training is provided. Once borrowers have fully repaid, they can 
apply for incremental loans.  
The US MFIs traditionally have struggled to attain high recovery rates and control arrears 
(Edgcomb, Klein, and Clark, 1995; Bhatt & Tang, 2001, Tang & Painter, 2001; Schreiner and 
Murdoch, 2001). PE had been plugged by similar problems as the recovery rates have been 
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consistently low (the annual recovery rate, at the time of interviewing, was 60%). However, 
the GA since its inception has been able to achieve exceptionally high recovery rates, similar 
to its parent organization in Bangladesh as annual recovery rates for GA has been maintained 
consistently above 99%.   
The GA authorities cites this achievement to a number of factors. First is the peer pressure, 
generated by the group lending model. Such a pressure is created by the fact that a centre may 
lose access to incremental loans when group members fail to pay back, a pressure that prevails 
not only at the group level but also at the centre level which comprises of up to 60 borrowers 
(i.e. twelve groups). If one or two borrowers fail to be regular with their loans, the reputation 
of the entire centre is at risk and the chances of getting incremental loans for all 60 borrowers 
are reduced. Hence there is an incentive for not only borrowers within the group but also other 
borrowers in a centre to create peer pressure to repay the loans106 .  Second is the importance 
of the weekly meetings where the GA staff collect instalments from members, and clients 
discuss the problems and prospects associated with their businesses. Past studies have revealed 
the social value of such meetings for clients in the context of Bangladesh (Larance, 1998). 
Testimonials also reveal the relevance of such meetings for the GA clients as some deem the 
sharing of ideas and the creation of social networks to be as important as the loan component 
(Kiviat, 2009).  The high frequency of the meetings assure that the borrowers and centre 
managers are constantly in touch with each other assisting in regular monitoring of borrowers’ 
business activities and personal situation.  The meetings are also important for GA to assess 
the regularity and discipline of its clients. Even if a borrower struggles to pay back his/her 
regular attendance at the weekly meetings is seen as an evidence of honesty and commitment 
to the relationship with GA and inclination to pay back the loan by the management. This also 
positively influences the other members of the group in certain ways. An example provided by 
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GA authorities was that when a borrower fails to repay but shows his/her commitment by being 
regularly present at meetings and conveys genuineness about reasons for delays in repayment, 
other group members sometimes agree to repay the instalment on their behalf and request the 
borrower to repay in the following weeks107 .  Interestingly, at GA the meetings are sometimes 
used by borrowers for selling merchandise to other borrowers which is an additional source of 
business for them108.  
Annual recovery rates for PE are provided in Table A.7 (Appendix). As the Table shows, the 
recovery rate for PE had been on the decline and been very low since 2008. The reasons for 
this, as cited by PE authorities, were: (i) the impact of financial recession on the business 
activities of its borrowers; (ii) a lack of adequate infrastructure to monitor the expanding loan 
portfolio, including staff inadequacy and technology constraints to deal with high number of 
clients. (iii) The PE authorities also bemoan a lack of a “natural” community in an industrial 
nation such as USA compared to the developing countries such as Bangladesh in which 
Grameen model is believed to succeed109. 
Such views are confirmed in research findings, as formation of social capital can be effective 
when group members commonly belong to a neighbourhood that is underpinned by 
homogeneity, meaningful relationships and communications (Gomez and Santor, 2001). This 
in turn leads to effective peer pressure under a group lending resulting in high recovery rates. 
Previous studies have shown how a lack of social capital leads to improper screening and 
sanctioning of members under a group lending model in the US (Taub, 1998; Bhatt and Tang, 
1998). Unlike the typical GB lending scenario of a closely knit community the clients at PE 
are sometimes dispersed across neighbourhoods which make it difficult and costly for staff to 
enforce repayment in the event of a default.  
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The GA operates in the same city as PE and has successfully expanded since its inception in 
2008, despite the impact of recession.  The extents of necessity of the loans seem to render the 
crux of analysis when comparing PE and GA’s success in terms of recovery rates. GA’s 
recruitment strategy has continually focused on the lowest rung of the communities with a 
particular strategic emphasis on female Hispanic entrepreneurs. This has resulted in their 
clients (95%) comprising predominantly of Hispanic immigrants who genuinely lack access to 
financial services but are entrepreneurial in nature. They have a high level of necessity 
characterised by a lack of alternative access to either financial means or government welfare 
payments. This seems to be pertinent given that much of earlier research mentions access to 
welfare programs in the US as a major impediment for MFIs as safety net provided may 
dampen entrepreneurial spirits and discourage one to operate a business (Novogratz, 1992; 
Schreiner and Murdoch, 2001; Lieberman et al., 2012). The seemingly higher level of necessity 
experienced by GA clients thus may compel them to preserve their relationship with Grameen 
by being regular at meetings and ultimately paying back the loan instalments.  
In contrast, PE’s recruitment has focused on African Americans (88%) who may not have the 
same level of necessity. Most of PE’s clients had access to government welfare which provides 
them with a safety net should they fail to repay the loans and links with PE are severed. The 
lack of necessity on the part of such clients has resulted in a significant diversion of PE’s 
strategy from the usual Grameen procedures of the weekly borrower meeting. At PE, meetings 
are held only bi-weekly at the branch office. Furthermore, crucially the content of PE’s 
meetings were significantly different from Grameen’s. Whereas Grameen’s meetings are 
mainly for collecting loan instalments for borrowers and discussing prospects and challenges 
associated with borrower business activities, PE’s meetings were used for business training 
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where each week the borrowers are provided with lectures on various business topics110. This 
is an important deviation from Grameen’s practices.  
The location of the meetings is another important deviation as well; GA meetings are held at 
easily accessible convenient places like houses of the clients, whereas PE’s meetings are held 
at the PE branch111. This has significant implications because a branch has an operational area 
consisting of numerous neighbourhoods. While it may not be a problem for people living in 
neighbourhoods near the branch, those that are living in the distant neighbourhoods may find 
it costly and inconvenient to attend such meetings and consequently may be reluctant to do so.  
Such problems become even more relevant for members who have not received a loan or those 
who have already received their loans as they then need to be motivated to turn up at the 
meetings. Contrastingly, GA’s clients are required to visit the main branch office only very few 
times annually. The PE authorities recognize this difference and insist that the changes have 
been made due to contextual differences in how Bangladeshi and American markets operate112. 
PE has a system whereby the eligibility of clients for loans depend on their attendance levels 
at meetings (six months prior to application for loan).  The amount of loan varies positively 
with the level of attendance. However, despite this incentive to encourage attendance at the 
meetings, the PE authorities note that the attendance level of borrowers declined drastically 
when they adopted a similar weekly meeting system implemented by Grameen. GA, on the 
other hand, has implemented the same system to the original GB model without compromising 
attendance levels of borrowers. This may be an indication of the lower level of necessity 
experienced by the PE clients as they may be disinclined towards attending such meetings.  
In addition, PE has a system of the loan application being reviewed by means of a four-stage 
process whereby it is reviewed twice by the borrowers and the centre (comprising of a number 
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of groups of borrowers) followed by two levels of reviews by the staff.  It had a 1:2:2 staggering 
process which means loans are forwarded to the next two group members only when the first 
borrower pays back a certain proportion of the loan113. This usually means a lengthy wait before 
loans can be disbursed to the second and third group member (even longer for the fourth and 
fifth group member). PE authorities state that clients in the same group often do not require the 
loans simultaneously. Nevertheless, this may also show the lack of urgent necessity on the part 
of borrowers.   
One of the central attributes of Grameen’s system is that clients need to self-select the members 
of their groups which should consist of borrowers they trust and have known a sufficiently 
lengthy period. Most groups at PE are formed through self-selection when clients get together 
and know each other via the six-week group training prior to the disbursement of loan114. The 
PE authorities reason that it is difficult for groups to be formed naturally through the 
community similar to the Grameen process because borrowers are disinclined towards being 
accountable for each other. This made the process at PE questionable as the peer pressure is 
unlikely to prevail in circumstances where borrowers have known each other for a short period 
of time even if self-selection by clients is being practiced115. This is clearly relevant as past 
research shows if group members are less likely to interact outside their microcredit context, it 
leads to significant increases in transactions costs and reduced efficacy of socio-economic 
sanctions in the event of loan defaults (Hung, 1998; Schreiner and Murdoch, 2001; Lieberman 
et al., 2012).  
 
Another deviation of PE’s strategy is to offer services to both men and women as opposed to 
the usual GB practice of focusing entirely on women. The proportion of men in PE’s 
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membership was 40% (at time of interviews) while GA’s membership comprises entirely of 
women. The male clients at PE include army veterans or those coming out from prison centres 
and found it difficult to get jobs in under-resourced communities116. This is an important 
distinction given the fact that GB ( at a very early stage of its operation) tried to pilot a system 
consisting of both men and women but soon realized that men were often overpowering women 
within the groups affecting their decision-making and also been wasteful with the loan which 
ultimately had an adverse effect on repayment rates. As a result, GB decided to focus its 
services on women (Yunus, 1998). Its American counterpart, GA, has followed in this footstep 
to have a client base comprising entirely of women. Research also shows that repayment rates 
are often enhanced if borrowers believe that the lender organizations are stable and long lasting 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1998; Bates, 1995, Schreiner and Morduch, 2001). This may have relevance 
for the comparison between GA and PE as the former has been markedly proactive in its 
approach and steadily expanding its operations across the US while the latter has never really 
grown since inception experiencing a decline in its already low clients base in the last decade 
final leading to its termination in 2016. Naturally, customers may feel more inclined to repay 
loans to a thriving organization like GA rather than an organization such as PE which was 
struggling to survive. A comparative analysis of the recovery rates at GA and PE is summarized 










                                                             





Table 7.1 Loan Recovery 
 
 GA PE 
Repayment High Low 
Reasons authorities cited  Peer pressure and the 
prospect of losing out on 
incremental loans incentivise 
clients  
 Weekly meetings focused on 
building solidarity & loan 
recovery. 
 
 Adverse impact of recession 
on borrowers’ business 
activities 
 Inadequate staff and 
technology constraint 
 Lack of a ‘natural’ 
community 
Analytical findings  Self-Selected groups apply to 
join the program before the 
process starts. 
 Mostly Hispanic clientele 
immigrant base, bonded by 
similar culture, language and 
professions, with no access to 
welfare programs, but have 
higher levels of necessity  
 
 Most groups are formed 
during 6- week training prior 
to loan disbursement   
 Mostly African American 
clients with access to welfare 
programs 
 Bi-Weekly meetings consist 




The current section analyses the client recruitment practices of both the US MFIs. GA 
originally attempted to recruit clients by using orthodox approaches such as approaching clients 
directly in cafes, laundries, saloons, bus stands, convenience stores and schools by distributing 
leaflets and speaking to them. However, such an approach proved difficult to most clients as it 
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was a completely new concept for most of them; many were often suspicious about GA’s 
objectives. Given the relatively low interest charged by GA, the prospective clients would 
question GA’s intention in offering collateral free loans fearing that there may be an implicit 
fee or charge incorporated into the process. These issues often resulted in such recruitment 
initiatives being ineffective. GA also tried to approach community organizations with access 
to potential clients but this was also unsuccessful. Earlier Grameen also tried to focus its 
recruitment on local Bengali communities but this failed as a result of a general lack of interest 
and other factors such as of expectations of higher loan amounts117.   
 
GA then shifted its strategic focus on recruiting clients from within the Hispanic community. 
A number of the initial sets of clients were recruited when members of staff contacted potential 
borrowers amongst their own friends and family network who were engaged in business. This 
helped to build and foster trust as such individuals were interested and willing to listen to the 
staff sharing a long-term relationship with and correspondingly listen attentively to the benefits 
brought to them by the lending method. Once these preliminary set of clients were recruited 
and the loan process was underway, it was easier to recruit the next batch of clients as the 
existing clients could communicate to the prospective clients amongst their own friend and 
family network about the ease with which they could obtain loans and the favourable loan 
conditions. The management soon realized that referral from existing clients was the most 
productive method of recruiting clients. New clients felt a certain level of comfort as their 
friends and family were already part of the program and this helped to enhance trust essential 
for the success of the model118. Almost all GA clients did not have access to traditional sources 
such as banks. Some used the services of payday lenders prior to using Grameen’s services and 
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would be charged extortionate rates of interest which would often exceed the capital they 
borrowed. Such clients realized that GA was not only charging a reasonable interest rate (15% 
on a declining basis) but also flexible in terms of number of instalments which need to be 
repaid.  These clients predominantly consisted of hard-working Hispanic migrants who are 
single mothers and entrepreneurs with a high level of commitment towards their businesses119. 
As a result of these factors, the number of clients at GA has continued to grow steadily since it 
started in 2008 and now stands at 132000 by 2020 (Grameen America A, 2020). One of the 
crucial aspects of GA’s recruitment drive has been appropriate targeting of clients. The loans 
start at an initial sum of $500. This may seem a very meagre amount but the demand for such 
loans may be an indication of the necessities facing these clients.  
 
GA started its operation with loans beginning at $3000 at the request of an initial group of 
Bengali clients. Soon it realized that most of such clients were not putting in sufficient effort 
and commitment towards the discipline expected from them. In light of its experiences, GA 
thus decided to revise the initial amount lent and provide incentive to the client to get increased 
loans as a result of enhanced discipline levels. As a mandatory part of the GA loan 
disbursement process, the centre managers have to visit the house of clients. This is done on 
the fourth day of the continuous group training prior to disbursement of loan. This proved 
important for three reasons: (i) deducing whether the clients are permanently living in the 
location they earlier recorded; (ii) assessing whether the clients in the same group are living in 
close proximity; (iii) finally, deducing the social status of the borrower. Thus, the house visit 
is an important cog in appropriate targeting of clients for GA120.  
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PE, in contrast, had struggled to expand at the same rate. Its initial loan starts at a higher amount 
of $750, compared to GA, and it offers an even more reasonable rate of interest (12% on a 
declining basis) compared to GA. However, despite this the numbers of clients have been 
steadily dwindling, which stood at 200 clients in 2014. For the declining number of clients PE 
authorities mainly cite shifting of its location from Harlem to South Bronx for saving on rents. 
Harlem was noted as a major area for client recruitment, as potential clients would often walk 
in while the new location does not offer such opportunities. PE authorities also attribute the 
decline to an inadequate number of staff121.  
However, it may be argued GA managed to grow steadily with very few staff in its initial 
stages. The main method of client recruitment at PE has been to network with other voluntary 
organizations working with prospective clients. Presentations are made at such organizations 
and business solution centres by PE staff with the objective of recruiting clients122.  
It thus may be argued that GA’s targeting of clients and method of liaising directly with 
prospective clients via internal friend and family network and reliance of word of mouth 
referral from existing clients is more effective for client recruitment than that of PE. The 
strength of GA’s marketing approach has been to approach the clients directly rather than the 
clients coming to Grameen to attend presentations. It was less formal and more based on 
personal trust. Grameen hired staff who resided in the actual community they were trying to 
serve who spoke the same language (mostly Spanish for recruiting Hispanic clients) and formed 
a relationship with the community built on trust by using those staff to connect to potential 
clients they knew. Once the initial set of clients was obtained in this manner Grameen relied 
on trust generated by personal referral from existing clients to supplement its number of clients.  
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This was unlike the PE marketing process which was to rely on building collaborative 
relationships with other community organizations with access to potential clients. This is an 
approach that GA experimented initially with and abandoned as it was found to be ineffective. 
GA’s approach was more about going to clients while PE’s strategy was focused on clients 
coming to them for the presentations. Experts also seem to favour GA’s approach. Viswanathan 
(2007) postulates that consumer to consumer interactions which influence functions and 
meanings of the product is a distinctive feature of subsistent marketplaces. Weidner et al. 
(2010) highlighted the success that the parent organization of GA (GB) has been able to achieve 
by focusing on such interactions. GA’s outreach initiatives and its consequent success also 
resonate well with this theory as trust was fostered through client communications.  
Some studies note the small size of the microenterprise sector in the US compared to 
developing countries as a problem for development for MFIs.  Self-employment rate was 
around 11% between 2002 and 2009 (Hipple, 2010) and declined even more since recession 
(Smith, 2013; Wright, 2014) These self-employment rates are significantly less than what is 
commonly found in developing countries (De Soto, 1989; Schreiner and Murdoch, 2001; 
Lieberman et al., 2012).  However, despite this, GA’s strategic focus on the Hispanic 
communities resonated very well with entrepreneurial environment of the US economy and 
hence proved to be highly productive as research reveals that there was a boom in Hispanic 
entrepreneurship between 1990 and 2012 compared to other ethnicities (Fairlie, 2012; Davila 
et al., 2014).  Many of GA’s clients are Mexican immigrants (Brear, 2013).  
GA’s experiences thus resonate well with the booming demand and growth of microfinance in 
Texas, especially along the US-Mexico border populated by Mexican immigrants. A number 
of factors (also helpful for understanding GA’s growth) are indeed cited (Assanie and Virmani, 
2006) for this growth: (i) Poor immigrant families often do not have adequate financial literacy 
required to operate accounts at mainstream financial institutions or they simply mistrust banks. 
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Previous research confirms their reluctance to apply for loans as a result of a fear of rejection 
(Robles, 2002). (ii) Such clients are unlikely to be able to sustain the minimum threshold 
balances needed for checking and savings account and hence face the prospect of being charged 
exorbitant fees which makes mainstream banking costly and inaccessible. (iii) The clients being 
from low income entrepreneurial groups often lack access to sufficient credit histories in order 
to access bank loans. It places them in a vicious circle of poverty where they are unable to build 
savings and hence end up relying on predatory lenders charging extortionate interest rates. 
Studies reveal that a bank account is more crucial to establish credit than net worth, education 
level or household income (Barr, 2004). (iv) Cash based microenterprises are likely to flourish 
amongst the low-income Hispanic migrants as a result of them not having adequate 
documentation. This leads to a significant informal sector deprived of adequate finance to 
sustain entrepreneurial activities. This may have been an important factor in the booming 
demand for GA’s services from the low-income immigrant groups they were serving and 
resulted in their steady expansion. (v) The location may result in an ethnically dense 
community that has a comparative advantage over those external to the community in providing 
niche specialized goods and services to members of the same community or ethnic group (GA 
reports some clients even sell merchandise in the weekly meetings). This may be an important 
factor leading to comparative advantage for GA’s borrowers given that earlier research point 
out the presence of large retailers such as Walmart which may make it hard for potential 
entrepreneurs to compete in the market in terms of price and quality (Leiberman et al., 2012). 
Thus, GA’s clients may have been to be able to offer goods and services for which there is 
latent and local demand undetected by large retailers and be able to sustain their businesses.  
When compared to GA’s effectiveness and success, PE’s program focus on African-Americans 
may have been less effective, as most clients had access to government welfare and thus were 
protected by a safety net. Thus, they may lack the drive and necessity that GA’s target clientele 
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had. It may also reflect a reluctance on the part of PE’s target clientele to join a program based 
on a community model as they have been brought up in an American society characterised by 
individualism where “good fences make good neighbours” (Schreiner and Murdoch, 2001: 13). 
Unlike GA, PE has failed to tap into the latent demand for microfinance from Hispanic 
community despite operating in a location populated by large number of this ethnic group. 
Latest figures show that in Bronx (where PE is based), for example, is populated by 56.4% 
Hispanics while there are 43.6% Blacks (Unites States Census Bureau, 2019).  
 
A significant challenge for any MFI related to outreach is to be able to recruit competent loan 
officers. MFIs differ from mainstream financial institutions as such officers are not only 
expected to market lending products to prospective borrowers but also have to assess their 
ability to repay, size of loans required, approve and collect loans (Churchill & Frankiewicz, 
2006; Roodman & Qureshi, 2006). This unique combination of skills is deemed vital for 
achieving success in terms of outreach and achieving required repayment rates (Battilana and 
Dorado, 2010).  Towards this it is deemed essential that staffs of relevant background are 
chosen for their job and then they get proper training to add up to their skill and efficiency. For 
recruitment, GA used various methods over the course of its operational period. Originally, it 
used conventional approaches like posting on job websites and/or using services of local 
recruitment agencies. GA then went on to try other approaches and one such strategy was to 
offer internships to university graduates with the prospect of fixed appointments at the end of 
internship. Each branch usually operates with one branch manager and ten centre managers. 
GA operated initially with very few members of staff. Until 2010, four branches were being 
run by only four members of staff. The initial problem of staff recruitment that GA faced was 
a high level of staff turnover.  
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A number of factors caused this high level of turnover: (i) New employees did not have any 
experience of the model and were uncertain about the longevity of the organization; hence they 
felt detached from GA’s objectives and vision. (ii) They may have underestimated the level of 
challenges associated with the job.  Most recruitment was for outreach jobs at the field level 
which involved convincing people who were averse to be approached. Such roles are often 
quite demanding both mentally and physically. The staff must be prepared to work in busy 
streets promoting products and also frequent borrowers’ businesses and houses sometimes as 
part of the lending process. This was even trickier in the context of an industrialised country 
such as USA as most simply did not have knowledge of the model. (iii) GA requires a house 
visit by a loan officer, an essential but challenging part of its assessment of the borrowers’ 
credit worthiness. (iv) The most challenging part of the role may be to visit reluctant borrowers 
who have reneged on their contracts and coax and persuade such clients to repay. Staff 
performance for such job positions was evaluated in terms of the number of clients recruited. 
When target numbers were not achieved the staff felt pressure and some were not experienced 
enough to cope with this. (v) In addition, during the initial years of GA’s operation, staff did 
not have adequate time to obtain skills and experience to be promoted to work in middle-
managerial positions.  
 
In this backdrop GA had to recruit experienced management staff from Bangladesh which in 
some cases led to delays as a result of immigration clearance issues. Later GA adopted a 
different recruitment strategy, recruiting staff through internal referrals from existing staff and 
borrowers, which proved to be effective123. This is known as “incubator technique”, which 
involves requesting current staff who are known to be competent and been with the 
organization for a sufficiently long period to locate others like them (Frankiewicz, 2001; 
                                                             
123 (ME#9, 2014) (ME#10, 2014) (ME#11, 2014) 
234 
 
Battilana and Dorado, 2010: 1425).  Borrowers were also encouraged to refer suitable 
candidates from amongst their friend or family network at weekly meetings. This enabled both 
existing staff and borrowers to communicate in a genuine and efficient manner the realistic 
difficulties (as they had a strong understanding of the Grameen model and about how GA 
functions through personal experience) associated with the job positions to prospective 
candidates they knew. Thus, refereed applicants already had a very good understanding of what 
the job responsibilities entailed and thus were better prepared and more willing to deal with the 
numerous challenges that such roles presented compared to other applicants.  It also helped in 
getting efficient employees as existing staff and borrowers were disinclined to compromise 
their reputations and their relationship with GA by referring unsuitable candidates. Further, it 
helped create a strong internal network of employees which was very useful for retaining staff. 
GA actively promoted this strategy by providing cash incentives to existing staff to encourage 
referrals and also had in place clearly defined career paths for promotion leading to greater 
motivation for both existing staff and new entrants.  
 
In order to augment the trust and add to reliability factor amongst the target clientele, analysts 
postulate that field workers need an enhanced level of knowledge about the community which 
is best assured by hiring from within the communities (Roodman and Qureshi, 2006). Staff 
recruitment strategies at GA reverberate well with client recruitment objectives as there was an 
emphasis on recruiting Spanish speaking staff to enable smooth communication with a 
predominantly Hispanic clientele, both existing and prospective. A particular example of the 
actuation of this strategy is when GA approached a local college with a high number of 
Hispanic students attending (for studying English). Out of these students, suitable candidates 
were offered internships with the prospect of long-term employment. This was a successful 
move as most of such interns employed turned out to be at GA for much longer period 
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compared to interns recruited from top universities who were usually interested in research and 
wished to work at GA for only a short period124.  
 
The experiences of GA echo very well with a number of studies which have found referral 
hiring to have positive effects on staff turnover and employee quality in different contexts 
(Gannon, 1971; Burks et al. 2015; Pieper, 2015). In addition, some borrowers have been 
recruited as they have fulfilled their loan requirements. As these borrowers have first-hand 
experience of the model as clients, this strategy may have been useful for getting skilled 
employees with a firm understanding of the community GA was trying to serve and the 
corresponding challenges that came with serving the target clientele.   
 
PE, the other hand, has been reliant on traditional sources such as posting requisitions through 
internal and various external websites and recruitment agencies for hiring staff125.  The natures 
of PE’s challenges are different to GA. The fact that it has a funding constraint and the nature 
of system of its meetings meant that staff was needed to undertake multiple responsibilities 
such as outreach work and training clients at the bi-weekly meetings. Thus PE needed staff 
who had a combination of skills such as community organization expertise for efficient 
outreach work (familiar with the communities PE was operating in, be able to travel as they 
have to cover multiple territories and good communication skills and ideally a marketing 
degree) and also other additional skills and experience such as high level of numeracy to be 
able to impart adequate training to the clients and business experience or entrepreneurial 
connections. For example, such employees may need to be able to develop apposite curriculum 
in order to keep clients engaged and motivated to come to the meetings for entrepreneurial 
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training and also have the numeric skills in order to be able to help the clients understand the 
costs and benefits associated with their loan applications and the corresponding businesses they 
intend to use the loan for. PE offsets the effects of funding constraints to an extent by recruiting 
unpaid interns and offering volunteering opportunities. These positions may be attractive to 
potential applicants as experience may be gained in a number of different areas such as data 
analysis, curriculum development, fundraising and event planning and also used for gaining 
college credits (Project Enterprise B, 2020).   
Profit-making institutions keep up strong incentives to pressurize and reward employees’ 
performance in the interest of higher benefits from improved services and ensuing increases in 
the client base. Management of non-profit institution, in contrast, may lack similar drive to 
improve the adeptness of its employees. Yet pressure may be exerted by government or relevant 
donors for continual development in such cases (Schreiner and Murdoch, 2001), though some 
believe that these entities rarely have significant reasons to provide such incentives (Von 
Pischke, 2001). Balancing the dual logics of sustainability and development may lead to inner 
tensions for MFIs, as it may instigate conflict between members of the organization who 
execute these logics (Glynn, 2000; Heimer, 1999; Zilber, 2002).  Research has shown that 
sustainable commercial microfinance organizations that are successful in combining multiple 
logics hiring and socialization policies offer crucial early levers for promoting an 
organizational identity that combines such logics (Battilana and Dorado, 2010). Such identity 
prevents the formation of conflicting sub-group identities which exacerbate tension between 
the differing logics. GA, though not a commercial institution, with its strong emphasis on the 
Institutionist perspective may have a stronger natural drive to improve employee efficiency 
evidenced by its rapidly evolving and innovative hiring policies (which elucidate who are able 
to become the members of the institution) and socialization practices (which educate and 
strengthen anticipated ideologies and actions in employees) (Van Maanen & Schein, 1977).  
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Accordingly, GA experimented with various recruitment methods and finally realized that 
incubator technique was the most effective process. The knowledge of the logics that GA 
embodies may have been communicated to them through the current staff and borrowers and 
resulted in them having a strong understanding of what to expect and how to perform at GA 
(Bourdieu, 1998; Scott et al, 2000).  On the other hand, at PE there has not been much focus 
on refining its HR and socialization practices, which may have been due to its low client base 
and funding constraints leading to an inability to recruit a significant number of staff and 
provide training adding up to their efficiency.  
7.3 Regulatory environment  
With hindsight of the GB experiences in Bangladesh, this section takes up the issues of 
regulatory environment of the US MFIs and the corresponding problems that they have 
experienced.  A key aspect of GB’s success is the mobilization of savings of its clients in 
Bangladesh. However, in the US, unlike GB, GA and PE are registered as non-profit 
organizations rather than as banks. This places several constraints on their effective 
functioning: First is an issue of operational cost: providing a loan in the range of $500-1500 is 
much costlier than loans of significantly higher amount as a result of higher transaction cost of 
administering such loans (Helms & Reille, 2004; Cull et al, 2008; Rosenberg et al., 2013). This 
is why most mainstream financial institutions seem reluctant to provide such loans of smaller 
amounts (Leitner, 2010). Second is the issue of chargeable interest: GA charges an interest rate 
of 15% as any rates above 16% would be considered as usurious under US regulations 
(NYCcriminallawyer, 2020). This poses a significant constraint for GA as it is unable to charge 
higher rates in order to cover cost (in developing countries rates may reach up to 70%) (Kiviat, 
2009). Third is the aspect of organizational growth: organizations such as GA (unlike GB) are 
unable to operate savings account for their clients, a very important regulatory factor which 
severely impede their growth.  
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The constraining aspects of such regulations have also been echoed in some studies. It is 
suggested, first of all, that inadequate savings may impede start-up and development of 
businesses even more than a lack of access to finance (Bates, 1997; Berger and Udell, 1998). 
Secondly, savings are a safeguard against adversities (such as sudden illness or business 
failure). Thirdly, accumulating savings over a sustained period of time inculcates discipline 
into borrowers and produces significant entrepreneurial learning. Finally, substantial savings 
also means that funds allocated for business purposes need not be deflected for short-term 
urgent needs (Schreiner and Murdoch, 2001).    
 
The regulatory issues facing the US MFIs leads naturally to a pressing question: why these 
MFIs with strong emphasis on the Welfarist perspective to serve the financially excluded are 
not allowed to open savings account, whilst profit-making commercial banks with a heavy lean 
on the Institutionist perspective with preference towards serving wealthier clients are privileged 
to do so126. However, it is also plausible that there may be abuse of such opportunities 
(permission to operate savings accounts) thus giving rise to regulatory challenges.  
 
7.4 Client training 
The current section examines the practice of client training each of the US MFIs follows. At 
GA once the clients are recruited, they undergo a “Continuous group training” for 5 consecutive 
days, whilst at PE clients were required to undergo 6-week training; at the end of which they 
had to pass a test set by the PE authorities for attaining eligibility for the loan127. The nature of 
the training varied markedly between them. GA’s training is about building group solidarity. 
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The first step of the training is to inform clients about the benefits of joining the program and 
how this is linked to the overall mission and objectives of GA. This enables the clients to get a 
broad perspective about Grameen’s vision and helps to build trust between them and the centre 
manager.  The next challenging step for GA is to impart a sense of responsibility for clients 
themselves to their group as it is a core element of the peer to peer lending process that GA 
utilizes. The objective is to make them realize the positive outcomes of fulfilling their 
responsibilities to fellow group members, a stronger relationship with GA and the consequent 
opportunity to access greater amounts of loan.  This stage is about instilling into the clients a 
firm understanding of the discipline which is required in terms of attending group meetings, 
repayments and being accountable to their fellow group members. They are provided an 
understanding of how successful groups are formed and operated, the fact that the group 
operates as a single component of the entire functional unit which is the centre. A centre 
comprises of up to twelve groups within one area and the members are meant to know and trust 
one another leading to a strong network of borrowers who are socially responsible to each 
other. The training process thus is about inculcating the ethos, ideologies and values of GA and 
developing the habits of borrowers, most of whom are previously unfamiliar with such a group 
lending model. However, central to the process is continuously engaging the clients and 
reinforcing the concepts and ideologies taught in the training particularly though the weekly 
meetings128. Schreiner and Murdoch (2001) note that women in the US may value the non-
economic benefits of such meetings less than their counterparts in developing countries as a 
result of the availability of more social opportunities. While this may be a strong argument for 
reluctance on part of the predominantly African American client base at PE to attend such 
meetings, it may be less relevant for the primarily Hispanic immigrant clientele of GA all of 
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whom originate from developing countries and may find networking prospects offered by the 
weekly meetings invaluable in an alien country. 
Contrastingly, PE’s training is about teaching entrepreneurs about how to construct a business 
plan. The topics covered include cash flow management, pricing, sales projection and writing 
executive summaries. At the end of the course, the clients have to pass a test set by PE. After 
passing the test, they become classified as “Certified members” who are eligible for loans. If 
they fail the test they need to reappear until they pass it in order to become eligible for the loan. 
Clients are charged $20 for the course. Furthermore, PE also runs an additional course known 
as Entrepreneurial Assistance Program (EAP) (an advanced version of the 6-week course) 
which is run for ten weeks. PE encourages all its’ borrowers to participate in this program129. 
This practice of PE seems inconsistent with the ethos of Professor Yunus where he believes 
that entrepreneurs has the skills and localized knowledge to be successful and they do not need 
to be spoon fed with entrepreneurial training. Furthermore, the training has cost implications 
for PE as the $20 charge covers the material cost but the qualified trainer must be compensated 
for all the teaching hours. This means PE has to rely on donor funding to cover the additional 
cost of providing the training.  It may also be discouraging for any potential clients to join the 
PE program as they may deem the course to be unnecessary and the process of getting the loan 
to be needlessly lengthy. This may be relevant because GA’s continuous group training only 
lasts for 5 days before loans are disbursed while the duration PE’s training course was 6 weeks 
(it may take the client longer to obtain loans if they fail to secure sufficient marks in the 
examination). In PE’s case, providing such training seemed to be incongruent with the group 
lending model that they are offering as a number of studies have found entrepreneurial training 
to be ineffective in achieving desired effects or even detrimental in some cases (Bhatt, 2000; 
Schreiner and Murdoch, 2001; Oosterbeek et al., 2010, Karlan and Valdivia, 2011). Balkin, 
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(1992: 141) states that the purpose of general entrepreneurship training “is to provide the 
practical knowledge to do the myriad of little things it takes to start and sustain an enterprise.”  
To this end, some of the topics covered such as bookkeeping, product pricing and cash flow 
management may be useful especially given that 55% of PE’s clients are new entrants without 
any experience of operating a business. However, the generic nature of the topics covered in 
the training also means that skills training tailored to the specific types of business or sectors 
is not included. It would simply be more difficult and costly to include the wide range of 
training which may be required for such classes to be effective for such purposes.  This may 
be a problem given that 45% of the clients are already operating businesses when they join PE 
(Project Enterprise C, 2015). For many of such clients, the training is likely to have a 
detrimental effect as they may deem it to be patronizing or surplus to their requirement.  
Murdoch and Schreiner (2001) point out a simple method of checking the value of a training 
program as to whether clients are willing to pay a fee to attend and whether or not the training 
is obligatory. In PE’s case, training was mandatory and trainees were charged $20. GA’s 
continuous training is also compulsory, however, there is no charge whatsoever for clients.  
The fact that PE had struggled to recruit a significant number of borrowers compared to GA 
may be an indication of the fact that prospective borrowers may find training of this nature to 
be superfluous to their requirements. Schreiner and Murdoch (2001) note that MFIs in 
developing countries usually avoid training due to a number of factors including the 
rudimentary nature of the borrowers’ businesses and high costs associated with such training. 
These factors strike a chord with the current analysis as the clients of both organizations are 
likely to be operating businesses which are relatively basic and training is costly to provide as 
trainers have to be compensated accordingly for all teaching hours. A potential solution may 
lie in a strategy that GA has adopted for clients who express training needs. GA refers clients 
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to appropriate training institutes in such cases. This may be cost effective as it utilizes the 
availability of specialized training that caters to the needs of a particular client (Bhatt and  
 
Conclusion 
A comparative review of the two US MFIs suggest that GA has fared much better toward 
balancing the dual logics of sustainability and development than its counterpart PE, despite its 
much earlier start. Such an upshot may owe to the fact that GA, unlike PE, hold on to the core 
components of GB’s original brand, without yielding to the contextual circumstances of its 
operation. GA has been able to perform efficiently in securing high repayment rates (similar to 
GB in Bangladesh) and stayed on an expansion course. In contrast, PE, served only lower 
number of clients, yet experienced dwindling repayment figures and eventually closed down.     
The contrasting experience of GA and PE in terms of loan recovery may be attributed to the 
nature of self-selection process practiced by the organizations, the differences in target clientele 
(including necessity levels characterized by issues such as access to welfare and social habits) 
and difference in nature of the weekly meetings. Further, GA serves only female clients in line 
with the model of GB which may also be an important factor driving high repayment rates.  
GA’s focus on building solidarity amongst the borrowers and instilling their vision and 
ideology into these borrowers may be a crucial factor in achieving high loan recovery.  During 
6-years of its existence GA has demonstrated a better capacity for organizational learning and 
has been more strategically proactive in the areas such as marketing, staff recruitment and 
training. The difference in outreach performance may be attributed to the fact that GA’s word 
of mouth referral approach appears to be more direct and proactive than PE’s approach of 
connecting with voluntary organizations with access to potential clients (a method piloted and 
found to be ineffective by GA). GA has proactively focused on Hispanic female clients while 
PE has focused on African-American clients serving both male and female clients. The above 
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analysis shows that GA’s strategy was resonant with the entrepreneurial environment in the US 
which showed a rapid boom in Hispanic entrepreneurship during the last two decades. An 
important factor for a rapidly expanding organization such as GA was staff recruitment which 
is also crucial for its sustainability and outreach objectives. GA initially experienced problems 
with high staff turnover and had managed to overcome this through the innovative “incubator” 
technique.  The differences in philosophies of GB and PE were characterized by the fact that 
the nature of client training was divergent.  Client training at GA is about building group 
solidarity and engagement amongst clients in the form of sharing of experiences while there is 
a great emphasis on entrepreneurial education at PE (inconsistent with the GB model). Both 
organizations face significant regulatory constraints the most pertinent of which is the inability 
to operate savings accounts on behalf of clients.  
GA’s current focus on the Hispanic entrepreneurs may continue to bear fruit as Hispanics are 
projected to become one-third of the population by 2060 (Meckler, 2012; Davila et al, 2014). 
However, towards realizing service expansion to this vast number GA may consider learning 
from the success of Progresso Financiero, a California-based MFI, which uses an individual 
lending approach but amalgamates a “high touch” with a “high tech” approach (that add up 
technology know-how for statistical scoring, automation and customer relationship 
management (CRM) for enhanced relationships both amongst the borrowers and borrowers- 
lender (Lieberman et al, 2012: 61)).  GA may need to focus more on the “high tech” aspect of 
its operations and consider adopting more sophisticated technology as it increasingly deals with 
an expanding base of clients. GA has already realized this and is in the process of establishing 
new technology platforms through all of GA’s offices in order to go cashless and paperless and 
enhance efficiency. For example, GA has collaborated with Mastercard to support their clients 
to use digital banking which has helped them to establish financial identity and facilitate 
business growth (Mastercard Center, 2020) 
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However, for GA, the strategic bias towards the Hispanic community may be problematic, as 
doubts exist on the projected rapid rise of Hispanic entrepreneurship due to external factors 
impeding the surge of Hispanic entrepreneurship in the US. These include dysfunctional 
immigration laws which lack a feasible visa entry process for Hispanic immigrants to become 
US citizens, enabling them to engage in entrepreneurship. The nearest program, the EB5 
investors’ visa sets out a minimum amount of $900,000 to $1.8 million for entrepreneurs to 
invest in US business ventures as an eligibility criterion for obtaining green cards (USCIS, 
2020). However, this threshold level may be too high for aspiring Hispanic immigrants to be 
able to apply. Administrative bottlenecks and designated country allocations also mean an 
unusually long wait for Mexican Americans eager to sponsor adult sons and daughters for US 
permanent residency. If reforms are made to integrate the 11 million undocumented immigrants 
and the aforementioned long waiting times for families to be reunified are addressed, then it 
may lead to a further boost in entrepreneurship amongst the Hispanic community as they are 
made to feel more welcome by the system (Davila et al. 2014). However, recent trends indicate 
that a substantial number of applications are being denied on public charge grounds (Reuters, 
2019). It may also be difficult for GA particularly when looking to extend its services beyond 
the Hispanic community given the lack of industry-wide data on micro-entrepreneurs on 
business loans of less $50000 (Lieberman et al.2012).   
Anticipating such challenges facing MFIs, Yunus (2008) offered his reflections. Firstly, the 
government may introduce regulatory reforms, enabling MFIs to operate savings accounts and 
use the deposits for onward lending, a crucial step for global expansion of MFIs. Secondly, 
welfare reforms that provide incentives for people to engage in income producing activities 
and build assets should be incorporated into current policy. For GA such reforms may not be 
currently relevant as most of its Hispanic immigrant clients does not have access to welfare 
programs. However, it was pertinent for PE as most of its clients do have such access. Further, 
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it may also be important for Grameen as it looks to diversify its clientele base into indigenous 
entrepreneurial populations with such access. Finally, such reforms should be supplemented 
by regulations which make it easier for micro-entrepreneurs to operate and sustain their 
businesses and be able to compete with large retailers. Yunus (2008) provides the example of 
florists in the state of Louisiana who are not able to sell additional varieties of flowers without 
obtaining state licenses. Such superfluous regulations, he argues, is detrimental for market 
competition and leaves the consumers with fewer choices and higher costs. If such reforms are 
implemented, it enables MFIs such as the current case study organizations enabling them to 
better balance the dual logics of sustainability and development and both lenders and clients 
become more viable in the process.  
In many ways, GA has revived the effective use of a model which many MFIs found too 
difficult to implement in the context of an industrialized country such as USA resulting in its 
abandonment by them and transition to conventional lending approaches. This may be 
attributed to GA’s adherence to the core aspects of the original model despite numerous 
challenges in different areas of its operations such as loan recovery, outreach and client 
training. It has also shown a great capacity for rapid organizational learning in its relatively 
short period of operation enabling it to employ and refine innovative client and staff 
recruitment methods. The current business environment in the US also may seem suitable for 
MFIs such as GA to thrive. The impact of recession and the more recent coronavirus has meant 
there is a rapidly emerging business class (such as the Hispanic clientele base that GA serves) 
starved of business credit as a result of tightening lending services by mainstream financial 
institutions. The state of the US economy and the high levels of jobseekers also mean that many 
Americans may progressively view self-employment as a viable option.  
Research on MFIs in the comparative context of developed countries is scanty; particularly 
sparse are those that use lending models such as Grameen committed to promote social 
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networks. In order for organizations such as GA to be able to better assess the uncertainties 
associated with their coexisting operations, the author deems such research crucial. Future 
research may weigh up findings of existing projects in the UK and other European countries 
for identifying effective cross-cultural learning towards enhanced performance of the MFIs in 


















Chapter 8 INSTITUTIONAL 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP- US CASE 
STUDIES 
Introduction 
Battilana et al. (2009: 72) defines institutional entrepreneurs as ‘‘agents who initiate and 
actively participate in the implementation of, changes that diverge from existing institutions, 
independent of whether the initial intent was to change the institutional environment, and 
whether the changes were successfully implemented’’. The current research considers the case 
study organizations as institutional entrepreneurs as they have endeavoured to adopt the 
Grameen model which is primarily being used in developing countries and seldom utilized in 
the context of developed countries. PE was the first MFI to use the model in New York while 
GA (based in the same city) revived the use of the Grameen model which was generally 
considered to be ineffective in the context of the locations it was operating and thus was 
divergent to conventional practices in the US community finance field.   
This chapter analyses the process of institutional entrepreneurship of adopting the Grameen 
model by the US MFIs, how they responded to the emerging context of macro-level 
institutional complexities they experienced in the course of their operation. The multi-cultural 
and dynamic nature of the locations in which the MFIs were operating necessitate a deep 
understanding of the diverse nature of their clientele base and their characteristics, how these 
organizations framed the social problem they were attempting to resolve in relation to the 
characteristics of the field in which they were operating and shaped their organizational 
identities to appeal to their respective target clientele base. Further, the nature of alliances 
formed by these MFIs with external actors for gaining legitimacy and for effective provision 
is also a major concern of the current research. As a larger MFI and due to a wider array of 
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operation, GA naturally finds analytical prominence, whilst PE due to its limited range is 
projected when relevant. 
In this backdrop the evolving context of the dynamics of entrepreneurship and social capital 
formation effort in the clientele base will be examined. The perspectives will also include the 
shaping of diagnostic framing and identity, mobilisation of allies along with how all these 
factors are incorporated within the organizational template and strategic visions of the two US 
MFIs. As per diagnostic perspectives outlined and analytic gaps indicated in the literature 
review in the earlier chapter (Chapter 2), the current chapter addresses how the nature of the 
process of institutional entrepreneurship has evolved as Grameen model was being 
implemented in the USA.   
Content-wise, the chapter examines the aforementioned issues in five sections. Section 8.1 
illustrates the contextual backdrop in which the case study organizations operated in, the nature 
of their clientele base and its relation to their corresponding strategies.  Section 8.2 shows how 
the characteristics of the community finance field evolved in the USA and compares diagnostic 
framing between the relevant MFIs. Section 8.3 explains the role of identity and how this 
influences the institutional entrepreneurship process of adopting the Grameen model. Section 
8.4 elaborates how the case study MFIs mobilise allies in order to balance the sustainability 
and development logics. Section 8.5 contrasts the organizational templates and strategic visions 
with respect to Institutionist and Welfarist goals adopted by the case study organizations and 
their repercussions. The conclusion summarizes the findings and visualizes future 





8.1 The Emerging Context: Collectivism and the Rise of 
Hispanic Entrepreneurship 
The milieu of entrepreneurship will be better substantiated from the emerging numbers. 95% 
of GA’s clients are Hispanic whilst PE has a clientele base of 88% African Americans. It is 
thus necessary to understand the dynamics of entrepreneurship and social capital formation 
underpinning both these communities to decipher the institutional entrepreneurship process. 
A research report revealed that Hispanic entrepreneurship had grown rapidly in the period 
between 1990 and 2012 as the numbers of Hispanic entrepreneurs were more than thrice that 
of 1990. Interestingly, this increase had far exceeded the corresponding population growth in 
the working age Hispanic American populace. Furthermore, self-employed non-Hispanic 
entrepreneurship grew only one-eighteenth as fast as the Hispanic rate at the same time (Davila 
et al., 2014). Table 8.1 below shows the growth rates of Hispanic and non-Hispanic 
entrepreneurs.  
Table 8.1 The size and growth of Hispanic self-employment 1990-2012  




Most of GA’s clients are Hispanic immigrants, mainly from Mexico (Brear, 2013). A relevant 
study revealed that the likeliness to start a new business for immigrants is more than twice of 
Native Americans. It also showed that immigrants founded 28% of new businesses in 2011, 
despite making up only 12.9% of the population (Fairlie, 2012). The findings in a recent study 
confirm the trend, which revealed that immigrants were almost twice as likely to be self-
employed as Natives (Pew Research Center, 2015). In the period 1990-2012, the number of 
Hispanic immigrants grew by more than four times. Table 7.1 above shows this increase. The 
aforesaid report also revealed that Hispanic migrants predominantly from Mexico played an 
important role in the growth of Hispanic entrepreneurship.  In this period as the number of self-
employed Mexican migrants was 765000 showing that it had risen by a factor of 5.4. This 
meant that entrepreneurship was so pervasive amongst the Mexican population that by 2012 
over one in 10 such immigrants was an entrepreneur (Davila et al., 2014). Some attribute this 
surge in Hispanic entrepreneurship to the collaborative nature of the community (Clarke, 
2013). A recent study has revealed that both necessity and opportunity self-employment rose 
sharply among Mexican immigrants in the aftermath of 9/11 (Wang and Lofstrom, 2019). The 
fact that such immigrants found opportunities hard to come by meant that they were really 
driven in pursuit of their goals and the facilities forwarded to them by GA suited them well in 
terms of the finance and the collective community strength offered by the program.  
 
The collaborative nature of the Hispanic immigrant community bonded by similar gender, 
culture, language and difficulties associated with starting life in foreign setting also resounded 
very well with the collective process of the GA’s group lending.  One study reported that 
Hispanic entrepreneurship grew post the 2008 recession by 71.5% while during the same period 
entrepreneurship among non-Hispanic US born individuals fell (Davila et al., 2014). This may 
have particular relevance for GA’s steady growth as it began operations in 2008 during the US 
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recession.  Further, GA’s strategy of offering the loans only to women, as compared to PE, 
which offered it to both sexes, may have struck a chord with the entrepreneurial environment 
in which it is operating. Studies show a boom in female Hispanic entrepreneurship between 
2007-2012 compared to other ethnicities (NWBC, 2012; Vega, 2015; Fisher and Lewin, 2020). 
This kept GA in line with strategy of its parent organization ensuring high repayment rates. 
This is also supported by studies which show that a focus on women may lead to enhanced 
repayments (D’Espallier et al., 2011; Shahriar et al, 2020).  
 
PE’s outreach focus on African American clients may have found limited success because of 
the relatively low levels of entrepreneurial drive in this community (Beasre, 1984; Bates, 1995; 
Fairlie, 1999; Bogan and Darity Jr, 2008).   A study shows that black entrepreneurship during 
2003-2014 was static, hovering around 9% (Geoscape, 2015). This is backed by a recent study 
which revealed that African Americans are least likely to become self-employed amongst all 
ethnic minorities (Pew Research Centre, 2015). A number of studies have reflected on the 
limited entrepreneurial success that African Americans have had. Several studies found African 
American businesses to be less profitable and more prone to closure. A number of reasons were 
cited for this which includes a lack of access to adequate educational and financial resources 
and the significance of a family business background (Fairlie and Robb, 2008). Another study 
focused on social, political and cultural factors which have combined to have an adverse effect 
on African American entrepreneurship compared to immigrant groups (Bogan and Dairty Jr, 
2008).  
 
The Grameen model revolves around group dynamics and thus depends greatly upon the 
process of social capital formation amongst the group members. The theory of cross-cultural 
variation underpinned by individualism and collectivism, an important area of cross-cultural 
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psychology, is thus deemed pertinent to the current research (Hofstede, 1980; Hui & Triandis, 
1986; Kagitcibasi, 1997; Sinha & Verma, 1987; Triandis, 1995). Collective communities are 
characterized by the strength of the association between members where collective goals take 
precedence over individual needs and action and conduct is shaped by such pursuits (Hui & 
Triandis, 1986; Triandis, 2001).  Individualism, on the other hand, is characterized by 
autonomous members who perceive their own needs to be of greater importance than collective 
goals (Hofstede,1980; Schvaneveldt, & Behnke, 2012). The persistently low levels of 
entrepreneurship in the African American community has been linked to the individualistic 
nature of the society leading to a lack of social networks required for fostering entrepreneurial 
activity (Light, 1980; Light and Gold, 2000).  Research findings substantiate this line of 
thinking (Coon and Kemmelmeier, 2001; Somashekar, 2019). One study compared differences 
in individualism and collectivism across four largest ethnic groups in the US and found the 
African American community exhibit the highest levels of individualism (Coon and 
Kemmelmeier, 2001). Somashekhar (2019) attributes a lack of geographical diversity in the 
African American social capital as a central factor putting this group at a disadvantage 
compared to immigrant entrepreneurs from Mexico. 
 
The Hispanic culture, contrastingly, has been associated with high levels of collectivism in 
literature (Schvaneveldt & Behnke, 2012). Hispanics tend to come from a culture where group 
activities take precedence and accountability and responsibility is likely to be collective and 
shared (Gudykunst, 1998). This collectivist orientation is associated with the concept of 
Familismo found to be strong in Latino families (Perea and Slater, 1999). Familismo denotes 
the strong bonding between members of a family and shows an inclination of such members to 
prioritise family needs over their own needs (Falicov, 2007). This was supported by the US 
Census Bureau in 2009 when it revealed that Latinos are likelier than other ethnic groups to be 
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living in a family setting. The collective orientation pervades the Hispanic way of life and 
causes other’s opinions to be valued by community members. This resonates well with the 
Grameen model where members require a drive to participate in weekly group meetings and 
benefit from engagement in such meetings. Furthermore, as most of GA’s clients are 
immigrants, the concept of “Immigrant interdependence hypothesis” may be relevant to 
analysis (Ayçiçegi-Dinn, A., & Caldwell-Harris, 2011: 10). According to this theory, 
immigrants confront numerous obstacles as a result of starting life in an alien country without 
assistance from a substantial network of family and friends. Hence, they are compelled to 
become more collectivist in these circumstances to overcome such problems (Triandis, 1995). 
This factor has been acknowledged in more recent studies as well. One study, for example, 
notes the collectivist nature of the informal economy of Mexican immigrants (Saad-Lessler, & 
Richman, 2014). The collaborative nature of the largely Hispanic clientele base of GA is thus 
reinforced by the fact that they are predominantly migrants, which is one of the crucial factors 
for effectiveness of the group lending model in the context in which they were operating.  
 
 
8. 2 Field Characteristics and Problem Framing  
 
The early US initiatives to adopt the Grameen Model in the 1980s and 90s seem to be in 
accordance with the concept of mimetic ‘Isomorphism’ proposed by DiMaggio and Powell 
(2002). Isomorphism refers to a situation in which organizational designs and practices in 
different organizations are similar. According to the theory, there are three different forms of 
isomorphism: (i) Normative – occurs when an organization’s members are normatively 
predisposed to favour certain sorts of designs and practices. (ii) Coercive - occurs when some 
powerful institution obliges organizations in its domain on threat of coercion to comply with 
certain practices and design. (iii) Mimetic isomorphism- in simple terms, mimetic isomorphism 
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means the process of copying. This occurs when some organizations and their managers desire 
consciously, to be similar to a particularly highly regarded exemplar (Clegg et al, 2011). 
 
In this case, mimetic isomorphism seems to be most fitting as the managers of early initiatives 
attempted to emulate the Grameen’s success by copying its core designs and practices. This 
may also be attributed to the fact that the field of community finance in the US was “emerging” 
during the 80s when the model first appeared. It was characterized by lower levels of 
institutionalization related to an increased degree of uncertainty providing opportunities for 
potential institutional entrepreneurs to act (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997; Phillips et 
al.,2000; Battilana et al., 2009).  “Mature” fields are characterized by highly prominent central 
players in terms of their power, size and visibility and media coverage (Greenwood et al, 2011: 
335). It follows that in the absence of such highly visible central players in the US, Grameen 
Bangladesh was the global face of microfinance that the US initiatives endeavoured to be 
associated with. WSEP was one such organization which adopted the model in the context of 
Chicago inner city in 1985. The program went on to achieve significant recognition as a result 
of being the first lender of its kind for low income welfare dependent women and winning 
accolades such as The Chicago Spirit awards in 1992 (Liou, 1998).   
 
Project Enterprise (PE) was inspired by the achievements of the WSEP program and initiated 
a similar program which was the first of its kind in New York in 1995 (Counts, 2008).  It is 
interesting to note that PE framed the problem, in a non-gendered and perhaps more generic 
manner than WSEP by aiming to support entrepreneurship in under resourced communities. 
This was different to WSEP which framed it in a gender specific way by using the model to 
support female entrepreneurship. However, the field had matured to extent in the last decade 
that in general the model was deemed to be less effective in the context of an industrialized 
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nation such as the US due to aforementioned problems in the previous chapter. Some programs 
phased out while others mitigated institutional complexities by adopting individual lending 
models and/or focusing on training. These organizations included major central players such 
as Accion (Freemark, 2005; Fairbanks, 2008).  
 
Despite this change in orientation of the field, GA revived the use of the Grameen model as it 
started in 2008 in the context of a recession affected economy. GA, in line with its parent 
organization, framed the problem of financial exclusion in terms of feminization of poverty, 
highlighting the often-low wages and poor quality of life experienced by US women in 
employment and projecting self-employment as a potential saviour. On its website for example, 
GA highlights a number of factors that female micro-entrepreneurs lack in the US; these 
include loans, savings facilities and networks and propose the Grameen model as a solution, 
providing all components (Grameen America B, 2020).  
 
Earlier studies contrast between “central” and “peripheral” organizations. The former is 
typically characterized by size and status. A higher status may imply intensification of 
institutional demands as a result of greater visibility and media coverage (Den Hond & De 
Bakker, 2007; Greening & Gray, 1994; King, 2008; King & Soule, 2007; Rehbein, Waddock 
& Graves,2004; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). Peripheral organizations, on the other hand, 
may not face the same levels of institutional complexities and the nature of their responses may 
be significantly different to central organizations.  They are weakly associated with other 
organizations from which apposite behaviours are absorbed and carried out and hence unlikely 
to receive same level of pressure to reassert current practices (Davis, 1991; Galaskiewicz & 
Wasserman, 1989; Greve, 1998; Kraatz, 1998; Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997; Westphal 
& Zajac, 2001; Zuckerman, 1999; Greenwood et al., 2011).  
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Thus, PE’s deviation from some of the core features of the Grameen model may be explained 
by the fact that it continued to remain a peripheral organization throughout its existence owing 
to its limited scale and lower status before finally succumbing to an inevitable ending. GA was 
perhaps peripheral in a US context at inception; however, it quickly went on to occupy a more 
significant place within the field owing to the globally central position of its parent organization 
and its steady expansion. GA quickly went on to be known as one of most prolific micro-
lenders in the field (Lieberman et al., 2012). The size, status and reputation of the parent 
organization thus had important implications for how GA framed the problem. GA unlike other 
central players such as Accion in the field could not use diagnostic frames which were generally 
used to provide products based on individual lending. This would be difficult given that 
Grameen continues to be considered the global beacon for peer group lending.  
8.3. Alignment of Interest with External Actors 
Central to the process of institutional entrepreneurship, as some analysts postulate, is the ability 
to mobilize allies and garner support in implementing divergent change (Battilana et al., 2009). 
Allies are rallied together (Fligstein, 1997; Greenwood et al., 2002) and co-operation is fostered 
in the process (Fligstein, 2001; Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002; Rao, 1998). The objective 
is to unite allies and moderate intrinsic incongruities in the coalition and concurrently 
highlighting the failures of current institutional designs and enhancements that are an outcome 
of the new practices (Fligstein, 1997; Haveman & Rao,1997; Holm, 1995; Rao, 1998; Seo & 
Creed, 2002; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Battilana et al., 2009).  
 
GA has developed innovative strategic collaborations for overcoming regulatory constraints 
and effective provision of services.  Firstly, the GA authorities recognized the importance of 
savings in order to build the assets of the borrowers and gain their confidence and built 
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significant collaborations with commercial banks, second with a credit ratings agency, third 
with healthcare bodies, and lastly, with donors.  
 
With commercial banks GA has entered into agreements which specify that clients will not be 
subjected to minimum charges which usually apply if the deposits are less than a certain 
threshold value.  As a result of the agreement, clients are enabled to open savings account with 
partner banks for deposits as little as $10 (whereas similar accounts would usually require 
deposits in the range of $50-60 to prevent charges for clients). It is also beneficial for 
commercial banks to enter into such an agreement from both an economic and a corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) standpoint. From a CSR perspective it makes sense for the banks 
to be associated with a brand like Grameen known globally for not only addressing financial 
exclusion problems for the underprivileged but also for their focus on empowering female 
clients. From an economic viewpoint, the banks can operate the high value corporate account 
of GA which is used to disburse the loans as well as access to the substantial number of GA 
clients via the opening of savings accounts. GA thus collects savings on behalf of its customers 
at the weekly meetings and deposits it to partner servicing banks every week130.  
 
The foregoing savings mobilisation aspect plays an important role in the following manner:  
(i) It is expedient as it encourages the clients to save and the GA authorities reckon that most 
clients were not inclined to save before joining the program; but after joining GA, they realized 
it is very convenient for the borrowers (many of whom are single mothers busy with their 
businesses and family) as GA staff deposits the money on their behalf after collection at the 
weekly meetings;  
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(ii) It is also cost–effective as the clients save time, and also save up on the substantial cost of 
travelling to the banks, which consequently provided incentives to the clients to save even 
more;  
(iii) GA forwards the loan to the client only if she satisfies the eligibility and residential 
requirements of the partner banks, thus enabling the GA to assess the legality of the clients’ 
immigration and residential status in the US as US banks adopt a rigorous process of 
verification131.  
The second strategic collaboration GA has built on is with Experian, the credit ratings agency. 
The borrowing history of all GA clients is listed with the agency which means that borrowers 
who have repaid on time will have an enhanced credit score. This is important, given that clients 
with poor or no credit scores, must reserve finance for urgent needs such as utilities, and are 
also likely to have problems renting homes, being exploited by abusive lenders in addition to 
difficulties finding jobs (Fremson, 2013). This is reinforced by GA staff at group trainings 
which further motivate clients to repay. There is a line of thinking within the extant literature 
that competition from commercial lenders may impede MFIs’ growth as existing or potential 
clients may have access to products such as credit cards (Schreiner and Murdoch, 2001; 
Lieberman et al., 2012). GA’s collaboration with Experian and the consequent access of high 
scoring clients to mainstream financial services raises this issue. However, GA authorities 
contend that clients with access to credit cards are not charged interest only if they pay the 
entire amount borrowed within a designated short period of time. Often it is not feasible for 
clients to pay this sum, given that it has been invested in their businesses and time is required 
to realize profits in order to pay back. The advantage with the loans provided by GA is that 
clients can afford to pay back in smaller instalments and pay interest rates which are 
substantially less than credit cards. Thus, it is usually not a case of competition as GA clients 
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are able to supplement their access to GA loan with an option of finances through credit cards 
which she may use for additional expenses. This in turn empowers the clients as a result of 
access to mainstream finance132.  There may be an association between inadequate assets and 
absence of bank accounts as individuals with low assets confront difficulties in sustaining bank 
accounts and individuals without accounts may have problems building assets (Schreiner and 
Murdoch, 2001). Caskey (2005) proposed a number of steps to resolve such issues. These 
included low cost small, safe and friendly bank outlets suitably located for poorer households 
which offer minimum balance requirements which are not high to prevent unnecessary charges 
and special accounts which enable clients to save in small frequent instalments. Caskey (2005) 
also proposed that collaborations may be formed with community organizations to provide 
such services. GA’s collaboration with banks to offer savings services for its clients thus goes 
a long way towards fulfilling these recommendations. However, GA’s experience and the 
problems of collaboration with banks (discussed in details the following section) suggest that 
the outlets are not quite “friendly” as Caskey recommends. Hence the collaboration between 
GA and the banks may not be yet performing to its full potential in maximizing savings as a 
substantial number of clients may feel disenchanted and potentially feel discouraged from 
using the banks.  
 
The third strategic collaboration is with donors. As a result of the regulations (as explained in 
the previous Chapter) imposed on GA, it relieves heavily on donor finance. However, 
complexities arise as a result of unrealistic requirements set by donors. These often include 
impractical and superfluous details which are required from GA clients by the donor. An 
example of this is requirements on the part of some donors that the borrower provides 
information about whether their economic condition or welfare has improved as a result of the 
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loan. Borrowers may feel pressured and inclined to show inflated figures for income and 
increased welfare, as they are reluctant to strain their relationship with the centre manager. As 
a result, the information on the form may be distorted133.  
 
Finally, GA also realizes that access to healthcare is a crucial aspect of poverty alleviation and 
hence worked on innovative plans to collaborate with a number of prominent healthcare 
organizations such as Iora Health, Mount Sinai Hospital, United Healthcare and Clic Medix to 
provide low cost healthcare for its clients and their families. GA also has ambitious plans to 
extend these services to the general public. This service is deemed vital for immigrant 
borrowers, many being uninsured and lack access to basic healthcare through regular channels 
such as Medicaid (provided for low income US citizens), which left them out of the services 
of Emergency Rooms (ER) and Federally Qualified Health Care Centres (FHQC). GA set itself 
to provide such access, realizing that lack of healthcare may inhibit development and 
sustainability of their borrowers’ business. (Grameen Research, 2016). It is relevant to mention 
that GA’s strong emphasis on the Institutionist perspective means that program is structured to 
be economically sustainable like its microfinance program. Hence it aims to achieve this by 
charging their clients $10 per week ($43/month) for these services (Yunus, 2013; Chase, 2013). 
Extending the services beyond GA’s existing base of clients and their families would mean that 
it would have to potentially compete with ERs and FHQCs compelling them to be more 
efficient. However, they would have a unique advantage as they would work with the same 
team as opposed to the fragmented nature of services provided by such bodies (Chase, 2013). 
Table 8.2 below summarizes GA’s collaborative efforts to overcome clients’ concerns and 
offer benefits: 
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Table 8.2 Benefits and Challenges of GA’s Collaboration  
CHALLENGES COLLABORATIONS CLIENT BENEFITS 
Clients Inability to operate savings 
accounts   
(i) Agreement with Commercial banks *Open accounts with minimum 
charges, if the deposits are less than 
threshold value;  
*Open savings account with partner 
banks for deposits as little as $10  
*Clients encouraged to save and build 
on assets; 
*Cost–effective service as GA staff 
offer free services to deal with banks.  
 
Lack of access to mainstream 
financial services  
(ii) Agreement with Experian  *Clients with low/no credit score may 
have problems 
 reserving finance for urgent 
needs such as utilities  
 renting homes; 
 finding jobs; 
 greater risk of exploitation 
by abusive lenders 
*Collaboration with Experian helps 
clients to build credit scores 
addressing such problems 
 
Lack of access to Healthcare (iii) Agreement with Iora Health, 
Mount Sinai Hospital, United 
Healthcare and Clic Medix (in 
planning stages) 
*Clients and their families, especially 
immigrant borrowers who may be 
uninsured and denied access to regular 
healthcare channels, are enabled to 
access basic low-cost healthcare. 
Reliance on external finance Donors/Social Investors *Lesser uncertainties with future 
investments assists in more efficient 
planning. 
 
The PE authorities felt that the permission to open savings accounts, though has many 
advantages, may have led to complex regulatory issues. Unlike GA, PE had not been proactive 
in seeking partnerships for savings accounts; but it facilitated and encouraged savings through 
partner referrals to existing credit unions134. One may surmise that if PE works to form 
partnerships similar to GA, it may have positive implications for enhancing its capacity as the 
opportunity to operate a savings account in a convenient way may attract wider potential 
clients; yet any attempts to collaborate may be disadvantaged by the fact PE has a limited 
number of clients and does not associate itself with a brand name like Grameen. Furthermore, 
state welfare programs often have means testing process which discourage recipients from 
building assets (Powers, 1998; Schreiner and Murdoch, 2001).  Most of PE’s clients have 
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access to welfare and hence may be disinclined towards saving as a result of this. PE also did 
not collaborate with credit agencies such as Experian unlike GA which did this at initial stages 
of its operation. PE had also collaborated with Dorsey and Whitney which provides pro-bono 
legal services to it along with all its clients. This collaboration has been mutually beneficial as 
Dorsey and Whitney has been able to highlight the support that it provides to the community 
through this partnership with an organization such as PE using an innovative model. It 
recognizes PE as a unique Grameen – style micro-business loan provider in New York. PE and 
its clientele, on the other hand benefit from the pro bono service from a prominent professional 
legal firm. It has acknowledged the support from Dorsey and Whitney by awarding it the title 
of “Project Enterprise Champion of Entrepreneurship” in 2008 (Dorsey,2008).   
8.4 Identity  
 
As has been mentioned earlier, a distinction between “collective” or “institutional” identity and 
organizational identity is prevalent in literature (Glynn, 2008; Kodeih and Greenwood, 2014). 
The former is viewed as being a member of a social category while the latter includes specific 
claims of how the organization perceives itself to others in that social class. It follows that the 
US case study organizations have an institutional identity of being a “Community Development 
Financial Institution” which in turn depends on certification from the government. This 
certification is important because it enables qualifying organizations to be eligible for a range 
of public and private funding and technical assistance provided by the CDFI fund of the 
government via the Capacity Building Initiative. In order to be eligible for the certification, it 
is required that the organization has a fundamental mission of supporting community 
development, provides financial services and training, retain accountability to defined markets 
and be a legal non-governmental body (CDFI Fund, 2020). The certification thus covers a 
broad spectrum of organizations including community development banks, credit unions, Loan 
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funds and Venture Capital funds. Both GA and PE belong to category of Loan funds which is 
classified by the US treasury as “Typically non-profit organizations providing financing and 
technical assistance to small businesses, microenterprises, affordable housing developers, and 
community service organizations” (Minority Bank,2020). GA thus has an organizational 
identity of “CDFI providing entrepreneurial loans to women through the Grameen peer group 
lending model”. A distinguishing factor between the two case study organizations identity is 
the privilege of prestige or status. High prestige organizations are likely to lead the field and 
be copied by contemporaries.  (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Navis & Glynn, 2011; Kodeih and 
Greenwood, 2014). Grameen is characterized by its global status and symbol of being the 
pioneer of the group lending model. It explains its historical origins in a one-page statement on 
its website:  
“Founded in Queens, NY in 2008, Grameen America builds on the legacy and proven model 
of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus. His revolutionary but simple 
idea that all people can lift themselves out of poverty through their own entrepreneurial spirit 
has dramatically altered how the world views global poverty.” (Grameen America B, 2020). 
 
This identity of GA clearly utilizes the global standing of its Nobel laureate founder by 
including his name in it. PE clearly does not carry the same status as GA and recognizes the 
eminence of Grameen by acknowledging that it was modelled on Grameen (Project Enterprise 
website C, 2015).    Previous studies have shown status to be a significant factor in influencing 
institutional strategy. One study, for example, showed how prestige enables actors to alter what 
is required and desirable in a field (Durand and Szostak, 2010). This is what enabled GA to 
establish itself in 2008 amidst a recession affected US at a time providing loans without 
collateral to poor individuals would be scoffed at even more by conventional institutions. The 
prestige and status Professor Yunus enjoys afforded him credibility to constantly highlight his 
message that the poor are creditworthy across a range of platforms in the US (Fora.Tv, 2010; 
Andrew, 2010). This message was reinforced by the high repayment rates along with the steady 
outreach that GA has sustained throughout its operations. Further, it is costly to execute any 
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change and perhaps even costlier to implement divergent change, hence access to adequate 
resources is crucial for institutional entrepreneurs. High Status actors are likely to have 
enhanced access to a field’s most important resources (Goodrick, 2002). This is evidenced by 
the fact that GA requires a minimum capital of £6m in order to open each branch which it has 
been successful in securing to initiate all of its 23 branches. The power and status of Grameen 
along with its distinctive organizational identity underpinned by credible performance in terms 
of outreach and sustainability thus makes it an appealing prospect for its clients, social investors 
and partner organisations.  
 
A distinct feature of PE’s organizational identity is that it was the first organizations to adopt 
the Grameen model in New York, a factor which it publicizes on its website (Project Enterprise 
C, 2015). PE’s unique institutional identity as the only CDFI using the Grameen model in New 
York has helped it to get funding in its initial years. For example, in 1999 it was given funding 
by treasury for its innovative Grameen model which was explicitly acknowledged in the 
funders’ report (CDFIFund.gov, 1999). The dilution of this identity by offering other types of 
loans and to both sexes places it in a potential danger of being overshadowed by a plethora of 
other CDFIs operating in the same field offering similar services.  
 
Another aspect of GA’s identity is its heavy emphasis on empowerment of women. This 
identity is communicated through its mission statement: 
“Grameen America is dedicated to helping entrepreneurial women who live in poverty build 
businesses to enable financial mobility” (Grameen America B, 2020) 
Its gender-based identity is derived from the female focus that the parent organization Grameen 
is known globally for.  This gender focused identity is also projected through powerful stories 
of female entrepreneurship using selected case studies from its clientele base on various 
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communication media such as blogs and videos on the GA website. It is not thus not 
unreasonable to assume that the prestige and status of GA along with its gender focused identity 
has struck a chord with its target clientele of female Hispanic clients, many of whom are single 
mothers and resonated well with the entrepreneurial environment in the regions it operates in. 
A study by National Women’s business council (NWBC) reported a significant spurge of 27% 
in women owned small business from 2007 to 2012. Importantly, the major increase was 
attributed to the growth of businesses owned by Hispanic women, growing at 87%, which 
reflects a lack of employment opportunities amongst this population. Employment rate was 
consistently low, indeed, for Hispanics compared to other ethnicities such as White and Asians 

















Figure 8.1 Increase in female entrepreneurship (2007-2012).  




GA’s identity attached to a focus on female entrepreneurs thus bore fruit as it seemed able to 
latch on to this surging entrepreneurship assisted by its proactive and innovative marketing 
methods. PE’s organizational identity is “CDFIs providing entrepreneurial loans through the 
Grameen peer group and individual lending model”.  It has thus diluted the impact of its identity 
by focusing generally on access to entrepreneurial finance to both genders (hence losing the 
female focused identity that GA has) and also the fact that it has an individual lending program 
in addition to the Grameen inspired peer group loans. Its mission statement does not incorporate 
GA’s gender-based focus, and is as follows:  
“The mission of Project Enterprise is to support and develop entrepreneurs and small 
businesses in under-resourced communities in New York City.  By providing micro-loans, 
business development services and networking opportunities, Project Enterprise helps 
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entrepreneurs increase their standard of living, create jobs for their communities, and build 
financial assets” (Project Enterprise website, 2015).  
 
It is important to note that a significant change in organizational identity is being planned by 
GA. The analysis in the previous section showed how GA built innovative collaborations with 
banks to overcome regulatory constraints. Yet there are challenges revolving around the 
differing ethos and ideologies of the GA and traditional commercial banks. While GA’s 
strategic focus maintains a strong balance of Institutionist and the Welfarist approach, the 
commercial banks, being purely profit-making institutions are heavily biased towards 
Institutionist goals.  The GA authorities view that the senior authorities at such banks are 
favourably predisposed towards assisting GA; however, such positive attitude and stance often 
does not trickle down to staff at the lower levels working at the servicing branches. They reason 
that staff performance at such banks often revolve around how many accounts are opened and 
of what value the deposits are which means that bank staff at servicing branches are often 
disinclined towards providing the appropriate level of services to GA clients as a result of lower 
value of such accounts.  
 
One issue often arising up for GA clients is that they are subjected to charges as a result of their 
account value being under a threshold level (the charges as per agreement are not applicable to 
GA clients); yet the charges are made on their accounts via the banks’ automated systems, 
despite the agreement between GA and the partner banks being contrary to this. Although such 
clients are eventually refunded when GA authorities intervene, both the GA staff and clients 
have to undergo unnecessary hassle of going through the lengthy and inconvenient refund 
process. GA authorities assert that although existing savings are substantial, the deposits would 
go up by a much higher amount if the clients were provided with better service hence increasing 
their trust on the banking system.  
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A second concern for the GA as an MFI is the divergence in banking philosophies (based on 
solidarity and community) in which GA clients are taught from those of traditional commercial 
banks (based on individual services). Complications arise when bank tries to sell its products 
to the GA clients.  The GA authorities’ concern seems pertinent as several banks offer deposit 
‘advance’ loans which are designed similarly to payday loan products (Lieberman et al., 2012). 
Studies have shown how the payday lending industry in the US has exploited clients in terms 
of charging extortionate interest rates which in turn has led to immense debt problems (Centre 
for responsible lending, 2020)135.   
 
GA has been in the process of changing its organizational identity to being a credit union for 
overcoming foregoing problems of collaborating with banks136.  Credit unions in the US are 
exempt from paying tax. They are not-for-profit co-operatives regulated by the National Credit 
Union Administration (NCUA, an independent federal agency), by state agencies, or both. In 
most cases, deposits are indemnified by the NCUA. This is an important strategic move for 
GA, as credit unions are designed to be financially independent. The key feature of such 
institutions is their ability to operate and fund themselves through deposits distinguishing them 
from non-profit CDFIs as they are able to mobilize savings and thus reduce dependency on 
donors and eventually become operationally sustainable. The sum-total of deposits for an MFI 
is usually substantially higher than the outstanding loan balance thus making deposits a vital 
source funds for onward lending (Cull et al., 2008). In addition, credit unions that serve low 
income clients termed as low-income credit unions or LICUs are permitted to receive non-
member deposits from CRA programs, religious investors, social investment funds, 
corporations etc. and the ability to raise subordinated debt enabling them to expand their capital 
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base quickly (Lieberman at al., 2012). Thus, this strategy of GA seems to resonate very well 
with its strong emphasis on Institutionist goals. Furthermore, if successful in changing its 
organizational identity to “Credit Unions providing entrepreneurial loan to women using 
Grameen Model”, GA will still be able to retain its institutional identity as CDFI certification 
also includes credit unions under its purview.  
 
8.5 Organizational Template and Strategic Vision 
 
This section makes a comparative appraisal of the organizational template and strategic vision 
of the case study organizations. GB places strong emphasis on achieving operational 
sustainability and focuses on poverty alleviation and women empowerment. In accordance with 
that vision, GA also attaches significant weight to Institutionist objectives (along with the 
Welfarist goal of addressing financial exclusion) with a great focus on achieving operational 
viability at the branch level. This is characterized by the statement of GA’s former President 
(during its inception) and current board member: 
“Microfinance has not worked that well. There are 750 MFIs in the US and only about 200 of 
them actually make money. None of them are actually profitable yet. Accion is at scale and is 
close to profitability and does a very good job. But none of the others are others are 
completely profitable and we want an operation that will become profitable.”  (Jorgensen, 
2009).  
 
In its website GA defines sustainability as operational expenses being covered by interest 
income (Grameenamerica.org, 2020). GA branches are built on a sustainable business model 
and aim to achieve sustainability within 4-5 years of operation with 4500 active borrowers. GA 
has a distinct process which the management uses in order to construct a viable business model. 
The loan size is assessed by calculating initial investment required for developing micro-
businesses such as food carts. GA charges an interest rate of 15% as any charge above 16% 
would be considered as usurious under US regulations (Lexisnexis, 2013). The cost of 
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operations including staff salary is then worked out to figure out the number of borrowers 
required to make a branch viable (usually in the range of 4000-4500). Three branches in New 
York (Jackson Heights, Brooklyn and Manhattan) have attained sustainability in December 
2014. As per it’s recent report, GA has achieved an organisational sustainability of 82% 
(Grameen America annual report, 2019). The initial branches have taken relatively longer to 
achieve sustainability as there were uncertainties during the preliminary phases about the 
strategic approaches to be undertaken with respect to locating operational areas, marketing 
methods and staff recruitment.  The organization had to learn from experimenting with 
different strategies and ascertain the most appropriate ways of accomplishing operational 
objectives. The GA management assert that the newer branches will take less time to attain 
sustainability as such intra-branch strategic learning are incorporated into their operations. 
Prior knowledge in terms of fertile grounds for client recruitment means that the GA survey 
team can now hone in on the appropriate locations where the operational area will be based. A 
strong existing base of local staff / clients can refer appropriate staff and clients which along 
with a good understanding of the likely obstacles ensure that less time has to be devoted to 
researching such issues. However, it is important to note that sometimes funding is received 
for opening a branch at a particular place where the population density is low and local 
population is spread out. In such cases, formation of self-selected borrowing groups is difficult 
thus making progress slow and hence attaining sustainability will be longer.  
The inability to open savings account means that Grameen is reliant to a significant extent on 
external financing. However, GA continues to attract finance from social investors such as 
commercial banks which look to fulfil their commitment to invest in community development 
project run by Grameen, a credible global brand-name.  Such a brand-name also helps GA to 
secure at least $6m which it requires as a minimum threshold for setting up a particular branch. 
This is a crucial factor which sets it apart from smaller organizations like PE because unlike 
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those organizations, this gives GA more time and financial cushion to experiment with different 
approaches in order to select the most appropriate strategies with respect to the aforesaid 
operational activities. 
 
PE’s strategic approach strongly leans towards a Welfarist approach. This is evident from the 
low interest rate (12% on a declining basis) it charges its clients and willingness to provide 
costly and extensive business training. The PE authorities stress the organization’s reluctance 
to charge hefty fees and charges as way of being sustainable. It is felt that this would divert PE 
from its core mission of steering clients away from predatory lenders as charging high fees and 
interest may cause it to be viewed as an abusive lender itself.   PE management feel that there 
was some focus on Institutionist goals during the initial phases of its operations but this 
gradually faded away owing to the aforementioned operational problems and low number of 
clients. Thus, PE’s financing is completely reliant on donors, which include a handful of 
dedicated social investors and government grants. The problem with PE’s approach is low 
client volumes, causing a lack of internal source of income, which in turn led to a high level of 
uncertainty as it had to rely on donor financing for which there is notoriously high competition. 
In addition, there were administrative issues associated with government grants. The conditions 
of the award of the grants often meant that PE had to spend the money before they can claim 
from the government. This led to liquidity issues and was risky because funding may eventually 
be denied for various reasons137. Funding constraints had also compelled the PE management 
to make difficult choices. One such example is the shifting of the main office branch from 
Harlem to South Bronx. Although PE benefitted from lower rents at the new location, it came 
at a price for PE as its Welfarist objectives were compromised as a result of losing out on a 
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significant number of clients who would walk in to the branch straight from the street at the 
Harlem branch138.  
 
Analysts suggest that organizational capacity for learning is a key factor for sustainability and 
even survival of MFIs, particularly in the context of industrialized countries such as USA 
(Roodman and Qureshi, 2006). Such views strikingly resonate with the current study of the US 
MFIs. GA has shown a much better appetite and capacity for organizational learning through 
its experiences. This culture of learning is propelled by novel management mechanisms. An 
example of this is letters/essays sent regularly by the staff to uppermost management 
circumventing the intermediate levels of the management structure, thus enabling Grameen 
policymakers to have an insightful understanding of events at the field level (Rhyne and 
Rottblatt, 1994; Rutherford, 2005). GA faced similar challenges as PE in its initial phases of 
operation unlike the latter, it did not respond by changing key features of the original Grameen 
model that enabled it to succeed in Bangladesh. Thus, clients still had to form self-selected 
groups before joining the programs (ensuring that they already had a strong relationship 
amongst themselves which could be utilized to achieve high repayment rates). Contrastingly, 
prior to disbursement of loan, at PE, most clients formed self-selected groups during the six-
week training. The PE authorities attributed this to reluctance on the part of prospective clients 
to form self-selected groups.  
 
GA also faced similar disinclination when it first marketed its loan to other communities such 
as the Bengalis which they felt would be fertile grounds for recruiting as a result of Bangladesh 
being the origin of the model. GA responded to these challenges by shifting its strategic focus 
to emerging Hispanic migrants which currently makes up majority of its clientele (MDRC, 
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2019). It may be argued that GAs client targeting was more appropriate because these clients 
had a high necessity of the loans and were prepared to adhere to the strict rules and regulations 
which included attending meetings every week. However, GA made it cost-effective and 
convenient for clients by arranging meetings in centres close to the clients’ businesses or 
homes. The analysis in Section 4.1 shows that GA’s strategy was in accordance with the US 
entrepreneurial environment characterized by rapid Hispanic self-employment growth and the 
collectivist nature of the immigrant community. PE, contrarily, continued to focus on the same 
clientele base (African Americans made up 88% of its clients) but responded to its institutional 
complexities by altering core components of the original model such as changing the meetings 
to bi-weekly. More significantly PE changed the contents of the meetings which were based 
on entrepreneurial education rather than group solidarity and inter-personal learning 
emphasized by the original model adhered to by GA. This in turn made the system costlier to 
operate for PE as staff had to be compensated for training hours. In addition, clients may well 
have considered it costlier and inconvenient to attend such meetings as they were held at the 
branch as opposed to centres near the clients’ home or business used by GA for its meetings. 
GA also continues to focus its services on women much like GB (all GA clients are women). 
This strategic focus on women is consistent with how GA framed the problem of financial 
exclusion (based on feminisation of poverty). It is also evident from the following statement of 
its CEO, Andrea Jung (who before joining GA had extensive experience working for Avon 
Cosmetics, a $10 billion business which has assisted millions of women to become 
entrepreneurs associated with its direct selling model): 
“Whether you’re running a one-person business or a 40,000-employee corporation, 
the more women we can involve in economy creation, the better off their families are 
going to be and the better off our country is going to be.” (Di Mento, 2014) 
 
Contrastingly at PE, 44% of clients are men (Project Enterprise C, 2015). Previous studies have 
shown that this may dilute the impact of the model as it may have an adverse effect on key 
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aspects such as repayments. Studies such as those by  D’Espallier et al. (2011) and Shahriar et 
al, (2020) conclude that women are superior credit risks compared to men. The results revealed 
that a greater percentage of female clients results in lower portfolio risks and write-offs. In this 
context one study argues that organizations must continuously adapt to the evolving contexts 
in which it operates in order to be successful (Roodman and Qureshi, 2006). GA, in many ways, 
has been able to do this as it learnt through its experiences that it was marketing to the wrong 
client base and quickly adapted its services that appealed to the emerging Hispanic immigrant 
client base which in turn helped it to expand steadily. It also continuously experimented with 
different approaches with respect to its marketing and HR practices, deciding finally on the 
most effective approaches through its organizational learning. The above study further pointed 
out that “excellence in complex organizations is not so much achieved as continually pursued” 
(Roodman and Qureshi, 2006: 29). This is evident at GA with the refinement of its HR 
strategies and the consequent development of the institute which enables it to further nurture 
new and existing talent and instil its vision and ideology into its staff.  
In contrast, despite its inception way back in 1996, many strategies with respect to the aforesaid 
operational areas seemed to be static at PE, not evolving with the rapidly changing environment 
surrounding the organization which eventually led to its closure. It is important to point out 
that PE may have been affected by funding constraints compared to its more established and 
reputed counterpart GA. However, GA since its inception had modest beginnings in New York 
during 2008 at a time of financial recession and faced numerous challenges, including funding 
issues. It is only through its apparently more proactive and innovative approach, compared to 
PE (learning and responding rapidly through its organizational experience), that it was able to 
demonstrate its effectiveness and steady expansion. GA’s strong identity characterized by 
power and status of the parent organization (GB) and Professor Yunus as a global beacon for 
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peer group lending, appealed to potential social investors who continued to provide a steady 
stream of funding to enable it to operate smoothly and grow in the process.  
 
Unlike PE which had remained a peripheral organization throughout its existence, GA, in a 
relatively short period of time, went on to become a central MFI player owing to the strength 
of its organizational identity and effective outreach and loan recovery performance. This also 
helped GA to collaborate with various organizations such as banks to operate savings accounts 
on behalf of its clients. GA’s strong emphasis on Institutionist perspective along with its 
Welfarist goals is exemplified by its desire to convert to a credit union. The aspiration to further 
innovate is illustrated by its collaboration with various healthcare bodies to provide innovative 
healthcare services which was previously inaccessible for its clients. But crucially, GA is not 
looking to fund these innovations through donor financing but internally generated sources. 
For example, Grameen Primacare is proposed to be funded by a $43 per month charge to 
clients. This focus on sustainability and the resulting effects permeate through all operational 
areas of GA hence making it more innovative, efficient and less vulnerable to its contextual 
circumstances. This is all the more remarkable given that GA has not compromised on its 
Welfarist goals to accommodate a more commercialized approach. This focus on a commercial 
approach to alleviate social problems is manifested by the following statement of its CEO 
Andrea Jung explaining why she joined GA:  
“I wanted a real shot over the next 10 years, not in a for-profit job or a government or 
policy job, but in a unique hybrid, to be able to show how capitalism applied for social 
benefit can be scaled to make a difference for women who were not given a chance.” (Di 
Mento, 2014) 
 
Whilst PE may be lauded for its emphasis on Welfarist goals of alleviating problems of 
financial exclusion for nascent entrepreneurs, its dependence mainly on donor financing for 
survival inhibited its efficiency and innovation. The approach of GA thus greatly resembles 
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Yunus’s “Social Business Model”, which Yunus defines as a non-loss, non-dividend Company 
structured to address a social problem. It is financially sustainable with any profits generated 
going into the expansion and development of the business rather than paid out in dividends to 
owners. Unlike profit maximizing firms, the principle objective is not to maximize profits 
(although there is a significant weight attached to generating profits). On the contrary, unlike 
non-profits (such as PE), it is not heavily reliant on charitable donations with a strong emphasis 
on being self-sustainable (Yunus, 2009; Yunus, Bertrand and Lehman-Ortega, 2010; Yunus, 
2011). The strategic vision of the MFIs with respect to Institutionist and Welfarist objectives 
along with the core components of the above analysis is now concisely provided below in Table 
8.3  
Table 8.3 Organizational Template and Strategic Vision (GA and PE)  




Strategic Vision: Poverty 
alleviation, women empowerment, 
self-sustainability  
Strong emphasis on both Institutionist 
and Welfarist objectives Clear focus 
on sustainability, i.e. covering 
operational expenses; branch 
sustainability to be achieved within 4-
5 years, serving 4000-45000 clients, 
which is confirmed by the senior 
management during the interviews. 
 
PE’s focus on Welfarist objectives is 
laudable as it has provided affordable 
finance and costly entrepreneurial 
training to its target clientele. 
However, an early focus on 
Institutionist goals had gradually 
faded away due to operational 
difficulties. 
Business Model Social Business Non-Profit 
Operation Period 12 years 20 years 
 







Rapidly grown into 23 branches 
across the US. 3 branches have 
attained sustainability and 
organizational sustainability stands at 
82% (GA Annual report, 2019) 
 
 
Reliance on external finance, much 
from some social investors and 
government grant. Carries no brand 
name like Grameen, & funding 





















Rapid rise of Hispanic 
entrepreneurship from 1990s 





Historically low levels of African 
American entrepreneurship. Recent 
studies indicate that African 
Americans least likely to be self-
employed amongst all ethnic 

































Framing of financial exclusion as 




Non-gender based generic framing of 
financial exclusion as lack of access to 








Characterized by power, size and 
status as a global beacon for peer 
group lending and a strong focus on 
women,  
 
Less distinctive identity as a result of 









Rapid organizational learning from 
the use of different pilot methods to 
establish the most effective approach. 
 
 









High recovery rates (99%)   and 
strong client recruitment  
 
 









Innovation evidenced in marketing 
methods, staff recruitment & effective 
collaborations with commercial 
banks, Experian credit agency & 
conversion to credit union echo well 
with institutional objectives & are also 
beneficial for clients. More 
collaborations being planned  
such as Grameen primacare to address 
social problems such as healthcare & 
ensure sustainability of service 
 
 
Referrals to credit unions but may be 
ineffective as most clients have access 
to welfare and may be discouraged to 






Most early US MFIs that imitated the Grameen model and adopted similar diagnostic framing 
of problems to GB either ceased or changed to more commercialized individual lending models 
and/or an emphasis on financial training. Such programs reframed the problem of financial 
exclusion to provide a range of personal and business finance products tailored to the needs of 
the clients owing to the numerous institutional complexities discussed in the previous chapter. 
GA revived the diagnostic framing abandoned and considered to be ineffective in the context 
of an industrialized nation such as the US by major MFI players such as Accion. It has been 
successful in adopting this framing due to the emerging context of rising Hispanic 
entrepreneurship as majority of its clients are Hispanic immigrants. GA was able operate the 
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model more effectively due to the collectivist nature of the Hispanic commubnity, unlike PE, 
which have had problems due to the individualistic nature of the predominantly African 
American clientele base that it has been serving.  
GA was also helped by its organizational identity characterized by the power and status of the 
parent organization (GB) as the global beacon of the peer group lending model incorporating 
the image and influence of the Noble laureate Professor Yunus, the founding father of 
microfinance. Further, its gender based identity focused on feminisation of poverty resonated 
very well with the entrepreneurial environment in which it operated in, typified by booming 
female entrepreneurship amongst the Hispanic population. As a result the model may have 
appealed broadly to its target clientele, many of whom are single mothers.  This helped GA to 
achieve its outreach objectives and mitigate institutional complexities. The high status of the 
Grameen brand also enabled GA to access valuable resources required for development and 
rapid expansion.  
GA has also been planning proactively to bring about changes in its organizational identity by 
converting to a credit union ,which will help it to circumvent the regulatory problem of not 
being able to mobilize savings of its client for onward lending. If such efforts are successful, it 
will contribute towards its sustainability objectives by reducing reliance on donors to a great 
extent.   GA has collaborated effectively with external partners to counter institutional 
complexities. GA has thus collaborated successfully with commercial banks and provided 
savings account services for its clientele base. It has also built collaborations with Experian to 
help clients access mainstream financial insitution. This has tangibly affected the sustainability 
logic by assisting in luring more customers to join GA and also contributed to the welfare logic 
by enabling customers to enjoy the benefits of such services. GA has also been able to better 
balance the sustainability and welfare logic as a result of its organizational template and 
strategic vision characterized by a sharp focus on sustainability.  This emphasis on 
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sustainability permeates through different operational areas such as maketing, staff recruitment 
and loan recovery enabling rapid organizational learning at GA to continously experiment with 
and refine its approaches in order to be effective. The efficient performace of GA in securing 
high recovery rates and steady outreach has reinforced its identity and given it credibility. The 
access to resources has also facilitated the growth of expansion of GA by enabling it to 
continuosly invest in developing  resources (exemplified by the introduction of its training 
institute) to acheving its objectives.  
PE was one of the early MFIs to adopt the Grameen model, as it was inspired by the 
achievements of another program, WSEP based in Chicago. It has been a peripheral 
organization from its inception to its closure and never remotely possessed the power and status 
of GA.  It thus, did not have the vital access to resources that GA is priviledged with. This was 
complicated by inefficiencies such as relatively poor loan recovery despite a much smaller 
clientele base than GA. Furthermore, it had a less refined organizational identity than GA as it 
offered the loans to both sexes and also operated an inidividual lending program. This nebulous 
identity along with its low status perhaps appealed less to propective clients and may be an 
important factor explaning its limited outreach impact. These factors may also have constrained 
its ability to successfully align with external organizations for effective service provision. PE 
thus faced institutional complexities to a much greater extent than GA. Owing to all its 
problems, PE had lost initial focus on sustainability and continued to be biased heaviliy towards 
the welfare logic. The problem with this approach was contnued significant reliance on donor 
funding for which there is ever increasing intense competition. Nevertheless despite all these 
problems,  prior to its closure, PE had thus survived over the years as a result of dedicated 
social investors which remain commited to its purpose.   It should be lauded for its welfarist 




A crucial factor in the early success of GA is its focus on both Institutionist and Welfarist 
objectives, as compared to PE, which remained deeply predisposed towards Welfarist 
perspectives with no clear institutional strategies towards sustainability. PE’s Welfarist goals, 
along with its support to numerous entrepreneurs does speak well of the largesse of its sponsors; 
yet such a largesse under Welfarist approach without any prioritization of contents, methods 
and objectives has its toll on declining implications for its efficiency, its performance and more 
importantly, expansion of its services and led to its ultimate closure. GA’s strategic focus on 
innovation and efficiency has driving impact on its impressive repayment figures despite a 
rapidly rising client base, effective marketing and staff recruitment methods, and its successful 
collaborations with legitimate bodies. This, in turn, led to great benefits to GA clients in 
accessing mainstream financial services. Another proactive approach is its innovative plans to 
convert to a credit union so as to become operationally sustainable and develop more 
collaboration to provide healthcare for its clients.  
However, there may be potential future complexities for GA if there are changes in contexts. 
Hispanic entrepreneurship may experience a future dip due to various factors, including 
changes in regulation. The current administration led by President Trump has adopted an 
aggressive stance against Hispanic immigration. In such a scenario, GA may need to diversify 
beyond its existing base of predominantly Hispanic clients. Previous MFI experiences 
(including PE’s experience) have shown that this is complicated and necessitates policy 
changes in areas such as welfare to work. Complexities may also arise if GA succeeds in its 
attempts to become a credit union (CU), which, by law, require retention of a minimal ratio of 
7% of net worth-to-total assets to evade imminent regulatory action and, in cases of high loan 
defaults and consequent losses, even may face liquidation (Lieberman et al, 2012: 56).  
However, all this may be less relevant for GA as a result of its high repayment figures and 
steady growth during the same time since its inception in the backdrop of a recession affected 
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economy in 2008. CUs are built around membership of clients from whom savings are 
mobilized. GA’s success will thus (irrespective of whether it is successful in its attempts to 
become a CU) depend upon continuing to steadily expand its client base This may be difficult 
for GA particularly when looking to extend its services beyond the Hispanic community given 
the lack of industrywide data on micro-entrepreneurs on business loans of less $50000).  In 
addition, GA also relies upon the success of the businesses it is lending to. Given that this is 
heavily biased towards businesses owned by Hispanic entrepreneurs, the non-diversified nature 
of GA’s lending may be fragile to socioeconomic contexts influencing the outcome of similar 
micro-businesses owned by its clients.   
There is a paucity of research on MFIs in the comparative context of developed countries, 
particularly those that are using unique lending models such as Grameen committed to promote 
social networks.  In order to address such gaps in literature, researches may analyse the process 
of institutional entrepreneurship by studying initiatives that endeavour to adopt of the Grameen 
model in different locations of US and neighbouring countries such as Canada. It may also be 
helpful to compare the institutional entrepreneurship process of adopting Grameen model to 
existing models such as individual lending or evolving models such as online peer to peer 
which provide further useful insights.  
In order for organizations such as GA to be able to better assess the uncertainties associated 
with their coexisting operations, the author deems such research crucial. Future research may 
weigh up findings of existing projects in the UK and other European countries for identifying 
effective cross-cultural learning towards enhanced performance of the MFIs in a wider context 






CHAPTER 9 DISCUSSION: 
COMPARATIVE ADAPTABILITY OF 
THE GRAMEEN MODEL IN THE UK 
AND THE USA 
Introduction 
The current Chapter compares the UK and US experience of the adoption of the Grameen 
model. It does so with particular reference to the recent projects such as GA and GU and uses 
the experiences of retrospective case study organizations wherever relevant. The purpose is to 
ascertain the similarities and differences in the institutional entrepreneurship process of 
adoption of the model and factors which have contributed to institutional complexities. Another 
objective is to deduce whether there can be cross-cultural lessons which can be drawn from the 
experiences of both organizations. The Chapter also speculates about the future prospects of 
adaptability of the Grameen model in the UK and the US incorporating the evolving contexts 
in both countries within the analysis.  In order to do this, we now bring in our analytical 
framework that we introduced Fig. 2.1. Figure 9.1 populates the analytical framework with 
relevant themes that have emerged during the study.  
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Each of these relevant themes will be discussed in detail in the following sections.  Section 9.1 
elucidates the extent of success achieved by current organizations in the US and UK in 
recovering loans and the factors influencing recovery rates. Section 9.2 compares the outreach 
strategies of organizations across the countries and issues revolving around such strategies. 
Section 9.3 reveals the nature of regulatory differences in the UK and the USA and their major 
implications for the adoption of the Grameen model in the respective countries. The ideologies 
driving strategies for client training is analysed next in Section 9.4. The emerging context of 
immigrant entrepreneurship is identified in the following section 9.5 as a key factor influencing 
the progress of the organizations and explicated. Section 9.6 explores how the field of 
microfinance is linked across the countries and compares the nature of problem framing 
adopted by the MFIs. Section 9.7 scrutinizes the nature of differences in alignment strategies 
adopted the organizations and their implications. Section 9.8 shows how the Grameen identity 
has evolved across UK and USA as organizations have looked to adopt the model in their own 
contexts. It points out the nature of differences in institutional identity, organizational identity 
and identity aspirations across UK and USA and their possible consequences. Section 9.9 
assimilates the discussions in previous section to indicate the differences in nature of the 
organizational template and strategic vision adhered to by the organizations. The conclusion 
summarizes findings in all the sections and offers reflections on the viability of adoption of 
then model with respect to the evolving contexts in these countries.  
9.1 Loan recovery 
The available data for recovery rates indicates that all case study organizations with exceptional 
recovery rates had a complete focus on women and practiced self-selection consistent with the 
original model. Examples include Account 3, Full-Circle in UK and GA in the US. It should 
further be noted that all case studies which have achieved exceptional recovery rates have 
served a homogenous set of clients. Account 3, for example served mainly Bengali clients and 
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Full-Circle served mainly indigenous White females of British origin while GA’s clientele base 
consists of over 90% Hispanic population.  
However what sets GA apart from these other organizations in the UK is that it has managed 
to consistently to sustain these recovery rates (over 99%) despite serving an exponentially 
higher number of clients compared to the UK organizations whose clientele base was very 
small. GU’s recovery performance was underwhelming when compared to that of GA and that 
of the parent organization, GB despite serving a very small number of clients. Regulatory 
impediments stand out a key differential factor between the initiatives in the two countries. In 
the UK, regulations prevent meetings to be held at borrowers’ residence potentially leading to 
disciplinary issues. The weekly meetings are a vital cog in the Grameen model as they are used 
to foster group cohesion, intragroup learning and a way of engendering discipline within groups 
as the individual responsibilities are regularly reminded to the members. The enhanced 
discipline in turn positively influences the loan recovery. However, in the UK, meetings often 
have to be held at confined spaces such as shops which reduces their effectiveness as clients 
are inclined towards rushing to complete the meeting as it is inconvenient for them and 
problematic for the shop owner. Regulatory restrictions preventing GU to visit borrowers home 
also inhibits its ability to use such visits as a way of assessing the socio-economic status of the 
borrower and the geographical proximity of group members. Being classed a low risk lender 
under current UK regulations also means that GU has a non-marketing license and relies on 
referrals from other organizations for getting clients. This restricts its ability to do outreach 
work based around the borrowers’ domicile. All such regulatory restrictions and their effect 
had an impact on the client selection process and ultimately affected group cohesion and 
discipline.  
Unlike GU, GA does not face any such restriction in the US. As a result, meetings are often 
held at borrowers’ residences and staff are free to do outreach work as they wish. This in turn 
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means that they can practice the core Grameen marketing principle of “Grameen going to 
clients” rather than clients coming to the organization. The home visits are also an important 
part of the processes at GA which is crucial for appropriate selection of group members.  
Another key difference between the two organizations is GA’s gender focus on women in 
resonance with the model of the parent organization. As discussed in the previous Chapters, 
none of the case study organizations in the study which have served a mixed audience have 
been successful in achieving good recovery rates. This includes Street-UK in the UK and PE 
in the US. Although unlike these organizations GU operated segregated groups, the experience 
of these organizations indicates that it was a flawed approach to generalize services.  
Homogeneity of clients also seems to be a key difference between GU and GA as GA serves a 
homogenous clientele base of mainly Hispanic clients while GU serves a diverse group of 
clients consisting of mainly immigrants from different countries of Africa and Asia. A major 
strategy for GU was to recruit lending officers within the community that they were serving 
who speak the same language. However, it may be difficult for GU to employ a similar strategy 
to manage groups as a result of different languages, culture and behaviour of group members. 
The GU staff have used the common language of English for operational processes but have 
found it difficult as some clients may have weak command over that language139.   
There are other important differences in the operational processes at the two organizations. At 
GA, all paperwork and loan disbursements are processed centrally which means loan 
disbursement are treated as a “ceremony” where clients come into the branch to sign their loan 
documentation and are physically provided the cheques which under the current US financial 
system can be cashed quickly. GU, on the other hand, forwards the fund directly into the bank 
account of the borrower as the cheque clearing process would take longer under the UK 
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financial system. The GU management have realized that unlike GA the borrowers are not 
coming into the head office and are not consequently meeting the staff at Head office and may 
lack a contextualized understanding of GU’s vision and mission. This, in turn, may have had 
implications for the nature of relationship that GU had with the borrowers and potentially 
affected loan recovery.  
Another important difference noted by a senior GU manager who had recently visited GA was 
the much more regimented and structured nature of integral processes at GA. Examples include 
meetings which were being held early in the morning and well attended by borrowers, loan 
collection and trainings would be conducted during specified time. The processes at GU, he 
acknowledged, were far more flexible as GU was more reactive to the desires and convenience 
of the clients with regards to issues such as when meetings and trainings are to be held (in 
contrast to GA, GU members usually prefer meetings to be held late evenings). This in turn 
cause operational and disciplinary issues as a limited number of lending officers have to be 
allocated in accordance with the whims of clients140.  
Recovery problems may also be attributed to the nature of the selection process. Examples 
include Street-Cred in the UK which operated a lending process whereby clients were selected 
into the groups by development workers or Project Enterprise in the USA where clients often 
get to know each other during a 6-week course prior to the formation of groups. In some cases, 
management have cited the individualistic nature of a society as an integral factor in 
influencing recovery rates. Examples include PE in the US or Street-UK in the UK.  
 
 
                                                             




9.2 Outreach  
It is worth noting that all case study organizations have struggled to attract indigenous clients 
to their programs. This has even included an organization such as GA which has been 
successful in attaining outreach targets. This has been attributed to some key contextual factors 
by interviewees. In the UK, the generous welfare regime has been noted by many as providing 
disincentives for indigenous clients to be involved in self-employment. Clients are particularly 
afraid of losing out on house benefits (GU). In the US, this may have a relevant factor for PE 
not being able to attain substantial outreach amongst the targeted African American population. 
The individualistic nature of the societies has been mentioned as a key obstacle by management 
of organizations such as Street-UK, GU, WEvolution in the UK and PE in the USA. The 
similarities in the societal and cultural dimensions of UK and USA as identified by Hofstede 
is apparent from the comparison of Figures 9.1 and 9.2 below. 
Figure 9.2 Hofstede figures for societal attributes in USA  





Figure 9.2 Hofstede figures for societal attributes in UK  






The high level of individualism in both countries implies that a model such as Grameen based 
on collectivism and prioritisation of group ambitions over personal goals is unlikely to appeal 
to indigenous clients. The low levels of uncertainty avoidance and high levels of indulgence 
indicates that features such as mandatory savings (a core part of the original model) may further 
reduce the appeal of the model to such societies.  The high subscription of both GU’s and GA’s 
program by immigrants in contrast to the indigenous population may be attributed to the 
different nature of societies where this population originates from. Many of GA’s clients are 
Mexican immigrants whereas a substantial proportion of GU’s clients hail from Sub-Saharan 
African countries such as Nigeria, Uganda and Somalia. Interestingly, all such countries are 
known for high levels of collectivism. Figures 9.3 below reveal the identically low levels of 
individualism prevailing in the Mexican and Nigerian society indicating why the collectivist 
nature of the Grameen model may have appealed to this audience.   
 
Figure 9.3 Level of individualism in Nigeria and Mexico 





The differences in recruitment may also be attributable to differences in entrepreneurial attitude 
between the societies. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) is an international study 
providing estimates of entrepreneurial attitudes, activity and aspiration across different 
countries.  The study measures the total early-stage entrepreneurial activity or TEA as “the sum 
of the nascent entrepreneurship rate (those involved in setting up a business and the new 
business [not more than 3.5 years old] owner-manager rate” (Hart, 2018: 5). This is the estimate 
which is pertinent to analysing the extent of demand for Grameen style loans as it is early-stage 
entrepreneurs who are expected to be interested in such loans.  
The GEM report classifies countries as either factor driven, innovation-driven and efficiency- 
driven economies. Sub-Saharan economies such as Nigeria and Uganda are categorised as 
factor driven while Latin American countries such as Mexico are considered as innovation 
driven economies and Western developed economies are typically classified as efficiency 
driven economies. The 2015 GEM report noted that the TEA rates are typically highest in factor 
driven economies diminishing with greater economic development. These can be seen from the 
Table 9.1 below which shows that average TEA rates are generally higher for factor driven and 
innovation-driven economies compared to efficiency-driven economies. Since the model has 
generally been targeted towards women, it is relevant to consider the female TEA figures. The 
Table 9.1 below reveals that female TEA rates are higher along with the male TEA rates for 
factor driven and innovation-driven economies compared to efficiency-driven economies 
(Kelley et al. 2015). Furthermore, it is also pertinent to use the concept of necessity- 
entrepreneurship which is defined as percentage of those involved in TEA who are involved in 
entrepreneurship because they had no better options for work (i.e. starting a business because 
other employment opportunities are unavailable) (Bosma and Kelley, 2019: 138). As can be 
seen from the Table 9.1 below, both male and female TEA are substantially higher for factor 
driven and innovation-driven economies compared to efficiency-driven economies. Figure 9.4 
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below also reveals that African and Latin American economies have higher TEA rates than 
Europe and North America.  
Table 9.1 Development Phase Averages for Male and Female Total Entrepreneurial Activity 
(TEA) and Necessity Proportion of TEA in 60 economies 










A much greater percentage (66%) of those surveyed in factor driven and innovation-driven 
economies considered entrepreneurship as a good career choice compared to efficiency-driven 
economies.  
Figure 9.5 Development Group Averages for Societal values in 54 economies  




Figure 9.6 Development Group Averages for self-perceptions about entrepreneurship in 
60 economies  






The above figures 9.5 and 9.6 reveal the entrepreneurial traits (the operational definitions by 
GEM are provided below in Table 9.2) such as perceived opportunities, perceived capabilities, 
fear of failure and entrepreneurial intentions for factor driven and innovation-driven economies 
also compare favourably to efficiency-driven economies.  
Table 9.2 Operational Definitions of entrepreneurial traits 







Figure 9.7 Percentage of Adults intending to start a business in factor and efficiency-
driven economies, by region and gender  











Figure 9.8 Percentage of Adults intending to start a business in innovation-driven 
economies, by region and gender (SOURCE: GEM REPORT, 2014) 
 
 
This is consistent with the available data for the relevant countries in the current analysis. 
Figure 9.7 and 9.8 above reveals that countries from African and Latin American countries in 
general (including relevant countries for the current analysis such as Nigeria and Mexico) have 
much higher entrepreneurial intention rates than USA and UK.   Although current TEA rate is 
unavailable for Nigeria (as a result of non-participation in the GEM study), a GEM report for 
Sub-Saharan Africa in 2012 considered Nigeria as a global leader in entrepreneurial spirit 
exhibiting the lowest fear of failure in the world (GEM Sub-Saharan Africa report, 2012). 
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According to GEM reports, Mexican TEA rate has been on the rise and at 2014 stood at 19% 
substantially above the Latin American Average of 17.6% and that of UK (8.6%) and US 
(13.8%). Furthermore, the female TEA rates for Nigeria (41%) and Mexico (19.2%) are also 
substantially higher than UK (4.8%) and USA (9.2%) indicating the difficulties of targeting 
the indigenous female population in these countries (GEM report, 2015).  It is thus not 
unreasonable to assume that when immigrants from these countries travel to the UK and USA, 
they bring with them this entrepreneurial culture which along with the collective nature of their 
society justifies the targeting of such communities for Grameen outreach initiatives.  
A key point of difference between GU and GA is the nature of strategy employed to reach 
clients. GU relies on a direct approach strategy achieved with the help of staff contacting known 
clients who are then encouraged to speak to their friends and families. This is more resonant 
with the parent organization GB ethos of “organization going to clients”141.  Conversely, GU 
depends on other organizations for obtaining client referral which is more about “clients 
coming to the organization”. This may have been a problem for GU as the study revealed in 
the earlier Chapters that obtaining referrals from external organizations is generally an 
ineffective strategy for purpose of outreach. In the UK this has been true for organizations such 
as Street-Cred and WEvolution whereas in the US this has been relevant for GA. Conservative 
attitude and cynicism of the management of such organizations has been commonly attributed 
for such problems.  
Word of mouth referral appears to be the most productive method of referral reported by current 
organizations such as GA in the US and GU in the UK142. Trust emerges as a key issue as 
suspicions arise about intentions of MFIs as a lending organization. In the US, GA encountered 
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these problems when it initially approached clients to offer its products and, in the UK, GU 
encountered such problems from representatives of some organizations that were approached 
for client referrals. This problem in GA’s case was overcome to a substantial extent by 
recruiting Spanish speaking lending officers from the communities it was targeting. This 
strategy may have been fruitful due to the homogeneity in terms of language and culture. 
However, in GU’s case employing this strategy was more difficult due to the diverse nature of 
the clientele it dealt with143.  It is also notable that GA has a 100% target focus on women 
whereas GU had a more generalised mixed gender focus. GU management attributed regulatory 
distortions for such deviations from the original model.  
Another significant contextual factor affecting client recruitment amongst indigenous clients 
identified by the study is the welfare regime (particularly generous in the UK). In the UK, this 
has been relevant for all organizations including GU and WEvolution. A pilot study by GU for 
example found that people were particularly afraid of losing out on house benefits. In the US, 
this may have been an important factor for the low recruitment figures for PE which targets 
indigenous African American clients. It is worth noting that most clients of current programs 
such as GA or GU do not either have access to welfare or do not subscribe to welfare payments. 
In the US, almost all of GU’s immigrant Hispanic clients do not qualify for state welfare 
program. In the UK, most of GU’s immigrant clients either do not qualify for government 
support or are existing business owners who do not rely on welfare provision.  
An additional problem of targeting indigenous clients noted by authorities was a lack of 
awareness or understanding of the model (e.g. Street-UK in the UK). The pervasive use of the 
Grameen model or microfinance in general in Sub Saharan and Latin American countries in 
this case may explain the familiarity that immigrants may feel about the model and their 
                                                             




consequent take up of the program. An interviewee also noted that GA’s outreach strategy was 
to open different branches in different locations after 1 year which was not possible for GU 
partly due to financial constraints and also somewhat attributable to the decision of the senior 
management to operate from a single central branch144. This may have potentially affected the 
speed and extent of organizational learning for GU. 
9.3 Regulatory environment  
Regulatory impediments stand out as a key differential factor between GA and GU. In the UK, 
the risk classification designed by the FCA leads to GU being wary of being classed as a high-
risk lender leading to operational constraints.  Unlike GA, under its license GU was unable to 
incorporate home visits in line with the original model which inhibits its ability to assess the 
socio-economic status of the borrower and proximity to group members. Although both GU 
and GA practice self-selection on paper, these restrictions may have limited the effectiveness 
of the selection process at GU as groups ended up consisting of members who are 
geographically dispersed and leading to less cohesive groups. The strength of Grameen’s 
approach lies in the fact that the “the organization goes to the clients” rather than the clients 
coming to the organization. As GU is concerned about being classed as a high-risk lender, it 
does not approach clients directly or employ outreach strategies based around the domicile of 
the borrower. Instead it has predominantly relied on external organizations for client referrals, 
a strategy considered to be ineffective by many early practitioners in the UK such as Street-
Cred, WEvolution145. GA, on the other hand, has no such concerns and has used a number of 
ways to approach clients directly consistent with the original model. This implies that GA’s 
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marketing strategy has not been constrained by regulations and it has been able to do outreach 
work based on the same principle and spirit as the parent organization. It has used its staff to 
connect directly with potential clients who in turn are encouraged to contact their own friend 
and families (using strategies such as recruiting staff from the target communities who speak 
the same language and understand the culture). This is important as it does not have to rely on 
other organizations who are often insecure of losing their own clients and suspicious of its 
objectives as a lender. This has important implications as the process is not lengthy and GA’s 
message has less chance of being distorted by any organization acting as a medium.  
More important, perhaps is the ability to design outreach work based around the abodes of 
clients as this is a focal point for building social collateral. The regulatory restrictions in the 
UK may also have important implications for operational effectiveness and discipline of the 
group. Weekly meetings are a vital part of the Grameen model as they are used to inculcate 
discipline into the borrowers and sharing of experience amongst borrowers which in turn has 
implications for loan recovery. Unlike GA where weekly meetings are mainly held in the 
comfortable atmosphere of the borrowers’ home, the restrictions to visit borrowers’ home for 
GU means that meetings have to be held at the shops of borrowers. The space is often limited 
at such venues and hardly convenient for borrowers. This leads to them being in a rush to 
complete the meeting potentially rendering the process unproductive.  One interviewee pointed 
out that programs and events are much more structured and regimented at GA compared to 
GU. As an example, he pointed out that meetings are well attended despite the fact that they 
are held at early in the morning. The GU authorities on the other hand often have to be more 
flexible and incorporate the desires of the clients with respect to decisions of time of meeting 
(often preferred to be late in the evenings) and locations.  
GU authorities have also attributed serving both male and female clients to their legal team’s 
interpretation of the sexual discrimination act in the UK. There is no such issue with GA as 
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they design their operation around a 100% focus on women. This helps them to be consistent 
with the policies of the parent organization and also removes internal discord between senior 
management. GA’s core strategies such as marketing and outreach incorporates (for example, 
vision and mission statements, blogs and narratives on the website) this gender focus. This may 
have helped GA to attract more female clients and hence tap onto the burgeoning Hispanic 
female micro-entrepreneurship in the American society.  On the other hand, GU sent a more 
confused message to its target audience about the nature of its product as a result of inherent 
contradictions with the original model which may have resulted in potential female clients 
feeling disinclined to join the program. Furthermore, there have may been an adverse effect of 
operations as the analysis in the previous sections show that programs without a gender focus 
on women such Street-UK in the UK and PE in the US have struggled to achieve exceptional 
loan recovery rates.  
A common regulatory problem affecting all case study organizations across the UK and the US 
is the inability to operate savings accounts of clients. This is important as savings mobilization 
is a core part of the original program which has enabled GB to achieve operational 
sustainability by using the funds for onward lending and instil discipline into the borrowers 
and helps them to manage risk in the event of unforeseen emergencies (Collins et al., 2009; 
Wright, 2010). While some programs (such as EEMC/WEETU in the UK and PE in the US) 
have not addressed the problem at all other, others (such as GU and WEvolution in the UK and 
GA in the US) have tried to incorporate a savings element by aligning themselves with external 
partners such as commercial banks. For example, GU has partnered with Tesco Bank and Royal 
Bank of Scotland while GA has partnered with several commercial banks including Citibank 
which is a major partner. However, it is important to note the differences in which these 
operational elements are actualised in these cases. At GA, consistent with the original model, 
a mandatory savings of $2 is required from borrowers which is typically collected by GA staff 
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along with the loan instalment which is due at weekly meetings. This is then deposited by GA 
on behalf of the borrower to the partner bank. Contrastingly, at GU, although regular savings 
are encouraged and recommended by the organization, it is not obligatory. Thus, GA may have 
had much better control over the savings and able to achieve the aforementioned objectives 
instilling discipline into the borrowers as they can monitor whether borrowers are saving. In 
addition, substantial amounts are being deposited for borrowers which ensures that such funds 
can be used for urgent needs or that loan funds meant for business purposes are not diverted 
for such requirements. Unlike GA, GU did have no such control over the savings process as it 
was not mandatory under the GU program and any savings were voluntary and optional and 
deposited by the clients themselves. It should be noted that despite the efforts to address this 
problem in different ways in the UK and the US, all programs still have to rely on external 
partners to manage savings. This not only creates additional problems as a result of different 
ethos and ideologies of partner banks but also means that unlike GB these programs cannot 
mobilise the clients’ funds for onward lending. An interviewee pointed out that there seems to 
be regulatory discrepancy in allowing commercial banks which usually target affluent clients 
to mobilize deposits while imposing restrictions on MFIs who wish to serve the financially 
excluded deprived neighbourhoods. However, the interviewee also pointed out the need for 
regulatory supervision to protect clients should MFIs be granted permission to operate savings 
account in these countries146.   
There are additional regulatory constraints in the form of restrictions on the interest rates which 
may be charged by the case study organizations. In the US, usury laws vary according to the 
states in which MFIs operate. As GA is based in New York, it is unable to charge interest rates 
above 16% as it will be considered as usurious. There are no specific caps in the UK for GU. 
                                                             




However, FCA’s classification design meant that GU risked being classified as a high-risk 
lender in the event of charging higher interest rates than the 23.5% it charged. This would place 
it along likes of doorstep and provident lenders (who charge much higher interest rates) and 
potentially ruin its image as a socially responsible lender.   It can thus be deduced from the 
above that UK regulators could learn from the experience which has allowed GA to thrive and 
not stifled it by unnecessary regulations which has prevented it from operating the model in 
accordance with the original model. Regulatory restrictions on home visits for GU, for 
example, miss the point that GU wants to use visits to the borrowers’ domicile for fostering 
community cohesion by organizing weekly meetings at such locations rather than intrude upon 
clients to sell loans. There is a need to recognise to the socially oriented objectives of 
organizations like GU which go an extra mile and to try and helps clients and not apply 
regulations which are predominantly designed for predatory lenders with purely commercial 
motives of profit maximization.  
Another area in which the UK regulators may learn from the US experience is the incorporation 
of “Community Reinvestment Act” (CRA) which has played an integral role in promotion of 
US community finance. The CRA was passed in 1977 in the US with the objective of urging 
commercial banks and savings associations to assist in serving the financially excluded 
impoverished neighbourhoods (Avery et al., 2003). GA has greatly benefitted from this 
regulation as its certification as a CDFI by the US treasury Department has incentivised 
mainstream financial institutions such as Citi, Wells Fargo and Silicon Valley Bank to provide 
it with financial resources for operational purpose. Reynold and Muscat (2009) identified a 
number of critical systemic problems with the UK financial systems and recommended that 
law similar to CRA could be passed in the UK to ensure reasonable access to loans for 
financially excluded communities. Along similar lines, Appleyard (2012) also viewed funding 
support for CDFIs as fragmented and suggested the need for incorporating an UK version of 
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the CRA. The author surmised that this would compel commercial banks to lend to Small and 
Medium enterprises (SMEs) through CDFIs in the UK which would then be accountable for 
all stages of the lending process. There would also be better possibility of those being rejected 
by the mainstream institutions being passed on to CDFI as a result of such changes (Appleyard, 
2012). Thus, if introduced in the UK, this legislation could greatly benefit organizations such 
as GU and WEvolution in getting the assistance required for sustaining their operational 
activities.  
9.4 Client Training  
Most former UK initiatives such as Full-Circle and Street-Cred in the UK and PE in the USA 
had incorporated training as a component of the lending process for clients as a result of 
perceived needs for such lessons to deal with regulatory complexities in these countries. In the 
UK, Full-Circle’s training sessions comprised of a component known as “Enterprise for me” 
the core topics of which was setting goals, market research and presentation skills. This was 
followed by a “Skills for me” component which included topics such as cash flow management, 
designing of business plans and financial literacy. Similarly, Street-Cred also provided a 40-
module business training to its clients centred on subjects associated with business start-ups 
ranging from taxation to navigation of the UK welfare system. Some of these organizations 
such as Full-Circle fund in the UK or PE in the US made such training obligatory to attend and 
complete for clients before they could get loans. PE, for example, made it mandatory for clients 
interested in a loan to attend a six-week training following which they needed to pass an 
examination in order to be eligible for the loans. Some organizations such as Account 3, Street-
UK and WEvolution have run ancillary business support or advice services concurrently with 
the loans.  
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It is interesting to point out that GA in the US has offered a version of training which is more 
consistent with the original model as it is similar to GB’s “continuous group training program” 
which is a weekly training program focused on orientating clients with the internal, processes, 
ethos and methodology of Grameen. Unlike GA, in the UK, GU started off in a similar tone to 
former UK organizations as training was provided to clients on topics such as cash flow 
management, marketing and designing business plans. This was costly as external consultant 
had to be hired to design the programs147. However, GU management soon realised after 
piloting this training regime that it was costly and unproductive. It was realised in particular 
that most of the training on basic business topics was irrelevant and almost insulting the 
intelligence of the majority (approximately 90%) of clients who were existing business owners.   
This led to a redesign of the training regime to make it much more tailored to the situation and 
needs of each client and retain emphasis on internal processes and procedures in resonance 
with the original model and consistent with that of GA. The initial five-day training program 
is reinforced by the authorities at weekly meetings with the purpose of instilling discipline and 
consistency into the borrowers. In addition, as the GA experience seems to indicate networking 
prospects are often deemed valuable in an alien country which leads to well attended 
disciplined meetings.  
However, as the analysis above indicated the UK regulatory restrictions of using clients’ home 
as venues for weekly meetings means that the process may not be as effective in the UK for 
GU. This is because of the meeting being held at business premises which have limited spaces 
and make it uncomfortable to attend meetings. There is no doubt that the business environment 
is more complex in the context of developed countries such as UK and USA. The section on 
the regulatory environment outlined the nature of such complexities with particular reference 
                                                             




to the issue of occupational licensing which potentially renders the micro-entrepreneurship 
process cumbersome compared to the more relaxed and informal nature of the business 
environment in developing countries such as Bangladesh. Yunus (2011), for instance, noted 
the example of entrepreneurs desiring to sell more than one variety of flower in the state of 
Louisiana require to sit for an exam to obtain a state license in order to do so.  
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the nature of business training which have been 
provided at some former UK organizations (such as Street-Cred and Full-Circle) and current 
US organizations (PE) are incongruous to the practices of the original model (with the 
exception of WEvolution which does not look to adopt the Grameen model) as Professor Yunus 
believes that entrepreneurship is an innate skill which cannot be taught. Training at many 
organizations are typically generic and consist of elementary topics associated with business 
start-ups. However, this is potentially an ineffective strategy as the client base at these 
organizations usually come from a wide range of professional background and at different 
stages of their operations. The training needs to be customised to the needs of an individual, 
the nature of business he/she operates and the stage the business is in. This could prove to be 
very costly to incorporate into the system. The experience at GU had validated this argument 
to an extent as it reverted to a training regime which is more consistent of that of GB. Training 
is usually costly as external consultants are hired (for e.g. in GU’s initial training regime). Thus, 
there is a need to evaluate the training to deduce whether it is cost effective which in turn is 
difficult due to a lack of a benchmark methodology. As has been pointed out above, training 
has been made a mandatory element by some programs (Street-cred and Full Circle Fund in 
the UK and PE in the US which also charges a fee for the training) insisting that the training 
program be completed before clients graduate onto a loan. This may discourage potential 
clients from joining such programs. All such programs have struggled to recruit significant 
number of clients to their programs indicating this problem. The period of training may also be 
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a significant issue (PE’s and Full Circle’s training, for example, training lasts for six weeks) as 
clients may be disinclined towards committing themselves to protracted periods of training and 
may have immediate need for loans. The Full-Circle fund management recognized this issue 
and developed a fast track 1-week course for clients who are unwilling to commit to 6 weeks 
(Ramsden, 2008). However, the question would then arise about effectiveness of such training 
and what can be taught and grasped in such a short span of time. A potential solution to this 
problem as suggested by some of the interviewees may lie in referring clients to appropriate 
local organizations in case any training is required148. Account 3 in the UK had already actuated 
this strategy effectively to assist its clients. Innovative training schemes based on volunteering 
by experienced entrepreneurs may also eliminate costs and be a successful way of helping the 
clients149 .  
9.5 Emerging Context: Immigrant Entrepreneurship 
The earlier section established that immigrant entrepreneurs form a significant core of the 
clientele base of current programs such as GU and GA. The section also revealed the high level 
of collectivism which prevails in this society which may have been a relevant factor in the high 
subscription of Grameen programs amongst such clients. This necessitates a contextual 
understanding of the emerging context of immigrant entrepreneurship in UK and the USA. In 
the USA, a study by Migration Policy Institute which analysed US migration from 1960 to 
2014 showed that most of the migration originates from the Latino/Hispanic countries with the 
predominant country of origin being that of Mexico. According to estimates by the US Census 
Bureau, Latinos are expected to rise to one-third of the US population by 2060 (US Census 
Bureau, 2012). The American entrepreneurial landscape is increasingly being defined by 
                                                             
148 (ME#9, 2014) 
 




Latinos as entrepreneurship amongst this population has tripled over the course of last two 
decades and by 2012 approximately 1 in 10 Latinos were involved in entrepreneurship (Davila 
et al., 2014).  However, there is growing disparity between Latino entrepreneurs and non-
Latino entrepreneurs underlined by substantial difference in median income and family wealth 
(Fairlie, 2018). This lack of capital and assets in turn adversely affects these entrepreneurs’ 
investment and restricts business growth. Latino businesses also have comparatively higher 
business failure rates than non-Latinos. An analysis by Goldwater Institute found a high 
concentration of low-income entrepreneurs amongst this population. The study found that   
Hispanic/Latino community was the second-most dominant ethnic group which accounted for 
low income entrepreneurs in the US (Table 9.3 below).   
Table 9.3 Nature of low-income entrepreneurship in the US  
(Source: Slivinski, 2015) 
 
It was reported that this rising low-income entrepreneurship was mainly driven by immigrants 
who were twice as likely to become entrepreneurs compared to the Native White population. 
Approximately 90% of low-income entrepreneurs are immigrants according to the study 
(Slivinski, 2015, Fetsch, 2015). It is thus unsurprising that GA’s clientele base predominantly 
comprises of Hispanic migrants.  
Chapter 7 and the previous sections showed how the entrepreneurial culture, the collectivist 
nature of the Latino/Hispanic community and a high level of necessity driven by a lack of 
access to welfare provision may have enabled Grameen to attract target and operate the model 
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effectively. It is worth outlining and comparing the nature of UK immigration to the US 
scenario to understand the prospects for current programs such as GU which look to emulate 
GA’s success in a UK context. Figure 9.9 below shows the breakdown for long term 
international migration into the UK.  
Figure 9.9 Long term UK immigration (Source: ONS, 2016) 
 
 
A recent report by DueDil and Centre for Entrepreneurship (2015) noted the lack of data on immigrant 
entrepreneurship in the UK and conducted a study on this aspect. The study revealed that 14% of 
start-up businesses in the UK were founded by immigrant entrepreneurs and provided a top ten list 















As can be seen from the list above, most immigrant entrepreneurs come from EU countries which are 
considered as individualist. Table 9.4  below shows the relatively similar figures for individualism levels 
derived by the Hofstede study for these EU countries. 
Table 9.4 Level of individualism in some European Countries  








Some Non-EU countries such as USA are individualist and hence immigrants from such 
countries are unlikely to be approriate targets for Grameen programs. Other regions with high 
levels of migration into the UK are South Asian countries such as Bangladesh and Pakistan 
where collectivism prevails. Jones et al. (2015: 10) classifies the intial wave of South Asian 
entrepreneurs as “old migrants” that have entered the country before 2004. Several earlier 
studies have reflected on how “old migrants” from this particular ethnic minority group have 
overcome racism and attained welath , enhanced social status and a desirable extent of 
independence as a result of the rising neo-liberal enteprise policies in the 80s (Gidoomal & 








Wardell, 1996; Srinavasan 1995; Metcalf et al. 1996). There is thus unlikely to be a great 
demand for the Grameen micro-loans from this population even though they originally hail 
from collectivist cultures. This is also evidenced in the inability of earlier programs such as 
Street-Cred and Street-UK to attain projected targets in areas such as East London and 
Birmingham with a heavy concentration of South Asian “old migrants”. Other countries with 
a significant extent of UK migration also featuring in the list above are China or Nigeria both 
of which have a low score for individualism and hence are collectivist societies. But all such 
countries (where new migrants come from) are from outside the EU for which heavy 
restrictions are imposed for new entrepreneurs trying to obtain entrepreneur visas, the most 
prominent of which is having access to atleast £50000 investment funds to apply for a Tier 1 
entrepreneur visa earmarked for the business. This is in addition to other strict requirements 
which typically includes the following: 
“Create full time employment for at least 2 EEA nationals 
 Work solely in the business  
 Have sufficient funds to accommodate and maintain yourself until the business is 
profitable.  
 Have a controlling interest in the business 
 Take a share of the business’s liabilities  
 Be implementing a business plan that looks to be thorough and viable” (UK 
immigration website, 2020) 
It follows naturally from the huge investments required and the additional strict requirements 
that, by default, immigrants from non-EU countries officially entering the country are unlikely 
to be micro-entrepreneurs and hence be appropriate targets for Grameen style programs. In 
contrast, EU immigrants have no such restrictions on them and are free to open any kind of 
businesses they wish including microenterprises. This may change following UK’s exit from 
the EU in 202.  However, the analysis above indicates that most EU countries from which 
immigrant entrepreneurs come from are individualist in nature. A8 countries are the group of 
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countries which joined the European Union after 2004. There has been increasing immigration 
into UK from this region post 2004 with the most prominent country being Poland which also 
features in the top ten list of immigrant entrepreneurs above.  
It is worth pointing out at this stage there are some exceptional cases in which Grameen model 
has actually worked in despite a country being generally considered as individualistic. Poland 
stands out as one such example with a high score for individualism. Fundusz Mikro is a Polish 
microfinance institution which was inspired by Grameen started its journey in 1994 and has 
managed to achieve exceptional recovery rates and went to become operationally self-
sustainable in 1999 (Copisarow, 2000). However, the earlier sections pointed out the 
importance of welfare regime as a key impediment in outreach for Grameen programs. Fundusz 
Mikro thrived in a deprived post-communist country where a rapidly growing business class 
was starved of credit in an underdeveloped financial market. Polish immigrants to the UK on 
the other hand, as EU nationals currently enjoy the same privileges as the indigenous 
population in terms of access to a range of benefits as well as free healthcare from the NHS. 
This means that the level of necessity entrepreneurship driving demand for Grameen style loans 
is likely to be much lower for such immigrants. There are other relevant issues pointed out by 
Favell (2009) which include migrants from A8 countries benefitting from inexpensive air fares 
to sustain temporary “circulatory” migration moving in and out of UK and Eastern Europe like 
“long distance commuters” (Legrain, 2009). This indicates that such migrants are unlikely to 
have a lasting dedication required to become successful entrepreneurs (Jones et al, 2015: 11). 
These factors may have caused low demand from immigrant from such backgrounds for GU’s 





9.6 Field Characteristics and Problem Framing  
The field of Microfinance and associated Grameen adoption efforts in general is more mature 
in the US compared to the UK as the Grameen replication initiatives such as WSEP started in 
mid-80s compared whereas the UK programs started in late 1990s. Both countries were devoid 
of national central players when these organizations initiated operations. Mimetic isomorphism 
prevailed in such cases as organizations sought to follow the example of GB which has been 
the global face of peer group lending.  Some were also, however, inspired by other international 
efforts. Street-UK was clearly inspired by the success of Fundusz Mikro, the Polish MFI based 
on Grameen as both were started by the same institutional entrepreneur, Rosalind Copisarow 
(Copisarow, 2000; 2004). The authorities who were behind Full Circle fund in the US also 
noted the success of WSEP in the inner-city context of Chicago in the US as staff from the UK 
visited the US to get a better understand of how the model was operated (Pearson and Watson, 
1997). 
The parent organization GB used diagnostic framing in the context of a developing country 
such as Bangladesh to highlight the feminization of poverty. Female empowerment was a core 
theme of this framing in particular as women often considered as subjugated and undermined 
in a mostly rural context dominated by social and religious taboos were the targets of the model. 
The institutional entrepreneur behind the model, Professor Yunus, thus proposed Grameen as 
a path for such women to become rejuvenated and independent. In the UK, many programs 
have followed a gendered nature of framing similar to the parent organization. EEMC and its 
component organizations such as Street-Cred, for example, highlighted the plight of female 
entrepreneurs lacking access to finance (particularly in the context of ethnic minority 
communities) in East London. Similarly, WEETU, noted the lack of employment resulting 
from perceived lower wages, skills and training of Norwich and adjacent Eastern regions in the 
UK (Pearson and Watson, 1997). In the USA, GA’s framing approach has been consistent with 
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the parent organization and all the aforementioned organizations as it revolves around the 
feminization of poverty emphasising the pervasive low wages and poor quality of life 
associated with being in employment for women and promotes self-employment as a crucial 
solution (Grameen America B, 2020). Interestingly, GA has successfully revived a framing 
approach which is currently rarely used in a US context. 
However, some organizations have adopted a non-gendered framing contrary to the original 
model. Street-UK for example, used diagnostic framing to denote financial exclusion in terms 
of existing financial system not meeting demand from entrepreneurs regardless of gender and 
proposed the model as a solution of assisting micro-entrepreneurs to graduate from the grey 
economy into the mainstream. Street-UK management also used motivational framing to 
provide compelling reasons to introduce the model in terms of desirable outcomes such as 
enhanced levels of business survival, self-esteem and confidence, skills, income and social 
network for borrowers. It is worth noting that GU’s framing approach was similar to this 
strategy as its goal is “providing micro-credit business loans to thousands of people who are 
currently not served by any mainstream financial services”. Furthermore, both the 
organizations have adopted a non-gendered frame unlike GB. However, an important 
difference between Street-UK and GU’s approach is that GU proposes the model as a way out 
of “cycle of welfare dependency” in the UK (Grameen in the UK, 2017). 
In the UK, the framing was changed by some of the organizations (EEMC/Fair finance and 
Street-UK) from an emphasis on “lack of entrepreneurial finance” to “protection from abusive 
lending” as they shifted to using personal lending models due to the institutional complexities 
and rising context of predatory lending. The change of framing was possible because these 
organizations were peripheral in nature and could implement such changes without any major 
repercussions. They have been able to successfully adopt this new framing as a result of high 
demand for their services and relatively conventional credit risk methodologies based one on 
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one relationship between loan officers and borrowers. In the US, some peripheral organizations 
such as Good faith fund in Arkansas changed their framing to project the financial exclusion 
problem as a generic lack of entrepreneurial finance and used individual lending models instead 
of group lending. In the UK, organizations that did not change their framing (such as Street-
cred and WEETU Full Circle Fund) perished. In the USA, GA had also faced similar 
institutional complexities when it initially began operations. But unlike the peripheral 
organizations in the UK which radically changed their framing in response to the institutional 
complexities they had faced, a change of framing was not an option for them as a result of the 
central position of the parent organization known as the global beacon of peer group lending.  
GA adhered to its original framing but refined other operational areas such as marketing and 
recruitment to suit a favourable context of a burgeoning clientele base of Hispanic female 
entrepreneurs. GU also experienced similar institutional complexities (arguably to a much 
greater extent) to what GA was facing in its early years. Like GA, it was not be possible to 
bring about radical changes in how it frames the financial exclusion problem given its strong 
links to the parent organization. Unfortunately, such institutional pressures caused GU to close 
its doors.  
9.7 Alignment of interest with external actors 
All case study organizations have encountered “liability of newness” as they embarked upon 
implementing a model conventionally known to be used in developing countries in the context 
of industrialised economies. This liability was evidenced in the fact almost all of the 
organizations initially struggled to attract funding for what was seen as a radical idea. It was 
particularly more difficult for peripheral organizations such as EEMC and Full-Circle fund in 
the UK to convince mainstream financial institutions to contribute as this may have been an 
acknowledgement of their failure to reach a significant proportion of the population. This was 
different to organizations such as GU in the UK and GA in the USA which benefitted from the 
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global prestige and status of the parent organization and personal legitimacy gained through 
the involvement of Professor Yunus. However, even these organizations had initially struggled 
to obtain funding for their projects initially. For instance, GU’s influential board members were 
negotiating with mainstream financial organizations for funding and support for protracted 
periods.  
Some organizations even used personal finance of the institutional entrepreneurs to overcome 
initial scepticism. In the US, GA was able to begin operations owing to the personal finances 
of a wealthy dedicated Republican, Vidar Jorgensen. Similarly, PE has also benefitted from 
continued assistance from social investors who initiated it and were committed to its purpose. 
In the UK, Faisel Rehman had used £4000 from his own credit card to pilot the model at EEMC 
to demonstrate its effect to social investors in order to be able to attract funding. However, 
organizations in both countries were eventually successful initially in getting moral legitimacy 
to obtain funding and form relevant partnerships. This is attributable in a number of factors. 
Firstly, the concept of peer group lending based on community cohesion propagated by 
Grameen is intuitively appealing. All Grameen based organizations have used a similar strategy 
of developing historical narratives to define social evil and saviours and formulated a 
hypothesis based on such storylines to make their argument plausible to potential investors and 
partners (Morrill & Owen-Smith, 2002; Zilber, 2007). The remarkable success story of 
Professor Yunus in a Bangladeshi context in assisting local entrepreneurs has thus been used 
repeatedly by such case study organizations in their quest for legitimacy and the subsequent 
funding and support. Secondly, mainstream organizations such as banks often have a corporate 
social responsibility agenda that they look to be fulfilling as part of their commitments. They 
need to be perceived by stakeholders as investing and contributing to the communities they 
thrive in. The core theory that these organizations were proposing was that the poor are 
creditworthy and appropriately skilled to become capable entrepreneurs. It is not difficult to 
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see why this argument is inherently engaging to such social investors who would want to use 
the same message to enhance their own image as contributors to the community. This is even 
more relevant with investment in organizations such as GA and GU which carry the original 
brand label of the parent organization such that association with such organization can bring 
immediate global attention to the alliance formed. Thirdly, there are also economic 
implications when partnerships not only involve contribution of capital or grants but also 
referrals for savings accounts from clients. In the USA, this is evident from the partnership of 
GA with Citi while in the UK, clients from GU and WEvolution are referred to banks such as 
Tesco Bank and Airdrie Savings Bank. Citi Bank, in particular has benefitted from the sheer 
number of clients that it receives from GA in comparison UK banks which have formed such 
partnerships. It must also be noted that GA implements a savings component consistent with 
the parent organizations which makes it mandatory to open the savings and contribute a 
minimum weekly sum of $2 towards it. This in turn guarantees Citi that an account will be 
opened for each client from GA to which regular contributions will be made. This is unlike the 
partnership with Tesco Bank with GU which does not make savings mandatory (although it is 
encouraged). It follows that there is simply more incentive for financial organizations to align 
with GA given its processes which resemble the system implemented at GB compared to GU.  
In the UK, organizations such as Street-UK and Weetu faced numerous institutional 
complexities in implementing the model. As a result, they struggled to secure consequential 
legitimacy as they were unable achieve tangible outcomes in terms of outreach coverage. These 
organizations tried to justify receiving additional funding and support based on the argument 
that they should not be judged simply on the numbers they were achieving but the intangible 
benefits that their programs were bringing to their small number of clients in terms of factors 
such as empowerment, confidence and enhancement of skills. This heavily Welfarist leaning 
view did not seem to gel with funders who were mostly interested in evidence-based outcomes. 
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Some organizations such as EEMC/Fairfinance and Street-UK which faced similar institutional 
complexities to these organizations changed their framing and identity to rebrand themselves. 
This identity which was more consistent and resonant with the reality of the context of rising 
abusive lending they were operating and their strong focus on the Institutionist view may have 
helped them to realign with important external partners. GA in the US, however stands out 
amongst the case study organizations as exemplary in forming innovative and effective which 
has produced multiple beneficial impacts for all stakeholders. The partnership with Citi, for 
example, is helpful for its mostly immigrant clientele base many of whom do not have access 
to or have the confidence to approach mainstream financial organizations. As explained above, 
Citi reaps the benefits from the mandatory savings account with regular contributions. Finally, 
GA takes advantage of the partnership as it is able to overcome regulatory restrictions of 
savings mobilization to an extent. The nature of impact of GU’s partnership with Tesco Bank 
is much vaguer as it is difficult for GU to assess the exact numbers of borrowers deciding to 
save and the amount that they are savings.   GA’s link with Experian is also advantageous for 
clients as it helps it them to graduate onto the mainstream financial systems and achieve GA’s 
broader aim of financial coverage. It also helps to lure additional customers as a result of being 
able to access mainstream financial institutions. The partnership with Iora Healthcare which 
has currently materialised shows GA’s ambition in designing a classical disruptive innovation 
approach to address a seemingly insurmountable problem. GA realised that most of its low-
income borrowers were excluded from the complex US federal health care system and 
endeavoured to resolve the problem by forming a partnership with Iora. This service is 
operational and has been deemed as superior to some of the traditional clinics in the US (Chase, 
2016).  
Each partnership however, bring about their own complexities. In GA’s case, the bank had a 
different operational philosophy to its ideologies and offered incongruent products to what 
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Grameen was offering. Moreover, the helpful attitude of the senior management at the partner 
banks often did not trickle down to administrative staff in the retail branches which caused 
frictions. The experience of WEETU and Street-cred suggests that donors may be unwilling to 
give projects enough time to experiment with the model and want quick result in terms of 
repayments and outreach. Furthermore, both organizations in the UK (GU, Street-Cred and 
WEvolution) and in the US (GA) reported that obtaining referrals by partnering with local 
community organizations was a difficult and less effective recruitment method. This was 
attributed to the conservative attitude of the management of these organizations who were wary 
of either of losing clients or of the intentions of the MFIs as moneylenders.  
GA, currently in its twelfth year of operations appears to be well placed on the path to secure 
consequential legitimacy as it continues to align itself with relevant partners effectively to 
achieve its objectives. The continued success with which it has been able to align itself with 
central organizations may also be attributable to the procedural legitimacy it has gained as a 
result of implementing systems which are consistent with the ethos, ideologies and vision of 
the parent organization. Examples of this include the near perfect recovery rates as well aspects 
of its operations such as mandatory savings, appropriate implementation of self-selection and 
a focus on women. GU, on other hand, has failed to live up to expectations and folded in the 
fourth year of it’s operation. It was successful in attaining the moral legitimacy required to get 
operations off the ground, much of which is attributable to the personal legitimacy earned 
through the involvement of Professor Yunus and the power and status of the parent 
organization. Naturally, the next step for GU as to be able to attain consequential legitimacy 
by showing the effectiveness of the model over sustained periods. This depended on achieving 
procedural legitimacy which in turn hinges on its operational efficiency indicated by factors 
such as satisfactory outreach and repayment figures.  However, previous analysis revealed the 
numerous institutional complexities GU experienced its efforts to adopt the Grameen model. 
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Thus, it was extremely challenging given the regulatory and contextual impediments that GU 
faces. This is evident from its recovery figures which are substantially below that of the parent 
organization. Further, GU’s outreach targets which have been revised to modest figures have 
been difficult to attain as well. Additional problems were a lack of female focus and the 
resulting non-gender based framing and organizational identity which may make securing 
procedural legitimacy difficult. GU thus collapsed in 2018 with the liquidator attributing the 
main reason for closure to many clients falling into arrears leading to a detrimental impact on 
its cash flow (BBC, 2018) 
9.8 Identity 
In Bangladesh, the parent organization GB has a collective or an institutional identity of being 
purely a microfinance institution. It has an organizational identity underlined by its recognition 
as the first ever peer group lending provider in Bangladesh. “Grameen” means rural in Bengali 
signifying the pervasive use of the model in the context of Bangladeshi villages. Some may 
consider the borrowing of this term “Grameen” to be contradictory in the urban context of 
developed countries such as UK and USA. However, it is understandable given the global 
status and prestige of the Grameen brand and its Nobel prize winning founder Professor Yunus. 
Usage of the term helps organizations such as GA and GU to instantly establish authenticity as 
a result of connection to the parent organization and hence benefit from its global appeal. It 
also provides them with an edge over other community finance organizations operating in the 
same field which are seeking legitimacy in terms of funding and support. Thus, both GU and 
GA’s organizational identity incorporates the status of the parent organization and its founder 
to a great extent on its promotional materials such as mission statements and website blogs/ 
case studies.   
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It is worth noting that in the UK community finance organizations are given recognition as 
“Responsible lenders” (formerly known as CDFIs) by an independent association/body known 
as Responsible finance providers (formerly CDFA) for which there is a substantial membership 
fee. On the contrary, in the US, recognition as CDFI hinges on certification from the 
government which does not charge any application fee for the process. Thus, unsurprisingly, 
all the current US organizations such as GA and PE have applied for and obtained CDFA 
certification and consequently benefitted from this recognition in terms of funding (for e.g. the 
earlier section revealed how GA benefits from the US community investment legislation which 
compels mainstream institutions to commit to supply capital to CDFIs. To be eligible for this, 
GA needed certification as a CDFI) On the other hand, many of the current UK organizations 
(GU, WEvolution and Street-UK) have not applied for Responsible Finance providers/ CDFA 
membership despite being in operation for a substantially long period. This seems to indicate 
that UK organizations stand to lose less compared to those in the US if they do not have a 
formal institutional identity. In addition, it also indicates the substantial charges imposed by 
Responsible Finance providers are perhaps not justified by the benefits of membership. 
Furthermore, it may be pointed out that unlike the US, the institutional identity of community 
finance organizations in the UK has been under a redefinition struggle. As the earlier Chapter 
pointed out, the industrial body has rechristened itself “Responsible Finance” and further 
redefined the term “CDFI”. While the earlier definition focused solely on organizations which 
lend to entrepreneurs, the new definitions is much more generic enabling it to incorporate 
organizations such as Fair Finance and Street-UK the clients of which are predominantly 
personal lenders.  This new definition is quite similar to the generic categorization developed 
by the US government for qualification as a CDFI. For example, to be eligible as CDFIs in the 
US lenders must meet the following criteria:    
• “Is a legal entity at the time of Certification application; 
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Has a primary mission of promoting community development; 
Is a financing entity; 
Primarily serves one or more target markets; 
Provides development services in conjunction with its financing activities; 
Maintains accountability to its defined target market; and 
Is a non-government entity and not under the control of any government entity (Tribal 
governments excluded).”  (CDFIfund.gov, 2020) 
Another notable difference between GU and GA’s organizational identity was in term of gender 
focus. GA is heavily focused on female entrepreneurship which in turn is clearly communicated 
to its target audience through promotional materials on its website which include mission 
statements and contents that emphasize powerful narratives of female entrepreneurship which 
may have resonated well with its target focus on rapidly burgeoning female entrepreneurship 
amongst the Hispanic community. GU clearly lacked this gender focus in its organizational 
identity and risked projecting a more befuddled image in comparison that may send out a more 
confused message to potential female clients who may be reluctant to join as a result. It may 
also make it difficult to align with relevant partners who are predominantly concerned with 
providing funding and support to promote gender equality in the regions they operate. 
Examples of the success that GA has been able to achieve as a result of its gender focus has 
been partnerships with California Community Foundation. CCF has invested over $4.2 million 
in GA’s Los Angeles program to boost small businesses owned by over 2000 women. On its 
website, for example, CCF notes a typical example of a case study entrepreneur “Bertha” (left 
out by mainstream financial institutions) whose dreams of expanding her bakery shop has been 
fulfilled as a result of the partnership with GA. The report also highlighted the fact that there 
were over 300000 small businesses owned by women. CCF also pointed out the pervasive 
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poverty amongst the female population with about 40% of households headed by women being 
in poverty.  The importance of the GA’s gender focus is also reflected in the following 
statement on the CCF website 
“Our vision for the future is a Los Angeles where great ideas become great businesses. Where entrepreneurs like 
Bertha, Adelina and Marlene transform their lives and their communities. Where hard work, innovation and 
determination allow women to raise their families out of poverty and make their own American dream come true. 
But to make this vision a reality, we need partners who believe in entrepreneurship, who understand that 
supporting L.A. businesses grows the economy for everyone. By investing in Grameen America’s Los Angeles 
program, our partners become venture capitalists, gaining equity in the economic future of L.A. County.”     (CCF 
, 2020) 
 
The final notable difference between GU and GA lies in identity aspirations. Earlier chapters 
pointed out that GA is currently in the process of becoming a credit union whereas GU 
authorities had long term plans of becoming a bank as a more feasible route to overcome the 
regulatory restriction of savings mobilization. The GU authorities believed that conventional 
requirements of credit union clients in the UK to be membership/saving for certain period with 
the institution before becoming eligible for loans is fundamentally contradictory to the 
Grameen methodology of releasing the loans rapidly. This is pertinent as GU’s experiences 
indicated that most clients have immediate needs for loans. Some believe that whereas the 
lending process from its invitation to its completion took approximately 2 weeks, a credit union 
style membership process may stretch this to a period between 6 weeks and 3 months rendering 




                                                             




9.9 Organizational template and Strategic vision 




GA GU PE 




Shared vision, with Strong 
emphasis on both 
Institutionist and Welfarist 
objectives Clear focus on 
sustainability, i.e. covering 
operational expenses; branch 
sustainability to be achieved 
within 4-5 years, serving 
4000-45000 clients, which is 
confirmed by the senior 
management during the 
interviews. 
 
Similar vision to GA, however 
outreach targets are far more 
modest 
PE’s focus on Welfarist 
objectives is laudable as it has 
provided affordable finance 
and costly entrepreneurial 
training to its target clientele. 
However, an early focus on 
Institutionist goals has 
gradually faded away due to 
operational difficulties. 
Business Model Social Business Social Business Non-Profit 
Operation Period 13 years 5 years 19 years 
 







Rapidly grown into 18 
branches across the US with 
several branches attaining 
operational sustainability  
 
 
Heavily reliant on external 
finance, much from some 
investors and government 
grant. funding remains a major 
constraint. Growth strategy 
different from Grameen with 
planned operations from 
central office rather than 




Reliance on external finance, 
much from some investors and 
government grant. Carries no 
brand name like Grameen, & 












Mainly African immigrants 














Rapid rise of Hispanic 
entrepreneurship from 1990s 





Difficult to target indigenous 
clients due to welfare regime 
and individualistic nature of 
society 
Historically low levels of 
African American 
entrepreneurship. Recent 
studies indicate that African 
Americans least likely to be 
self-employed amongst all 
ethnic minorities (Pew 






100% Women (in line with 
strategy of GB 
 
 






























Framing of financial 





Non-gender based generic 
framing of financial exclusion 
as lack of access to finance for 
under-resourced 
neighbourhoods and a way out 
of poverty and dependence on 
welfare 
 
Non-gender based generic 
framing of financial exclusion 











Characterized by power, size 
and status as a global beacon 
for peer group lending and a 
strong focus on women,  
 
Less distinctive identity as a 
result of being a peripheral 




Less distinctive identity as a 
result of being a peripheral 










Rapid organizational learning 
from the use of different pilot 




May be slower organizational 
speed of its learning due to 
centralized nature of 














High recovery rates (99%)   
and steady client recruitment  
 
 
82% (substantially less than 
GB), struggling to attain 
modest outreach targets 
 
 











Innovation evidenced in 
marketing methods, staff 
recruitment & effective 
collaborations with 
commercial banks, Experian 
credit agency & conversion 
to credit union echo well 
with institutional objectives 
& are also beneficial for 
clients. More collaborations 
being planned  
such as Grameen primacare 
to address social problems 
such as healthcare & ensure 
sustainability of service 
 
Partnered with Tesco Bank 
however unlike GA saving is 
not mandatory and not 
collected during weekly 
meetings. No partnerships 
with credit ratings agency 
unlike GA. Challenging to 
work with local organizations 
to obtain referrals due to 







Referrals to credit unions but 
may be ineffective as most 
clients have access to welfare 
and may be discouraged to 
build assets. Planned future 
collaborations with Experian 
and Trans Union.  
 
 
Regulations Savings mobilization Savings mobilization 
Home visits not permitted 
under operational license 
Clients could not be 





This section compares operational templates, features and strategic vision between GA and PE 
in the US and GU in the UK as these are the current organizations that are specifically aimed 
towards adopting the model in these countries. Table 9.5 above outlines the differences across 
the organizations. GA has a sharp focus on Institutionist objectives as it has a specific aim of 
serving 4000-4500 and achieving branch sustainability within 4-5 years. PE, on the other hand, 
was heavily biased towards a Welfarist view with emphasis on operational sustainability 
waning over the years. Although GU shared the Institutionist focus consistent with the ethos 
of the parent organization, GB and that of GA, the outreach figures that it hoped to achieve 
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were far more modest compared to GA. It aimed to achieve operational sustainability within 
4-5 years attaining 1500-2000 clients in that period. The fact that it GU actually closed down 
during that period clearly indicates the nature of complexities of adopting the model in a UK 
context. However, earlier Chapters also revealed that GA faced similar difficulties in the initial 
phase of its operation which it overcame by focusing on the Hispanic immigrant community. 
The earlier analysis the current Chapter shows that GU may have had limited options in terms 
of diverting its focus on other communities in comparison to GA.  
The nature of growth expansion strategy marks an important difference between GA and GU. 
GA looks to grow and expand by opening branches in new localities. Owing in part to funding 
limitations, GU had different plans for growth and expansion. Its system was based on the 
lending officers being stationed in different localities and the administrative work being 
accomplished in its sole branch based at the Glasgow Caledonian University to reduce 
operational costs. While such an approach may indeed reduce costs, it may have slowed down 
the speed of organizational learning at GU compared to GA151.  
The non-gendered framing of the problem and the lack of gender focus of GU in the UK is 
quite similar to the approach followed by PE in the US. This may have contributed to the less 
distinctive identity that these organizations had in their fields. This problem is perhaps even 
more pronounced for PE as it cannot rely on the Grameen brand label unlike GU. Both GU and 
PE are peripheral organizations which were in quest for consequential legitimacy whereas GA 
moved to a more mainstream and hence central position in its field as a result of its prolific 
performance in maintaining a steady stream of clients and securing exceptional loan recovery.  
In the UK, GU had faced much more regulatory restrictions affecting various aspects of its 
operations such as how it markets its products and location of weekly meetings affecting its 
                                                             




ability to implement a system consistent with the original model. All the case study 
organizations face the common regulatory problem of not being able to mobilize savings of 
their clients unlike GB. Both GA and GU have followed a similar approach in collaborating 
banks to overcome this problem. However, there are important differences. GA implements a 
method similar to GB which makes weekly savings mandatory and retains some control over 
the process in terms of being aware of how much is being saved and who is saving as staff 
collect the savings at weekly meetings and deposit at partner banks. Contrarily, GU implements 
a system which does not make it obligatory on clients to save although it advises the clients to 
do so.  
GA has also been decidedly more innovative than GA and PE in collaborating with 
organizations to bring numerous benefits for their clients. The collaboration with Experian for 
example, helps build clients credit scores providing them with an opportunity to access 
mainstream financial services while the collaboration with healthcare organizations has been 
lauded as a “disruptive innovation” helping clients to access healthcare services who may have 
been otherwise been excluded by a complex system. It is not unreasonable to assume that these 
benefits helped GA in attaining its outreach targets as potential clients may have been lured in.  
Conclusion 
The analysis in all Chapters indicates that all case study organizations have encountered 
numerous institutional complexities in adopting the Grameen model in the context of a 
developed economy. In the UK, the fact that former as well as current case study organizations 
have struggled to implement the model does not necessarily imply that it cannot be used in a 
different time period. There may have been a range of factors attributable to the institutional 
complexities encountered by such organizations. It is worthwhile to point out that either one or 
more core strategic factors such as self-selection, focus on women, mandatory savings and 
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weekly meetings were missing in almost all such initiatives making them inconsistent with the 
original model. Such decisions were attributable to the discretion of the management who at 
times may have felt compelled by the restrictive regulatory and unfavourable socio-economic 
environment they operated in.  
However, the US experience of GA appears to indicate that the model may become easier to 
operate for an organization which in turn encounters less institutional complexities as the socio-
economic context evolves in a country. Earlier organizations such as Good Faith fund and 
Accion had also struggled to adopt the peer group lending model in a US context and 
consequently ether ceased operations or changed to different lending models. GA has 
successfully revived a model widely thought to be redundant in the context of an industrialised 
economy. This has been possible given the significant contextual change in the US economy 
brought on by substantial Hispanic immigration and rapidly rising female entrepreneurship 
within this group. Further, the collective nature of this community has also made it conducive 
for GA to target this ethnicity.  
However, GA must be given due credit for being able to tap into this emerging market through 
its creative institutional entrepreneurship process and its diligence and persistence.  This is an 
important lesson for UK organizations which are seek to adopt the model in the future.  As the 
national and global context unravels in a hugely uncertain time underlined by economic 
slowdown and international conflict leading to significant shifts in key factors such as 
migration or welfare policies, the Grameen model may gradually go on to become a potent tool 
for addressing poverty and social/financial exclusion. However, the regulatory environment 
has to be conducive and not generalize all lenders as high risk recognising the Welfarist 
intentions of organizations such as GU incorporating them into a distinct category for the model 
to be implemented effectively. GA has flourished as it has not faced unnecessary regulatory 
constraints that GU is currently experiencing at the moment.  The analysis above also reveals 
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that keeping the model more in line with the essence of original model in key operational areas 
may lower the degree of institutional complexity. GA’s experience substantiates this line of 
thinking. It implemented appropriate self-selection and a focus on women which led to 
exceptional recovery rates. GA’s outreach methods were based on trust and revolved around 
“going to clients” rather than clients coming to them through external referrals also bore fruit. 
GA’s client training regime also centred on centred on internal processes and methodologies 
rather than presumptuous training on entrepreneurship.  All such aspects of its GA’s operation 
thus retained the essence of the original model. These were the core elements of the model 
which made the program successful in serving poor marginalised entrepreneurs albeit in an 
entirely different context. In GB’s case, these necessity entrepreneurs mostly consist of the 
rural poor whereas GA’s clientele base comprises of poor Hispanic immigrants. The similarity 
lies in the fact that both groups are excluded by the mainstream financial institutions although 
the reasons for such exclusion is different. These core elements should be kept intact as 
marginalised necessity entrepreneurs are likely to act and behave in remarkably similar ways 
regardless of the context. For instance, if someone has an urgent need for a progressive loan, 
she is likely to pay back her current loan and try her best to ensure that all others within the 
group pay back regardless of the context in which the program is being implemented in. This 
is also likely to lead to appropriate behaviour such as attending regularly at meetings and 
accepting moral responsibility for other group members’ actions which Grameen expects from 
its clients. Programs which have targeted indigenous clients who are not likely to be amongst 
the bottom poor in the region may have struggled to get clients to act in accordance with the 
high discipline levels required.  
The analysis thus reveals that Grameen model may be more successfully used in the context of 
developed nations to serve immigrant entrepreneurs rather than targeting indigenous clients to 
bring them out from welfare dependency. Furthermore, programs may need to target 
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immigrants from innovation driven economies such as Mexico which have a highly 
entrepreneurial and collective culture. It is notable in this regard that, even in the absence of 
levels of regulatory constraints prevalent in the UK, GA has been unable to target indigenous 
entrepreneurs. Research has revealed that getting indigenous clients to use such services would 
require broader changes in welfare policy which incentivize people to be involved in self-
employment. Nevertheless, even if it is difficult to target indigenous clients, the current context 
of globalisation and the consequent high rates of immigration forced by economic needs or 
wars also presents opportunities for the government to utilize the model effectively to support 
new migrants in a resource constrained world as the model encourages people to be self-reliant. 
This in turn may have long term implications in terms of reduced cost of providing welfare 
support to such migrants. The central concept of Grameen revolves around the notion that poor 
people can become successful entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial loans do not need to be 
collateralized by physical assets. This concept is intuitively alluring to social investors. 
Although most case study organizations have struggled to obtain funding initially but they have 
eventually succeeded in doing so due to the novelty and appeal of this idea. However, most 
organizations have struggled to obtain sustained funding. This may be due to not being able to 
secure procedural legitimacy by establishing substantial client outreach or exceptional loan 
recovery both of which are key indicators of organizational achievement. Procedural 
legitimacy may have been difficult attain for programs which have not implemented core 







Chapter 10 CONCLUSION 
The process of such replication and adaptation of a microfinance model developed in the 
context of a developing country such as Bangladesh in the differing contexts of developed 
countries has not been unproblematic, as explained in the study. The current research has 
identified that the institutional complexity and the institutional entrepreneurship process of 
adopting the Grameen model in different contexts revolves around some major themes which 
have been identified in the theoretical framework. The themes for institutional complexity 
include loan recovery, outreach methods, nature of client training and regulatory environment. 
The themes for institutional entrepreneurship are in the areas of alignment of interest with 
external actors, field characteristics, problem framing, organizational identity and contextual 
factors.  The analysis revealed the elements behind each of these themes that has led to GB’s 
success in implementing the Grameen model in Bangladesh. Loan recovery has been identified 
as the most crucial aspect of the adoption by the pioneer of the model, Professor Yunus. GB’s 
significant success in achieving exceptional loan recovery rates is attributable to an effective 
implementation of the peer group lending technique. This in turn, requires cohesive and highly 
disciplined groups who are prepared to commit to the rigors of the model such as regularly 
attending weekly meetings. The weekly meetings are obligatory for borrowers to attend and is 
an important factor in reinforcing discipline and leading to intra-group learning. Furthermore, 
mandatory savings mobilization is a fundamental aspect of the original program which has led 
to numerous beneficial effects of both the GB and the clientele it serves. It has enabled GB to 
enhance its operational sustainability to the point that it is no longer reliant on donor finance. 
On the other hand, GB has used it to instil discipline into the borrowers and ensure loan funds 
are not diverted for purposes other than originally intended. GB has also implemented a 
complete focus on women which may been an important factor in attaining high loan recovery 
as shown by extant studies in the field. GB has also achieved outstanding outreach success 
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serving almost 9 million clients covering 97% villages in Bangladesh (Grameen Bank C, 2020).  
The three essential aspects of GB’s aspects of this success are firstly, its marketing method 
which centres on GB going to the clients rather than clients approaching the organization. 
Secondly, there has been substantial levels of latent demand for its product and services from 
poverty-stricken entrepreneurs excluded from a largely unrefined financial system. Finally, GB 
has redesigned its model to remove joint liability from its systems and only requires clients to 
undertake moral responsibility for each other which may have been useful to overcome 
potential clients’ reluctance to join the program. The client training method at GB is based on 
Professor Yunus’s philosophy that people have innate entrepreneurial skills which cannot be 
taught and must be “learnt by doing”. GB thus uses a client training method which focuses on 
internal processes and procedures. Hence training at GB is precise and relevant to every client 
and likely to be helpful for enhancing discipline amongst borrowers and cost effective. The 
regulatory environment in Bangladesh has also been favourable as it has allowed GB to 
mobilize deposits from its inception. Regulations in Bangladesh have also not prevented GB 
from implementing essential aspects of its operations such as home visits which are used to 
assess the socio-economic status of the client and proximity to other borrowers and marketing 
methods used to approach the clients directly. In terms of the institutional entrepreneurship 
process of adopting the model, GB had less problems of adopting the model in the favourable 
context of a war-ravaged economy and undeveloped financial system. This conducive context 
enabled GB to target an expanding pool of poverty-stricken entrepreneurs being exploited by 
abusive moneylenders. It was also helped by the collective and the entrepreneurial nature of 
the community that it was serving. GB went on to occupy a central position within the field of 
microfinance owing to its status as a leading social innovator. It has also been persistent with 
the gender focused manner in which it framed the problem it was addressing centred around 
the feminization of poverty. Its organizational identity has been underpinned by its global status 
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as a pioneer of the group lending model and its emphasis on female empowerment. The framing 
of GB was based on the central concept that poor women are creditworthy and can be successful 
entrepreneurs. This is intuitively appealing and enabled it to gain initial moral legitimacy to 
align with external partners. It was able to achieve consequential legitimacy as a result of its 
exceptional performance in areas such as recovery and outreach. Procedural legitimacy was 
not questionable as GB was the organization which invented the model and refined operations 
according to its experience. Furthermore, GB’s organizational template and strategic vision 
was based on Professor’s Yunus Social business model which attaches equal important to 
market and development logics.  
 
The UK experiences of adopting the model indicates that the core elements of the model are 
essential to overcoming institutional complexities and a successful process of institutional 
entrepreneurship.  The analysis revealed that in all retrospective UK case studies, one or more 
core elements of the enabling factors of the GB model are missing either by design or imposed 
upon by the context thus leading to heightened institutional complexities. Such problems or 
deviations from the core aspects of the parent model include: (a) distorted client selection 
practices which include staff to select members of the group or mixed groups consisting of both 
sexes; (b) most organizations did not have mandatory weekly meetings unlike GB; (c) Not 
following the Grameen marketing principle of “going to the clients” instead relying on referrals 
from external organizations; (d) contextual challenges such as debt aversion, generous welfare 
provision, the pervasive presence of abusive lenders and a restrictive business environment; (e) 
imposition of joint liability rather than moral responsibility as is enshrined in GB which may 
have discouraged participation; (f) the differing natures of the training regimes, inconsistent 
with Grameen philosophy which were not cost-effective and hence affected sustainability; and 
(h) finally, regulatory impediments such as the inability to mobilize deposits which in turn had 
335 
 
negative implications for factors such as loan recovery, group discipline and organizational 
sustainability making it incoherent with the original model.    
 
The study then went on to analyse the institutional complexities using current case study 
organizations based in the UK and compare their experiences to that of the earlier 
organisations. The analysis revealed that many of the earlier elements causing institutional 
complexities for the retrospective case study organizations continued to be relevant for the 
organizations operating recently in the UK. These complexities meant that GU only lasted for 
4 years and terminated its operation in 2018. GU did not have a gender focus or implement 
mandatory savings unlike the parent organization which may have adversely affected its loan 
recovery efforts. Although GU does make it compulsory for borrowers to attend weekly 
meetings, the effectiveness of the process may have been compromised by the fact that 
meetings have to be held at business premises or alternative venues and not borrowers’ 
residences due to distortions caused by current UK regulations. This may have naturally caused 
problems for borrowers’ discipline and eagerness to attend meetings. Apart from the inability 
to mobilize deposits, further regulatory distortions meant that GU was unable to practice 
community-based outreach methods practiced by the parent organization and had to rely on 
referrals from external organizations. This is in turn caused difficulties as such organizations 
are often reluctant or wary of an MFI’s intentions as a finance provider. Even though GU only 
required clients to undertake moral responsibility for each other, it did not experience great 
demand from the indigenous population as originally expected, in similarity to previous 
organizations operating in the UK. Its clientele base hence was predominantly composed of 
immigrants originating from Sub-Saharan Africa. GU started off by piloting a client training 
regime which focused on providing training on various business areas to borrowers which was 
costly and required the services of external consultants. Thus, GU’s training regime was 
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initially inconsistent with the original model and resembled the client training methods of 
earlier organizations in the UK.  However, GU eventually streamlined its training 
methodologies as it had learnt from its experience to make it more consistent with that of the 
original model and focus more on internal processes. As has been pointed out before, 
WEvolution adopted a different version of the group lending technique inspired by the SHG 
model in India. The lending element has been insignificant as a very small proportion of clients 
have subscribed to this service. Its marketing methods are similar to GU and unsurprisingly it 
has faced similar problems in terms of collaborating with external organizations. Its clientele 
base predominantly consists of indigenous clients in contrast to GU which may indicate that 
indigenous clients are keener to benefit from client training rather than lending services.  
 
The study then analysed the institutional entrepreneurship process of introducing the Grameen 
model in the UK by firstly exploring the retrospective case studies. It showed that the field of 
microfinance in the UK was underdeveloped and evolving at the times when these 
organizations started to adopt the model. Some organizations framed the problem in a way 
similar to GB utilizing a gender focus based on feminization of poverty; but others framed the 
problem differently, for example, as a way to get entrepreneurs to transition from the shadow 
economy to the mainstream. All organizations encountered the “liability of newness” and were 
peripheral organizations owing to their size and stature. It also revealed that institutional 
identity that the organizations initially had was that of being community development financial 
institutions and that their organizational identity was based on the peer group lending and, in 
some cases, had gender-bias.  The UK organizations also managed to obtain moral legitimacy 
owing to the novelty of the concept, but failed to translate this into consequential legitimacy as 
a result of being unable to attain key operational objectives. The emerging context of the rapidly 
rising predatory lending caused a change in the framing and institutional and organizational 
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identity of some case study organizations (particularly those with an Institutionist lean) from 
“CDFIs using the innovative Grameen model to provide entrepreneurial loans” to “Responsible 
Finance Providers promoting social justice and transparent lending (i.e. combating the malice 
of abusive lending)”.  In terms of the most recent case studies, both GU and WEvolution have 
tried to overcome the regulatory restriction of saving mobilization by partnering with 
appropriate mainstream financial organizations. The institutional entrepreneurship of adopting 
a peer group lending has been affected by an unfavourable environment characterized by high 
levels of individualism, a welfare regime with insufficient incentives to stimulate self-
employment and low degrees of necessity entrepreneurship.   Both organizations are peripheral 
and have used different types of framing. Both GU and WEvolution have used diagnostic 
framing to highlight the shortcomings of the current institutional designs. However, GU 
presented the current system as having excluded entrepreneurs from getting access to loans and 
proposed itself as an answer to the problem with Grameen loans at the core of the solution. 
Contrarily, WEvolution depicts the current institutional design as fragmented and presents 
itself an integrated solution where its training and support services are the main component and 
loans only play an ancillary role if required. GU’s organizational identity may have benefitted 
from the global status of the organizations. However, it may also have been affected by the 
non-gendered nature of the framing in contrast to WEvolution. Both have successfully gained 
initial moral legitimacy due to the appeal of the concepts and unique nature of framing. GU 
has an organizational template and strategic vision characterized by Professor Yunus’s social 
business model as it had distinct targets for organization sustainability while PE is a non-profit 
with increasing emphasis on longevity of the organization. However, GU struggled for 
consequential legitimacy due to modest performance outcomes which led to its eventual 
closure in 2018. WEvolution may have faced a lesser degree of complexities and lasted longer 
compared to GU due to non-emphasis on rapid expansion of lending operations.  
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It was interesting to scrutinize the institutional complexities confronted by current case study 
organizations in the USA. GA was experiencing greater levels of success and lower degrees of 
institutional complexities compared to PE which closed its operations in 2016. This may be 
attributable to the fact that most of the core elements that contributed to GB’s success was also 
prevalent at GA in contrast to PE. GA may have been able to achieve exceptional loan recovery 
as a result of applying systems consistent with the original model. It implemented a 100% focus 
on females in contrast to PE which was serving both genders. Mandatory weekly meetings 
were used to collect repayments and facilitate discussions and learning amongst borrowers as 
opposed to PE which only used bi-weekly meetings (repayments were not collected at these 
meetings). GA also required clients to save regularly and contribute towards a savings pot. The 
nature of clientele community it served (Hispanic immigrants) may have also had important 
implications for group discipline as PE’s clients mostly consisted of indigenous population 
who may have been reluctant to adhere to the stringent disciplinary requirements of the model. 
GA had experimented with various methods of outreach finally settling on a system which 
resonated well with the Grameen’s principles of “going to clients”. PE, however, continued to 
rely on external referrals which was not as productive as GA’s approach. The contrasting 
fortunes in terms of attaining outreach objectives also underlined the fact that there was 
significant demand for microfinance services amongst the Hispanic communities actively 
targeted by GA whereas PE experienced stagnant demand from the largely indigenous African 
American population it has been serving. GA’s outreach prospects may have further been 
boosted by the fact that it only requires clients to undertake moral responsibility and not 
financial responsibility in similarity to GB. The client training methods used by GA centres on 
internal procedures rather than teaching business or finance subjects. This is in contrast to PE 
which required clients to undergo training on various business subjects and pass an exam to 
become eligible for loans. Thus, GA’s methods resound well with GB’s approach and likely to 
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be more relevant and cost effective. Both GA and PE as community development financial 
institutions were unable to mobilize deposits under current US regulations. While GA has 
actively addressed this problem by partnering with commercial banks and requiring clients to 
contribute savings regularly to the accounts at the partner organizations, PE were dependent on 
a less reliable and inconsistent method of referrals to credit unions for overcoming the problem. 
US regulatory system has also not interfered with operational aspects such as home visits or 
nature of outreach methods employed by GA. 
 
The institutional entrepreneurship process of adopting the Grameen model in the US was then 
examined using the same case study organizations. GA benefitted from the conducive context 
in which it was operating as it targeted a rapidly burgeoning clientele base consisting of 
Hispanic female entrepreneurs and the high levels of collectivism prevailing in this particular 
community. GA also benefitted from high levels of low-income necessity entrepreneurship 
from this ethnic group which contributed to high demands for its services. PE was unable to 
benefit from this as it simply did not proactively target this ethnic group. GA went to quickly 
assume a central position in its field as a result of its exceptional performance compared to PE 
which had remained a peripheral organization since inception and eventually closed down. GA 
also adopted a framing which was similar to GB as it was based on gender and feminization of 
poverty in contrast to the generic framing approach used by PE. Both organizations had an 
institutional identity of being a CDFI. The organizational identity of both organizations has 
benefitted from being one of the very few adopters of a unique lending model in the US. 
However, it may be argued that GA has a more refined organizational identity compared to PE 
as a result of its gender focus. In a similar way to the case study organizations in the UK, both 
organizations have been able to secure initial moral legitimacy due to uniqueness of the 
Grameen concept. GA was also able to benefit from the global status and prestige of the 
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Grameen brand which enabled it to partner with some major mainstream organizations. GA 
has been able to form effective and innovative partnerships to overcome operational issues. 
The collaborations with Citibank, Experian and Iora Health are shining examples of its 
effectiveness in bringing clients tangible benefits that have helped to retain clients and attain 
outreach objectives. PE on other hand has struggled to get consequential legitimacy as a result 
of its operational difficulties and lack of funding. Procedural legitimacy is also questionable 
for PE as it has deviated from core elements of the model such as gender focus, nature of client 
training and savings mobilization. Overall, it is fair to conclude that in PE, similar to the UK 
organisations, there were various operational deviations from GB practices which caused it 
underperform and fail to attain operational objectives. All such problems have contributed to 
termination of its operations in 2016.  
 
The qualitative comparative analysis used in the study has revealed some very important factors 
as the experience of the past and present case study organization using the Grameen model in 
the UK and USA have been assimilated. The difference in nature and effectiveness of the loan 
recovery in the UK and USA was established. GA stands out as exemplary amongst all case 
study organizations as a result of maintaining exceptional recovery rates despite serving a 
rapidly expanding clientele base. The homogeneity of clients surfaced as a key factor with 
organizations serving similar ethnic groups facing less difficulties in recovering loans. This 
may be relevant to the comparison of GU and GA as the former serves a more homogenous 
clientele base in terms of ethnic background. Regulatory impediments also emerge as a key 
factor which may have made operating the model much more difficult in the UK compared to 
the US as operations such as weekly meetings and outreach cannot be organized around the 
comfort and convenience of borrowers’ homes. This may have negative implications for 
borrower discipline and cohesiveness and have negative repercussions for loan recovery. 
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Outreach practices adopted by GA are also more consistent with that of the original model as 
it revolves around community-based marketing and based on approaching clients directly 
rather and then relying on word of mouth referrals for recruiting clients. This is unlike GU 
which depended on partner community organizations for client referrals.  The choice of GU’s 
outreach methods may have been influenced by the current regulatory environment which 
views direct marketing approaches as “high risk”. All programs including the recent initiatives 
have generally struggled to recruit indigenous clients attributed to the various factors with 
notable issues such as high levels of individualism and lack of welfare to work incentives. GA 
struggled initially with its outreach efforts but has been able to thrive as a result of targeting 
Hispanic immigrant community whereas GU’s clientele base comprises of borrowers from a 
diverse background with African immigrants making up a significant proportion. Most of the 
organizations operated costly entrepreneurial training regimes dissimilar to that of the original 
model. GA’s client training methodology has also been more consistent with that of GB with 
importance on internal systems and processes and fostering client discipline. While GU initially 
piloted training systems with a heavy weight attached to entrepreneurial training, this had been 
refined later on as a result of its experience. Regulations have prevented mobilization of savings 
in both countries for both GA and GU. Although both have responded to this problem by 
partnering with different mainstream financial institutions, the research revealed that the nature 
of savings schemes was different for these organizations. GA made savings mandatory in 
contrast to GU. In addition, GA retained a degree of control and awareness over the savings 
process as borrowers are required to contribute savings of a minimum 2$ every week collected 
by staff at meetings and deposited to partner banks. This made the nature of the GA program 
resonant to that of the parent organization. The nature of immigrant entrepreneurship was 
pointed out as a key cog in the analysis of the institutional entrepreneurship process. Although 
it experienced initial difficulties, the institutional entrepreneurship process of adopting the 
342 
 
model for GA may have been made possible by a favourable context characterized by high 
levels of low-income entrepreneurship prevalent amongst its target Hispanic community. GU 
on the other hand, continued to encounter similar difficulties throughout its existence to the 
initial phase of GA as outreach targets had been revised in light of their experiences. However, 
GU may have limited prospects for targeting potential immigrants due to the nature of 
migration where it may encounter similar issues such as individualistic societies, welfare to 
work incentives or low levels of entrepreneurship. Mimetic isomorphism was prevalent as GB 
was seen as a global leader in microfinance as many organizations chose to adopt a similar 
gender framing based on feminization of poverty. Some UK organizations were also inspired 
by earlier peer group lending initiatives implemented in an urban context in the US. Some 
organizations in the UK chose to change their framing entirely along with their models in 
tandem with the context in which they were operating to address abusive lending. GA frames 
the problem in a similar way to GB as it is gender based focusing on the social and economic 
exclusion of women.  Although GA faced institutional complexities in the initial phase of its 
operation in similarity to earlier US efforts, it did not respond by changing its framing or 
lending model which may be attributed to its strong affiliation to the parent organization. GU 
had framed the problem differently to GA as it is not gender based instead offered itself as a 
solution to fill a gap in finance left by mainstream institutions. It also framed itself as a potential 
solution for people to transition from reliance on benefits to self-employment. It was pointed 
out that this framing was inconsistent with that of GB, and may have projected a confused 
image to relevant stakeholders and had been inconsistent with its operational experiences. The 
institutional identity of the case study organizations in the UK have undergone refinements in 
their definitions which reflects the evolving struggle of the organizations to establish 
themselves in the field. In the US, the institutional identity has remained stable with 
certification by the government as a CDFI leading to tangible benefits for the US case studies 
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in terms of funding and support. In terms of organizational identity, GU and GA additionally 
greatly benefited from the global status and prestige of the Grameen brand important for 
attracting funding and support. GA’s organizational identity is different to GB as it is based on 
its gendered framing. These organizations had different identity aspirations as well as GA is 
actively seeking to become a credit union while GU had plans to become a bank. All 
organizations have overcome liability of newness and gained moral legitimacy due to the 
novelty of the Grameen concept and the unique lending model based on community cohesion. 
Both GU and GA have further gained from the universal standing of Grameen as it helped to 
build networks with mainstream organizations. The exceptional performance in terms of loan 
recovery and outreach has also placed GA well on the path to secure consequential legitimacy 
to ensure continued funding and support from crucial partners. Gaining procedural legitimacy 
has not been difficult for GA as the above analysis shows that its core elements of operational 
design of the original model has been kept intact. GU on the other hand struggled to gain 
consequential legitimacy and eventually closed down withing four years of its operation. This 
is unlike GA which has gone from strength to strength in the US. GU’s fate may be attributed 
to difficult environmental context and the regulatory impediments discussed above. Procedural 
legitimacy may have been questioned by relevant stakeholders due to deviations from the 
original model in terms of operational areas such as outreach methods and framing.  
Based on the findings from the study, some policy recommendations relevant to current and 
aspiring organizations as well as regulatory authorities and other pertinent stakeholders is 
suggested. Findings suggest that the core elements of the should be kept intact even if the model 
is adopted in a different context and encounters numerous institutional complexities. Members 
should be allowed to self-select each other from tightly knit communities enabling the social 
collateral process to be effective. Any part of this process should not be influenced by the 
lending organization. Weekly meetings should be made mandatory to facilitate dialogue and 
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enhance discipline. Savings mobilization should be made compulsory with specified minimal 
contributions as it may be helpful for loan recovery and instilling discipline into borrowers. 
There should be a gender focus on female borrowers as findings suggest that this may have 
beneficial effects on loan recovery and outreach. Outreach should be predominantly based on 
the Grameen principle of “going to clients” or direct approach. Client training methods should 
focus on internal procedures and be used as way of augmenting discipline. Any clients 
requiring additional training may be referred to appropriate organizations. This has been 
successfully implemented at GA. Regulatory distortions should be minimized to facilitate the 
lending process including homes visits or community-based outreach. (This is particularly 
relevant for UK which needs special provisions to be out into place so that organizations such 
as GU are not wary of repercussions of using the core marketing elements of the parent model). 
Regulatory provisions may be put into place for non-profit organizations using micro-lending 
to mobilize deposits to retain control over the lending process and enhance operational 
sustainability. Along with aforementioned operational areas, the nature of problem framing and 
organizational identity should resonate well with that of the parent organization as this may be 
important for attaining procedural legitimacy in aligning with relevant partners. When the 
environmental context makes it difficult for an organization to achieve operational objectives 
and gain consequential legitimacy, donors and partners need to be understanding. In particular, 
the GA experience shows that patient capital is important for an organization to overcome 
institutional complexities in a difficult context by experimenting with different strategies to 
identity an effective solution.  In the absence of such support, the UK experience in particular 
appears to suggest that it may be judicious for CDFIs to consider changing their lending 
models, framing and organizational identity to suit the current context of pervasive abusive 
lending and a high demand for personal loans. This is turn may enable organizations to attain 
consequential legitimacy and thrive in a difficult environment where funding is increasingly 
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difficult to obtain. Significant changes in organizational identity may be contemplated in order 
to overcome regulatory impediments. GA’s organizational aspiration to become a credit union 
is an example of this which if successful will help it to mobilize funds and help towards 
operational self-sufficiency. It would require broader policy changes such as enhancement of 
welfare to work incentives, engage in self-employment and generate assets and easing 
regulatory requirements for micro-entrepreneurs (such as those for occupational licensing) for 
CDFIs to successfully recruit indigenous clients.UK regulations may learn from the US 
experience by introducing a Community Reinvestment Act inducing mainstream financial 
organizations to provide funding and support to MFIs using the Grameen model, from which 
the US case study organizations have clearly benefitted. In terms of organizational template 
and strategic vision, organizations seeking to adopt the model should note the significant 
emphasis that Grameen places on the market logic using the principles of the social business 
model. The desire to become self-sufficient and reduce reliance on donors is apparent across 
different areas of its operations. This ambition is conspicuous by its absence in some of the 
organizations in the current study which may have played an important role in their eventual 
demise.  
Few words are due on future research. There is a paucity of research on MFIs in the 
comparative context of developed countries, particularly those that are using unique lending 
models such as Grameen committed to promote social networks. In order for organizations to 
be able to better assess the uncertainties associated adopting the model in the context of 
industrialized economies, the author deems such research crucial. Future research may weigh 
up findings of existing projects in the US and other developed European countries or 
neighbouring countries such as Canada for identifying effective cross-cultural learning towards 
enhanced performance of the MFIs in a wider context of the developed world. It may also be 
helpful to compare the institutional entrepreneurship process of adopting Grameen model to 
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individual lending models or evolving models such as online peer to peer which should provide 
further useful insights. Prospective studies may consider future developments at current case 
study organizations and assess strategies undertaken to moderate institutional complexities 
noted in the study. Environmental factors and regulatory context influencing the institutional 
entrepreneurship process at these organizations may also be scrutinized to understand to 
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FIGURE A.1 PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLDS BELOW LOW-INCOME 
THRESHOLDS (1979-2000) 











Table A.1 Annual loan recovery Grameen (%), 2005-2015  
(Source: Annual reports of Grameen, grameen-info.org) 
 






















Table A.2 Activities for which Members take Loans  
(Source: Grameen Website, 2020) 
Activity Name 
    
 Rice/Paddy trading   
 Grocery shop   
 Milk cow   
 Cow fattening   
 Bamboo works   
 Paddy cultivation   
 Paddy husking   
 Miscellaneous business   
 Land lease   
 Farming   
 Vegetables cultivation   
 Cane works   
 Vegetables trading   
 Stationery shop   
 Agriculture equipments making   
 Plantation   
 Cloths trading   
 Fish trading   
 Bullock raising   
 Pisciculture   
 Pottery products   
 Garments making   
 Betelleaf cultivation   
 Poultry raising   






Table A.3  Number of branches and groups (Grameen Bangladesh- 1976 to 2020) 
 
Year Group Branch 
1976   1 
1977 4 1 
1978 45 1 
1979 377 6 
1980 2935 24 
1981 4818 24 
1982 6243 54 
1983 11667 86 
1984 24211 152 
1985 34324 226 
1986 46869 295 
1987 67831 396 
1988 98073 501 
1989 132452 641 
1990 173907 781 
1991 213286 915 
1992 284889 1015 
1993 372298 1040 
1994 412145 1045 
1995 2065661 1055 
1996 2059510 1079 
1997 2272503 1105 
1998 2368347 1137 
1999 2357083 1149 
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2000 2378356 1160 
2001 2378601 1173 
2002 2483006 1178 
2003 3123802 1195 
2004 4059632 1358 
2005 5579399 1735 
2006 6908704 2319 
2007 7411229 2481 
     2008 1210343       2539 
     2009 1253160       2562 
     2010 1284606       2565 
     2011 1302882       2565 
     2012 1311827       2567 
     2013 1321974       2567 
     2014 1337398       2568 
     2015 1356113       2568 
     2016 1370930      2568 
     2017 1381103      2568 
     2018 1388316      2568 
     2019 1,398,370      2568 






Table A.4 Number of personal loans forwarded for Fair Finance  
 
 
(SOURCE: FAIRFINANCE WEBSITE, 2015) 
Table A.5 Number of business personal loans forwarded for Fair Finance  




Table A.6 Summary of main questions asked to interviewees 
 
Questions asked to MFI executives: 
Please point the key stages of the evolution of your organization from its beginning until 
now? Please point out to me what you feel are the key successes and the reasons that you 
have been able to achieve that success? 
What were the operational challenges of adopting the Grameen model? 
Was the demand high/low for the loans offered? What were the factors affecting demand? 
What was the marketing techniques to create awareness among your target clients? 
How was the cohesiveness in the group? What were the factors affecting cohesiveness? 
What was the annual recovery rates? What do you attribute the low/high recovery rates to? 
Was there joint liability? If yes/no what are the implications of the strategy? 
Was self-selection practiced? If no, why was it not practiced? 
What are the factors affecting sustainability of the organization? 
Where does the funding mainly come from? What are the key factors as to why your 
organization has been able to secure funding? What are the challenges in relation to getting 
funding? 
Was it possible to have savings provision? If not, why? 
What kind of business/financial training do you provide? What are the topics covered in the 
training? Why do you think it is important to provide this training? How does it compare to 
the training component in the original program in Bangladesh? What are the cost and time 
implications of providing this training? What implications do you think such training has for 
long term sustainability of group lending projects? 
In addition to the training, are there an services provided which is free of charge? If so, why 
do you think this is necessary? 
What have been the regulatory challenges of running the organization and how have you 
overcome these challenges? 
What is the process of setting interest rates? Is there a cap from regulatory authorities in 
terms of how much can be charged? 
Do clients feel that there is complexity of the business environment in the USA in terms of 
taxation, licensing and other forms of regulation? 
Please comment on the external partnerships and alliances of the organization?  
What have been the challenges in terms of outreach or getting more people to use your 
services? How have you overcome such challenges?  
What is the future strategy with respect to expansion of the organization? What kind of challenges 




GT authorities were asked to reflect on their experiences of adopting the model in various 







Table A.7 Recovery rates for PE  
(Source: collected by author) 
 
 








A.8 THE EAST END MICROFINANCE CONSORTIUM (EEMC) 
(EEMC) project in East London. In 1998, Women’s Enterprise Employment and Training Unit 
(WEETU) started running the Full Circle Fund, modelled on the Grameen peer lending 
programme in response to the growing marginalization of women in the economy of Norwich 
and surrounding areas. The EEMC was set up as an experiment to enable greater understanding 
of the effectiveness of the Grameen model in the context of UK.  In terms of objective it sought 
to identify the need for accessible finance for women who wished to develop their income-
generating ideas into reality. It was initiated by an institutional entrepreneur, Faisel Rehman, a 
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former intern at the GB. He wanted to use his experiences with the organization to address the 
issue of financial exclusion in the UK. It was based on a ‘hub and spoke’ model wherein the 
EEMC was the hub offering  lending and administering loans, whereas the role of the spokes 
was taken up by three local community organizations Streetcred, Homeless family unit and 
Account3 involved in direct and support, outreach work and operating the peer group model 









Quaker Social Action (QSA) is a prominent charity which operates in the East End of London 
which is well-known for various initiatives to address poverty and social exclusion. Street-
Cred was set up by QSA project in 1999 in response to the perceived need for female 
entrepreneurs to be able to easily access finance. The founding co-ordinator of the organization, 
Jennifer Kavanagh was influenced by the achievements of Grameen Bangladesh. This led to 
her to be inspired by the GB model and use the model at Street-Cred for its lending activities. 
The skewed nature of wealth distribution and the requirement for a novel microcredit to address 
the poverty and financial exclusion issues were identified by Street-Cred. Its members 
comprised exclusively of unemployed or low-income women who were encouraged and 
supported to start their own businesses. An invitation was sent out to prospective clients to 
participate in a workshop designed to orientate them about the skills required and processes 
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involved. This was an opportunity for them to meet other entrepreneurs in the same position 
who wished to develop their own businesses. A borrowing group of 4 to 6 clients was then 
joined by a client, the members of which was selected by a development worker. Bi-Weekly 
meetings were then held between the development workers and the client at a suitable place 
and time with the idea that clients would be able to share their experiences at such meetings. A 
business training manual was designed which comprised of 40 modules ranging including 
elementary topics for business start-ups.  Additional business development workshops were 
held in the different areas such as  building self-confidence budgeting, , dealing with Inland 
Revenue, test trading, networking, and developing action plans. Street-Cred ceased operations 
in 2009 owing to funding constraints and numerous challenges faced in adopting the Grameen 
model in a UK context. 
 
A.10 ACCOUNT 3 
 
 
Account 3 Ltd is a prominent UK social enterprise established in 1991. It aims to address a 
number of social issues including gender inequality in East London.  Although its primary 
services consist of business advisory support and training, it has been involved in a number of 
high profile and influential projects. It is a leading innovator and has won awards in service 
provision in areas of employability, vocational training and enterprise development including 
recognition as Best Objective project for equality for Enterprise Development project by 
Government Office for London in 2007. It has predominantly focused its services on women 
throughout its periods of operation, although this changed following a review and evaluation 
in 2009. Account 3 played an important role in piloting Tower Hamlets first ever microcredit 
program in partnership with EEMC. This program ended in 2003/04 and led to the 
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establishment of Fair Finance which went on to become one of the pioneering microfinance 
institutions in East London. 
 
 
A.11 FAIR FINANCE 
The culmination of EEMC and its component organizations led to the formation of Fair Finance 
led by its former co-ordinator Faisel Rehman who had incorporated into it all the lessons which 
were learnt in using the Grameen model at EEMC. Fair Finance was a social business in East 
London which offers a range of financial products and services in order to combat predatory 
lending and address issues of financial exclusion in the regions it operates. Since its inception, 
Fair Finance has numerous awards demonstrating the high level of recognition by the 
government and the CDFI industry for the exceptional work it has done. These awards include 
the Big Society award by government in 2013 for proving individuals and businesses with 
access to finance and the CDFI growth award at the Citi Micro Entrepreneurship Awards. This 
is in addition to the recognition achieved by its founder Faisel Rehman as a Young Global 
leader by the World Economic Forum, an Ashoka Fellowship and an OBE awarded for services 
to community finance. 
A.12 THE FULL CIRCLE FUND (WEETU) 
Women’s Employment Enterprise and Training Unit (WEETU) was a not for profit 
organisation limited by guarantee which was established as an independent voluntary agency 
in 1987 based in Norwich. Funding was received from various sources including European, 
local Government and commercial sectors. It strived to assist women by providing support and 
training to promote employment and enterprise prospects for clients based in Suffolk and 
Norfolk. The “Full Circle” programme was set up to provide socially excluded women access 
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to microfinance of up to £4000 with no need for conducting credit checks or usage of 
collaterals. The Grameen model was adopted for the purpose of forwarding such loans to 
clients. In addition, further support was provided in the form of workshops designed to develop 
self-employment and business skills which led to Level 2 OCN qualifications. Weetu had 
experienced several challenges in adopting the Grameen model and ceased operations in 2013 




Street UK is one of the founders of community development finance in UK. It is a non-profit 
organisation which was set up in 1999 to offer loans to small entrepreneurs usually not 
considered as creditworthy by mainstream financial institutions Street UK Foundation, a 
company limited by guarantee and charity, is its parent company. Street-UK initially desired 
to establish 40 branches nationwide serving 20,000 clients and wanted to achieve a £40 million 
loan portfolio over the period of seven years.  There was an initial focus on microcredit –up to 
an initial loan size of £10,000 and 12 months to businesses which had fewer than 5 employees, 
the business model changed over time to include other areas such as  business support ,the 
provision of wholesale services to other CDFIs (which turned out to be an area of comparative 
advantage leading to substantial revenue generation). It was also involved in policy and 
advocacy work which revolved around challenges faced by clients and issues which influence 
demand for products and services. Esmée Fairbairn Foundation, one of the main independent 
grant-making foundations in the UK, provided it with funding. Using these funds, Street-UK 
operated a pilot scheme (with the objective of roll-out after the scheme) in various locations 
inclusing Birmingham, Newcastle, Bradford and London. The first loan was forwarded in April 
2001.  The purpose was to show the substantial demand for microcredit on the basis of which 
a permanent self-sustaining national microfinance institution could be created. However, since 
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its inception, several changes have been made to its lending product, the most significant of 
which has been a shift from the system of group loans to that of personal loans. As of its 
experiences, there have been various changes to its business model. Apart from the 




A.14 GRAMEEN IN THE UK  
Pilot studies were conducted by Grameen Trust in the West of Scotland in 2009 assessing the 
demand for Grameen style loans. It concluded that there was substantial demand from the local 
population for the project to go ahead. As a result, the Grameen Scotland Foundation (trading 
as GRAMEEN UK/GU) was established and registered as a charity with the objective of 
addressing poverty and education by adopting the Grameen model by providing micro-loans 
to financially excluded communities or aspiring micro-entrepreneurs.  GU operated from its 
lone office based at the Glasgow Caledonian University with plans to roll out to North 
Ayrshire, Dundee, West Dunbartonshire and Inverclyde regions in the future. GU’s partners 
included Tesco Bank, Gloag Foundation, Wholeplanet Foundation, Royal Bank of Scotland 
and Clifford Chance amongst others. GU faced several institutional challenges since its 
inception and as a result, ceased to operate in 2018.  
 
A.15 WEvolution (formerly known as PASSAGE FROM INDIA) 
WEvolution is an organisation which has resulted from a movement that dates back to 2010 
when the Church of Scotland decided to explore the Indian women’s self-help group concept. 
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There are approximately an 8 million of such groups (known as self-reliant groups) with the 
participation of around 100 million women. The movement is known to have significant 
positive implications in terms of social and economic change for these women enabling them 
to improve their own lives along with that of their families and neighbourhoods.  A delegation 
of women from Glasgow’s deprived communities travelled to Mumbai and Gujarat in India to 
learn about SRGs- the trip being named as “Passage to India”. This led to recognition of the 
model in terms of the confidence and resilience of group participants in combatting widespread 
poverty. It was believed that there was significant potential of this model to transform lives of 
Glaswegian women. This led to the formation of the charity “Passage from India” and 
establishment of Scottish SRGs and a microfinance initiative funded by the Church of Scotland 
and the Scottish Government. Passage from India was rebranded as WEvolution in 2015. 
WEvolution is currently active.  
 
A.16 GRAMEEN AMERICA 
Grameen America was founded in 2008 by Professor Muhammad Yunus based on the belief 
that the Grameen model could be used in the context of urban America to provide substantial 
benefits to a potentially high number of clients. Women self-select each other into groups 
following which they attend a weekly training. At the end of the training they are required to 
open savings accounts at partner banks. The women then receive a loan of $1500 and have to 
repay this in instalments at weekly meetings which are compulsory to attend. Since its 
inception, GA has been expanding rapidly growing from 500 borrowers in January 2008 to 
currently serving almost 70000 women and extending over 197,820 microloans. Further, it has 
created 72995 jobs. GA’s head office is based in New York where it is predominantly active 
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and currently has 18 branches operates in 11 cities including (New York, California, Puerto 
Rico, Nebraska, New Jersey, Texas, North Carolina and Indiana and Massachusetts).  
 
A.17 PROJECT ENTERPRISE 
Project Enterprise was cofounded by the social investor couple Debra Franklin-Schatzki and 
Nick Schatzki who had travelled to Bangladesh. They were inspired by their experiences at 
Grameen and wanted to bring the model back to New York to assist under resourced 
communities. PE opened its doors for micro-entrepreneurs in Harlem in 1997 when it was the 
only lending provider to offer loans without any collateral requirements, previous business 
experience or credit history. It received formal recognition as a CDFI by the US treasury in 
1998 and subsequently expanded its operations to Five New York boroughs including 
Brooklyn, the Bronx and Queens. It ceased its operations in 2016.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
